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THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 



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THE 
INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

STEPS IN A NEW SCIENCE 
OF HISTORY 



BY 



FREDERICK ADAMS WOODS, M.D. 

LECTURER IN BIOLOGY IN THE MASSACnCSETTS INSTITUTE OF 

TECHNOLOGY ; AUTHOR OF " MENTAL AND MORAL 

HEREDITY IN ROYALTY " 



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
1913 

All rights reserved 






COPTEIGHT, 1913, 

By the MACMILLAN COMPANY. 



Set up and electrotyped. Published May, 1913. 



Nortooob ^rtsa 

J. S. Cashing Co. — Berwick & Smith Co. 

Norwood, Mass., U.S.A. 



©CI.A347584 



*. 



TO THE MEMORY 

OF 

MY MOTHER 



PREFACE 

In 1902, I brought together and rearranged, under a single 
interrelated group, the main historical statements concerning 
some three thousand members of royal and noble families, with 
the double purpose of measuring the force of heredity against cir- 
cumstances, and of making a beginning in the systematic analy- 
sis of historical causation. The summary of that research was 
published in twelve papers under the title, "Mental and Moral 
Heredity in Royalty," which appeared in the Popxdar Science 
Monthly, August, 1902, to April, 1903, and afterwards (New 
York, H. Holt & Co., 1906) in book form, somewhat amplified 
and reenforced. 

The present volume is the first application of the methods of 
historical measurement (historiometry) to the larger questions 
of national growth and decline. It has long been recognized, in 
a general way, that many nations have had their eras of splendour 
and decay, but these transformations have never before been rep- 
resented with definiteness and completeness. One could never 
place one's finger upon a specific date and say that about here the 
decline began in such and such a special feature, or that at 
another point a minor wave of progress rose upon a downward 
slope, or at some other point there was a pause in a general ad- 
vance. For this reason, the mere tabulation of economic and 
political movements in modern Europe has a value of its own. 
This forms a line of departure from which journeys can be made 
into the more fascinating domain of historical causation ; and 
whether such explorations do or do not meet their goal, discus- 
sions of this nature must always proceed from some such widely 
collected series of simple and easily verified facts. 

Beginning from the tenth to the sixteenth centuries and carry- 
ing the study as far as the time of the French Revolution, there 
are two series of historical changes presented in this work. The 



Vlll PREFACE 

first concerns itself with the successive alterations in the material 
conditions of the fourteen European countries which have been 
made the subject of comparative study; the second concerns itself 
with the personalities of the monarchs themselves ; whose mental 
and moral characteristics are here summarized in brief. The his- 
tory of these fourteen countries furnishes 368 reigns or periods. 
These are matched against the personalities of the monarchs, and 
parallel columns are formed. Only very rarely has a nation pro- 
gressed in its political and economic aspects, save under the lead- 
ership of a strong sovereign. It is indeed strange that so plain i 
and simple a truth has never been dwelt upon before.^ There! 
are, moreover, cogent reasons for believing that the monarchs 
have, to a very large extent, caused the changing conditions and 
not the reverse — that the monarchs have been the product of the 
environment in which they lived. 

If the differences among the kings of history, whose varying 
types range all the way from imbecility to genius and from 
bestiality to heroism, are in their essence caused by qualities con- 
tained in, and carried by, the germ-plasm from which they have 
been engendered ; and if these differences among rulers have been 
of such transcendent importance, then the master key of history 
is heredity. 

That the genealogical method should furnish the clew to the 
successful interpretation of history is not at all surprising, since 
the genealogical interpretation is the only correct interpretation 
for natural history; i.e. all classifications of animals and plants 
are based upon descent. In the metagenesis of human affairs, 
neither heredity nor personality are everything, but they go so 
far towards being everything that they may well be made the 
first forces to be measured ; and, as the extent of these ceaseless 
and omnipresent forces is appreciated, the presence of contrary 
forces can also be ascertained. 

This, the second volume, has methods and aims, on the whole, 
different from the first; it does not deal with precisely the same 
branches of royal genealogical trees, though some dynasties 
appear in both studies. This has given an opportunity to here 

»See p. 196, 239, Chapter XVI. 



PREFACE IX 

and there remould a personal characterization. Each of these 
researches has been made thoroughly inclusive as far as it has 
gone, with definite limits as to outlying dates. The outposts once 
fixed, every individual possible and every reign possible has been 
included in the judgments. Thus the first and most elementary 
necessity for the avoidance of self-deception is at once achieved ; 
and to pick instances favourable to a preconceived theory becomes 
impossible. Whatever difficulties may lie ahead in the way of 
successful conviction, one chief difficulty is avoided. This error, 
arising from conscious or unconscious bias towards a personal 
a priori point of view, is, I believe, the principal reason why the 
philosophers of history have left no heritage to their successors 
and have thereby forfeited a general respect. 

Even though the limits of time (the date outposts) are rigidly 
fixed and all instances are considered one after another in sys- 
tematic succession, there still remains some danger of fallacy 
from bias. The interpreter may pervert each individual instance, 
and also he cannot escape the deviation from strict truth inci- 
dental to historical record, even in the sources themselves. But 
any scheme which is able to override a good portion of these diffi- 
culties can claim the name of science, since science is a relative 
term, and many of the so-called exact sciences are only approxi- 
mations. Even the measurements of astronomy are only ap- 
proximately correct, and the classification of organic species is 
being constantly shifted. The most exact natural sciences of 
to-day were once very inexact, but as soon as they began to show 
the spirit of science they deserved its name; and their early 
efforts, which to-day seem crude, are just as willingly given a 
place when the history of its development is reviewed. The 
present attempt to make history scientific, to find correlations, 
and to weigh causes, must be measured by what has preceded it; 
and, so measured, it will be found that no forerunner exists for 
which it can either feel envy, or from which it can receive aid.^ 

In the present volume, I have kept on the safe side by conced- 
ing to the opposed point of view the doubtful cases. In this way 
I have measured not so much the full influence of monarchs as 

'See pages 21, 22, Chapter II. 



X PREFACE 

their lower limit of influence. History at its best is teeming 
with minor errors. Xo method is needed to prove this ; but any 
assertion that history is too full of error to lend itself to scientific 
treatment is a gratuitous assumption unsupported by proof. The 
coordinated results of this volume and of its earlier companion 
are themselves the proof that such an assertion is ill-founded, for 
if it were well-founded, then orderly, reciprocal, and interlocking 
results could not be obtained. What I have been able to get, I 
have got in sjnte of the errors of history ; and the grasping of this 
principle, which is explained at length in the second chapter, is 
the sine qua non of any intelligent criticism of the method I have 
called historiometry, and which I hope will more and more fur- 
nish a better-balanced judgment of historical values. Sociology, 
psychology, and eugenics, as well as economics and political sci- 
ence, need all the aid they can get from that long-established 
laboratory of experimental evolution known as human life, and 
that account of individual and national experience known as 
history. 



FREDERICK ADAMS WOODS. 



Brookline, Massachusetts, 
February, 1913. 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTER I 



Introductory 



Need of a new interpretation of history — The problem stated — 
The relative importance of "great men" as factors in history — 
Need of new methods — Methods here used for collecting the evi- 
dence — Scope of the v?ork — The influence of individual monarchs 
— The significance of regencies and minorities. 



CHAPTER II 

Philosophy of History and Historiometry ..... 15 

Failures of the philosophers of history — New method needed 
— Measurements in anthropology and psychology — Central idea 
of historiometry — Errors in history, random and otherwise — 
Random errors may, under some circumstances, be ignored — Ex- 
amples from " Heredity in Royalty," and from the city birth of 
notable Americans — A paradox in historiometry — The need for 
accuracy in historical details — Dogmatic opinion permissible in 
historical details — Also for the evaluation of traits of character 
and condition of countries — For the interpretation of causes, 
methods of proof must be devised. 

CHAPTER III 
France. A Summarized History 37 

CHAPTER IV 
Castile. A Summarized History ....... 65 



Xii CONTENTS 

CHAPTER V 

PAes 

Akagon. a Summarized History 77 

CHAPTER VI 
United Spain. A Summarized History ...... 81 

CHAPTER VII 
Portugal. A Summarized History ....... 87 

CHAPTER VIII 
The Netherlands. A Summarized History 91 

CHAPTER IX 
Denmark. A Summarized History ....... 113 

CHAPTER X 
Sweden. A Su.mmarized History ....... 123 

CHAPTER XI 
Russia. A Summarized History ....... 139 

CHAPTER XII 
Prussia. A Summarized History 151 

CHAPTER XIII 
Austria. A Summarized History ....... 161 

CHAPTER XIV 
Turkey. A Summarized History ....... 178 

CHAPTER XV 
Scotland. A Summarized History ....... 187 

CHAPTER XVI 
England. A Summarized History ....... 196 



CONTENTS xiii 



CHAPTER XVn 

PAGB 

Interpretation of the Results ........ 240 

The parallelism between rulers and the condition of their coun- 
tries — This correlation is very high except in modern England — 
Three arguments which prove that the rulers influenced the con- 
ditions, and not vice versa : (1) Suddenness of the changes ; (2) The 
evidence from minorities ; (3) The evidence from the pedigrees — 
Natural ability of royalty compared with other social classes — 
Eight reasons for believing their natural ability to be high — Gen- 
eral and special characteristics of royalty — Sovereigns reputed 
chaste and not cruel were common even in the earlier ages — Such 
contrasted types are expected from modern views regarding hered- 
ity — The a priori point of view and the way the facts fit into it — 
The question of false bias — Reasons for holding this error slight : 
(1) Early, compared to later history ; (2) Nations much studied, 
compared with those but little studied ; (3) Estimates have been 
but rarely reversed ; (4) Perhaps as often raised as lowered ; 
(5) General survey of the whole distribution of the material — Defi- 
nition of the "gametic interpretation of history" — Hereditary 
influences (gametic) can be separated from environmental, by mak- 
ing the problem a problem of differences. 



CHAPTER XVni 

Causation in History 280 

Prussia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries an example 
for the study of causation — Some ifs in history are pertinent, 
others not — Complexity of history and the question of unravelling 
causes — "Method of differences" may be tried — The time ele- 
ment in history is helpful — The "great-man" view of history — 
Graphic curves to represent class differences — Five conditions 
which lead to the fonn of curve typical of the monarchies of an- 
tiquity — Modern dynasties formed in the same way — These five 
forces are working at the present day towards the production of 
castes and an aristocracy of wealth. 

Appendix (1) Bibliography and Grading 305 

Appendix (2) A New Name for a New Science 404 

Appendix (3) Historiometry as an Exact Science . . . .407 



THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 



CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTORY 

No subject of speculation lies more in odium, confusion, 
and neglect than the philosophy of history, and yet no ques- 
tions arouse more heated discussion than those concerning the 
causes of human action or the reasons for a nation's fate. 
Here every one speaks with the utmost assurance; and the 
same man who would contend that the record of history is 
unique, and that the human drama has been too complicated 
ever to be interpreted into a science, is the first to advance 
his cause as the cause, and the last to see the many alterna- 
tives which indeed do inhere, and are the warp and woof of 
its complexity. 

It is more than two thousand years since the saying "The 
proper study of mankind is man" was accepted as a safe 
remark, and in its passage through the ages this oft-quoted 
phrase has not been seriously contradicted. If, then, man is 
apparently interested in his own welfare beyond the concrete 
needs of the hour, and does for some reason crave a rational 
account of why some succeed and others fail, he will always 
in some way turn to the records of the past. Even if his de- 
sires be entirely utilitarian, he cannot avoid it. His knowl- 
edge of the past may not be more than the records written 
in his own brain, impressions of his contact with his fellow- 
men, they may not be reenforced by memories of what he has 
read beyond the vague impressions gained from the daily 
press, yet in the formation of his judgments he has used the 
human record. He has been obliged to weigh probabilities 



2 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

and not certainties, and measure men in terms of a standard 
which has come to him as the composite resultant of his 
worldly wisdom. If, then, man takes recourse nolens volens 
to records of the past, how much more wisely in the game 
of life the play must unfold under the hand of the person 
who remembers what he has read as well as what he has 
seen; and if to the usual reading of history and biography, 
some scheme can be devised which can compel that printed 
record to divulge even a fraction of its deeper meanings, then 
by so much the knowledge of mankind, for mankind, will 
progress. 

There is a fascinating interest in explaining the decline of 
the great civilizations of the past, and there is always much that 
is superficial in such explanations, from the failure to take into 
account causes of growth which acted prior to the beginning of 
the decline — factors which were at one time present but were 
afterwards withdrawn; and no factor of such a character is 
more important than the dynastic factor, and indeed the whole 
aristocratic element of which royalty is but the top and crown. 
Because Egypt, Greece, Rome, the Itahan cities, Spain, and 
Portugal all declined, there is no reason why other nations 
should follow in the same track. The new western nations may 
be built upon entirely different foundations; they may have 
been evolved in such a way that great masses of people have 
become elevated, and able to govern themselves, whereas the 
earlier civilizations may have been dependent for their life and 
growth on a very few people, who formed an aristocratic class far 
superior to the masses whom they governed. A knowledge of 
the relative intellectual differences between royalty, nobility, 
and commoners becomes, therefore, a desideratum for each 
nation and each age. The present research makes a beginning 
towards such an appreciation of class differences. 

No historian will deny that monarchs have had at least 
some importance in moulding the course of ancient, mediaeval, 
and modern history. No complicated and exhaustive research 
like the present is needed to arrive at an agreement on this 



INTKODUCTORY 3 

point. But as soon as one asks, how much, when, and where, 
the answers can be given only by systematic comparisons and 
quantitative tests. There are several reasons why an accurate 
knowledge of the personal influence of sovereigns is among the 
first desiderata in a true science of historical interpretation, 
and not the least significant among these reasons is the fact 
that in some countries, and especially within modern times, 
this factor becomes reduced to a minimum. By indicating all 
the points at which regal influence has been at its maximum, 
one at the same time marks out those periods when the same 
factor has had little importance, and these periods, once isolated, 
may well become the objects of further investigation. One can 
then see if these democratic or anti-monarchical periods have 
elements common to all, or if they can be in any way classified 
or better understood. 

If the monarchs themselves have had great weight in directing 
the course of history, how did they get this importance, how 
did they utiUze it, how and when did they lose it? These 
become historical questions of unsurpassed interest. The 
present book will have something to say as to the first and 
last of these queries, the origin and decline of royal power, but its 
chief concern will be to describe the uses which these privileged 
persons have made of their exceptional positions, or, more ex- 
actly, the personal influences of monarchs on political and eco- 
nomic history. 

This research will be almost entirely objective and will at the 
start make no assumptions whatever, unless it be an assump- 
tion that a book is a book and a printed word is a printed 
word. It is important to note that I do not assume that any 
book tells the truth or that any statement is correct. While 
a statement in a book of history need not be a fact, it is at 
least a fact that the book says so, and it is with such facts 
that I begin. In collecting the printed statements of history 
I am just as much dealing with objectivity and reality as if I 
were picking up pebbles on a beach. I have made a rear- 
rangement of historical statements under a new classification, 



4 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

and am ready to show that when such a rearrangement is 
made, then certain conclusions follow as the most probable 
interpretation of the observations. 

The next step in the process will be readily granted. 
Whatever one may think of kings as a whole, some kings have 
certainly been more able than others. It is also a fact that 
the amount of admiration shown by historians for the intel- 
lectuality of some kings is greater than for others. It is 
also a fact that some periods of national history are more 
generally recognized as progressive than others. We are, 
therefore, justified in attempting to express these differences 
by means of common methods of classification. Of all 
methods of classification the threefold is the commonest 
and the most promising. We do not commonly find that 
men are either good or bad, or all men can be divided into 
two classes, the successful and the unsuccessful. What we 
do see on every hand is that out of large groups, some few 
stand out as distinctly superior, some few as distinctly 
deficient, and between the two a mediocre class which blends 
gradually into the two extremes. If any large group of 
kings be divided into three classes, and the names pigeon- 
holed as superior, inferior, and doubtful (according to reputed 
ability) a fair proportion will fall inevitably into the superior 
or inevitably into the inferior category, no matter who makes 
the classification. The point is that, comparing them with 
each other, some must go in these extreme classes, as there 
are sure to be some who stand out from the average. The 
middle grade may then be reserved for those who do not 
easily fall into one of the two extreme classes. 

Following the threefold method, I have graded each ruler 
in one of three classes except where information has seemed 
too meagre. The symbols -|-, "plus" ; ± ," plus or minus " ; 
and — , "minus," are placed at the left of each name in 
the tables found in the Appendix.^ They refer to three 

1 Occasionally a doubt is expressed by the use of two symbols (±, or +) 
(±. or -). 



INTRODUCTORY 5 

grades of rating for intellectual qualities. Moral traits are, 
as far as possible, left out of consideration while making up 
the classification for intellect. The reader may wonder if 
it is possible sharply to separate intellectual from moral 
attributes. Without going into the psychology of the 
question, and conceding that there is a border line in which 
these two commonly employed terms blend and become in- 
distinguishable, it is nevertheless undeniable that for every 
day purposes we all do classify and distinguish between 
goodness and brilliancy, wickedness and stupidity. Expe- 
rience proves that it is usually easy to place adjectives 
qualifying psychic differences either into the class called 
mental or the class called moral. By looking over the 
summaries for the characteristics of rulers, one can see that 
only a few of the adjectives employed fail to fit one or the 
other of these arbitrary psychic categories. The words 
courage, bravery, and perseverance seem to divide their 
significance. I have let these words carry a partial weight. 
I have not followed any mechanical or objective scheme in 
weighing the value of adjectives, not because of any inherent 
difficulty,^ but simply because it is not necessary for the 
purposes of my conclusions. Indeed, even by the dictates 
of strict science I am not beholden to describe any part of 
the method by which I have obtained these summaries under 
the parallel columns ''Ruler" and "Condition of Country." 
These tabular columns are formed of 736 elements or minia- 
ture histories. Three hundred and sixty-eight of these are 
descriptions of the chief economic and political changes 
during the years of 368 different monarchs, regents, or other 
rulers, royal or non-royal. The 368 elements which form 
the left-hand columns are my own descriptions of the traits 
of character of the rulers, formed, it is true, out of materials 
collected in a systematic way, but presentable as they stand, 
without the need of further justification. It is only neces- 
sary that each of these separate elements (condition of 

1 See Appendix (3). " Historiometry as an Exact Science." 



6 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

country and characteristics of ruler) shall be sufficiently 
accurate to be assigned rightly to its proper grade. As 
there are only three grades, and the doubtful cases are al- 
lotted in a way to give the benefit of the doubt to an oppo- 
nent of the conclusions, my position in the matter is a very 
safe one, and the assignment of grades becomes very easy. 
That is, on presenting the elements, with their grade-symbols 
attached, I am ready to ask — who will challenge more 
than a very small per cent of these assignments ? If most of 
the elements go unchallenged and are accepted, then any 
conclusion afterwards made must be accepted, providing 
the subsequent reasoning be correct. That is to say, I 
start fresh, from a new position. 

This is one way of developing the thesis. Those qualified 
as specialists on the history of the various countries will, I 
hope, pass a sufficiently favourable verdict upon the judgments 
I have made, to allow the data to serve as a basis for the am- 
phfication. The unfavourable critic must remember that it 
is not sufl&cient to indicate places where my own judgments 
fail to correspond to his own historical opinions. He must, 
if he discredits the value of the research as a whole, show 
that the errors which I have made tend falsely and improp- 
erly to favour subsequent conclusions. If, for instance, 
a ruler whom I have graded as "minus" is in his opinion 
"plus," unless the grade-symbol which I have made for the 
"conditions" is also minus, it would not lessen the weight of 
my conclusions if the symbol mark for the ruler were changed. 
Suppose the "conditions" were "plus," then it would ac- 
tually strengthen my conclusion to raise the grading of the 
ruler. If the conditions were ±, "plus or minus," then it 
would not make any difference one way or the other whether 
the ruler were in grade "minus" or grade "plus," as each of 
the extreme grades is at an equal distance from the medium 
grade. So, from the standpoint of strict logic, I might 
hold myself entirely aloof from mentioning any authorities, 
and say : These statements about historical characters and 



INTRODUCTORY 7 

historical events are so well known and agreed upon that any 
justification is unnecessary, or even if they are not entirely 
so, the remark applies to a sufficiently large percentage of 
the statements, and I will rest on this. 

It may be worth while, however, for some purposes to 
give an account of the method used in making up the grades 
and tabulations. Such details have a technical interest 
and may be serviceable later on. It has been my aim to 
rely on the usual or standard authorities, — histories which 
are well known and cover a considerable portion of the life 
of the nation. These are perhaps just as useful and reliable 
in this particular research as a large collection of special 
monographs.^ I have purposely omitted biographies of 
individual sovereigns and special works on short periods, 
because, first it would take a much longer time to complete 
such a research, and even then it is a question if the advan- 
tages would outweigh the disadvantages. It is presumable 
that special histories are more correct in recording facts and 
details, but it is not likely that the historian who has dealt 
with only a short period of time or with the biography of a 
single ruler will have as good judgment of comparative 
values — changes in national welfare, or degrees of differ- 
ence among royalty — as one whose field has been more 
extensive. 

Some might suppose that in looking up material of this 
sort, biographical, political, and economic, one would find 
many disagreements in expressions of opinion, but this is 
not so. Historians may and do disagree upon minor points, 
but not often upon essentials. This is one of the facts that 
I have already found to be certainly true as regards indi- 
viduals, and the whole material of this work shows that this 
statement is equally true for political and economic conditions. 

Sometimes the more detailed histories have also been 
consulted and according to the following plan. Usually 

' For evidence that encyclopsediaa agree with high authorities, see page 407 
of Appendix. 



8 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

such specialized works are unnecessary. A sufficiently 
clear idea can be gained at once as to the intellectual rank of 
the sovereign and the tendencies of his reign even from the 
most generalized accounts. The encyclopaedias alone con- 
tain sufficient data to fix the extreme examples — those 
which deviate the widest from the doubtful or median grades. 
For instance, if only three grades are employed, no detailed 
reading is needed to decide the intellectual grades for Frederick 
the Great or Peter the Great, or, as an antithesis for Charles 
II of Spain, or for the conditions during the reigns of these 
monarchs ; and so on from the extreme deviations toward 
mediocrity where the decision becomes more difficult. It 
is not necessary to go to specialized sources in cases like 
Frederick the Great and Peter the Great ; ^ no amount of 
subsequent reading would remove them from the "plus" 
grade for mentality. They might be shifted up or down 
within the grade, but such would not affect this research. 
The rulers and reigns that deviate far from the mean are 
fortunately easy to place ; they are also fortunately the 
ones which affect the weight of the conclusions most; just 
as any weight on a balancing beam tends to tip the beam 
more, the farther out it is from the centre. If the grading of 
the ruler and the grading of the conditions cannot be sat- 
isfactorily decided upon at once, then one naturally looks 
to more specialized sources. A considerable number will 
even then not be assignable with precision, but these will 

1 Even the epithets, which by popular consent have been attached to the 
names of sovereigns, are not often misleading summations of their character. 
We may find a John "the Good" of France really bad, or a Ferdinand "the 
Saint" to have won encomium through extravagant patronage of the church; 
there are exceptions, of course, but far more often than otherwise these 
adjectives seem to give as good a picture of their traits as it would be easy 
to concentrate in a single word. In the confusion of genealogical nomenclature 
and the bald lists of dynasties, it is helpful to the eye and memory to find 
Bayezid "the Thunderbolt" and Alfonso "the Noble," Peter "the Cruel" and 
Martin "the Humane," Charles "the Simple" and Frederick "the Great." I 
shall make use of these terms, but will note whenever they appear incon- 
gruous or conflict with the estimates of modern scholars. 



INTRODUCTORY 9 

affect the conclusions least, owing to their median position 
in the scale, and, as before stated, they are so placed as to 
weaken the conclusion to which I have come. 

The bibliographies printed in the Appendix are made up of 
such works of reference as one sees mentioned at the close 
of the special articles in the standard English, French, and 
German encyclopaedias. These articles on the history of 
European countries are signed articles written by well- 
known scholars and ought, therefore, to be valuable as a 
starting-point, not only for their references, but also for their 
own statements of fact and judgment. Under the condensed 
summaries in the Appendix the letters A, B, C, D, etc.,* 
refer back by volume and page to the books that have been 
consulted. 

It may be noticed that some of the authorities are either 
out of date or notoriously partial. Such criticism might 
be directed against Dunham, Coxe, or Motley, but I have 
not used these when their statements conflict with others. 
The great majority of the historians relied upon are modern, 
and have the reputation of being impartial. Even if their 
impartiality be questioned, the general effect of their par- 
tialities would not lead me to a spurious conclusion unless 
they tend in one direction. This possibility will be recon- 
sidered in the next chapter. 

The history which I am analyzing concerns itself almost 
entirely with political or economic affairs, — the side of 
history which may be called material, in contradistinction to 
the spiritual or intellectual. Although it is not possible, 
from one point of view, to separate these two factors in his- 
tory, it is nevertheless easy, in practice, to place under the 
term "material affairs" all changes which have to do with 
certain stated features of national life. 

' In the choice of authorities I have also been aided by the personal ad- 
vice of a number of historians, whose special knowledge in their various fields 
has made their suggestions very helpful. The order in which these works 
are arranged — A, B, C, D, etc. — is not intended to have any significance. 



10 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

This research will note all the important statements on 
the following topics : finances, army, navy, commerce, 
agriculture, manufacture, public building, territorial changes, 
condition of law and order, general condition of the people 
as a whole, growth and decline of political liberty, and the 
diplomatic position of the nation, or its prestige when viewed 
internationally. No attempt is made to include literary, 
educational, scientific, or artistic activities. The monarchs 
as patrons, doubtless, were not uninfluential here, and also 
it would be interesting to compare eras of intellectual and 
artistic growth with political and material splendor, especially 
as many believe in the influence of the latter upon the develop- 
ment of higher culture. Such a research is already half 
completed, if the politico-economic tabulation which I here 
present be sufficiently correct. 

The question of political liberty and how far this is to be 
considered a material and how far a spiritual advantage, 
sometimes, though not often, enters in a way to cause per- 
plexity. One frequently finds that under strong kings the 
country flourished in almost every way except that the people 
were oppressed. It is naturally difficult to weigh the value 
of political and personal liberty against prosperity in com- 
mercial, industrial, or other materialistic affairs ; but the 
question which I am dealing with is as far as possible the 
economic or material side apart from the intellectual or 
ethical. Nearly all the statements in history are found to 
fall naturally into one or the other of the two classifications, 
materialistic or idealistic. It is just the same in dealing with 
the traits of an individual. Most aspects fall naturally 
to either the intellectual side or the moral side. Some few, 
like courage or perseverance, might well be thought to 
belong to both. It would not be a bad first approximation 
to divide in halves these middling attributes. In any 
event a certain amount of individual judgment or personal 
equation is unavoidable, or is perhaps even advantageous, 
in work of this sort. If I have succeeded in eliminating by 



INTRODUCTORY 11 

my methods a great mass of preconceived notions and a 
priori dogmatisms, I shall not be disturbed if a few are found 
to remain. 

It is better to divide the intellectual, moral, and artistic 
conditions from the materialistic and correlate them sepa- 
rately with monarchs, or with whatever series one wishes, 
than it is to mix all the national conditions together. Some- 
times one set of conditions is "minus," and the other is 
"plus," and so they would confuse each other, and mask a 
correlation which might be truly present. For instance, 
the literary and scientific conditions are "plus" for the reign 
of Alfonso X of Castile (1252-1284), while the material con- 
ditions are "minus." Both are highly associated with the 
strength and weakness of this monarch, who was scholarly, 
though unpractical. Even as it stands there is at times a 
masking of true correlation by putting all the "material" 
conditions together; as, for example, when the nation is 
successful in warfare, though declining internally (financially 
and otherwise) under the leadership of a warlike sovereign 
who is both brilliant and reckless. Therefore, as far as this 
source of error is concerned, the real parallelism is higher 
than I have found it, and would be proved higher if the sepa- 
rate factors which fall under the general heading "material 
conditions" were each correlated separately with the 
peculiarities of the rulers. 

Sometimes the activities of one king were not realized 
during his own reign and became manifest only during that 
of his successor. Sometimes a country has been devastated 
by uncontrollable forces of nature, earthquakes, famines, or 
plagues. The general effect of all such chance happenings 
is, of course, to reduce still further the parallelisms which 
have been found in spite of all such happenings. 

There is one source of error which would work in the 
opposite direction. Since it would illegitimately raise the 
correlation and so lead to an overestimate of the influence 
of monarchs, a consideration of its probable magnitude 



12 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

becomes of the first importance. This arises from the 
possibility that historians, especially the earlier historians, 
the chroniclers, and contemporary writers were wont to 
panegyrize such kings as were fortunate, or ruled when the 
conditions were favourable, and at the same time unjustly 
condemned those who, through no fault of their own, suffered 
reverses or lost their crowns. The answering of this objec- 
tion is a long story. Its importance will be constantly kept 
in mind, and the arguments reunited in Chapter XVII, where 
the whole question is gone into in detail. I need only say, 
for the present, that this source of error is shown to be 
slight when viewed in its bearing on the entirety of this 
research. It is not a general danger associated with the 
entire research, but is rather a special danger coexisting with 
certain specific periods. 

Fourteen national histories in all are analyzed in this 
volume. Most of the accounts cover a period of about five 
hundred years ; and for some of the countries, England, 
France, Spain, and Portugal, it has been found feasible to 
extend the study into earlier centuries, so that about eight 
hundred years can be given. Each account begins at as 
early a date as the exigencies of the case permit, the special 
reasons for which are given at the beginning of each chapter, 
and closes with the reign approximating the French Revolu- 
tion and the last part of the eighteenth century. Thus the 
anterior and posterior date limits are systematically fixed. 

The territorial outlines include all the lands actually under 
the monarch in question, except occasionally when the 
territories are too much separated geographically to be 
treated as one country. These fourteen countries cover the 
greater portion of the map of Europe as it is to-day. They 
are representative of various races and climatic surroundings. 
They are, in general, the nations that have succeeded in 
maintaining their entities, being on the whole successful 
politically, having grown at the expense of surrounding 
areas. For this reason more "plus" periods are found than 



INTRODUCTORY 13 

would be the case if one studied the areas which, from the 
international political standpoint, have disintegrated and 
diminished in importance. 

The monarchs themselves are not representative of the 
stock of the nation over which they happen to rule. They 
are, from the standpoint of race, an international breed, and 
(with the exception of the house of Osman, which still rules 
in Turkey) an interrelated and biologically segregated group 
of persons of ultimate Germanic-Scandinavian origin. 

In addition to the monarchs themselves, the personal 
influence of prime ministers and other leading statesmen is 
naturally an important question, and while I have not 
laboured with the same definiteness to correlate their per- 
sonalities with national political and economic conditions, I 
have nevertheless noted in each country these non-royal 
leaders, and their entrances and exits, historical distribution, 
and presumable effects on national changes, and I do not 
hesitate to suggest that they constitute a force second only 
in importance to the monarchs themselves. These non- 
royal rulers appear upon the scene frequently during the 
minorities of sovereigns. Frequently, also, a far-seeing 
sovereign appoints a great statesman to a post of extreme 
leadership. How frequent, when and where, is a question, 
and this will be answered in the course of the text as well as 
summarized among the conclusions. 

When a regency is in non-royal hands, — whether under a 
single regent or divided in form of a council, — I shall treat 
the period as if it were a period in which the monarchs were 
"minus," that is, absent or weak. If the conditions are 
favourable or "plus" when the monarchical rule is absent, it 
counts so much against the influence of monarchs. If 
disaster and decline set in under non-royal rule, then there is 
that amount of indication that monarchical rule was needed. 
It is sometimes difficult to say just when a minority ends and 
when the debit and credit account should be taken out in 
the name of the young king himself. I have frequently 



14 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

taken this at the date when the king reached the age of 
twenty-one, but very often the youthful sovereign has been 
in actual and practical control of affairs, and indeed making 
revolutionary changes, much earlier than this age, so that 
each case must be treated on its own merits. 

In a way similar to a minority, there is another form of 
government, which lends important aid in unravelUng com- 
plicated questions. This is the existence of an interregnum. 
These definite interludes have much of the experimental 
method about them, and although some of the debatable 
questions of history arc necessarily interwoven, they are 
especially valuable because of the undcbatable material 
which they contain. An interregnum has a definite begin- 
ning and end, and, the royal authority being completely with- 
drawn, this influence becomes for a time nil. The amounts 
and kinds of progress made during minorities and inter- 
regna, their distribution in place and time, are among the most 
instructive of the tabulated facts, and an inquiry into the 
causes of the same serves to throw light on several other his- 
toriological problems not directly involved. Many points 
like this have been taken advantage of in developing the 
conclusions. The methods of historiometry differ so funda- 
mentally from the older "philosophies of history" that it 
will be necessary to give considerable account both of the 
history of historical speculation and of the ideas and aims 
of the newer science. 



CHAPTER II 

PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY AND HISTORIOMETRY 

The present indifference to any systematic outlook on 
history is not hard to understand. Although the most 
brilliant and gifted minds have worked in the field of his- 
torical interpretation, it is not surprising that little advance 
has been made. The famous champions lie well in the past. 
They could hardly have been expected to have any clear 
conception of human development if they lived and died 
before the days of Darwin, Wallace, and Spencer. Evolu- 
tion in some form was, it is true, already the conviction of 
nearly every great thinker from Thales to Goethe. They 
guessed at the continuity from general considerations, but 
they did not know it until the naturalists proved it ; and, 
furthermore, the ideas of natural selection, survival of the 
fittest, heredity, and modification from the environment 
were practically non-existent, or at least not utilizable as they 
are to-day. 

Not only did the pre-Darwinian philosophers of history 
lack assurance for the correct genetic point of view in regard 
to the development of human society, but, more baneful still, 
their systems were developed in a way to give free rein to 
the most rampant theories. Never once did the precon- 
vinced, if earnest and erudite, apostles of historico-political 
doctrinaires devise any check to curb their waywardness, or 
recognize the dangers of the personal equation. The result 
has been that the well-known writers who have attempted to 
interpret historical meaning are always found unconvincing. 
They have been one-sided in their devotions, or narrow in 
their scope, and always deficient in scientific method. The 
partisanship of each famous writer is so evident that it is 

15 



16 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

worth while to go over a list of the leading philosophers of 
history very quickly, and show that each can be associated at 
once with some particular presumption. 

It is unnecessary to begin as early as the ancients. Neither 
the Greeks nor the Romans regarded history as a subject 
for special philosophy. Political science and political expe- 
rience occupied much of their attention, and here they 
were the great pioneers ; but the world had then but a brief 
historical past to look to, and was not much interested in 
gazing backward. Perhaps the earliest contribution to 
the philosophy of history is the "De Civitate Dei" of Saint 
Augustine. It recognizes historical unity and the progress 
of mankind, but it subordinates all things to the Church, is 
essentially a theological discourse, and ignores secular culture 
and the ordinary human interests. 

It was more than nine hundred years after the death of 
the great Latin father before another considerable attempt 
was made to interpret the record of the past. Ibn Khaldun, 
the Arab historian, wrote during the last part of the fourteenth 
century a so-called "Universal History," the first volume of 
which (Muquaddama, or preface) is devoted to discussion of 
causation. Although the Arab race has produced few orig- 
inal thinkers, the Muquaddama, whatever its defects may 
be, is certainly an original work. Ibn Khaldun v/as the 
first to treat history as a proper object of a special science, 
and, considering the age in which he lived, the Arabic phi- 
losopher was indeed remarkable in the depth and keenness 
of his observations and in his numerous anticipations of 
modern theories. By him we first hear sounded the well- 
known themes, taken up by Montesquieu, Draper, Buckle, 
and scores of others, — a nation's life is like the life of an 
individual, with youth, maturity, and decay ; a civilization 
is determined by its geographic, climatic, and personal 
entourage. Soil, rivers, moisture, mountains, desert, seas, 
all come in as factors in his reckoning, nor are the psycho- 
logical causes entirely overlooked, — luxury and town-fife 



PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY AND HISTORIOMETRY 17 

enervate the native vigour of nomad tribes. Adequate 
proofs of cause and effect are of course lacking, but the mere 
suggestion of so many naturalistic factors in civilization was 
a wonderful thing in itself ; and, more than this, Ibn Khaldtin 
appears to have been the first historian to appreciate, not 
only human adaptation, but also progress, — he went far 
beyond any of the Christian chroniclers of the Middle Ages ; 
they were quite unconscious that history had been unfolding 
successive stages of development. Ibn Khaldtin was the 
earliest devotee of what may be called the "environmental' 
school of historical philosophers. He had, of course, no idea 
of the force of heredity, or of natural selection, sexual selec- 
tion, or many other internal causes recognized to-day as 
important factors in the rise and fall of nations. 

Bodin (1530-1596) and Montesquieu (1689-1755) show 
much the same bias. Vico (1668-1744), great in his under- 
standing of the evolution of Roman law, put into history his 
own law, the "law of cycles," and then forced facts to con- 
form. Bossuet wrote around a theological centrum, and his 
eye never wandered far from the focus. Rousseau made a 
paradox of history and did not even recognize the truth of 
the general progress of humanity. He, more than any of 
the others, excelled in the arts of the special pleader, and 
whatever service this eccentric genius may have rendered 
the cause of liberty, his effect on the philosophy of history was 
to introduce even greater confusion. 

Hegel, with his universal interests and own theory of the 
universe, plunged into history, but not until he had already 
developed his philosophical system. Hegel reduced every- 
thing to his formula "the development of the Idee.'' His 
"Philosophy of History" is his most popular work, has been 
much translated and recently reprinted as part of a popular 
science series, in English. It is unsatisfactory to historians, 
not on account of its metaphysical point of view, but because 
so many of its chief subsidiary theories are in defiance of the 
facts of history. For instance, according to Hegel, man in 



18 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

his primitive condition lived in the mountainous regions of 
the globe, next in the plains and valleys, lastly by the coasts 
and mouths of rivers. The first form of government which 
we see in history is Despotism, the second Democracy and 
Aristocracy, the third Monarchy. All-powerful is "the 
spirit of the age." The Great Man is merely its incarnation. 
Hegel has no place for the opposite view, — that the Great 
Man may be the accidental resultant of favourable inherent 
qualities and himself the moulder of his age. 

Frederick von Schlegel also wrote from the metaphysical 
point of view. Man was created free, — two courses lay 
before him, upward towards God or "downward to the abyss." 
The "Lectures on the Philosophy of History," first published 
in 1829, still maintain a certain popularity and are included 
in Bohn's Standard Library ; but they show the same gen- 
eral fault of all philosophies of history, written from a pre- 
meditated position. Schlegel's desire is to glorify the Cath- 
olic Church. He was opposed to principles of political and 
religious freedom. 

Auguste Comte, from an entirely different though equally 
a priori conception, tried to make the statements of history 
fit his theory of the law of the Three States. The earliest or 
most primitive stage of human evolution was the Theological, 
next came the Metaphysical, and finally the Positive or 
scientific. Whether his generalization be true or not when 
viewed in its widest interpretation, it is certain that Comte 
strained the facts of history in his handling, and was partial 
in the selection of only such materials as attracted his eye 
and would decorate a handiwork to which he had pledged his 
life's devotion. Scientific knowledge has advanced since 
man dwelt in the savage state, and seemingly at the expense 
of Theology and Metaphysics. Comte did not realize that the 
sources of Theology and Metaphysics are infinite, and their 
reservoirs feel not the loss. Take something from infinity 
and infinity remains. Theology and Metaphysics continu- 
ally expand anew from higher and higher levels. 



PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY AND HISTORIOMETRY 19 

This depreciation of religious and spiritual forces is gen- 
erally considered a primary defect in the writings of Buckle. 
From the biological standpoint his theory of history is very 
one-sided. Environment is extolled and heredity decried. 
Moral forces, so neglected by Comte and Buckle, became 
for Droysen the one important consideration. "Historical 
things have their truth in the moral force, as natural things 
have theirs in natural laws. Historical things are the per- 
petual actuali25ation of these moral forces. To think his- 
torically means to see their truth in the actualities resulting 
from that moral energy." ^ 

The names of many other less notable philosophers of 
history might be cited, and it would be easy to show that 
they, like their more famous brethren, generally can be at 
once associated with some particular theory. More often 
than otherwise, their writings are biased, usually notoriously 
so, but even when their views are many-sided and their dis- 
crimination is fine, as with Guizot and Turgot, no method is 
taken to insure objectivity. The interpretations, excellent 
as they may seem to one reader, may not suit another reader, 
for the very fact that they do not stress that particular reader's 
private fancy, and so even here again, all go out the same door 
where they went in, and nothing permanent is gained. 

All these considerations make it increasingly clear that a 
new method is needed in historical interpretation, one that 
shall make the investigator able in some way to take cogni- 
zance of contrary forces and contrary explanations at the same 
time that he is testing his own working hypothesis. The 
business of science is to get concerted agreement. About 
the only ideas on which the great majority of historical phi- 
losophers may be said to agree, are the ideas of progress, of 
humanity, and of freedom. ^ The last two are embodied in 
the first, so that there is not much more agreed upon by his- 

1 "Outline of the Principles of History," Boston, 1893, p. 16. 
* I am indebted to Flint's "History of the Philosophy of History," for much 
of the above concerning the particular beliefs of various writers. 



20 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

torians than the general conception that somehow, and on 
the whole, there has been a progress, an increase of the store 
of human knowledge and an advance to more complex levels 
of what we call civilization. The economic interpretation, 
the geographical, the anthropo-geographical, the Kultur 
geschichte, the individualistic, the political and the ideological 
are all current. It is not advancing very far or a proof of any 
great discernment to adopt the view of the "autonomic" or 
sociological school and see that there is some truth in each of 
these one-sided interpretations. Of course there is something 
to be said for each set of opinions. The question is, how 
much ? 

The method I propose has for its chief aim just this quan- 
titative valuation. We have had enough of idle argument, of 
a priori dogmatism, of free generalizations from half-truths 
and eternally conflicting conclusions. The time is now ripe 
for the introduction into the study of history of the methods 
which have so much improved the conditions of human life 
through advancing the sciences of physics, chemistry, elec- 
tricity, medicine, and public hygiene, — inductive methods, 
methods of the laboratory, methods of experimentation. No 
objection can be raised, because you cannot set up govern- 
ments merely in order to see how well they work, or place 
races in new surroundings, or control the breeding of man as 
man controls the breeding of domestic animals. All objec- 
tions of this sort are swept away by the simple reply : the 
experiments have been performed. History is their record. 

It is estimated that 400,000 books have been written on 
the subject of human history. All, or the greater part of 
these writings, have been read and re-read, culled over, re- 
arranged, criticised, and utilized by other historians, and the 
whole concentrated into text-books, standard histories, and 
encyclopaedias. This great mass of knowledge may be likened 
to a pyramid in which the sources lie at the base ; and the 
few books that are often read by many people (not the 
merely popular but the standard and authoritative works) 



PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY AND HISTORIOMETRY 21 

lie somewhere towards the apex. Their statements are 
drawn from the material which lies beneath. They are 
fewer in number and their material is more concentrated. 
Resting upon these standard works and taking support from 
the broad nether structure lie the most concentrated of all, 
the brief historical articles written by the special experts and 
bound up with other quintessential matter in the modern 
encyclopaedias. Can it be that all this information is useless, 
that there is no lesson to be learned except the bare narrative, 
no prime causes to be demonstrated as more important than 
other causes in determining the destinies of nations? 

Considering the importance of the subject and the great 
advances made by objective investigations in the organic 
and inorganic sciences, it is not only high time that a beginning 
be made, but there are many reasons for thinking that now 
and only now all things favour a successful issue. After the 
theory of evolution became established and the excitement 
of the fray had dwindled on the great primary problem, there 
still remained the question how evolution had taken place, 
and questions centring around modes and manners of in- 
heritance. This led to the introduction of new methods as 
an adjunct to mere observation, the propounding of numer- 
ical laws governing heredity, and the bringing over into 
psychology, and sociology, as well as biology, of systems of 
grades and measurements. 

Quetlet was the first to apply on a large scale quantitative 
expression to human attributes. He worked from 1823 
onward. Galton took up the idea and developed it further, 
and especially applied it to heredity and eugenics. The 
total number of investigators who in one way or another 
have used methods of measurement in psychology and biology 
is certainly in the hundreds if not in the thousands ; but it 
is only since about 1895 that this movement has been well 
under way. The recentness of this development is one ex- 
planation why no attempt has so far been made to quantitate 
historical movements. A very few (not more than a dozen 



22 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

persons at most) have made some more or less objective analy- 
sis of groups of persons mentioned in history, chiefly historical 
celebrities with the idea of discovering the qualities of such 
men and explaining the origin and psychology of genius. 
These researches have not as yet been applied to historical 
criticism or historical interpretation, but their results are 
valuable as a line of departure in this direction. In the 
issue of Science for November 19, 1909, under the title of 
"A New Name for a New^ Science,"^ I published a brief bib- 
liography of such researches and proposed the term histori- 
ometry for the same, i.e., any researches in which the state- 
ments of history have been subjected to some more or less 
objective method of measurement. In some of these re- 
searches the personal bias of the investigator is slight or 
negligible. In others the personal equation is higher, but 
all aim at proving something by means of counting historical 
instances pro and co7i. The advance which these scientifi- 
cally inclined writers have made over all earlier interpreters 
lies in the counting of the cons. But all this objectivity 
does not necessarily mean the attainment of even roughly 
satisfactory truth or the conviction of the properly critical. 
The criticism is at once raised that unless we can be sure of 
the accuracy of our sources and the truth of our data, it is 
unsafe to draw generalization and conclusions. Skepticism 
arises in the mind of the reader, and he is inclined to doubt 
the value of any and all such researches. 

As I said before, such a general criticism is entirely un- 
founded. ^ It is perfectly possible to proceed as if the sources 
were all verified and the original data correctly drawn, — 
as if the errors were negligible. When the results are all in, 
and lie before the eye, it may turn out that the errors of the 

1 Reprinted in the Appendix of the present book. 

2 1 have already tested the accuracy of some of the methods already em- 
ployed, and published the general justification for these methods in Science, 
April 14, 1911, under the title " Historiometry as an Exact Science." This paper 
is reprinted in the Appendix of this volume. 



PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY AND HISTORIOMETRY 23 

original data are not negligible, or that nothing but confusion 
can be made of the original data ; in other words, that the 
research is a failure ; but, on the other hand, it may turn out 
that the results contain within themselves something which 
proves that the original data must have been of sufficient 
worth. In other words, the amount of approximate error 
which the original data contained may be grasped as the 
research proceeds, and its measurement made a part of the 
problem itself. 

This concept which it is so necessary for the reader to get 
at the start, and which I have said is fundamental in the 
development of historiometry, is perhaps most easily attained 
by recourse to concrete examples. 

In "Heredity in Royalty" I came to the conclusion that 
heredity is a very strong force, and that environment is not. 
Can this conclusion have been wrongly arrived at because 
of the errors which history and biography necessarily con- 
tain ? What I did in this research was first to bring together, 
as one collection, all the easily available statements concern- 
ing the mental and moral characteristics of royalty ; second, 
to arrange the individuals in the order of their reputed merit 
(two kinds, mental and moral) ; third, to rearrange the 
individuals according to reputed ancestry (genealogical 
arrangement) ; fourth, to measure mathematically the cor- 
relations between individuals, close of kin, or more strictly, 
close of reputed kin.^ I showed that, when this was done, it 
was found that correlations existed agreeing substantially 
with those already obtained in the anthropometric laboratory. 

' On page 16 of "Heredity in Royalty," I discussed the bearing of the error 
introduced, arising from the possibility that sometimes the ascribed father 
is not the real father. My view as there expressed is merely a statement of my 
own judgment in the matter, which was, that any error arising from this source 
would be slight. I have no reason to alter that opinion, but what I ought to 
have done would have been to have swept away the whole objection by simply 
saying : these errors tend to lower the correlation ratios. Therefore, the true 
results are (as far as this question is concerned) certainly as high as I have 
found them, and probably a little higher. 



24 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

As I wrote in Science, April 14, 1911: "Such would 
not be the case if historians perverted the truth greatly, or 
if for any other reason the truth were largely unattainable. 
To make this clear it is only necessary to think what the 
result would be if history were merely 'a pack of lies agreed 
upon' as the extreme view puts it. We should then fail to 
properly pick out our true intellectual giants and runts. 
The result would be nothing but confusion. A whole series 
of errors would be distributed at random. This would act 
like rain on waves and flatten down to a common level the 
real differences between the individuals. The correlation 
measurements would fall, and we should get no results com- 
parable to those obtained from the delicate and accurate 
measurements of the anthropometric laboratory. 

" Furthermore, any weakness in the method of grading, any 
failure to properly classify the great men in the high grades 
and the degenerates in their proper grades, would work in 
precisely the same direction, — to lower the correlation 
coefficients. The supposed errors of history and the diffi- 
culties of grading act as two united strains of tension to pull 
the coefficients down towards zero, which would be the coef- 
ficient for random distribution. If the coefficients can stand 
the strain without declining, then, roughly speaking, we may 
conclude both that the historical foundation is just and that 
the method of procedure is sound." 

Once this simple mathematical principle is comprehended, 
it becomes evident that several specific criticisms that were 
directed against "Heredity in Royalty" were entirely beside 
the mark, and were due to the inability of the reviewer to 
understand the significance of the very objections which he 
raised. These pretended scientific criticisms appeared ex- 
clusively in literary or historical reviews, or in the daily press, 
not in journals devoted to science. Although the reviewers 
in scientific journals did not fall into such errors as the fol- 
lowing, they did not call the attention of their readers to 
the point that the random errors of history, in this particular 



PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY AND HISTORIOMETRY 25 

series, had hereby been shown to be trivial and immeasur- 
able. 

False criticisms like the following were fairly common. 
Some complained that the authorities (works consulted) were 
out of date or meagre in material. My reply is that while it 
is perfectly true that I took authorities uncritically, I had 
at the same time proved that such a method apparently 
introduces no error commensurate with the truth which it 
somehow does attain, truth evidently sufficiently accurate 
for the needs of this particular study. The point is that the 
"out-of-date authorities" would not, in their separate de- 
scriptions of different individuals, have any conscious or 
unconscious bias towards a theory of heredity. On the 
contrary, there is reason to suppose that they would be 
especially free from such a bias, because they wrote long ago, 
before there was any general belief in the force of heredity. 
Yet even with such material, blurred and incomplete as it 
was, the heredity factor was unmistakable ; the strongly con- 
trasted traits of character could still be seen in the hazy and 
ill-defined ensemble of only partially authenticated history. 
How strong then heredity must be ! That should be the 
nature of the mental reaction growing out of the observation 
that poor authorities had been used. The same kind of 
reply is to be made to those who criticise the use made of 
encyclopaedias and the arbitrary use of Lippincott's Bio- 
graphical Dictionary as one of the criteria of admission into 
the grade called "genius." 

Some few critics (newspaper critics only) wished to throw 
overboard all the results because of the great differences of 
opinion in regard to some historical characters. One cited 
Loyola and Luther, and asked what the result would be if in 
their cases one tried to balance opinions and strike an average 
out of such notorious discord. My reply is that I was not 
concerned, for the time being, with Loyola and Luther. 
I was concerned with showing, among other things, that any 
presupposed conflict of opinions which some persons might 



26 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

have supposed to permeate history cannot be great, in at least 
one department of history, because if it were, the sequences 
which I have uncovered could not possibly be found. 

Another type of criticism was made (chiefly in historical 
journals) which had no bearing on the main conclusions of 
the work. A historian would here and there see a character 
described, or graded not in accordance with his personal 
judgment. He would point out and name those kings, 
queens, or other personages whose characterizations he be- 
lieved unjust, and would then argue that because a portion 
of the work contained error the rest might not be above sus- 
picion ; whereas he should have tried to show that the par- 
ticular specific errors which he had noticed were of such a 
nature as to lead me falsely to magnify heredity. That is, 
he should have done so had he wished to prove the errors 
vitiated my conclusions. It was perfectly proper for him as 
historian to suggest a different opinion regarding the classi- 
fying and grading. I should be glad to readjust and improve 
these assignments of grades ; but the general effect of such 
improvement would be to strengthen the conclusions already 
obtained. At least, that is what the probabilities indicate. 
These conclusions I had been able to demonstrate, as clear 
and certain enough for ordinary purposes, even though I used 
rough data. If the data had been absolutely fallacious, my 
correlation ratios for offspring and fathers would have been 
approximately r = 0. As a matter of fact this correlation 
was found for intellectual qualities to be r = .30.^ 

The only way justly to attack the conclusion from "He- 
redity in Royalty," that the judgments of historians are now 
proved and knoivn to be a fair approximation to the truth, would 
be to show a bias in the material constantly working towards 
raising the correlation ratios, or else to attack the work at 
its only subjective point, namely the arrangement into grades. 

* "Heredity in Royalty," pp. 281-283. If I had used more extensive and 
more authoritative biographies, instead of to a considerable extent relying 
on the encyclopaedias and on Lippincott's Biographical Dictionary, I should 
have perhaps obtained a correlation ratio somewhat higher than r = .30. 



PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY AND HISTORIOMETRY 27 

Here my own personal judgment to some extent entered. 
If it can be shown that I have on the average unjustly over- 
rated the kinsmen of the individuals in the highest grades, 
(9) and (10), I should then spuriously have raised the corre- 
lation ratios. A critic should take a few sections of the book 
at random and see if this tendency can be detected. 

To summarize the situation : If one wishes to discover a 
correlation between two historical variables (deviations 
from random distribution, or from the average type), one 
should start with materials supposed to be good ; because 
only with true statements as data, can one detect the full 
force of the correlation ; but having found some correlation 
it is not necessary to go back and justify the materials used. 
Except there be a bias of the whole material towards the 
conclusion, the correlation found (if it sufficiently exceeds 
the probable error) is guarantee that some correlation exists 
which is, in all probability, even greater in reality than the 
measurement indicates. 

Another example of a research based upon data known to 
carry some scattering errors, yet yielding a conclusion all the 
more certain on this account, is the following : In the year 
1909 I happened to wish to know whether more leading 
Americans of the present generation had been born in the 
cities than in the rural communities. In other words, had 
more leading Americans come from the cities than their 
population would lead one to expect, or have the cities failed 
to produce their proper quota? As a convenient way of 
answering this question I turned to the latest number of 
"Who's Who in America." Arithmetical computation 
showed at once the cities leading, and only a little further 
investigation was needed to prove that according to this 
book the cities had done more than their share, and with a 
wide margin for accidental error. Whereas about 16 per 
cent was all that (in proportion to the population) could be 
expected from the cities, they had actually furnished about i 
32 per cent. 



28 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

There are then but two conclusions ; either that the editors 
have been unjustly partial, indeed doubly biassed towards 
men of city birth, or that there is really something in city 
birth (either inheritance or environment) that favours the 
achievement of notability. It would be a valid criticism to 
suggest any ways in which the list might supposedly be biassed 
towards those of city birth ; but unless such specific criticism 
be made, any general criticism that the list contains scatter- 
ing errors, contains names of doubtful merit, omits other 
names that ought to be included, is a criticism that works 
in precisely the opposite direction from detracting from the 
belief that the cities have been the chief birthplaces of notable 
Americans. 

To make this clear, let us think of it in the following way : 
Unless the list had been made up of persons possessing 
some peculiarity, there would be no more and no less born in 
the cities than the population demanded. Some peculiarity 
in the list, some predilection on the part of the editors towards 
men not random samples of the entire population of the 
United States, is absolutely proved. Therefore, if the 
editors have not l)een biassed, the only other inference is 
that this observed deviation in the birth ratios is associated 
with that quality which the book claims to select; namely, 
notability. 

A list made up at random w^ould show no greater number 
born in the cities than the total urban population demands. 
Next consider what the result would be if a very bad list were 
used, one made up of only a few of the real leaders, and al- 
most entirely composed of mediocre or worthless names. 
Such a list could of course only give a very slight, perhaps 
doubtful, correlation between notability and city birth. 

Next consider what the result would be if a somewhat 
better list of names were used. The truth of the matter 
would then begin to show itself more clearly. The better 
the list, the more the truth would stand out. In other words, 
if the list were worse (more full of error) than the one that 



PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY AND HISTORIOMETRY 29 

I have used, it would bring out the fact less strongly ; there- 
fore, if the list of names were better (more ideally chosen) than 
the one that I have used, it would bring out the truth even 
more strongly than I have found it. 

Two conclusions, then, are warranted : first, that a list 
which in any and every portion of its entirety shows twice 
the number born in the cities that random expectation calls 
for, must be worthy of being called a very good working list ; 
and second, that the cities have produced probably more 
than twice their share of notables. 

All this is said under the supposition that the list does not 
carry any prejudice in favour of the conclusion to which the 
investigator has come. This is a very important question, 
for if there be any special reasons why a constant, on the 
average unjust, bias enters, then the conclusion is in part 
artificially induced. It must be remembered that I have 
only said that if a general criticism is brought against the list 
of names (from random errors), this acts to strengthen the 
conclusion already obtained. If, on the other hand, a bias 
in favour of the conclusion is present in the original list, then 
it is a very different matter. 

In this particular instance we start with the common-sense 
belief that the editors of this reference work have not com- 
piled their list with the object of proving that city-born boys 
reach a higher degree of leadership than non-urban. There 
may, however, be ways in which the list unconsciously and 
unjustly favours the city born. 

Criticisms of this sort are entirely proper, for it is part of 
the work of historiometry not only to avoid bias but to be 
able to detect it and measure it. Let it be suspected that 
part or the whole of the increase of city-birth leadership is 
due to an excessive partiality towards professional men, and 
that the same result would not be found if business and prac- 
tical types were considered. This is a fair criticism. The 
answer is, reinvestigate. Split the whole material into two 
parts, the practical business types and the learned, profes- 
sional, then compare the two results. 



30 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

It is not to the point to discuss the possible special criti- 
cisms that might be raised d propos of this particular re- 
search. It is enough to say that any just criticism, raising 
the point of bias, should be answered. Any defect in the 
method which would in any way falsely magnify the conclu- 
sion ought to be closely scrutinized, but the general criticism 
that any and all such researches are rendered less solid and 
reliable on account of the general errors of judgment which 
permeated the original material on which they rest, is an 
utterly false objection. The tendency of the random errors 
of history is to mask the true but hidden causes, correlations, 
and other generalizations, which laws, though actually exist- 
ing, are more or less buried or overlooked in the mass of his- 
torical detail. Any device that can work out a general or 
continuous principle from the historical elements does so 
in spite of these random errors. This being the case, the 
random errors of history may be ignored (when generalized 
causes are sought), and the results cannot be wrong simply 
because the original material is known or supposed to carry 
some amount of random error. 

The concrete example I have just given illustrates what 
may be called the paradox of historical generalization. The 
worse the material, the more certain is the generalized con- 
clusion, provided there be no bias in the selection of material 
towards the conclusion reached. 

This statement does not apply to the usual types of his- 
torical investigation, and this, I take it, is the reason why so 
many historians are unwilling, at first sight, to accept the 
truth of such a paradox. A typical problem for the historian 
is the measuring or judging of some historical detail. Take, 
for instance, the dispute concerning the real characteristics 
of Richard III of England. Surely it cannot be that the 
worse our sources the more certain we can be of our con- 
clusions. The difference is this : here there is no third point 
against which a triangulation is made and an overplus found 
which must be accepted as significant and taken as a lower 



PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY AND HISTORIOMETRY 31 

limit of proof. In the case of city birth and leadership we 
measure these two elements over against a third element, 
namely, normal distribution of the population, and measure 
its deviation from this normal or random distribution. | In 
historiometric work there is this third element which is the 
novel and peculiar feature. 

The case is quite different when we are dealing with details 
and not with generalizations and correlations. In dealing 
with the question of the real characteristics of Richard III 
of England an examination of the worth of each separate 
statement becomes necessary. The reason for this difference 
needs careful consideration. There is some assurance that 
the mere balancing or averaging of the opinions pro and con 
gives a good and true picture of any one king or prince spe- 
cifically selected out of all royalty. This conclusion is drawn 
from the generalized conclusion that usually such a method 
must give fair approximation of the truth. But any one 
specific individual selected out of a group may be the very 
one to whom such a method of balancing opinions applies 
the least. What is true in the general is likely to be true in 
any special instance, provided we know nothing further about 
the particular instance. But as soon as we do know something 
about the particular instance the case may be altered. The 
same sort of reasoning applies in our ordinary human social re- 
lations and in our everyday knowledge of mankind. For 
some purposes we may wish to know as much as possible 
about some individual person. In default of special knowl- 
edge of the individual, any general knowledge as to his age, 
race, class, profession, or education, would help us to form an 
opinion about him, but a particular and intimate knowledge 
of the individual would be more to be desired, as long as our 
interest centres on the individual. On the other hand, for 
some purposes of generalization, as in anthropology, soci- 
ology, life insurance, etc., our interest may be general, not 
special. So our interest in history may be special and 
detailed, or it may be directed to discovering general 
principles, correlations, and causes. 



32 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

In studying the life of Richard III a few original docu- 
ments may be worth a great deal more than the multitudinous 
statements of later historians, emanating as far as one can 
see from the writers under the patronage of Henry VII, 
Richard's rival and enemy. If an historian disbelieves the 
older and unfavourable verdict of history, he makes use of 
the reliance on probabilities, but his reliance is essentially 
subjective and personal, and a part of his general judgment 
and common-sense, as a result of his contact with men and 
with books. He knows, or thinks he knows, the probability 
of human vanity, the probability that certain documents 
found in certain places are likely to be genuine. He thinks 
that certain contemporary writers are more likely to be 
trustworthy than others, which ideas are based on other 
probabilities ; he puts the whole together and gives what to 
his mind is the most probable view of the whole situation. 
The reader accepts, in so far as it fits in with his own judg- 
ment, but he never is obliged to do so in the way one is obliged 
to accept a mathematical demonstration. 

It does not seem possible in the present state of knowledge 
to devise a method which shall give objective proof in prob- 
lems of isolated periods or in questions of historical detail. 
Nor does it seem desirable to do so. We do not wish to 
eliminate the personal equation from the specialist of his- 
torical details. The personal equation is the best thing about 
him ; or at least should be. It ought to represent advanced 
knowledge from advanced experience. But the historian 
who goes in for explaining general causes or even the special 
causes of limited periods is in a very different position. No 
excuse can be offered for the self-satisfied historian who 
plumes himself for the gratuitous task of confidently supply- 
ing the reader with the reasons why this or that has taken 
place. The difference is this. Many a man has been able 
to handle the purely descriptive side of history in a way to 
give fair satisfaction to the great majority of his intelligent 
critics. The world of scholarship as a whole is satisfied 



PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY AND HISTORIOMETRY 33 

with most if not all of his statements ; therefore something 
definite has been accomplished, something permanently 
worth while has been done when a specialist publishes a book 
or memoir of descriptive history and confines himself to 
facts and judgments. 

But no one Kas ever gone high enough in subjective judg- 
ment to settle questions of historical causation. This is evi- 
denced by the great diversity of interpretations, both major 
and minor, and the dissatisfaction, on every hand, which 
such attempts have always met. And even if there should 
arise a superhuman being whose subjective judgments were so 
perfect that he allotted all causes correctly, ordinary mortals 
would still need the proofs ; otherwise, how should we know 
that he was right ? The orthodox methods may suffice for 
those who seek to weigh documentary evidence and recon- 
struct the past. In so far as historians are unearthing 
Mss. and comparing sources and deciding in their own minds 
what evidence is genuine and what is false, no slurs can be 
cast at the modern school ; their methods are scientific and 
their aims are in the majority of cases sincerely directed to the 
discovery of the truth. Nor are such specialists merely 
worthy of being called into court as witnesses of facts. They 
are also entitled to qualify as experts on questions involving 
opinions. 

History as we commonly find it in the printed accounts 
must approximate sufficiently to what actually happened, 
to meet the need of ordinary purposes, both of scientific 
analysis and superstructure. Historians must have already 
sifted facts and reported judgments with a high degree of 
sanity and completeness (at least for some departments of 
history), otherwise the interlocking results of historiometry 
which I have found could most emphatically 7iot be found. 
The phrase "report of judgments" I use to cover all expres- 
sions of evaluation of the traits of historical characters, good 
or bad, the general use of adjectives of praise and dispraise, 
and also the giving of opinions concerning the condition of a 

D 



34 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

nation's army, navy, treasury, trade, and commerce, or other 
direct statements which historians make involving the use 
of judgment, but stopping short of questions of cause. It is 
very easy to say that George IV of England was immoral. 
It is not only easy to say, but it is easy to find agreement in 
the sources and to get agreement among f he readers ; to 
bring everything together and to arrive at this one conclusion 
and no other. It may be (judging from the naive way in 
which some historians write) very easy for them to say why 
George IV was immoral, but it is not so easy for them to 
make other people believe it.^ 

An author who says "commerce declined" assumes a 
very different kind of responsibility from one who says 
"commerce declined because," etc. It is the unfounded, I 
might say confounded, introduction of the word because 
against which I protest. There may be a few obvious causes 
of broad historic movements for which general agreement 
can be reached without any specially arranged contrivance 
for compelling the proof, but I do not happen to think of 
any for the moment. Even the classical assumptions that 
Rome declined because of its luxury, and Greece was injured 
through the rivalries of petty states, are open to serious ob- 
jections, and to many counter-arguments ; and even if it 
be agreed that these factors enter somewhat into the prob- 
lem, unless we have some kind of a notion of how deeply 
they enter in, unless through some scientific scheme we have 
arranged the many contributing causes somewhat in the 
order of their importance, what is the use ? 

Dogmatic statements do not and will not satisfy, so com- 
plicated are the problems of historical causation. The his- 
torian who glibly says, because of, and then trips lightly on 

1 My own belief that George IV was immoral primarily on account of hia 
heredity is derived from scientific induction. All the facts concerning the 
moral deviation of royalty can be explained only on the theory of gametic 
heredity. They can, on the whole, best be explained by leaving the in- 
fluence of environment out. Therefore, what is true of the general is most 
probably true of any particular instance taken at random. 



PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY AND HISTORIOMETRY 35 

liis way to deal with some other political cataclysm or human 
enigma, and satisfy a psychology or political philosophy as 
superficial in the reader as it is in him, should be ridiculed 
out of existence. 

Although the methods of objectivity and induction seem 
slow at first, results will multiply as time goes on, and one 
well-grounded research makes another that much easier. 
The paradox of historiometry, which I have explained at such 
length, is a mathematical concept which gives great encourage- 
ment to ventures in the domain of historical interpretation, 
especially because it shows that it may not be necessary 
for the investigator to spend a great deal of time deciding 
upon the reliability of the sources he proposes to use. He 
should start with authorities supposed to be good, because 
good authorities contain fewer random errors than do poor 
ones, and, therefore, any previously hidden truth will be forced 
to show itself more distinctly. He should, on beginning 
the research, consider the question of constant errors (bias 
towards the hypothesis which he has in mind) and before 
closing the research he should consider this question again, 
either to prove its triviality or measure its importance ; 
but he need not concern himself again with the scattering 
errors. The random or scattering errors become important 
only should he wish special refinement of measurement. 
For instance, in the present research my conclusion is that 
monarchs have influenced history ; moreover, that monarchs 
have influenced European history from the eleventh to the 
nineteenth century very much, and that the characteristics 
of monarchs are correlated with the conditions of their 
countries to at least a probable r = .60.^ None of these 
conclusions could have been falsely induced by the random 
or scattering errors. Consideration of random errors is nec- 
essary only when measuring the full correlation. 

In all attempts to unravel causation in history, the com- 
parative method is needed, and reliable results can only be 

1 1.00 being perfect correlation, .0 being no correlation. 



36 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

obtained after a wide range of historical reading has been 
methodically systematized. We must discover correlations, 
and after finding that A is correlated with B we must then 
devise ways of determining how much A is the cause of B, 
or how much B is the cause of A, or; if both are caused by 
still another force. We can only have a science of history by 
comparing facts drawn from a great many countries. We 
must not ignore the evidence from the smaller nations. A 
knowledge of the history of Holland, Denmark, Spain, 
Portugal, or even Mecklenburg, and Reuss may be, for some 
purposes, just as valuable as a knowledge of the history of 
Rome, or Greece, or England. The fourteen countries here 
studied are widely representative of the various people of 
Europe. I should like to have included Hungary, Poland, 
Greece, Saxony, and Bavaria and several other countries. 
Indeed, the Italian cities might very profitably be studied in 
relation to the Sforzas, the Viscontis, and the Medicis. As 
every reader must imagine, the labour is considerable in bring- 
ing together all the relevant materials covering several 
centuries for any one country. But it would not have done 
to have stopped without a sufficiently large collection of 
elementary data. The number of elementary parts (minia- 
ture histories) which I have constructed (368) being large 
enough to meet statistical demands and to answer nearly all 
the questions which I had in mind at the start, I have stopped 
with this number. 

The following fourteen chapters give a summary, as briefly 
as possible, of the history of the fourteen countries studied. 
They discuss the more concentrated tabulations found in the 
Appendix. If a monotonous story is thus presented , the reader 
must remember that it is only the repetition of observations 
that compels the surety of science. Probably no other single 
factor will be found as important as the one here emphasized ; 
and if this be true, then the key to this section of European 
history is to be found in the material which lies ahead, the 
disclosure of which certainly merits the most careful scrutiny. 



CHAPTER III 



FRANCE 



With Hugh Capet (987-996) commences the history of 
the real and lasting French nation, as distinct from the 
Germanic Empire of Charlemagne, and therefore there is 
here, in many ways, a point of departure, clear cut and con- 
venient. Yet there are drawbacks to beginning at so early a 
date The small nucleus, then called France, continued to 
grow as such. The era is near the beginning of the eleventh 
century (the approximate date from which I would wish 
to trace the histories of the various countries of Europe), and 
we here begin a new dynasty ; but records of some periods 
are still very meagre, and the pen-portraits of certain sov- 
ereigns far from satisfactory. However, concerning a number 
of reigns, even for this early period, interesting and well-known 
facts are sufficiently authenticated for the main purpose of 
this inquiry, though it may be best to treat some sovereigns 
with less assurance, such as Henry I, Louis VII, Louis VIII, 
Philip IV, Louis X, Philip V, Charles IV. Even for Hugh 
Capet, famous though his name certainly is, material is lack- 
ing for a proper estimate of his personality and influence. 

Hugh Capet was probably not a very great man, though 
more than a mediocre one. He possessed the art of managing 
the turbulent men who surrounded him, and often by subtle 
or conciliatory means adapted himself to the needs of his 
times. One must remember that the claims of Hugh were 
recognized by only a fraction of the entire population, and 
his rival, Charles of Lorraine, needed to be vanquished. One 
must also consider how circumscribed in domain and power 

37 



38 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

the country was over which he held the title of king, a title 
which had long since failed to carry any especial dignity 
or influence. The lawless barons were strong. To them 
Hugh was scarcely more than an equal, and thus to gain his 
ends the new king felt himself obliged to make many hand- 
some grants of territory, so that at the close of his reign he 
had less land than when he began. Yet against all the 
warring interests of this troubled time, Hugh Capet held his 
own. He beat in battle the Carlovingian claimant, main- 
tained his dignity in the face of the Papacy and the Empire, 
gave a certain meaning to the sovereign power, and had 
his son and successor crowned during his own lifetime. In 
fact, the grand France of Richelieu and Louis XIV made its 
modest start. 

Unfortunately for this embryonic nation the next king, 
Robert, was not cast in the ancestral mould. For three 
generations the vigour of Robert the Strong had been be- 
queathed to the male descendants of that redoubtable warrior. 
Now a mentally weak, though kindly and pious, prince came 
upon the throne. The reign of Robert (996-1031) was ^^ 
long and inglorious. *'A ceaseless struggle against the 
barons . . . The rising of the servile population ended in 
a sad slaughter of the peasants." A weak king in those days 
had always his own household to fear. Robert's latter 
years were beset with civil wars forced upon him by his 
own queen, and only son Henry, and Robert of Burgundy. 
''Burgundy and the duchy of France suffered under the ills 
which formed the sum of war in those days." 

The conditions were not improved under Henry I, who 
ruled during the twenty-nine years following 1031. With 
petty wars, civil wars, frontier wars, devastating invasion 
by the Normans, who came within twenty miles of Paris, 
France stood for nothing and the kingly power was the same. 
Unfortunately our perception of the personal character of 
Henry I is extremely vague. Contemporary chronicles 
have left nothing of value, and later historians have de- 



FRANCE 39 

scribed his traits in conflicting terms. It will be best to pass 
over this era entirely, for it cannot enlighten the present 
problem. 

When Henry I died, his son Philip was then a child of 
seven years of age. The crown was of so little importance 
by this time that no one wanted it. Perhaps this is why 
no usurper seized the reins, and until Philip came of age, 
his brother-in-law, Count Baldwin of Flanders, was willingly 
given the regency, which he so ably maintained. Baldwin 
is credited with wisdom, energy, and prudence, and he soon 
brought about a decided change in the affairs of France. 
He curbed the nobles and suppressed sedition. The country 
enjoyed a seven years' breathing spell, and his untimely 
death was regretted by all. It is true that Baldwin's regency 
was luckily favoured by the Norman conquest of England, 
which diverted the foes of France towards other plunder. 
Baldwin's title of "Count" was virtually as good as that of 
king. He had, moreover, married a daughter of the late 
king. Therefore, Baldwin is entitled to rank among " royalty," 
and this period must be taken as the second example in favour 
of our thesis. Robert, the son of Hugh Capet, furnished the 
first, though in quite the opposite way. 

The good influence of Baldwin lasted only during his life- 
time, for his royal pupil Philip did not follow the excellent 
example set by his kinsman. Philip had a good education 
and was not deficient in natural aptitude, yet this promis- 
ing young prince developed into one of the very worst of all 
the early kings, and the unhappy country had soon to know 
the terrors of misrule. Philip was not only weak and self-in- 
dulgent, but also devoid of any virtues. He was false, hon- 
ourless, and grasping, lacking in judgment and courage, a dis- 
solute libertine of the most extreme type. Under him France 
again became the scene of interminable petty warfare, dreari- 
ness, and desolation. The Normans again invaded the terri- 
tory of the French. Mantes-sur-Seine was taken and burned, 
and the victors were pressing on, even to the gates of Paris, 



40 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

when, fortunately for France, the Norman leader, William 
the Conqueror, died. 

When Philip was forty-seven years of age he retired into 
obscurity, — the most praiseworthy act of his life. His 
son Louis VI, then but a mere lad of nineteen, was called 
upon to assume the uneasy, and likewise unmeaning, sover- 
eignty. Here was a man of different mettle. With him 
came a sudden and momentous change when viewed in the 
light of the entire history of the French nation, for only 
now did France as a true power begin. 

When Louis VI took upon himself the burdens of govern- 
ment, the limits of the royal domain were very narrow. 
The pretended extent did not amount to one tenth of the 
present territory of France. In reality there was little more 
than the cities of Paris, Orleans, Etampes, Melun, and Com- 
piegne ; for the land between was held by the robber barons 
at war with each other or with the king. Almost within 
sight of Paris itself, the enemies of France could be seen. 
Five miles to the north stood the lord of Montmorency with 
his army. Fifteen miles to the south Montlhery cut the 
royal domain in two by blocking the way to Orleans. There 
were many other rebellious chiefs on all sides. The valiant 
lad mustered what forces he could, and by dint of real genius 
for war, and ability to bring the forces of the clergy and the 
populace over to his side, subdued and humbled the rebels 
one by one. The frontiers were rendered secure, the poor 
found a protector, and one even sees the faint beginnings 
of independent commune life. All authorities agree that 
Louis VI was a man of very superior ability, and they like- 
wise never fail to praise his many virtues and noble qualities. 
The change which came about was sudden, and a great con- 
trast to the reigns of his predecessors. It is true that the 
Crusades lent their aid by diverting the attention of some of 
his enemies away to other lands, but aside from this, every- 
thing was against him. Louis VI had at the beginning the 
same feeble resources and the same lawless barons; yet he 



FRANCE 41 

overcame all obstacles, and died one of the great men of 
his time. 

Another notable figure of the period was the Abbe Suger, 
whom Louis VI prudently chose as his counsellor, and to 
whom much of the great work accomplished during his reign 
is said to be due. Fortunately for France the influence of 
this shrewd and politic churchman was equally great in the 
reign of Louis VII, at least during its early years, while this 
king was away on chimerical crusades. Under Suger the 
country enjoyed the blessings of peace and security. The 
foreign policy was strong. The finances were well admin- 
istered. The royal power expanded and its revenues in- 
creased. Churches sprang up, cities renewed their franchises, 
and moreover something of liberty and justice was accorded 
to common men who glorified the name of the great prelate, 
and called him "Pater Patriae." 

Here was a country prospering without a great king, 
for Louis VII was at most mediocre. He was weak and pious, 
easily under the domination of the church, which fortunately 
had so good a leader. Louis was gentle, well-meaning, and 
virtuous, and indeed rather learned for the times. He may 
be placed in the doubtful or inferior grade intellectually, 
while the material conditions must be classified under the 
general term "progress." Louis VII might be placed in the 
middle grade, but to be on the safe side I grant this reign to 
count against my thesis, — the importance of royalty. I 
do not, however, grant it against the broad theory of the pre- 
ponderant influence of a certain few individual personalities, 
for in Suger we find our notable man. 

We now come to the second of the great French kings, 
Philip Augustus (1180-1223). When he began to reign 
alone he was but a lad of fifteen. The vassals and barons, 
on account of the youth of the king, thought that now was 
the time to make merry with the crown. They were con- 
siderably disappointed. What certain boy-kings have done 
in the way of dignified and successful leadership, immediately 



42 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

after coming into their own, is extraordinary. In the 
maturity of after life, these royal prodigies have always, 
as far as I recall, developed into superior or indeed extremely 
illustrious rulers.^ They have, during their lives, time and 
time again been called upon personally to lead and direct 
their armies against the best generals of foreign realms, or 
to meet some rising tide of plotting factions within their own 
domestic circles. Judging by the record of their latter years, 
it would seem that these precocious princes must truly have 
been geniuses in embryo, and that their early triumphs 
could not have been the outcome of mere fortunate circum- 
stances. 

Philip Augustus at once began to show the mettle he was 
made of and the characteristic policy of his reign. He 
demanded subjection from all and took orders from no man. 
His untiring ambition was to get for himself and the mon- 
archy which he represented, as much as he possibly could 
of that power and dominion which the great feudatory chiefs 
had so insolently and lawlessly administered. Being but a 
lad, his mother and uncles expected to keep him still in lead- 
ing strings, but with the help of Henry of England and a 
following of young men of the realm, free lances, and paid 
men (Brabagons) he showed his would-be repressors that 
he was indeed already a king. "Within five years and before^ 
he was twenty-one years old, this proud stripling grandson 
of the able Louis VI had won sixty-five chateaux in Ver- 
mandois, also the important city of Amiens, had vanquished 
Flanders and seized parts of it and had reduced to docile, 
servitude the prince of Champagne." ^ 

It is said that he had dreams of restoring the Empire of 
Charlemagne, and the story goes that about this time he was 
seen one day by his courtiers gnawing a green bough, and 
glaring about him wildly. One of them asked him boldly 
what he was thinking of, and he replied, "I am wondering 

1 Richard II of England is an exception. 

* Lavisse, "Histoire de France," vol. iii, pt. i, p. 89. 



FRANCE 43 

whether God will grant me or my heirs grace to raise France 
once more to the heights she reached in the days of Charle- 
magne."^ A few years later he had conquered Maine and 
Touraine, but much of this was restored. 

The chief work of Philip Augustus was the conquest of 
Normandy. This he easily brought about because its ruler, 
John of England (of Magna Charta notoriety), was both 
weak in nature and resources, and had no proper following. 
John's subjects having turned against him, outraged at the 
murder of the little Prince Arthur, Philip found an open 
road in taking upon himself the burden of vengeance for the 
lad's death. Chateau Gaillard held out for a time against 
the French, but John himself did nothing save fly to England. 
When this famous castle fell and Rouen had been taken, all 
Normandy readily accepted the mastery of the French king, 
— feeling no doubt that Philip could not be worse than John. 
Thus a large and important territory was permanently added 
to the French monarchy. It was a question of kings; but 
it was brought about more through the weakness of one king 
than through the strength of another. 

With Normandy came also those other possessions of the 
English crown, — Touraine, Anjou, Maine, and Poitou. 
France was opened to the sea from the Seine to the north, 
and its territory was more than doubled in extent. The 
other great event of Philip Augustus' life was his signal 
defeat of the triple alliance formed against the French by the 
English, Flemings, and Germans. At the battle of Bouvines 
in 1214 he worsted the Emperor Otto IV and won the first 
great French victory. After this, Philip lived in compara- 
tive tranquillity and devoted himself to the consolidation and 
improvement of his country. He encouraged the growth of 
cities, paved Paris, increased the efficiency of the army, and 
managed the finances well. Industry and commerce took 
new life and France was again on the upward road. Thus 
a period of marked national progress is synchronous with the 

1 Kitchin. 



44 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

presence of a remarkable personality. Philip Augustus was 
certainly a great king. As a conqueror and administrator he 
stands forth one of the most striking figures in early French 
history. His intellect was of the clear, cold, and crafty type. 
Ambition and force formed the most conspicuous traits of 
his character. Further analysis of his virtues and vices 
must be rather uncertain owing to the dearth of contemporary 
records. Some say he was hard on the lower classes, some 
say not. It can scarcely be supposed that he was a man of 
tender heart or super-refined scruples. "He loved wine and 
women," and "was sometimes given to angry fits of passion, 
but soon recovered himself." ^ Whether Philip Augustus 
was, strictly speaking, popular or not, we cannot say, but 
certainly his subjects believed in him and unquestionably 
followed him in the great work which he laid down for him- 
self in early life, the realization of which he in such a great 
measure achieved. 

After the reign of Philip Augustus there follows the brief 
period of three years, when Louis VIII sat upon the throne. 
The chief events of this reign were the submission of Lower 
Poitou, Limousin, and Perigord, a successful but costly cru- 
sade against the Albigenses, and the granting of freedom to 
the serfs in the fife of Etampes. All together it seems to 
have been a rather prosperous period. However, we know 
too little of the personal traits of Louis VIII to estimate his 
own position in the events of the time. Authorities differ 
as to his ability, some crediting him with vigour and under- 
standing, others calling him weak, and attributing his activity 
to the promptings of his queen (the famous Blanche of 
Castile), about whom none differ, all praising her superior 
qualities. He appears to have been at least pious and 
chaste. 

Louis VIII died in his fortieth year and was succeeded by 
his son Louis IX, then a boy eleven years old. Again the 
barons thought their time had come, but again, as in the early 

1 Lavisse, vol. iii, pt. i, p. 284. 



FRANCE 45 

days of Philip Augustus, they were doomed to bitter dis- 
appointment. This time it was a woman who came to the 
fore, Blanche of Castile, daughter of Alfonso the Noble, and 
maternal granddaughter of one of England's greatest kings, 
Henry II. 

Blanche, by her powers of fascination, won over the leader 
of the barons, Theobald of Champagne, and then by dint of 
rapid action and by securing the burghers of Paris for the 
royal side brought victory out of languid wars, until at last 
she found the country pacified and had even in the mean- 
while actually extended the royal domains. The long 
quarrel with the Count of Toulouse came to an end with 
marked advantage to France, and thus the way was paved 
for the gradual absorption of the South. Beaucaire, 
Carcassonne, Beziers, Narbonne, Nimes, Velay, and Albi- 
geois were added to the territory of the crown ; most worth 
while was the condition of tranquillity which Queen Blanche 
established as a foundation for the great work of her son 
Louis IX. 

There seems to be no question about the high ability of 
Blanche, and the son was worthy of the mother, as she in 
her turn had been an honour to her own illustrious forebears. 
Blanche came of remarkable stock, and her sister Berengaria 
was one of the greatest and best of Spanish queens. Thus 
Louis IX, being a grandson of Philip Augustus, had, consider- 
ing both sides of the house, a pedigree such as is seldom met 
with. The expectations of heredity did not fail, for Louis 
IX became one of the greatest and best of French kings, and 
all in all, one of the best and noblest characters of his time. 

After her son reached his majority, and even up to 
the time of her death, the queen-mother did not cease to lend 
her councils and take an important part in the affairs of 
state. The whole period of Louis IX is forty-four years of 
signal prosperity. The chivalrous and pious king must 
needs (following the craze of the times) njake two unprofitable 
and futile crusades, yet even such mistakes were not serious 



46 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

and he reaped a certain glory. During the first of these 
crusades, the queen-mother successfully managed affairs at 
home. The second was of brief duration. It lasted but a 
few months, when the king contracted the fever which cost 
him his life. On the side of progress there is a great deal 
to more than outweigh these two ill-timed expeditions. Most 
important of all, the country remained within its own borders 
in a state of quietude while justice was well administered. 
Population, commerce, and industry increased ; and with it 
the total wealth of the land. This is especially shown by the 
great number of public buildings such as hospitals, asylums, 
churches, and abbeys which sprang up. In addition to his 
great work of quieting feudal hostility and of destroying the 
strongholds of feudal independence, he added largely to the 
actual domain of the crown. Louis IX, who in his day was 
"King of Kings," the idol of his people, has lost no lustre 
in the passing centuries. He was canonized shortly after 
his death. For long ages his anniversary was solemnly 
kept by the French people, and to this day the name of Saint 
Louis stands among the very foremost in French history. 
He was not a great general ; he was perhaps too scrupulously 
conscientious for that ; but as an example of what one man 
may accomplish when the highest moral purposes are united 
to a steadfast aim, the patron saint of the French illustrates 
in the strongest way the force which springs from personal 
character. 

Philip III (1270-1285) was a weak, ignorant, though pious 
prince, guided entirely by his counsellors. These were 
mostly lawyers, and seem to have known how to maintain 
the royal authority now that it was so well established. 
Internal tranquillity remained, and this is the most that can 
be said to its advantage. The actual territory of the crown 
was increased, but this came through inheritance and not by 
conquest. Languedoc, Vivarais, and Rouergue fell to Philip 
through the extinction of the House of St. Gilles, with the 
deaths of his uncle and wife. France received, in her external 



FRANCE 47 

relations, a distinct check in two serious disasters, the "Sicil- 
ian Vespers," and the victory of Roger de Laria, which de- 
prived Charles of Anjou (uncle of Philip III) of the throne of 
Naples. Furthermore, an expedition led into Aragon by Philip 
III himself met with poor success and cost the king his life. 

Philip III was followed by Philip IV, Louis X, Philip V, 
and Charles IV. We know too little about the personal 
traits of these kings to bring their history into this discus- 
sion. The whole generation (1285-1328) was one of confu- 
sion, and in general one of decline. It is natural to feel that 
if these kings had been distinctly able, the records concerning 
them would not be so meagre. 

After the death of Charles IV we come upon firmer ground. 
The character of Philip VI is very clearly drawn. He was 
brave and headstrong and as ambitious for military fame as 
he was for the idle glory of pomp and tournament ; but he 
was totally lacking in most of the qualities needful in a king. 
Moderation and ideas of justice were far removed from his 
mind. Though pious and possessed of some generous 
impulses, he was vain, false, heartless, and violent, and 
worst of all for France, no high ability compensated. ''His 
reign must be marked as a great beginning of woes to his 
nation. Philip tampered with the coin of the realm, and by 
vexatious restrictions interfered with and in fact almost 
stopped the course of trade throughout France. Thus he 
alienated the merchants and burghers, and at the same time 
dried up the sources of revenue. . . . Commerce ceased to 
pass through France. . . . France was in a state of deso- 
late barbarism, her people sunk in misery. In one respect 
alone did the kingdom seem to gain. Philip bought Vienne 
and the district and city of Montpellier, to pay for which he 
debased the coin. Thus ended a dark and melancholy reign. 
All things seemed to be evil in France, oppression, war, 
pestilence, faithlessness in king and people, days of shame 
and distress." ^ It was during the reign of Philip VI that 

1 Kitchin, vol. i, pp. 394, 422. 



48 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

the overwhelming French defeat at Cr6cy occurred and the 
beginning of the hundred years which placed France in 
chaos. 

Another king almost exactly like Philip VI follows, 
and also a similar reign. John II, the son, appears to have 
inherited his traits exclusively from his father, Philip VI. 
He is described as rash, ignorant, obstinate, incapable, 
passionate, cruel, self-indulgent, gay, and luxurious. He was 
called "le bon" because he loved tournaments and dances. 
Affairs of state were left to weak administrators. France 
suffered the great defeat at Poitiers (1356). Everything 
went wrong. Finances were wasted. Taxes were excessive. 
Bands of lawless soldiery ranged the land. Anarchy was alone 
supreme. John himself was taken captive into England (little 
of a prize that he was), and his son Charles, afterwards 
known as Charles the Wise, ruled as regent during the four 
years' absence of this monarch. Charles, at the beginning 
of his regency, was but nineteen years of age, and although in 
later life he well merited the epithet which history has be- 
stowed on him, at that period of his career Charles was any- 
thing but "the Wise." He was only a foolish, extravagant 
youth, rather indifferent to the seriousness of the situation. 
During the absence of John, darkness and confusion con- 
tinued throughout France. The Jacquerie, an organization 
of the peasantry, made an unsuccessful attempt to govern 
Paris and wreak revenge upon the nobles. There was a 
further financial decline ; and at the end, France had to 
submit to the humiliating Peace of Br^tigny (1360), by which 
she gave up to England a vast extent of territory and agreed 
to pay a ransom for their king of 3,000,000 francs. France 
was now smaller than she had been under Philip Augustus. 

No clearer picture of the miseries of the times, and the 
utter dejection into which the nation had fallen, can be drawn 
than in the words of the unfortunate and pernicious King 
John himself. This oft-quoted passage appeared in connec- 
tion with a certain ordinance which he issued about this time, 



FRANCE 49 

in which the king takes occasion to excuse the shame of the 
Peace of Bretigny. "By the space of four years and over 
have we and this our people ever sustained and suffered 
many ills, discomfitures and griefs ; for as these grew daily 
worse and worse, tidings come to us how that the people of 
our realm were divided, and were slaying and destroying 
each other and giving themselves up to rebellion and dis- 
obedience, and were committing divers horrible and enormous 
crimes, such as made it plain that had such things gone on, 
our realm and people would have been utterly destroyed, 
with perdition of all they had. Wherefore, all things con- 
sidered, we made the aforesaid peace ; for we have found 
that in our own realm there have been divisions and rebel- 
lions, robbery, pillage, arson, larcenies, seizures, violence, 
oppressions, exactions, extortions, and many other cruel 
misdeeds and excesses, justice ill-administered, many new 
taxes levied, and much seizing, carrying off and putting to 
ransom of personages, stores, horses, beasts and other goods, 
whereby all industry is at an end." It would seem that the 
king imagined that this woful state of affairs was somehow 
associated with his own enforced absence. He had indeed 
little ground for such a vain belief. 

King John returned to France for a brief space and then 
went back again into English captivity. During these 
years of John's return to France (1360-1364) Charles also 
acted as regent ; but he had not yet begun to show the ex- 
ceptional strength and practical wisdom for which he became 
famous after the death of his father, who, fortunately for 
France, was taken off in 1364. These four years were years 
of disorder and misery, without a soul to hold the anarchy 
in check. The ''free companies" ranged the land, and want 
and pestilence added to the awful scene. 

With the actual reign of Charles V occurred a remarkable 
change, both in the character of the king himself and in the 
visible conditions of the country. Charles was now twenty- 
seven years of age. He had always been crafty in furthering 



50 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

his aims and not devoid of natural ability, but he had shown 
himself indifferent to affairs of state, — a spendthrift in his 
habits and a poor and cowardly soldier in the field. Now he 
took to work and directed everything. He worked hard 
in his own methodical, mysterious, and scheming way, shut 
up in his closet, a sinister figure not unlike Philip II of Spain, 
with all the strings of government leading from his own 
person. Charles V never himself took the field, but he knew 
how to choose the ablest commanders to do the fighting for 
him, and found in Du Guesclin and others, men to carry out 
his most pressing needs, — the abolition of the roving "free 
companies" and the expulsion of the English from French 
soil. The king shrewdly turned the one against the other, 
and sent the ''free companies" to fight the English, who 
were then with the Black Prince in Spain. 

It is not necessary to go into details regarding all the war- 
fare of this reign. It is sufficient to say that Charles' policy 
was successful, that the tottering monarchy again became 
powerful, and that law and order were reestablished. The 
English were gradually driven back to their island, until at 
the close of his reign scarcely anything of importance re- 
mained to them within the confines of present France. 

In addition to accomplishing this weighty task, general 
peace and order led to an increase in the general prosperity 
of all classes. The internal administration was good and 
the financial condition improved. "The taxation was no 
doubt heavy and enforced on clergy and lay folk alike, but 
in return there was peace and security during which men 
could work." 

Charles V was unquestionably a very able sovereign, and 
the true fountain-head from which the various beneficial 
measures sprang. Thus the fourth important period of 
French growth, 1364-1380, was under the leadership of the 
fourth distinctly superior king ; the other three being Louis 
VI, 1100-1137, Philip Augustus, 1180-1223, and Louis IX, 
1263-1270. 



FRANCE 51 

The brilliant reign of Charles V was followed by the 
minority of Charles VI, — some eight miserable years, until 
this half-witted youth came to his legal majority. Years 
of discretion Charles VI never attained. The guidance of 
the government was intrusted to his three uncles, a worth- 
less trio. Each worked for his selfish interests. The ruling 
power was so much divided that it is difficult to correlate 
the traits of any one, or all of them, with the condition of 
times. The period illustrates the rapid cessation of progress 
and order as soon as a rugged king was removed by death, 
and no other suitable person was on hand to take his place. 
The rule of the uncles was disastrous for France; "no good 
government seemed possible for that unhappy land." 

Charles VI was feeble-minded even as a youth. Before 
he reached full manhood his mind gave way entirely, influ- 
enced partly by debauchery ; and he was ever after, except 
for lucid periods of short duration, a mad king. The same 
dismal political and economic conditions returned to France 
as in the reign of the weak and useless John. Since the 
death of Edward III and the Black Prince, England had been 
falling back under her own weak king, Richard II, while 
France had been steadily rising under the leadership of 
Charles the Wise. Now, under Charles the Mad, the reverse 
was to take place, and there is no more gloomy period in 
French history than the coming fifty years. 

France lost at Agincourt. Rouen was taken by the Eng- 
lish. To add to this were burdens from excessive taxa- 
tion, and riots and turbulence of civil wars, as the country 
was torn asunder under various factions. Moreover, Bur- 
gundy, under a line of able dukes, was gradually over- 
shadowing the French monarchy. This inglorious period 
lasted all through the reign of Charles VI and continued 
unabated for about seven years into the reign of his successor, 
Charles VII. The turn in the tide is again synchronous with 
the appearance of a remarkable personality, but this time 
it is no royal will that stems the onrushing current of disso- 



52 THE INFLUENCE OF MONAKCHS 

lution. It is a poor peasant girl of Domremy whose inspired 
leadership is to rouse the French nation and turn defeat 
into victory and mark an epoch in the upbuilding of 
France. 

With the siege of Orleans, in 1429, the fortunes of the 
French were at their lowest ebb. The city was about to 
surrender. Joan of Arc personally led and inspired the 
troops and raised the siege. Whatever may have been the 
secret of her mysterious power, the years which followed 
demonstrated that the relief of Orleans was indeed the end 
of the long period of decline which, broken only by the reign 
of Charles the Wise, had been dragging on in France for 
more than a hundred years. The Maid of Orleans was not 
permitted to serve long in the deliverance of her country, 
but before her death the English were already broken. 

Charles VII did nothing to save the incomparable heroine, 
to whom he owed his throne, and in fact did little at any time 
that can evoke the historian's praise. He was a shallow, lazy, 
self-indulgent prince, temporarily rousing himself, but ever 
sinking back in debauchery. His end was wretched in the 
extreme, and he died beset by terrors and delusions, almost 
as insane as his father, Charles VI. Charles VII, however, 
was not without prudence, patience, and judgment, and in 
the choice of servants he was particularly fortunate. He 
was indeed the "well-served," sometimes also called Charles 
"the victorious," but his victories were the victories of others, 
to which Joan of Arc, the able Dunois, and the Dauphin 
(afterwards the crafty and celebrated Louis XI) contributed. 
During the reign of Charles VII the English were driven out 
of all France, save three seacoast towns. Taxation was 
regulated, a standing army was organized and well estab- 
lished, lawlessness was suppressed and finances were re- 
formed ; yet this reign cannot be taken as counting to the 
credit of royalty. Charles VII may belong in the doubtful 
class of "plus or minus," as far as mental qualities are 
concerned, or he may belong to the inferior group ; it is diffi- 



FRANCE 53 

cult to say. The general misery which accompanied the 
Hundred Years' War did not by any means disappear, yet 
all in all, the condition of France was clearly one of progress ; 
and we shall take the king at "minus" to be on the safe 
side, and let this reign stand as an exception. 

The son of Charles VII had rendered great assistance to 
his father, but he had also turned in rebellion against him. 
He had filled his father's mind with strange terrors until, his 
besotten intellect giving way, he died of starvation, fearful 
lest the son should poison him. This son became one of the 
best known kings in history, — the notorious old schemer, 
Louis XI. We think of him as a sly, suspicious, heartless 
creature, a rat-like contriver of mischief. It is hard to find 
his personal moral virtues ; yet France grew notably stronger 
in many ways under this silent, sinister, despotic ruler. 
Perhaps Louis XI really had the good of his country at heart 
when on his death-bed he expressed his only wish that he 
might live to put the affairs of state in a little better order. 
As it was, a great work had been accomplished. In the first 
place, the actual territory of France was greatly enlarged. 
Furthermore, it was unified and strengthened, and rendered 
a compact and powerful entity. With security within its 
borders, trade and commerce (especially the cities, the cor- 
porations, and the silk and mining industries) made rapid 
advance. The country grew richer, and although the taxes 
were heavy, they could well be borne. There was an un- 
doubted progress on the economic side during this reign. 
The only serious point against the administration of Louis XI 
was that the strongly centralized government seriously 
undermined the personal liberties of the people. It is said 
to have prepared the way for the France of Richelieu and 
Louis XIV. Be that as it may, the marks of territorial and 
economic growth are so noteworthy, and the ambition, 
industry, and ability of the king so well acknowledged that 
the reign affords a clear example of marked progress under an 
exceptionally able, though morally deformed, ruler. 



54 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

The next period, a regency during the minority of Charles 
VIII, was intrusted to his sister Anne, who proved excep- 
tionally gifted. She was energetic and well-informed, firm, 
wise, and prudent. Like her father, her virtues were not 
her strong point. She was of an austere and haughty tem- 
perament, selfish, perhaps unscrupulous in her methods ; 
but as far as the results of her rule of eight years were con- 
cerned they were all on the favourable side. Intrigues and 
revolts were suppressed. France triumphed over the rivalry 
of Austria. The allies were defeated. Brittany was forced 
to submission. There was even one important internal 
reform, — a new method of election of the States General. 

Charles VIII unfortunately did not resemble his elder 
sister and inherit the superior ability of their father. No 
contrast could be greater than that between Louis XI and 
Charles VIII, called "the Affable," who in 1491 married and 
began to rule independent of the regent. He was then 
twenty-one years of age, a self-willed prince, deformed in 
body and weak in mind. He was indeed amiable and gra- 
cious, and filled with romantic ambition, but lacked judgment, 
and his education had been seriously neglected. To igno- 
rance he added debauchery, so there is little to be said in his 
praise. Foolish and quixotic, the story of his reign reflects 
the character of the man. The chief event was the Italian 
campaign, part of that ill-advised and useless chain of events 
in which the princes of France laid claim to the throne of 
Naples and Sicily. What Charles VIII conquered he soon 
lost, and the wars only wasted the resources of France and 
brought no advantage. During the reign of Charles VIII, 
France also lost Cerdagne, Rousillon, Burgundy, and Artois. 
Trade and industry remained about the same, but the reign 
as a whole was certainly a weak one, and the king both 
mentally and morally a minus quantity. 

During the reign of Louis XII (1498-1515) there are a num- 
ber of points which definitely count on the side of progress. 
The finances were_ brought into good order. There was an 



FRANCE 55 

improvement in the army, as well as in the condition of agri- 
culture, and in the administration of justice. The arts from 
Italy, especially architecture, made a notable advance. It 
does not appear that the king himself was strongly influential 
in this upward movement, except in so far as he relied on 
able ministers (chiefly d'Amboise), though perhaps he had 
the good of the people at heart. Louis XII is altogether a 
puzzling character to understand. Undoubtedly a bon enfant, 
a humane king, except in war, when he was correspondingly 
cruel, Louis XII was far too lazy and self-indulgent, and of too 
narrow a mind to bring about the marked improvements of 
his reign. A leading authority says that his intellect was 
superior to that of Charles VIII, but not above mediocrity. 
His lack of judgment allowed him to be drawn into Italian 
affairs, and this foreign policy was always weak. Yet on 
the whole this period must be considered one of progress ; 
and although the ability of Louis XII may properly belong 
in the middle grade, for the sake of being in a secure position 
I will place him in the minus or inferior category. This is 
the third and last example in French history in which the 
intellectual rating of the king and the conditions of the coun- 
try fall in diametrically conflicting grades. 

Much may be said on both sides concerning the reign of 
Francis I, and also there is much to be said pro and con in 
regard to the mental endowments of the king himself. He 
was brilliant and accomplished, called "the king of culture," 
brave and ambitious, but his gifts were superficial and his 
chivalry a mockery. Though shallow in brain and heart, 
Francis was undoubtedly an exceptional man and played a 
great figure in his day. The marked advance in wealth, 
industries, agriculture, and internal trade, the increase in 
population (especially the new skilled artisans from Florence), 
and the judicial reforms may be taken as offsetting the high 
taxation, andthe wasting of resources in foreign wars. These 
wars were, on the whole, neither successful nor unsuccessful. 
They brought no new territory, yet France, beset as she was 



56 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

by many powerful enemies, held her own, and in the end 
remained intact. 

The wars continued through the reign of Henry II (1547- 
1559), ending in the Peace of Cateau-Cambresis. The terms 
of this treaty showed the indecisive result of the long conflict 
waged chiefly against the House of Hapsburg. Financial 
resources suffered a further decline, and likewise, as in 
the period of Francis I, industry continued to advance. 
The reign of Henry II falls in the doubtful grade. Henry 
himself had little influence on the affairs of his time. It was 
really the reign of the Constable Anne of Montmorency, 
Diana of Poitiers, and the Duke of Guise. Henry was of 
mediocre or inferior intelligence, dull, gloomy, and obstinate. 
He was perhaps honest, and not evil in his intentions, but 
his character lacked strength and he was much under the 
influence of his aged mistress, Diana of Poitiers. 

Francis II was sixteen years old at the time of his father's 
death. Being a feeble, sickly, backward youth, the govern- 
ment of the nation fell naturally into the hands of others. 
In a divided regency they intrigued for power, until the king 
died, a year and a half after his accession. The Dukes of Guise, 
Charles and Francis, had charge of the civil and military 
affairs, respectively, while Catherine de' Medici was regent 
in title but without influence. This divided state of the 
regency is reflected in the conditions of the times. Violence, 
party factions, civil and religious strife, make up the story of 
France during these sorry months. This condition con- 
tinued during the minority of Charles IX, younger brother 
of the late king. The religious wars injured mercantile and 
industrial activity, but there are several points on the favour- 
able side. Catherine de' Medici was now sole regent. This 
remarkable and gifted woman, so notorious for her unscrupu- 
lous career, had the good sense to appoint as prime minister 
Michel de L'Hopital. To him are ascribed the measures 
taken to reduce the debt and to place the finances in a better 
condition, and also the reforms in the administration of 



FRANCE 57 

justice. To the credit of France we may add that Havre 
was retaken in 1563. Thus the minority of Charles IX, so 
troubled by the religious wars, is not a period of frank decline. 
Whether these favourable aspects outweigh the unfavourable, 
it is impossible to say. I shall allow this regency to rest in 
the doubtful class. At the head of affairs was a woman of 
indisputable ability, devoid of moral sense. 

In 1571 Charles IX became twenty-one years old, there- 
fore the next three years must be charged to him, although his 
personal influence was very slight. He was a poor, weak, vacil- 
lating creature, diseased in mind and body, immoral and dis- 
honourable, completely under the control of Italian partisans. 
The religious wars and party struggles plunged France deeper 
still in ruin and destitution. Taxes became heavier, trade 
and industry made further decline. Nor did the debacle 
cease under Henry III, — idle, childish, and dissipated, one 
of the weakest of kings both mentally and morally. France 
reached her lowest point since the Hundred Years' War. 
National decadence can go no farther than the condition 
pictured in the single word "anarchy." Either a foreign 
power takes control or a great man arises in the realm.^ 

Now under the White Plume of Navarre came forward 
another Henry of the royal blood of France, who was destined 
to bring an end to all the civil wars. Henry of Navarre, 
afterwards Henry the Great, or Fourth, of France, found a 
way to solve the difficulties of his time. We need not enter 
into the question of the motives which led to abjuration of 
his religion for the sake of the crown, or into the details of 
the wars which ended in a triumph for reason and toleration. 
It is sufficient to recognize first that, whatever may have 
been the faults of Henry IV, he was a king of decidedly su- 
perior ability, and second that during his regime France pros- 
pered immensely. The founder of the Bourbon dynasty 
was not a man of good education or high moral character, 

1 France never lacked great men; in fact, she has been, more than any otherX 
nation, fertile in most forms of genius ; but her specialty has not been statesmen. 



58 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

but he possessed, nevertheless, in a conspicuous degree, 
certain qualities which enabled him to shine, first and always 
as a leader of men, and to live even to this day as the great 
hero of the French people, Henri Quatre, their beau-ideal of a 
warrior, a statesman, and a king. Gifted with tremendous 
energy, dauntless courage, and an intellectual fervour at 
once vigorous and sane, his example and eloquence inspired 
every one. France had long needed a master. The master 
had at last arrived. We see in his later life, selfishness, 
sensuality, light-hearted ingratitude, but all through his 
reign we cannot fail to admire the outward marks of his 
great achievements, and a glorious change in the condition of 
France. 

First of all, peace and order were secured and maintained. 
Then in 1597 the king took the Lord of Rosny, afterwards 
famous as the Duke of Sully, as his right-hand man, and the 
Herculean reforms began. France advanced in practically 
every way that a country's material interests can advance. 
Financial reforms, improvement in the army, better roads, 
more bridges, the beginnings of canals, the remodelling of 
Paris, — advance in agriculture, increase in trade and in- 
dustry, and the acquisition of new and important territory, 
are the marks of the reign of Henry IV. He was one of the 
four greatest kings of France, and it was in his reign that 
France experienced one of her four greatest periods of 
material progress. 

An abrupt change took place in 1610, with the assassina- 
tion of Henry IV. Now a "great man" had gone, and a 
scheming, capricious woman found her way to the helm of 
state. Marie de Medici (who acted as regent during the 
uninspiring years when Louis XIII was a youth) has little to 
recommend her in the eyes of the historian. Her methods 
were petty, her ideals low, and her capacity was of a narrow 
and inferior order. Her government being always in a state 
of indecision and feebleness, the foreign prestige of France 
was considerably weakened. Industry experienced a sudden 



FRANCE 59 

check, and the burdens of taxation increased, while various 
grandees depleted the treasury. The royal power did not 
diminish, but it passed into acknowledgedly weak hands, 
and the regency of Marie de Medici became a period of 
frank decline. 

In 1617 the influence of this woman came to an end, and 
her favourites, the Concini, were put to death. Louis XIII 
was then sixteen years of age. From this time until Decem- 
ber, 1621, another incompetent and unscrupulous person, de 
Luynes, held the chief control. Conditions continued as 
before, with no glory to record for these four years of confu- 
sion and intrigue. The Huguenots took heart and organized 
themselves very strongly, threatening even complete political 
severance from France. The attack in Languedoc was 
unsuccessful and cost the lives of many French soldiers, 
among others de Luynes himself. He died of malignant 
fever December 21, 1621. 

This seems a suitable date to consider as beginning the 
true reign of Louis XIII, although he had been declared 
officially of age in 1614, when only thirteen years old. He 
was now nearly twenty-one, and must be considered the sov- 
ereign ruler of France, just as if Richelieu (who from this time 
on did in fact control everything) had not at all existed. No 
example of a weak king made glorious by a great minister is 
better known or more quickly cited than that of Louis XIII, 
who was so completely overshadowed by the personality 
of Richelieu. But if the internal conditions of the country 
are examined in the light of modern opinions, it is ques- 
tionable if, even here, France made genuine progress under 
non-royal leadership. There are excellent examples of incon- 
testable growth under feeble kings, but this does not happen 
to be one of them. Of the outward splendour, there can be 
no doubt ; nor will any one question the enhanced political 
prestige which made France the centre of the poHtical 
stage and kept her in the lime-light during all the world 
movements of that century. 



60 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

The policy of Richelieu may be summarized under three 
heads, — humiliation of the house of Austria, centralization 
and aggrandizement of the monarchial power, and suppres- 
sion of the Huguenots. In all this he was eminently success- 
ful. The armies of France were, in the end, everywhere 
victorious, and all parties and powers bowed to Richelieu's 
will. Even some new territories, like Sedan, Roussillon, and 
Catalonia, were added to the crown. Yet there are several 
serious charges brought against the administration of the 
great cardinal, a regime which, in point of time, coincides 
almost exactly with the reign of Louis XIII. The great 
wars could not be carried on except at an equal financial 
cost ; and the absolute centralization could not be instituted 
save at the expense of personal liberty and civic independence. 
While the taxes increased, the lavishness of the government 
augmented beyond all bounds, and the deficit steadily grew. 
Internal discord and conspiracies were common. Although 
the manufacture of certain luxuries, like silk and tapestries, 
increased (especially in Paris), trade and industry made on 
the whole but little advance. Commerce with the Levant 
and with the North American colonies declined ; and further- 
more, the common people as a whole were impoverished 
rather than enriched during this famous period of outward 
glory. The king himself was unquestionably a weak man. 
The period itself must be placed in the middle grade. 

On the death of Louis XIII, Anne of Austria became 
regent. Her intellect was of the narrow, intriguing type, 
lacking in depth and political capacity. Neither in virtues 
nor in vices was she a striking figure. The eight years of 
her regency resemble very closely the reign of Louis XIII. 
France gained outwardly and politically. The treaty of 
Westphalia brought prestige and territory, but the strictly 
internal conditions continued on the downward road. Taxes 
became more burdensome, while public and private wealth 
declined, as did commerce and agriculture. 

We now come to the famous reign of Louis XIV, which, 



FRANCE 61 

long and complicated as it was, may be judged and described 
in a very few words. The first portion, up to 1683, was a 
period of progress, the last portion was just as certainly one 
of decline. This is so generally agreed upon, relates to and 
includes such a complete summary of all conditions of polit- 
ical and material affairs, that further detail is unnecessary. 
France first progressed, and then in turn degenerated. It 
does not seem possible to satisfy oneself whether at the end 
of the reign the nation was actually better off or worse off 
than it was at the start. The personal characteristics of the 
sovereign were well marked, and few monarchs have left a 
better defined or more generally remembered portrait of 
themselves in the pages of history than Louis XIV. The vain 
and egotistical figure, with the high heels, the great wig, and 
the walking-stick, the admired centre of all things, goes 
strutting through the dazzling but artificial age. Yet the 
very fact that Louis XIV was able to keep so much power 
and command so much glory speaks something for the per- 
sonality of the man. The "Sun King" was certainly no 
ordinary mortal. He had a great capacity for work, an un- 
bounded ambition, a good knowledge of men and of methods 
to gain his ends, and had what was perhaps more essential in 
enabling him to play his part with such selfish success, an 
unconquerable will which seldom bowed to another's wishes. 

The long reign of Louis XIV was followed by the regency 
of the brilliant and dissolute Duke of Orleans, 1715-1723. 
The conditions here belong also to the middle grade, — on the 
one hand weak diplomacy and financial disorder, on the 
other improvements in agriculture, road, canals, trade, and 
industry.^ 

The regency of the Duke of Orleans was followed by that 
of the Duke of Bourbon, 1723-1726. This brief period 

1 These last four periods are not particularly illuminating to the measurer of 
royal influences, because no one of them, as far as conditions of the country are 
concerned, belongs definitely on either side of the scale. Their effect is to 
slightly lower the final correlation figures. 



62 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

appears to have been weak, both from the financial and 
diplomatic standpoint. For Bourbon himself there is no 
good word. His mind was brutal, his character greedy 
and debauched. He was completely under the influence of 
his mistress, the Marquise de Prie. 

Five years' ministry of the cardinal de Fleury brings us 
to 1731, the time when Louis XV was twenty-one years of 
age. For the sake of being consistent, I will charge these 
five years to non-royal rule, and the years after to the king 
himself. Fleury 's rule "was not strong for good or for evil; 
if no great reforms mark it, still it was free from exacting 
tyranny." ^ The picture on the whole, however, as gained 
from the consensus of opinion is rather favourable than other- 
wise. The government of Fleury extended twelve years 
further into the reign of Louis XV, and its total value in the 
end may be somewhat problematical, but I shall take these 
first five years, which alone concern us here, as beneficial 
or "plus" in the rating. 

Louis XV, who held the throne until 1774, proved himself, 
both as man and king, among the weakest and most despi- 
cable of all royalty. He had little capacity and is only famous 
as a libertine. Timid, indolent, and sensuous, he was at the 
same time cold-blooded and indifferent to the sufferings of 
others. One finds nothing good in his make-up. His long 
reign, covering the half of the eighteenth century, is one of 
the least glorious in the annals of France. The Seven Years' 
War was a great disaster and Canada was lost. The politi- 
cal and military affairs of the country took on a most decadent 
aspect. Commerce and agriculture declined. The financial 
condition approached bankruptcy, while taxes became more 
and more burdensome, until the peasantry were reduced to 
the most extreme misery. The wretched conditions multi- 
plied until even the dull wit of the king saw ahead the deluge 
which was so soon to sweep away a rotten structure and 
bring an end to his ancient line. 

1 Kitcbin, vol. iii, p. 393. Ed. 1894. 



FRANCE 63 

Following the death of Louis XV, the conditions improved 
for a time, in the reign of Louis XVI. Under Turgot, 1774- 
1776, financial and agricultural betterment is apparent, and 
during the American Revolution, France grew stronger through 
her victories on land and sea, and through her diplomatic suc- 
cess. But the latter half of the reign of Louis XVI, present- 
ing as it does one of the most frightful pictures in European 
history, must be held to more than outweigh the earlier 
years of moderate improvement. Whatever may be thought 
of the ultimate effects of the French Revolution on the prog- 
ress of France, and on the world as a whole, the actual ten 
years preceding the execution of the king were years of marked 
decline. The national finances were so depleted that the 
country found itself again on the verge of bankruptcy. The 
army reached a stage of utter confusion. Famine and misery 
increased among the lower classes until the reign ended in the 
anarchy of the Revolution. The intellectual standing of Louis 
XVI himself is not particularly easy to fix, for he seems to be- 
long somewhere between mediocrity and marked deficiency. 
Probably he more justly belongs to the lower grade. He was 
undoubtedly weak and vacillating, and timid at times, although 
courageous enough at the last. All his acts appear to have 
been governed by ill-timed obstinacy and a general lack of 
judgment. He was truly well-meaning and had many private 
virtues, but as a king he was certainly a complete failure. 

Looking backward over the entire range of French history 
from the time of Hugh Capet to the Revolution, the sum- 
maries in the Appendix show that the correlation is very high 
between rulers and political and economic changes. There 
are forty-five periods, twenty-seven of which give identical 
symbols (i.e., ruler + paralleled by + conditions, etc.). There 
are only three cases of conflict. The first of these exceptional 
instances is the progress under the weak Louis VII, which 
seems in part due to the leadership of Suger, and in part 
the expression of a social change which invigorated town 
growth during this era. Again during the fifteenth century, 



64 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

in the age of Joan of Arc, France progressed though under a 
weak king. This continued after the death of the maid, and 
does not seem ascribable to any one person. Various and 
general causes again seem contributory in the reign of Louis 
XII. On the whole it is somewhat surprising that only three 
cases of conflict can be found in the forty-five periods. 
France has had a large population for a very long time. For 
centuries prior to the Revolution the population of France 
was many times as great as that of Great Britain. In most 
forms of genius France has not been behind her ancient rival, 
but in the kind of genius which makes a statesman, all his- 
toriometric research shows France to be deficient. The 
French as a people have never shown any great ability in 
government ; their history from the tenth to the nineteenth 
century proves that little material or political progress was 
made by the Latin race except under the guidance of a royal 
stock essentially Germanic-Scandinavian in its origin. 



CHAPTER IV 

CASTILE 

Modern Christian Spain, like France, took a modest be- 
ginning. In and about the northern mountains of the Pen- 
insula, in rugged fastnesses, or inaccessible valleys, a few 
unconquered tribes lived on during the centuries of Moslem 
domination. From these narrow territories developed the 
independent kingdoms of Leon, Castile, Navarre, Aragon, 
and the province of Catalonia, which, sometimes in part 
uniting and often again separating, finally coalesced in the 
early part of the sixteenth century into the grand Spanish 
monarchy of world-wide influence. The early history of 
these separate kingdoms is very complicated. Genealogical 
accidents, or family feuds, often brought two or more regions 
under the rule of one king, only to be parcelled out again to 
his several heirs, as was the custom among Germanic peoples, 
and the royal families were Northerners in origin. 

It is best for the purposes of the present analysis to confine 
ourselves to tracing first the growth of Castile and then of 
Aragon, for most of the remaining territory was soon united 
to one or other of these crowns. Navarre played a part of 
little importance, and was for a time under the adminis- 
tration of the kings of France. 

It is difficult to know just where to begin an analysis of 
early Spanish history. Facts come but slowly out of the 
mists of obscurity and romance, and, moreover, there is said 
to have been a tendency on the part of the early chroniclers 
to distort the truth, to exaggerate the prowess and virtues 
of their greater rulers, and at the same time to indulge in 
p 65 



66 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

unwarranted censure were the kings unsuccessful in their 
time. If such be the case, of course a spurious importance 
would be given the sceptre of royalty. I wish, however, to 
begin with as remote a period as possible because it is in- 
teresting to trace the development of the earliest germs of 
what was afterwards a great growth. Furthermore, an 
impartial survey of this very age throws some light on the 
question of the probable validity of the historical evidence 
itself. There are at least two points, which I shall discuss 
later on, which seem to make good reasons for thinking that 
the estimates concerning these early sovereigns, as we find 
them to-day in modern histories, are not so far out of the way 
after all. 

Sancho el Mayor, a descendant of the counts and kings of 
Navarre, became also count or first king of Castile in right 
of his wife, Nuna Elvira, He consolidated his dominions 
and extended them by conquest and became in time virtual 
master of all Christian Spain with the exception of Catalonia. 
His appellation "el Mayor" or "the Great" may have re- 
ferred to the greatness of his sway, or may have been given 
for personal qualities. Beyond this epithet we have no 
characterizations by which to estimate his ability. At his 
death in 1035 the kingdom was redivided in accordance 
with earlier territorial limits. Aragon was left to his natural 
son Ramiro. Castile fell to Ferdinand, and the accession 
of this monarch is a good point at which to commence the 
discussion. 

Ferdinand (1035-1065), the first of that name in Castile, 
stands out in the pages of history, in spite of the comparative 
darkness of the period, as a clear-cut and distinctive character, 
a great and on the whole a good king. The chief events of 
his reign were certainly all on the side of growth, consolida- 
tion, and progress. Important achievements were : the suc- 
cessful government of the kingdom of Leon, which came by 
marriage, granting of fueros to the people of the towns, frus- 
tration of the dastardly attempt against Navarre, the king- 



CASTILE 67 

dom of his brother Garcia, and the wide conquests of cities 
and territories at the expense of Mohammedan power. Both 
Ferdinand and his father are blamed for lack of foresight in 
dividing their domains among their several sons, but there 
seems no point in blaming them ; they were merely following 
a general custom. 

At the death of Ferdinand, Castile passed to the elder son 
Sancho, while Leon went to Alfonso, who afterwards gained 
the greater country as well. The reign of Sancho II was brief 
and ignoble. It illustrates nothing save the unrewarded 
cupidity of a typically villainous king. The whole period 
is obscure, but it is stated that Sancho provoked an unwar- 
ranted war against his brother Alfonso, and was himself 
treacherously murdered outside the gate of Zamora, in 1072. 

The brother Alfonso then came into undisputed posses- 
sion of both Leon and Castile. The reign of this monarch 
lasted thirty-seven years and is replete with heroic annals 
which picture "the dawn of Christian prosperity in Spain" 
with thirty-nine victories against the Mohammedans and only 
two defeats. The towns received further privileges, but the 
signal fact is the great extension of territory to the south, and 
the capture of the important city of Toledo to crown and set 
it off. Alfonso himself is described in terms of praise for 
his strength and wisdom, his activity and his heroism. Be 
that as it may, we at least have here an undoubted advance 
occurring during a long reign of a single king and during the 
period of a supposedly vigorous personality. Alfonso the 
Brave appears to have been a fierce, relentless master-spirit. 
He was much eulogized by the troubadours of the time, who 
doubtless idealized him as a hero and a knight ; but it is 
interesting to note that even the Arabs admitted that 
Alfonso was true to his word. 

Alfonso the Brave died in 1109, and Castile fell suddenly 
into a period of great confusion, civil wars, party strife, and 
general lawlessness. The Christians waged constant war 
against each other, but never once advanced the cross at the 



68 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

expense of the crescent. The seventeen years of this ignoble 
reign were under the notorious Urraca, one of the most 
severely condemned queens in European history. She was 
greedy, reckless, and supposedly incompetent, as well as 
vicious from every point of view. 

At her death in 1126, her son Alfonso "the Emperor" came 
upon the throne. Events then took a different turn, and 
compared with the previous period Castile was fortunate. 
The turbulent nobles were silenced and the forces of the 
country unified. Much of this strength was uselessly ex- 
pended in fighting Aragon and Portugal, but, on the con- 
trary, successful wars which Alfonso carried on against the 
Mohammedans resulted in such important and extensive 
conquests that the reign must count for progress. One does 
not get a very clear idea of the personal qualities of this 
Alfonso, who so ostentatiously assumed that title of "Em- 
peror," but from what records there are, he seems to have 
been an exceptionally brave and ambitious warrior and at 
least above mediocrity in intellectual vigour. 

The reign of his son Sancho III (1157-1158) contains a 
successful war against Navarre and some further triumphs 
over the Moors ; but since we know nothing of the character 
of this king, who died about a year after his accession, we 
may omit this brief period from discussion. It was followed 
by one of those unfortunate minorities which occurred so 
often in early European history, and which serve in such 
a clear way to strengthen the contention I am making, — 
the general importance of royal leadership. This minority 
lasted twelve years under a divided and contentious control, 
and was characterized by the usual anarchy, intrigues, and 
family feuds. No victories were gained over the Moors. 

This condition of turmoil and retrogression again ceased 
with the assumption of authority by Alfonso VIII, the Noble, 
concerning whom we have unanimous testimony of praise, 
both for his intellectual and his moral qualities. Brave and 
skilful as a warrior, he was also an astute diplomat. To 



CASTILE 69 

religious enthusiasm he united amiable and generous quali- 
ties, and his right to the name of "the Noble" appears to be 
undisputed. Civil order was promptly restored and main- 
tained during the long reign of forty-four years ; the great 
event associated with his name was the famous victory 
of Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212, which brought about 
the virtual ruination of Mohammedan power in western 
Europe. 

With the death of Alfonso the Noble we are brought to a 
minority of three years' duration (1214-1217). The govern- 
ment was first placed in the hands of the queen-mother, 
Eleanor of England. She died within twenty-five days. 
Berengaria, the sister of the young king, next held the regency, 
but resigned the post in the following year in favour of a non- 
royal regent, Alvaro Nunez de Lara. The conditions under 
de Lara were insupportable. Violences and injustices were 
perpetrated on every hand. The clergy, the nobility, and 
the common people were all sufferers, and it is probable that 
a rising of the persecuted, which was in progress, would speed- 
ily have overthrown the regent had not the accidental death 
of the young king changed the face of affairs. Since the 
parts played by the royal women were of such short duration, 
they can hardly be expected to have established important 
influences. The good queen, Berengaria, having renounced 
her claim to Castile in favour of her son Ferdinand of Leon, 
these two countries soon after became united and were never 
again separated. The extensive power theoretically estab- 
lished by the union of Castile and Leon then fell into the 
hands of Ferdinand III. 

The military events of this reign (1217-1252) were ex- 
tremely important. It was then that the two great centres 
of Moorish civilization, Cordova and Seville, were lost for- 
ever to the infidel, together with many of the lesser cities 
and much of the best of Andalusia. This advance of the 
Christians was not maintained during the subsequent reign. 
All things taken together make it seem probable that Fer- 



70 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

dinand III was a real genius along the lines of government 
and warfare. 

Alfonso X, who succeeded to the throne, was also a very 
remarkable character, but an entirely different kind of a 
man. Being one of the most learned and enlightened men 
of the thirteenth century, he would naturally be classified 
among kings of a superior grade were his entire intellec- 
tual achievements taken into consideration. He was the 
founder of Castilian prose and the first monarch of modern 
Europe who was also a man of letters, the first to see the 
need of a continuous history of his own country, and the first 
to unify and codify her laws. Of all men in his kingdom he 
seems to have been the most interested in science, history, 
poetry, law, or theolog}", the one bright intellectual light in a 
dark age, a man far in advance of his time and little appreci- 
ated by his contemporaries. Alfonso the Sage was undoubt- 
edly a man of genius, but like many such was developed on 
one side only. In all practical affairs he was childish and 
incompetent ; but he was deep and far seeing in science and 
learned lore. Often likened to James I of England, he ap- 
pears to have been far more worthy of interest and respect, 
for Alfonso the Wise was a genuine pioneer. As my object 
is to trace the waves of national progress and decline on 
material and economic sides alone, this badly managed and 
confused reign cannot count as one of advance. It was not, 
however, marked by any distinct retrogression, such as an- 
archy and loss of territory. The civil conflict consisted 
more of threatened revolts than of actual warfare. The 
continuously bad financial condition was due to debasement 
of the coinage and excessive taxation. The king spent large 
sums of money on foreign potentates in a vain attempt to 
obtain the sceptre of the Holy Roman Empire. On the 
other hand, the advance in legislation is of some importance. 
On the whole, the material affairs may be taken as "minus," 
but certainly no reign in any country can better illustrate 
the characteristics of a monarch reflected in the conditions 



CASTILE 71 

of his land. All lines of achievement in which the king was 
gifted made a distinct advance. 

The next period (1284-1295), which covers the reign of 
Sancho IV, is somewhat difl&cult to judge, as the sources 
are unsatisfactory and there are some differences of opinion 
among modern historians. The presumption is that Sancho 
IV was both brave and active, a king above the average in 
mental rating though decidedly deficient in moral qualities. 
He was tyrannical, cruel, and false to his word. There had 
been a great division of the nation on the question of Sancho's 
right to the throne, even before the death of his father, 
Alfonso the Sage. This trouble continued and occupied 
most of the eleven years of his reign. Sancho triumphed 
over the opposing faction who wished the crown to pass by 
strict primogeniture to the son of his elder brother. He 
seems to have got the better of the Moors in the few engage- 
ments which took place, but the capture of Tarifa on the 
African coast in 1292 is the only actual acquirement of new 
territory. Commerce increased, yet the finances remained 
unsatisfactory. All together, the reign of Sancho IV is not 
one of importance or decisive trend. 

The next period (1295-1302) was a minority, yet the con- 
ditions were creditable. All the disturbances which usually 
accompanied a minority were there in full force, at the start, 
the difficulties were great both from within and without, but 
by the end of five years the rebellions had been suppressed 
and the foreign enemies frustrated. Our vigorous royal per- 
sonage in this instance was a woman, Dona Maria, the queen- 
mother. She was doubtless greatly aided by the famous 
Don Alfonso de Guzman "the Good." "The Hermandad, 
or association of free citizens who had banded them- 
selves together into a brotherhood in 1295 to defend them- 
selves from the depredations of the nobles, were protected 
by the prudent policy of Dona Maria. Not a single year of 
her regency was suffered to pass without a regular session 
of the Cortes. Thus she prevailed over the enemies of Cas- 



72 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

tile abroad, and withstood traitors within the realm, not by 
assassination and tyranny, but by encouraging the party of 
order and promoting good government at home." ^ But 
it was only after about five years, and at the close of the 
regency, that order became established. Thus, for a time, 
circumstances made themselves more potent than person- 
alities. 

About 1302 her son Ferdinand IV became of age, but 
proved himself a weak, headstrong, incompetent man, much 
under the influence of his favourites. His moral qualities 
appear to have been deficient, and we may be at least sure 
that he was no great man, and also that the reign was one 
of interminable dissension, revolts, and confusion, in fact, 
"one of the most disgraceful in the annals of Castile." ^ 

A divided regency followed, which obliged the country to 
wait twelve years longer for the coming of a strong king. 
Civil wars and desolation filled this period. "The central 
authority ceased to exist, both nobles and towns had to pro- 
tect themselves as best they could." ' Minorities have 
sometimes been harmful merely because they were minori- 
ties; that is to say, the circumstances of the situation gave 
free scope to rival princes who divided the country in civil 
wars. This minority appears to be a case in point. 

With Alfonso XI (1324-1350) the conditions changed for 
the better. Many of the lawless grandees were reduced to 
obedience and their castles razed to the ground. Complete 
order was not, however, established, but it was the great 
victory of Salado which gives the reign of Alfonso XI im- 
portance in the annals of the Christian recovery of Spain. 
This battle ranks second only to Las Navas de Tolosa in 
leading to the final expulsion of the Moors from the Penin- 
sula. Algeciras, which had served as a valuable landing- 
place for the Moors on their way from Africa, was also cap- 
tured. The character of this Alfonso appears to have been 

1 Burke. * Ibid. 

» Encyclopaedia Britannica. 9th Edition. 



CASTILE 73 

harsh, tyrannical, and licentious, but mentally he is con- 
sidered a superior man, thus making the twelfth instance in 
Spain of a good correlation between royalty and the condi- 
tions of the country; the two minorities just cited being 
exceptions. 

The reign of Peter the Cruel (1350-1369) may be charac- 
terized as one of extreme turbulence. There was an almost 
continual though desultory struggle with Aragon, the results 
of which were indecisive. During the last half of this period 
occurred the civil wars, in which Henry of Trastamara 
sought to depose his half-brother, the king, — wars seemingly 
brought about by Peter's own acts of barbarity and folly. 
Advantages were gained first by one party and then another, 
until Peter was treacherously betrayed into the tent of 
Henry, and there slain by the hand of his rival kinsman. 
The disordered conditions are clearly associated with the 
actions of the king himself, but the correlation with the 
strictly intellectual qualities of the king is not so strong ; for 
Peter, though a moral degenerate, was no fool. 

Under the reign of Henry II (1369-1379) law and order 
were soon established, and the enemies of the state subdued. 
The pretentions of Portugal were successfully opposed. 
Added to these primary marks of progress there are evi- 
dences of excellent legislation. King Henry II of Tras- 
tamara is accounted a strong king. Though far from tender- 
hearted, he appears forceful and active and surely a superior 
sovereign from the standpoint of mental endowment as well 
as a successful and indeed a desirable one in those stormy 
days. He died in 1379, leaving his kingdom in peace to his 
son John. 

The favourable turn of affairs did not, however, continue 
under the son. The reign is signalized by unsuccessful 
warfare with the Portuguese, the most notable event being 
the battle of Aljubarrota in which the Spaniards were severely 
beaten, and the independence of Portugal substantially se- 
cured. In other affairs no changes are to be noticed. John I 



74 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

was a man of inferior mental capacity in comparison to 
the majority of kings, though, perhaps, his intentions were 
good. He suffered from bodily infirmity, which interfered 
with his success as a soldier. His disposition was mild and 
amiable, and he is accredited with a generous and a just 
nature. 

Henry III, his son and heir, was a mere lad of eleven at 
the time of his accession. The government was placed in the 
hands of a council and the usual events ensued, — discords 
in the court, civil warfare, and general disorder. Henry 
developed many strong qualities as he grew to manhood. 
From the time he was twenty years old until he died aged 
twenty-seven, in 1406, the period shows the greatest contrast 
to the embroiled and retrograding minority. Not only was 
internal order restored but wise laws were enacted which 
served to restrain the rapacity of the judges and bring many 
unjust tax extortioners to account. Henry was essentially 
a diplomat, and did not neglect to strengthen his foreign 
relationships. All praise was given the young sovereign, 
and all, save the lawless, lamented his early death. 

Fortunately the regency for young John II (1406-1416) 
came into the hands of a prudent and able man, Ferdinand, 
uncle to the king, who ruled ten years with signal success. 
This favourable state of affairs did not last long. The young 
king, in contrast to his uncle, had almost no qualities suitable 
for leadership. Though possessed of some accomplishments 
and fond of literature, John II was so lacking in ambition, 
force of character, and practical insight, that he must rank 
among the weakest of royalty. It is said that on his death- 
bed he lamented he had not been born the son of a mechanic 
instead of a king of Castile. The business of government was 
under the dictatorship of Alvaro de Luna, and his work was 
very pernicious indeed. The long reign is nothing but the 
story of intrigues and disturbances, meaningless civil wars, 
and occasional inroads by the Moors. 

Castile continued to decline under John's successor^ Henry 



CASTILE 75 

IV (1454-1474). In fact, the conditions were even worse. 
Henry was "weak even to helplessness" and "addicted from 
his earliest youth to debauchery." He was indolent and 
cowardly, and altogether a pitiable specimen of a king. 

After some sixty years of retrogression and disintegration 
a great change came over the land. A country which a few 
years before had been but the wretched arena of internecine 
warfare and selfish struggles soon appeared among the great 
powers of the world and took a leading part in the important 
events of modern history. Both externally and internally 
there is here an abrupt and remarkable transformation. 
We know that Isabella came upon the throne of Castile in 
1474, and almost at once and before the union with Aragon 
in 1479 establishment of law and order and improvement in 
the finances marked her accession. We know that all 
historians of that time, or of our time, agree in considering 
Isabella a remarkable personality. How can we conclude 
otherwise than that it was the advent of this woman that 
constituted the prime cause of the change ? It is not likely 
that after sixty years of darkness and decline, the complex 
interplay of forces, which we call circumstances, should 
happen to be favourable again, and that these same favour- 
able circumstances should chance to occur just at the same 
time that a new ruler came upon the throne ; and then 
furthermore, that these circumstances should continue to 
happen to be favourable each succeeding year. 

A certain amount of union existed between Aragon and 
Castile after 1479, and from this date one may conveniently 
treat of both countries under the name of Spain ; but before 
tracing the more massive outlines it is necessary to go back 
to the early history of Aragon and bring this down to 1479 
and see if the lesson from Castile is supported by the annals 
of its neighbour. Castile furnishes twenty-four periods of 
sufficient historical clearness for the purposes of this study. 
Twenty-two of these show an almost perfect correlation 
between the characteristics of the royal leaders and the polit- 



76 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

ical and economic changes. It is to be observed that this 
correlation is almost invariably associated with the mental 
rather than moral qualities. In the reign of Peter the Cruel 
alone is the decline associated with moral defects. Two of 
the minorities were filled with conflict and disruption, — 
with retrograding movements which seem the result of moral 
deficiencies (overambition and lack of patriotism) on the 
part of those high in the councils of state. It is to be noted 
that the correlation is as high in the first half of Castile's 
history, the first twelve periods, as it is in the last twelve, 
thus indicating that there is no great tendency for the his- 
torian of the earlier and less authenticated period to over- 
praise and overblame the kings. This does not prove the 
entire absence of such a tendency, but it suggests the factor 
of error from this source is slight and not one to seriously 
invalidate the conclusions. It goes towards proving that the 
estimates for the earlier kings are not so very far out of the 
way, even if they are necessarily based on scanty material. 



CHAPTER V 



ARAGON 



The history of Aragon as an independent kingdom begins 
in 1035, when Sancho el Mayor divided his extended posses- 
sions among his several sons. Aragon, at that time but a 
weak and unimportant territory within narrow confines, 
fell to the bastard Ramiro. The next hundred years com- 
prised the reigns of Ramiro I, Sancho I, Peter I, and Alfonso I. 
Each of these periods is signalized by important victories 
over the Moslems and an almost constant growth in the area 
governed by its kings, each of whom is described as a 
vigorous character, — bold, ambitious, and enterprising. 

After a century of progress, events occurred of a three 
years' duration which are very suggestive. Alfonso I, 
called the Battler, died in 1134. Before the end of 1137 
Navarre had thrown off the Aragonese yoke, and Castile 
had won back from Aragon the best cities which she had 
previously lost. The "Empire," so-called, which Alfonso 
and the previous kings had formed, fell immediately. We 
may not know for a certainty that the new king, Ramiro II, 
was, as the historians pictured him, a modest, unambitious 
person of little courage or cleverness, but we do know that 
he had been a monk, and that in three years he retired again 
to a monastery. If we conclude that he really was, either 
by training or nature, unfitted to the task of kingship, and 
that this sudden break in the continuity of Aragon's growth 
was a question of personalities, then we can understand all 
the connected facts. But if we ignore or depreciate in any 
way the force of personalities, we cannot then explain why 

77 



78 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

this brief retrogression occurred after a century of progress, 
just at the death of Alfonso I in 1134. 

After the voluntary retirement of Ramiro the Monk, 
Raymond Berenger of Catalonia exercised sway over Aragon 
by right of his wife, Queen Petronilla. This reign and the 
next were very successful, gave sixty years of victory and 
growth, while the whole of Catalonia was permanently freed 
from Mohammedan control, and many important cities 
were taken in the new territory to the south. Both Raymond 
Berenger and his son, Alfonso II, were considered strong and 
able leaders. 

The years 1196 to 1213 brought no special prosperity or 
progress and no marked decline. Peter II is clearly delin- 
eated by historians as a romantic, impulsive character with 
the virtues and vices supposed to be associated with the age 
of chivalry. He was not a great king in any sense. His reign 
also belongs in a grade between mediocrity and weakness. 

In the year 1213 Aragon arrived at her second retrograding 
period, the first since about seventy-five years before, when 
the monk Ramiro sat for a short time upon the throne. We 
know that the second period, just as we know that the first, 
or Ramiro, period, was a distinct pause in the onward march 
of a nation which afterwards carried its name and influence 
to every quarter of the world. We also know that in the first 
case a monk unbecomingly held the sceptre, and in this 
second case a regency existed, the power being divided 
between several of the nobles. Now we may not be as 
absolutely assured that all our characterizations of early 
peninsular sovereigns are correct, drawn as they have been 
from estimates based ultimately on the early chronicles; 
but we can here see that the logical supposition is that the 
so-called weak kings really were weak, and, vice versa, the 
strong ones strong, and if we so assume them, then we can 
in that way satisfactorily fit all the facts together, both those 
well known and the less well attested. 

The young king early showed promise of exceptional 



ARAGON 79 

qualities and very soon took matters into his own hands. 
He became one of the most celebrated figures in early Spanish 
history, and is generally known as James the Conqueror 
and stands out both physically and mentally as a giant among 
his subjects, — a Teutonic type of hero, tall, fair-haired, 
impetuous ; generous or cruel, tender-hearted or sensual, 
as the mood impelled, but always a king among men. James 
the Conqueror was also a pioneer in the literature of his 
country, and wrote a valuable chronicle of his own times. 
He and his son Peter III, called "the Great," are the two 
sovereigns of Aragon whom any one would pick out as the 
foremost. They reigned from 1228 to 1285, covering the 
period of most important conquests, legislative, financial, 
and commercial progress which this country made at any 
time from the beginning of its career until the union with 
Castile in 1479. 

Alfonso III follows this heroic era with a short and colour- 
less reign (1285-1291) . He was a very young and presumably 
inefficient person, about whom little is known. The fact 
that the Cortes increased in importance, through the Privi- 
lege of Union in 1287, must not be overlooked. 

Again, in the administration of James II, came a time of 
relative progress, as is attested by the peaceful and prosperous 
conditions at home. Foreign affairs in Corsica, Sardinia, 
and Sicily are not so easy to determine. The king himself 
was probably above the average in ability. He was called 
"the Justice." It appears that an excessive penchant for 
vice and debauchery caused him to renounce the throne 
before his death. Then follows nearly a decade under the 
feeble Alfonso IV, which is characterized by no advance 
and no very notable decline. Aragon's commerce suffered 
from war with Genoa, which brought to either of these mari- 
time rivals nothing but wasted fury. 

From 1336 to 1410 we find a long series of contrary cur- 
rents, and it is not quite clear which way the stream flows. 
Legislative advance, commercial decline, wars both sue- 



80 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

cessful and unsuccessful, chiefly over Sardinia and Sicily, 
island conquests, which were the chief concern during this 
era, make, on the whole, a doubtful trend. Peter the Cere- 
monious, John the Careless, and Martin the Humane held 
sway. The first of these was vigorous, the second weak, 
and the third mediocre. Though the parallelism here be- 
tween the king and country is not perfect, there is no depar- 
ture of any significance. On the death of Martin the Humane 
in 1410, two years of decline set in, characterized by civil war- 
fare, internal disorders, and troubles in Sicily. It was an 
interregnum. 

Ferdinand I established peace and order during the short 
reign (1412-1416), and this is the same vigorous prince 
who, as regent of Castile, showed that a minority need not 
be a period of decline. Again we have a long course of 
doubtful conditions, very similar to those between the years 
1336 and 1410. Too much attention was given' to Italian 
affairs and conquests outside of Aragon ; the best interests 
of the home country suffered in consequence. It was, 
however, far from being a period of decline, and was under 
a comparatively superior king, Alfonso the Magnanimous. 
John II, another strong king, closes the list of Aragonese 
rulers, with twenty-one years on the side of progress. 

The correlation between the personnel of the Aragonese 
monarchs and the deviations in the conditions is very high 
indeed. For twenty-one periods there are no deviations 
which oppose each other, — i.e., ruler "minus," conditions 
''plus," or ruler "plus," conditions "minus," — and there are 
only three or four instances when the symbols of the two 
columns fail to parallel each other exactly. As in the case 
of Castile, the earlier half is no more made up of high corre- 
lation than is the latter half. 



CHAPTER VI 

SPAIN 

No chapter of history opens more gloriously than that of 
united Spain. Every one knows something of the reign of 
the famous Ferdinand of Aragon and the still more cele- 
brated Isabella of Castile, — the conquest of Granada which 
meant the final expulsion of the Mohammedans from west- 
ern Europe, the entrance of Spain among the powers, the 
beginnings of that growth in commerce and increase in 
wealth which followed the discovery of the new world. This 
era has been a favourite topic for historical research, but 
time has not diminished, in the perspective of the ages, the 
eminence of los Reyes Catolicos, who still dominate the 
panorama from every point of view. Ferdinand, whatever 
his failings may have been, was one of the cleverest statesmen 
of his age, and Isabella still stands timong the great women of 
all time. 

The death of Isabella was followed by a brief period, about 
a year and a half in duration, which, though not important 
in the totality of Spanish history, is suggestive nevertheless 
of what is probably a constantly recurring factor of some 
importance in ancient, mediseval, and to a less extent in 
modern, history. It is reasonable to suppose that, generally 
speaking, the death of a strong sovereign is in itself an event 
predisposing towards disorganization and retrogression, 
even when this ruler is immediately followed by another of 
equal ability. It gives occasion and hope to the malcontents. 
One must believe, from all the facts, that the duration of such 
a condition has been determined chiefly by the qualities of 
G 81 



82 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

the new ruler, but a certain amount of upheaval might 
naturally be expected before the new man had time to assert 
himself. 

Here is a case in point. Isabella was followed in Castile 
by the able Ferdinand, who was to act as regent for their 
daughter Joanna. A year and a half of unsettled political 
history was followed by the resignation of Ferdinand in 
favour of his son-in-law, Philip. This relinquishment was, 
according to Prescott, acceded to by the regent "to extract 
himself from his perilous position and shield the country 
from the impending evils of a civil war." If Ferdinand had 
continued in power long enough, it is fair to suppose that 
he would have overcome the excited opposition. Subsequent 
events would lead us to conclude as much. However that 
may be, the inexperienced and light-brained Philip was given 
a chance, but in two months he was out of it again. His 
reign was as disgraceful as it was brief. 

Conditions were growing steadily worse when in 1506 
Ferdinand was again, and this time permanently, given the 
regency, which office he brilliantly filled for the next ten 
years. As usual, the form of investiture of power counts 
for little, the personality for much. "Before him insurrec- 
tion quailed, the laws resumed their empire, and prosperity 
revisited the people." Both commerce and agriculture made 
excellent progress, but of greater interest is the commence- 
ment of that lordship over foreign lands which was to give 
Spain her wide, though transient, world power. This uplift 
continued without interruption until the death of Ferdinand 
in 1516, when a year of doubtful significance ensued under 
the non-royal regent Cardinal Ximenes. Perhaps this brief 
term should be counted on the side of progress. At any 
rate, Ximenes was a great and remarkable man, and it should 
be noticed how few of his mould Spain ever produced except 
from royal stock. 

Granting this regency as one of possible exception to the 
rule, we arrive at the date 1517, which begins the important 



SPAIN 83 

forty years' reign of the Emperor Charles V. This was the 
golden age for Spain in many ways, and in connection with 
the reign of his son, Philip II, covers nearly the whole of the 
sixteenth century, and carries us up and just a Httle over the 
crest of the wave of Spanish preeminence. Although these 
two reigns have been generally considered of unusual in- 
terest, they are not especially instructive in a bald and sys- 
tematic comparison of conditions with sovereigns. The 
reason why these two reigns are not interesting in the present 
research, is because neither one of them is a clear case of 
progress or of decline. If the conditions should be split up 
into their strong and weak aspects, doubtless much sovereign 
influence could be rendered probable. Therefore there is 
really more monarchical influence at the present point than 
the systematic method which I am pursuing is able to bring 
out. As I have said all along, the method only pretends 
to measure approximately the lower limit of the personal 
influences. 

The decline which was clearly manifest during the latter 
days of Philip II increased its pace enormously under the 
third Philip. The fourth of the same name saw matters go 
from bad to worse, while under Charles II (the last of the 
Hapsburgs) national demoralization reached its limit. The 
seventeenth century is synchronous with these four reigns, 
which are so much alike that a hasty composite of the four 
will serve as well as a detailed account of each. In fact, the 
the word " decline " covers the story of the material affairs in 
every department. As for the rulers, the single epithet, 
" weak," will suffice. 

The notorious retrogression of the Spanish monarchy 
during the seventeenth century has been very extensively 
investigated. The warfare of that time has been fought 
over again in the controversies of historians, but no one 
denies the main fact that Spain did decline. The quarrel 
comes over the proportional share of the various causes. 
The following is a partial list showing the variety of causes 



84 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

assigned by different writers, each usually bent on emphasiz- 
ing his own explanation : — depopulation on account of 
emigration to the new world, evil legislation relating to in- 
dustries, laws against the exportation of gold and silver, 
revolt of the Netherlands, importation of negroes in the 
colonies, cost of the wars of Charles V, great power of the 
Church, "too much gold and too little liberty had demoralized 
the race," establishment of the Inquisition, expulsion of the 
Jews, heavy taxes imposed on the mines in the new world, 
brutalizing tendency of the bull-fight, disaster of the Spanish 
Armada. 

That most of these supposed causes were really contribu- 
tory to the general debacle is certainly a reasonable assump- 
tion, but the personal weakness of the sovereign is generally 
overlooked, and furthermore nearly all these injurious forces 
may well be directly traceable to royal initiative, — to the 
pernicious policies of Charles V or Philip II, not corrected 
under their degenerate successors. I do not claim that the 
unusual appearance here of four weak rulers is a more 
powerful cause in bringing about the downfall of Spain than 
the other causes taken together ; but I do claim that we have 
here, by the comparative method, scientific proof that it is an 
important cause (while the acceptance or rejection of the 
other causes is gratuitous, in the present state of knowledge) 
and also that the other above-mentioned causes may have 
arisen from the mental defects of the kings. 

As a result of the War of the Spanish Succession, Louis 
XIV of France established his grandson, Philip V, upon the 
throne of Spain. Conditions, though not satisfactory under 
this prince, were so much improved in comparison to what 
they had been under the last four Hapsburgs that we must 
count the reign in the "plus" direction. Philip was a weak 
and indifferent character and finally became insane. Such 
reforms as took place were initiated by the prime ministers, 
who were French, Italian, and Dutch in origin, and who were 
sent into Spain by Louis XIV. Here is an instance of prog- 



SPAIN 85 

ress under a weak king, but the statesmen who directed 
the movement were not born in Spain. 

In the history of the next reign one finds a rare instance 
of a king of mediocre, or perhaps inferior, capacity exercising 
a very favourable influence through a sincere desire for the 
welfare of his subjects. Ferdinand VI was called "the 
Wise," and he seems to have been both prudent and en- 
lightened ; but he became insane, and this may have some- 
thing to do with the inferior rating which some historians 
give his intellectual capacity. The reign was peaceful, and 
reforms took place in agriculture, manufactures, commerce, 
and the finances. The Marquis de la Ensenada was prime 
minister, and in him Spain enjoyed the third instance of a 
native Spanish statesman devoted to the best interests of his 
country. 

The reign of Charles III was also successful. Charles III 
was himself a very superior ruler. Without being exactly 
brilliant he was generous, just, and enlightened, with a sound 
judgment for practical affairs. In connection with his 
ministers, de Aranda and Florida Blanca, an administration 
was given to Spain which brought improvement into every 
department of the government. Not only in military, 
financial, naval, and diplomatic affairs, but also in agricul- 
tural, commercial, and industrial life, solid advances had 
been made when Charles III died in 1788. 

This is the last reign which can be discussed without 
becoming involved in the Napoleonic period with its gigantic 
political changes, which depended on a personality so great as 
to upset all the usual fluctuations in the evolution of nations. 
Thus the greater part of the eighteenth century gave a better 
promise in Spain than the nineteenth realized. There was 
a perceptible improvement during the reigns of Philip V and 
Ferdinand VI, not readily ascribable to the kings themselves. 
But aside from this the whole history of more modern united 
Spain is not much different from ancient Castile and Aragon. 
Fourteen periods show only about four points of deviation 



86 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

from almost absolute correlation between sovereigns and 
conditions. Three of these four are associated with the 
names of exceptional statesmen (prime ministers), only two 
of whom were of Spanish birth. The history of Spain bears 
a very strong similarity to the history of Portugal. There is 
no evidence anywhere of gradual cumulative parliamentary 
development, although all these peninsular countries, Castile, 
Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia, Navarre, and Portugal, had a 
very early start in representative government. The steps 
in the direction of constitutionalism came under strong not 
under weak kings ; and it is a profoundly significant point 
that neither the nobles nor the commons were able to organ- 
ize and make capital out of the weaknesses of their kings. 



CHAPTER VII 



PORTUGAL 



The history of Portugal has never been given the attention 
it deserves. Not only is the period of discovery and con- 
quest an almost continuous epoch of expansion, replete with 
dramatic interest, but the long decay which this country 
underwent throws the second half of its history in vivid 
contrast to the earlier. Thus a splendid problem is pre- 
sented in the field of historical causation. The Portuguese 
were the pioneers in modern geographical exploration. They 
prepared the way for the discovery of America by systemati- 
cally pushing forward the art of navigation and penetrating 
the limbo of the South Atlantic, — "the sea of darkness" 
of the ancients. They were the first to open up the sea route 
to India ; they were the initiators of the permanent colonial 
policy of Europe and the first to shoulder the treasure 
that comes with the "white man's burden." Lisbon was 
the city, of all capitals of Europe, for life, adventure, 
intrigue, and profit, for one generation of men ; and the 
king of Portugal (Emanuel the Fortunate) the richest and 
most influential monarch in the world. 

The rise and fall of Portugal follow very closely the per- 
sonnel of the monarchs ; no more so than most nations, but 
more noticeably so than some, because here nearly all the 
early monarchs were strong while all the later were mediocre 
or weak. Indeed, it was while investigating the history of 
ancient Portugal that I first hit upon the idea of monarchical 
influence, and that it might, on account of its evident im- 
portance, be made a first or central force in historical meas- 
urement. The account which I have already published 

87 



88 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

(Chapter XII of "Heredity in Royalty") need not be essen- 
tially altered, though a more extended reading has shown 
three or four estimates that require readjustment. The 
history of Portugal has been studied by so few people in 
England, America, France, and Germany that it is not pos- 
sible to get adequate information except by going also to the 
Portuguese writers themselves. Not that the easily obtained 
information is so faulty, but it leaves much to be desired, 
because it is so meagre. I have personally collected some 
twelve hundred books and pamphlets, mostly in Portuguese, 
dealing with the heroic period, and so have gained some 
insight into the value of the sources. 

It seems to me that one's opinions and judgments change 
more and more on minutia) and less and less on essentials 
as one's studies extend from the usual towards the unusual, 
from the encyclopaedias towards the Mss. The minutiaB 
seem more and more as if they were essentials, but this comes 
from a narrowing of the field of vision. As soon as one 
expands that vision again — as indeed one must expand it 
if a broad problem be the goal, a problem covering several 
centuries of time — then the details vanish into an insig- 
nificant haze. The rigorous insistence of historians upon 
accuracy of detail is thus explained. As they work upon 
each segment of the historical curve they demand accuracy 
for all the points upon that segment, an accuracy which is 
important if taken in terms of the size of segment, — that 
is, in relation to a brief duration of time. On each of the 
segments they devote the same accurate care. Having 
devoted so much research to each section of the country's 
history they thus grow to genuinely love each period sepa- 
rately, and will not endure the least tarnish of what they 
believe the truth. Thej'' do not then realize that if they 
would stand back far enough to see the general form and 
direction of the curve the minutiae would become of very 
little importance. 

In the history of Portugal one runs across a number of 



PORTUGAL 89 

old legends now expurgated from the more critical modern 
accounts; but the remaining facts (or alleged facts if one 
likes) fit just as well into the theory which I am setting forth. 
Some of the changes and additions which I should wish to 
make were I rewriting the whole chapter would be the 
following: Sancho II (1127-1245) was not altogether so 
"weak and lazy," nor was his reign devoid of a progressive 
side. The reign of Ferdinand (1367-1383) also contained 
one important element of progress, — growth in the mer- 
cantile marine, — but there is nothing to offset the disruption 
in the government, decadence in agriculture, and a wretched 
fiscal policy. Ferdinand himself was lazy, frivolous, and soft, 
— distinctly below the average. On the other hand, I have 
taken John I too high. John I, the Great, so-called, was 
not exactly a genius, rather a man of gifts and judgment. 
He was undoubtedly aided by circumstances, by a popular 
movement, by his famous lieutenants, and perhaps chiefly 
by his own family. The period 1384-1433 which marks 
the beginning of Portugal's participation in the Renaissance 
is not much understood. At any rate, it was an era of pros- 
perity, and John I, though probably not deserving the epithet 
"great," is at least worthy of being graded here as "plus." 
Emanuel, often called the Fortunate, probably deserves 
much more credit for the direction of events during the cul- 
mination of the "heroic period" than the majority of writers 
have heretofore given him. The great discoveries were 
initiated by Prince Henry the Navigator, supported by the 
regent Dom Pedro, and furthered by John II, so that on the 
accession of Emanuel in 1495 the Cape of Good Hope had 
been rounded and preparation had already been made for the 
voyage of Vasco da Gama. Portugal's favourable maritime 
position and the training in seamanship which her people had 
long enjoyed were undeniably contributory to her great 
bonanga; but if the fluctuations in the expansion in maritime 
discovery be considered, the personal influence comes again 
to the fore, 



90 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

That the systematic explorations under Henry the Navi- 
gator were really due to his own initiative and persistent 
direction is shown by the way exploration languished after 
his death. Alfonso V, always bent on crusading in Africa, 
neglected exploration. Only a comparatively small strip of 
new coast line was discovered between the death of Prince 
Henry in 1460 and 1481, the close of Alfonso's reign. John II 
(1481-1495) took up the work again and geographical knowl- 
edge augmented with renewed activity. It is not too much 
to say that the greatest single series of events in the geo- 
graphical rearrangement of mankind, the discovery of half 
the world by the other half, would have been retarded many 
years had the heroic Portuguese princes (true Vikings in 
their blood and in their nature) never indeed existed. 

From 1521 to 1788 not a single strong king fell to the lot 
of Portugal. Philip II of Spain (I of Portugal) cannot 
awaken our enthusiasm. The only ruler to claim rank with 
rulers surely mentally superior would be Louisa de Guzman 
whose influence lasted from 1640 to 1662. She must be 
rated very high among princesses, not so high among actual 
rulers, as their average standard is higher. 

The only notable progressive period during all these 
generations of national demoralization was that under the 
Marquis of Pombal, the only man of genius to rise to the 
needs of the times. 

The last half of Portugal's history is, just about as much as 
the first half, correlated with the character of her kings. 
Therefore, there is evidence that the early chroniclers were 
not so far out of the way after all. 



CHAPTER VIII 



THE NETHERLANDS 



Groningen, Friesland, Drenthe, Overyssel, Guelderland, 
Utrecht, North Holland, South Holland, Zealand, North 
Brabant, and Dutch Limburg are the names of the several 
provinces which lie north of Belgium and west of the Rhine, 
and to-day form the independent political entity known as 
the Netherlands, sometimes less correctly called Holland. 
South of these lie the provinces of Antwerp, Brabant, 
East Flanders, West Flanders, Hainault, Liege, Limburg, 
Luxembourg, and Namur which constitute the various 
elements of the kingdom of Belgium. Although the geo- 
graphical significance attached to the names of these prov- 
inces has remained fairly constant, the political meaning 
of the term Netherlands, Pays Bas, or Nederland has often 
changed as the provinces have been united, separated, and 
united again in shifting combinations. Under Charle- 
magne all formed part of his vast empire. After the death 
of the great Emperor, there took place a parcelling out of 
minor territories according to the custom of a feudal age, 
so that many small countships and duchies became heredi- 
tary in the families of a new nobility. At the same time the 
cities achieved an early independence, and the vigour of 
their growth already indicated the quality of the commoner 
with whom the noblemen had to deal. From the beginning 
of the eleventh to the end of the thirteenth century, a 
strong line of counts of Holland aided in the development of 
the northern portion of the Netherlands. After the year 
1299, a change took place, and the long struggle between 
Zealand and Holland seemed to paralyze the national life. 

91 



92 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

It is not until Philip "the Good" appears upon the scene 
that the various territorial elements of the Netherlands are 
sufficiently united to constitute an important political 
aggregate, — a kingdom suitable for comparison and study 
side by side with other European nations. 

Philip "the Good," so-called, of Burgundy, inherited 
Flanders and Artois from his mother. He bought Namur, 
seized Brabant, Antwerp, and Limburg. He laid claim to 
the inheritance of the northern provinces also, and his efforts 
in this direction were no less successful. Jacoba, the last 
heir of the old house of Hainault, was compelled to cede her 
rights over that territory as well as the counties of Holland, 
Zealand, and Friesland. Thus Philip of Burgundy became 
one of the most important sovereigns in Europe, chiefly 
because of the value of the Low Countries, which at that 
time could not be matched for the wealth of their manu- 
factures and commerce. This was the beginning of the uni- 
fication of the Netherlands. Two generations later they 
passed en bloc to the house of Hapsburg by the marriage of 
Maximilian with Mary of Burgundy. They continued to 
be united two generations longer, until the northern prov- 
inces, under the leadership of William the Silent, formed 
themselves into an independent republic known as the 
United Netherlands. The southern provinces remained 
a dependency of Spain. 

At this parting of the ways I shall follow the fortunes of 
the northern division, because these formed a nation polit- 
ically autonomous and these provinces represent virtually 
the same geographical area now included in the kingdom of 
the Netherlands. During a short period only, this summary 
must also treat of conditions found in the territories now 
called Belgium and Burgundy. Although the northern 
provinces were for a time theoretically a republic under 
stadtholders of the house of Orange, there seems no good 
reason for breaking the continuity of the tabulation on this 
account, even though it be my purpose to measure the 



THE NETHEELANDS 93 

influence of royalty. The princes of the house of Orange 
were virtually kings. Their origin, if not strictly royal, was 
nearly so. Their marriages were either with the most 
important noble families of that part of Europe, or with 
actual reigning sovereign lines. The title is nothing. The 
point is, that they formed a dynasty of rulers (stadtholders) 
allied by blood with other dynasties of Europe. 

There are three periods when this quasi-royal line became 
broken. A republican form of government fills in three gaps 
which occupy the years 1650 to 1672, 1702 to 1747, and 1759 
to 1776. Thus opportunity is afforded to see how well or 
how ill this portion of the world could carry on the experi- 
ment of taking care of itself without the royal leadership. 
Such definite republican interludes occurring in governments, 
for the most part monarchical, are of the highest value in a 
negative way to one interested in measuring the potency 
of the kings themselves. 

Returning to a view of the Netherlands at the time of 
Philip of Burgundy (1419-1467), one sees a very flourishing 
state of affairs, a condition which had persisted in a general 
way for a number of centuries. Trade, commerce, fisheries, 
and the arts of fabrication here made an early start. There 
must have been a very high level of intelligence and industry 
in the make-up of the middle classes all through this section 
of Europe. Even from earliest historical times, a broad 
distribution of wealth had been enjoyed. Here the towns 
and cities soon achieved importance and independence. Not 
many nobles ruled over wide estates, or illustrious warriors 
conquered and built regal power at the expense of their 
neighbours and rivals. It is true that the nobility remained 
an important and powerful influence within its home limits, 
but there were no great governing families prior to the Bur- 
gundian rule, — nothing to be compared with the Plantage- 
nets or the Hohenstaufens, or the sovereigns of Castile, 
Aragon, Portugal, and France. 

Although Philip "the Good" of Burgundy found the Low 



94 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

Countries in a thriving condition, it is very certain that he 
left them even more so, and that these provinces derived 
much benefit from the astute policy which characterized the 
activities of this ambitious prince, Philip was called "the 
Good," an unfortunate epithet which every historian takes 
pains to notice. It is my general impression that the appel- 
lation which monarchs have received, given first by their 
contemporaries, and conserved through the ages, are usually 
very fair summarizations of their traits ; but Philip of Bur- 
gundy was not "the Good." He was a crafty, self-seeking 
tyrant who crushed the liberties of the people and overrode 
every one who came in his way. He had his good points, 
however ; one of them was a genuine appreciation for the 
fine arts, which led to something far more important than 
mere luxurious display or pompous court functions. Philip 
le Bon always demanded and obtained the best, whatever 
the object might be, — a neat little fertile province or price- 
less altar-piece. One cannot help forgiving much to the 
man who patronized the brothers Van Eyck, founded the 
wonderful Burgundian library, and aided in so many ways 
the establishment of the early Flemish Renaissance; but 
these developments belong to a side of history that I am not 
attempting to discuss. 

It is on account of the immense impetus to the industrial 
and architectural arts which this connoisseur-monarch gave, 
that his influence became important in its relations to strictly 
material matters. More and better public buildings, richer 
and more costly garments, paintings, statues, or books, belong 
of course in part to, and are indications of, material wealth. 
This side of history, during the reign of Philip, has a fine 
rare glow, with an atmosphere of alluring colour, — an 
aurora which reached for the first time the shores of western 
Europe. The loss of political and personal liberty which the 
commoners were forced to endure does not seem to outweigh, 
at least from the material standpoint, the many advantages 
which the Netherlands gained under this master tyrant. 



THE NETHERLANDS 95 

Philip was very clever in the diplomacy of his day, and 
cunningly played England against France.' He constantly 
resisted Frederick III and the Holy Roman Empire, and 
had hoped to found a great and independent kingdom from 
Burgundy to the North Sea. The treaties which he brought 
about were favourable to the provinces and were followed by 
a marked increase in commerce and manufactures. Agri- 
cultural development was aided by a wise management of 
the dikes, — the building and care of which was naturally 
a most important department of public works. Not only 
was the financial position of the government strengthened, 
but the increase in wealth enabled the people to bear the 
heavy taxation with comparative ease, so that one contem- 
porary author supposed that they were in fact more lightly 
taxed than the subjects of other princes. Philip le Bon 
never quite gained the ambition of his life, but he became at 
least a king in all but name ; and certainly, in wealth and 
magnificence, outranked the king of France and the Holy 
Roman Emperor. Before and after the fall of Constanti- 
nople, it was Philip of Burgundy to whom the Pope and the 
western princes turned, when the repeated conquests of 
Mohammed II drove Christendom into hysterical fear. 
Neither Burgundy nor the other western powers offered 
much assistance when the crisis came ; but the fact that 
Philip was looked upon as the natural champion shows that 
this prince had raised himself to an extremely exalted 
position. It would not be too much to say that from the 
strictly worldly standpoint Philip "the Good" was the ablest 
practical man of his own generation. A few more like him 
in the Burgundian line and there might have been no France, 
so-called, and we should to-day be reading in its place the 
history of Burgundy. 

The majestic plans of the father for forming a great Bur- 
gundian kingdom were destined to be shattered by the 
career of his rash and impetuous, though brilliant, and in all 
ways interesting, son Charles. The epithet le Temeraire 



96 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

is usually translated as "the Bold," but it might, with better 
judgment and finer linguistic propriety, be rendered as "the 
Rash" or "the Foolhardy." Charles le Temeraire was 
no fifteenth-century diplomat. Louis XI of France was, 
and herein lay the difficulty for Burgundy. European 
politics were lashed into the maelstrom which finally ingulfed 
the Burgundian interests by the sinister and green-eyed 
conjurer of France, — that master of the fine art of dealing 
with enemies. It was a mighty duel between France and 
Burgundy, but it was, as even their contemporaries saw it, a 
battle between "the French spider and the Burgundian 
lion." The methods of Burgundy were as different from 
those of France as were the tempers of their potentates. 
Charles was always frank and chivalrous, impetuous and 
above deceit, grand and quixotic, self-reliant and beyond 
restraint. He fought valiantly for his life's idea, the reincar- 
nation of the ancient kingdom of the Carlovingian Lothaire, 
which he would extend from the North Sea to the Mediter- 
ranean, and interpose a broad belt between France and the 
Empire. This was also the policy of his father, the founda- 
tion stones of which had been laid by his grandfather and 
great-grandfather. It is but little remembered to-day how 
near the Burgundian came to the realization of this dream. 
Philip the Bold, John the Fearless, Philip le Bon, and Charles 
le Temeraire all worked successively for a grand Burgundy. 
Charles overreached the mark and tried to accomplish every- 
thing at once ; he had, furthermore, in Louis XI an extremely 
astute man to outwit, while his forebears had only the insane 
and weak Charles VI and the mediocre Charles VII for French 
opponents. 

Still it is a question if the Netherlands, which form the 
true geographical region whose fortunes are the theme of 
this chapter, really lost more than they gained during the 
era of Charles the Rash. There is much to be said on the 
favourable side. Though the many wars were expensive 
and brought no advantage to the Low Countries, it is doubt- 



THE NETHERLANDS 97 

ful if the heavy taxes were borne with any great difficulty. 
The seat of action being chiefly in Switzerland, the Nether- 
lands were left free to develop their own trades and indus- 
tries ; and the vigorous rule of Charles made impossible any 
chronic and bloody conflicts between the opposed political 
parties at home, — the Hooks and the Cods. During this 
reign the already flourishing cities grew in wealth and 
importance. The fisheries, however, suffered from interrup- 
tions and seizures occasioned by French ships of war which 
Louis sent to the northward. But even this side of industry, 
if we are to accept the more modern view of Wenzelburger, 
progressed rather than declined during the days of Charles 
the Rash. It is but natural that the burgher classes should 
find their pretensions strongly opposed by such a dominating 
master, and that retrogression in political liberty should be 
the order of the day. As far as this goes, we must admit a 
backward tendency ; but, all things considered, it would 
seem that the years 1467-1477 were favourable to the 
Netherlands. 

It was otherwise with the fortunes of Burgundy. This 
country reached the apogee of its power about 1469, lost 
ground under the reckless career of its last duke, and when 
the naked body of Charles was taken from the icy shore of a 
Swiss lake, the last act of the Burgundian drama was over. 
The tragic death of Charles the Bold caused a profound 
sensation throughout Europe. All anxiously awaited the 
fate of a country left without a master or male heir, and 
discussed the young and still unwed Mary, the sole inheritor 
of the wealth of Flanders and Holland. Would Burgundy 
and its attachments swing to France or towards the Empire ? 
Eventually Mary married the young Maximilian, and so the 
house of Austria rose at once to the highest pinnacle of 
power and the history of the Netherlands became inter- 
woven with the lives of the Hapsburgs. 

Mary's rule was brief. She died five years after her father, 
in consequence of a fall from her horse ; but already time 



98 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

enough had elapsed to show the effect of transferring the 
control of the government into the hands of a weak and 
inexperienced woman. "The internal dissensions in Holland 
which the iron hand of Charles had crushed for a time, again 
grew rank after his death, and the two parties of Hooks and 
Cods renewed their persecutions of each other with a rage 
and bitterness that reduced Holland to a state of extreme 
bitterness and desolation." The naval power of the Dutch 
also suffered a severe blow during this period, losing very 
heavily in conflict with the French. On the other hand, 
political liberty (whatever that may be worth) must be 
weighed on the other side of the scales. It was then that the 
" Great Privilege" or "Groot Privilegie" was founded. This 
restored parliamentary rights, gave the cities and provinces 
a voice in the government, especially in the levying of taxes 
and the declaration of war. Although in practice the Great 
Privilege soon fell in abeyance, and remained ineffectual for 
nearly a century, it is important as expressing the basic 
principles on which the Dutch republic was afterwards 
founded. The " Great Privilege" of 1477 is also interesting 
because it shows that the people of the Netherlands were, 
for once, able to take advantage of a weak sovereign and 
obtain political advance by combined effort. It is difficult 
to weigh the value of the Great Privilege against the internal 
commotion, so the reign of Mary of Burgundy has a doubtful 
entity. 

Maximilian of Austria, husband of Mary, acted as regent 
for the Netherlands from 1482 to 1493, a period of turbulence 
and decline. Maximilian was a strong character, or at least 
in after years proved himself to be, but there is little in his 
regency over the Netherlands to demonstrate royal efficiency. 
The only thing to be said in his favour is that in the end the 
rebellions were suppressed. 

The reign of Philip the Handsome (1494-1506) was equally 
contradictory, though in precisely the opposite way. Philip 
was merely a pretty figurehead, never an important force. 



THE NETHERLANDS 99 

His country, however, enjoyed a distinctly progressive 
interval during the twelve years of this administration. In 
1494 the states lost the Great Privilege, but this did not make 
any real difference. There had never been any good results 
from the democratic movement, experimentally shown to be 
a failure under Mary and Maximilian. The chief glory was 
a commercial one. Holland and Flanders were growing. 
Trade, especially with Spain and Portugal, forged ahead. 
Here much credit is due the people as a whole ; good order 
was preserved and rival parties kept the peace. After the 
premature death of Philip the Handsome (1506) Maximilian 
again became regent and a year later this official position 
was relegated to his daughter Margaret. 

For the next two generations, it is impossible to separate the 
rule of the emperors from that of their relatives, who, as 
special regents, were appointed to govern the Low Countries. 
Fortunately for the method here employed, this does not 
introduce any confusion, for the reason that both the em- 
peror and the regents were definitely above the average ; so 
when both are added together the composite must also be 
superior or "plus." Maximilian, Charles V, Margaret of 
Savoy, Mary of Hungary, and Emanuel Philibert of Savoy, 
together form a very strong group. Special consideration 
must, however, be taken of Philip II of Spain, whose influence 
begins only at the close of this era. Philip II is an unusually 
difficult person to place satisfactorily in any scheme which 
distributes historical characters into grades for intellectual 
eminence. The case of Philip II will be given more detailed 
attention later. As far as the others are concerned, it will 
suffice, in a hasty survey like the present, to point out that 
coincident with this array of royal talent occurred a season of 
great productivity throughout the Low Countries.^ The 

1 I do not say the royal initiative produced this lively upgrowth, — 
doubtless many causes contributed ; but I do wish to emphasize an insufficiently 
observed phenomenon, here, as elsewhere, impossible to measure in its isolated 
occurrences ; but by its frequency of repetition compelling the recognition of 



100 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

more or less combined and interdependent government of the 
emperors Maximilian I and Charles V, with the regents 
Margaret of Savoy and Mary of Hungary, covers fifty years, 
and the era comes to a close with the abdication of Charles V 
in 1555. As far as the Netherlands are concerned, there 
can be no doubt but this age was one of great prosperity. 
All strictly material affairs joined in the forward movement. 
All such features of national life as industry, trade, agricul- 
ture, fisheries, finances, coinage, house-building, as well as 
the subtler forces which make for international prestige 
and importance, are found progressive. Antwerp became 
the first commercial city of the world. Ghent was so large 
and wealthy that the proud Charles declared jestingly to 
Francis I of France, "Je rnettrais Paris dans mon gant." 
There is not much to say on the other side of the question 
except that the people were governed with rigour, and popu- 
lar liberty necessarily suffered. It may be contended that 
by this beneficent tyranny the way was paved for the later 
atrocities, and the control of Philip II and Alva. Such may 
be the case, but even if the loss of political liberty be 
thought to outweigh the commercial and material advance, 
it does not alter the fact that the whole history of the 
Netherlands during this epoch is just what might be expected 
as an outcome of the management and expression of the 
characteristics of three or four people who were in the 
chief control. 

Philip II at first appointed Emanuel Philibert of Savoy as 
regent for his Dutch and Flemish possessions. This dis- 
tinguished prince did not continue in office except for the 
first few years (1555-1559) . There were no important changes 
during his administration ; but one sees the smouldering 
discontent and hatred toward the Spaniard which afterwards 
culminated in the great struggle for Dutch independence. 
The hand of Philip II is everywhere to be seen. His regents 

it3 own importance, not only as an abstract generalization but also for thia 
concrete case. 



THE NETHEKLANDS 101 

carried out his policy and formed a part of himself, an accen- 
tuation of that mysterious personality housed in its austere 
Spanish chamber, yet stretching its influence throughout the 
world. The character of Philip II is more difficult to grade 
than it is to understand. Extremely ambitious, industrious, 
strong-willed, and supplied with a great knowledge of details, 
all his acts and policies appear to have been in the wrong 
direction, and to have somehow brought, in proportion as 
they were carried out, just so much injury to that Church 
and State for which he so seriously laboured. The Spanish 
world-power, which had been developed and welded together 
in an unnatural fashion by a few great personalities, favoured 
by genealogical accidents, was bound to go to pieces except 
under the most masterly control. Holland and the northern 
provinces of Netherlands were the first to free themselves 
from the hated over-lordship. These form (from the racial 
standpoint) the district which, of all those under Spanish 
dominion, seems to have been included the most unnaturally. 
These provinces comprised almost the same territory as that 
now known as the Netherlands, so this chapter will follow 
their special conditions, and have little more concern with 
the southern provinces which remained long under Spanish 
and Austrian control. 

The wars which resulted in the Dutch Republic were as- 
sociated with the great religious questions and the horrors 
of the Inquisition ; but the long procrastinated withdrawal of 
the Spanish soldiers, the burdens of taxation, and appoint- 
ments of Spaniards to high offices must be counted among 
the grievances. The decade and a half which precedes this 
revolution presents a gloomy picture. It was a period of 
confusion, of persecutions, and uprisings. Thousands of the 
inhabitants were executed, thousands more left the country, 
and these were the industrious working classes. Commerce 
of course received a heavy blow and the wealth of the nation 
abruptly declined. 

It is not easy to fix the exact date for the commencement of 



102 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

the Dutch Republic. Its independence was not acknowl- 
edged for a long time; but the year 1575 seems to mark its 
virtual, if not its formal, beginning ; especially if we are 
interested in the relation of William of Orange to the founda- 
tion of political autonomy. It was in the summer of 1575 
that Holland and Zealand drew up articles of union. By it, 
William "received supreme command in war and absolute 
authority in all matters of defence, the control of all money 
voted by the Estates, the maintenance of the laws as count, 
in the king's name, the ultimate appointment (after nomina- 
tion by the Estates) of all judicial officers. These terms 
accepted, William became, in spite of their nominal recog- 
nition of Philip, the true prince of the two provinces." ^ 
This does not look like a republic, nor do we find such 
a form of government, except in name, either during the 
lifetime of William the Silent or under the regime of his 
sons, Maurice and Frederick Henry. From 1575 to 1578 
the unsettled conditions continued in the north, as well 
as in the south ; but after that and until the assassina- 
tion of William in 1584 the northern provinces enjoyed 
tranquillity and were again prosperous, even gaining more 
ground on account of the continued decline which the south- 
ern or Spanish provinces were forced to endure. 

Thus the period of William the Silent (1575-1584) was 
progressive even on the strictly material side. The great- 
ness of its significance lies of course in another direction 
removed from the present inquiry. Great interest is felt 
in the history of the United Netherlands, not because by 
heroic action they formed a republic, for this they never did ; 
but for the reason that they fought for freedom, and that 
here took place a great conception which has engendered 
a world-wide idea. It was here for the first time that a 
nation was constructed, founded on ideas of religious tolera- 
tion. William the Silent was the first to conceive such 
an idea, and William the Silent must always remain the 

1 Holland (history), Encyclopaedia Britannica. 9th Edition. 



THE NETHERLANDS 103 

pioneer in one of the greatest events of history. WiUiam 
was the soul of the movement. There seems to be no 
question about this. The delivery from Spanish atroci- 
ties and religious persecution could not have been brought 
about without his aid. They were fighting against tremen- 
dous odds. At one time it seemed impossible that the weak- 
ened Protestant party could escape annihilation in the 
revengeful grasp of the mightiest power in the world. But 
the heart of the great prince never faltered, even in the hours 
of darkness. William, wrongly called "the Silent," really 
the most eloquent man of his age, worked on, and by tongue 
and pen kept alive in others something of that unconquerable 
fire which was the essence of his own great nature. The or- 
dinary mortal knows temporary exaltations, the crowd once 
set in motion grows enthusiastic over its own enthusiasm ; but 
a perpetually exalted leader for a forlorn cause is a hard man 
to find, and men like William of Orange, men who combine, 
with such unusual strength of character, exceptional intel- 
lectual endowments, are so rare that there have been perhaps 
a hundred such among thousands of millions who were not. 

Fortunately for the Dutch and for the liberties of the 
world, his second son Maurice, on whom the burden of leader- 
ship fell, was a descendant worthy of his father. Maurice 
was extremely precocious, much as his father had been, and 
although but seventeen and a student at Leyden at the time 
of his father's death, it was not a year before he was made 
governor of the United Provinces and stadtholder of Hol- 
land-Zealand. For forty years Maurice of Nassau was 
the military leader of the Dutch nation. They still had 
Spain to deal with, and Alexander Farnese was no weak 
general to match. Maurice had to overcome opposition 
within the ranks of his own people, as well as that directed 
by the ire of Spain. Historians consider this member of 
the family of Orange to belong among the greatest military 
geniuses who have ever lived. If we inquire the reasons for 
this signal admiration, we discover that, for more than any 



104 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

other reason, Maurice of Nassau takes first grade among the 
world's soldiers because he, like his father, was a pioneer. 
William founded a nation based on principles of religious 
toleration. Maurice initiated modern methods of military 
intrenchment and produced a revolution in the art of war. 
Like many other innovations in the military art, the changes 
which Maurice introduced were opposed to the current idea 
of what constituted heroism in a soldier. The old men ridi- 
culed his plans, the enemy jeered at him as a mere boss of 
ditch labourers. But before Maurice was twenty-four he 
had formed the most efficient army in Europe and had made 
a new epoch. All must needs follow suit and learn his 
methods or be swept before the irresistible tide. He had 
formed a veritable school of warfare to which flocked the 
young nobility of France, England, and Germany. 

Maurice was not a statesman. This side of his career was 
weak, but the Netherlands fortunately had in John of Olden- 
barneveldt a man who grandly supplied this deficiency. 
Maurice became the uncrowned sovereign ; Oldenbarneveldt 
was the States-General itself. These two men brought the 
Netherlands to a celebrated degree of splendour ; or at least 
we may say with certainty that a glorious epoch for the 
Dutch people occurred during the leadership (moreover, 
arbitrary leadership) of two very great men. The quarrel 
between the two, which finally cost the old statesman his 
life, stains indelibly the name of Maurice; but, taken as a 
whole, the impression which the son of the great William 
leaves on the ages, though not equal in moral grandeur to 
that of his father, is nevertheless that of a devoted and 
constant prince. Whether his motives were patriotic or per- 
sonal (and human motives are very hard to fathom) his own 
extraordinary life was attended by a brilliant upbuilding of 
that country which in generosity we must feel that he loved. 

The increased international prestige and expanding com- 
merce which signalized this period, continued during the 
stadtholdership of Frederick Henry, the youngest of the 



THE NETHERLANDS 105 

children of William the Silent. This prince, less brilliant 
than either his father or his brother, was nevertheless very 
highly endowed, and if judged in relation to both war and 
statesmanship, perhaps better rounded than either. His 
singular moderation and well-balanced wisdom were of great 
benefit in reconciling religious factions. It was during his 
rule that the stadtholdership, already practically hereditary 
in the house of Orange, became such by written agreement. 

The young prince, William II (1647-1650), on whom the 
mantle fell, was only twenty at the time of his accession. He 
was a youth of brilliant gifts, and gave promise of equaling 
in genius the illustrious members of his family. Like Maurice 
he was proud, warlike, and impatient of rebuke, and like 
Frederick Henry and William I his ideas were lofty and 
comprehensive. Precocious as the others, ambition seemed 
in him carried to an extreme. William II died aged twenty- 
four, but in one way history shows the effect of his dominat- 
ing character. Already the popular voice had grown weak 
in the presence of such a regnant spirit. The Netherlands 
had become virtually an arbitrary monarchy. Aside from 
this, no important changes took place. Commercially and 
internationally the prestige remained about the same. 

When William II died in 1650 there was no heir. Eight 
days afterwards, his widow, Mary of England, gave birth to 
a baby boy whose career in life was to be filled with glory, 
equal to that of any of the family ; one who was to save, not 
only his father's land, but his mother's nation as well from 
the growing greed of France. 

The overreaching methods of the late stadtholder had 
created much opposition and discontent, so that a reaction 
set in, and for a time the Dutch Netherlands came under the 
form of government called "the States," which fairly well 
represents the democratic idea. Without going into details 
as to the exact form of government, it is sufficient to say that 
from 1650 to 1672 there was no royal personal leadership ; 
and there was much independent local control on the part 



106 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

of the separate provinces. This did not lead to disaster, or 
to a period of marked decline. Trade and industry continued 
as flourishing as before. But one side only of the national 
welfare suffered, and that was the diplomatic. The subtle 
work of Louis XIV gradually succeeded in placing the Nether- 
lands in an isolated position, so that she could no longer 
count on friends or supporters. This was a serious matter 
in light of the formidable and constantly growing pretensions 
of France. Clouds began to hang darker and more threaten- 
ing over the Netherlands. Without a leader her future 
seemed dubious. 

It was young Prince William who saved the day. "In 
1572 the storm broke : the English, without a declaration of 
war, tried unsuccessfully to intercept the Dutch Mediter- 
ranean fleet, and France at once set forth to conquer the 
hated tradesmen of the north. The States were ill-prepared 
on land, though their fleet was strong and ready ; party 
spirit was exceedingly bitter, and the ruling party, well aware 
that the Prince of Orange was very popular with the land 
forces, had utterly neglected their army. On May 28, 1672, 
Ruyter fought a great naval battle in Southwold Bay (Sole- 
bay) against the Duke of York and Marshal d'Estrees : the 
French held aloof, pleased to see the Dutch and English 
destroy each other ; the English suffered most, but as the 
Dutch withdrew to their own ports, the others claimed the 
victory. Meanwhile Louis XIV crossed the Rhine and 
threatened Amsterdam. The young Prince of Orange alone 
seemed to rise to the occasion : while others were panic- 
stricken, sending embassies of submission to the haughty 
monarch, making preparations for a great fight by sea, Wil- 
liam with his miserable army did his best, and aroused so 
strongly the feelings of the people, that Amsterdam, passing 
from dejection to despair and thence to reckless enthusiasm, 
rose against the De Witts, and foully murdered both in the 
streets. They had just before proclaimed William stadt- 
holder of Holland with powers unlimited. And thus Louis 



THE NETHERLANDS 107 

XIV destroyed the proud republic, though in so doing he had 
raised up the most formidable enemy he was destined to 
encounter. His invasion did not prosper; other nations 
began to take up the Dutch cause ; Germans and Spaniards 
threatened the embarrassed French army in the provinces, 
so that in 1674 France was on the defensive on every side." ^ 

After six years' struggle, the peace of Nijmwegen (1678) 
secured and recognized the independence of the Dutch. This 
was very advantageous to their commerce, which shows a 
creditable record during the time of William III (1672-1702), 
Although the wars depleted the exchequer, general wealth 
continued to grow, and at the close of the period of William 
III, the country's credit was good. The Netherlands and 
England as well were very favourably affected by the revo- 
cation of the Edict of Nantes, an individual and personal 
mistake on the part of the French king. As a result of this 
act the Protestant countries gained many desirable citizens, 
mostly of the upper middle class. They brought to their 
new homes wealth, initiative, and good blood. For this last 
transformation we cannot credit William III of Orange, but 
we can debit Louis XIV. 

On the other hand, for the early days of William's career, 
we must give full praise to the man who saved his country 
from threatened extinction. Reading the descriptions of 
his exceedingly lofty traits of character and his extraordinary 
precociousness of mind seems but re-reading the lives of his 
four predecessors. As a type of the exact historian, Ma- 
caulay may not satisfy'modern requirements, but inasmuch as 
opinion of his own hero has not been reversed, let his elo- 
quent words still be quoted in his description of William III : 

"Since Octavius the world has seen no such instance of 
precocious statesmanship. Skilful diplomatists were sur- 
prised to hear the weighty observations which at seventeen 
the prince made on public affairs, and still more surprised to 
see the lad, in situations in which he might have been ex- 

1 G. W. Kitchin. 



108 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

pected to betray strong passion, preserve a composure as 
imperturbable as their own. At eighteen he sat among the 
fathers of the commonwealth, grave, discreet and judicious 
as the oldest among them. At twenty-one, in a day of gloom 
and terror, he was placed at the head of the administration. 
At twenty-three he was renowned throughout Europe as a 
soldier and a politician. He had put domestic factions under 
his feet ; he was the soul of a mighty coalition ; and he had 
contended with honour in the field against some of the greatest 
generals of the age. . . . Courage in the degree which is 
necessary to carry a soldier through a campaign is possessed, 
or might, under proper training, be acquired by the majority 
of men ; but courage like that of William is rare indeed. 
He was proved by every test ; by war, by wounds, by painful 
and depressing maladies, by raging seas, by the imminent 
and constant risk of assassination, a risk which has shaken 
very strong nerves, a risk which severely tried even the ad- 
amantine fortitude of Cromwell ; yet none could even dis- 
cover what that thing was which the Prince of Orange feared." 

However much, or however little, these avowedly ex- 
traordinary Princes of Orange may have contributed to the 
national glory of the Netherlands, it is at least a fact that 
synchronously with their sway the power of the Dutch reached 
world-wide proportions ; and that immediately on their 
extinction (through the absence of male heirs), this nation 
began to decline. 

Again the government fell to the States-General (1702- 
1747). The forty-five years under this regime do not make 
as good a showing as the twenty-two earlier years of repub- 
lican government (1650-1672), which followed William 11. 
It will be remembered that the earlier period was charac- 
terized by commercial prosperity, but also by diplomatic 
and military weakness, so that the international prestige of 
Holland became insignificant. This second period retro- 
grades on the commercial side as well as on the political. It 
heralds the remarkable and well-recognized downfall of the 



THE NETHERLANDS 109 

Dutch from that eminent position in world affairs which 
they had occupied during the seventeenth century. The 
tide turned rather suddenly, and appears to have commenced 
very shortly after William Ill's death. The change in 
method of government in 1747 which came about because 
"the provinces had sunk so low that all men began to wish 
for a dictator," placed the old offices of captain and admiral- 
general of the whole union, and stadtholder of the Seven 
Provinces in the hands of William IV of Nassau-Dietz. A 
little later these offices were declared hereditary in both male 
and female lines. The people seemed to think that in any 
Prince of Orange, as of old, they ought to find a leader who 
would save them from the French and restore their prestige. 

But William IV was only distantly related to the earlier 
illustrious branch of Nassau-Orange. There was a possi- 
bility of his having been engendered out of the wonderful 
germ-plasm of the former princes, but it was certainly slight. 
Roughly speaking and in the light of our present knowledge 
of heredity we might fairly say that the odds against it were 
greater than ten to one.^ At any rate he was but moder- 
ately endowed intellectually, according to all commentators. 
His intentions were good and a number of reforms were 
instituted, but it does not appear that any important con- 
sequences followed either during his own rule or during that 
of the subsequent regency of Anne, his consort. The period 
of William IV (1747-1751) is, however, too brief to draw any 
definite conclusions. 

After the death of the stadtholder, the regency was given to 
Anne, daughter of George II of England, a woman of a highly 
ambitious nature and imperious temper, who was not very 
successful in her headstrong and rather selfish aims. The 
Seven Years' War injured Dutch commerce, for their navy 
was no longer in a position to protect this important side of 
economic life. A shrewd diplomacy might have at least 

1 Discussion of the cause of the mediocrity of the branch Nassau-Dietz may 
be found in "Heredity in Royalty," pp. 94 to 97. 



110 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

aided matters somewhat, but no one came forth to guide the 
fortunes of the little nation, now buffeted about among the 
more dominant powers. After the unregretted death of 
Anne in 1757, the States themselves exercised the power of 
stadtholder until 1766. These years do not reflect glory or 
indicate improvement. The commercial difficulties became 
greater than ever before. In 1763, a crisis which had long 
been imminent brought down several of the leading mercan- 
tile houses of Amsterdam, followed by the usual panic and 
business stagnation. By degrees things righted themselves, 
but the Dutch merchants were obliged to content themselves 
with a business less influential and extended. The rule of 
William V (1766-1795) saw no changes for the better; East 
Indian interests further declined. The diplomatic position 
continued weak and uncertain. The provinces quarrelled 
among themselves. The Orange party quarrelled with the 
people; and the weak, irresolute William V commanded no 
respect. The years 1766 to 1772 again brought failure to 
many of the old mercantile houses. By 1775 improvement 
was under way, but the American War of Independence now 
worked serious injury to the Dutch. The period ended in a 
revolution ; Holland became virtually a province of France. 
Thus the Netherlands take their humiliated exit at the 
close of the pre-Napoleonic era. The whole eighteenth 
century had been a series of gradual and constant set-backs, 
especially national and political, though also commercial 
and economic. Yet the picture must not be overdrawn. 
It must not be supposed that there was no wealth and no 
industry remaining among the descendants of the doughty 
traders, pioneers of colonial enterprise. Their relative posi- 
tion in the world's trade had declined, other nations had 
arisen ; yet there was nothing of that poverty among the 
masses, nothing of that picture of utter economic stagnation 
that characterized Spain and Portugal when their dynastic 
leadership was withdrawn. There are several other facts 
indicating a general racial superiority of the people of Hoi- 



THE NETHERLANDS 111 

land, and a certain creditable if not exceptional ability to 
take care of themselves. The early prosperity of the cities, 
guilds, and corporations prior to the fifteenth century shows 
this, though the same was true in Northern Spain, Northern 
Portugal, and Northern Italy. The obtainment by the 
people of the "Great Privilege" under Mary of Burgundy 
must be accredited to non-royal activity ; but this charter 
remained in force only for a short time. The progress under 
insignificant Philip the Handsome must be counted to the 
credit of classes other than royal, and of course the modern 
prosperity of the Netherlands, since the close of the Napo- 
leonic era, is proof that the people now have a very high aver- 
age ability. On the whole it appears strange that a sturdy 
country like Holland should show a high correlation between 
its royalty and its political and economic prosperity, but the 
two parallel columns compel such a conclusion. 

A rapid survey of the broad tendencies from the fifteenth 
to the nineteenth century shows a strong personal influence 
of the last two Burgundian princes, followed by a great rise 
under Charles V and his able regents, until the bigotry and lack 
of wisdom of Philip II, aided by the evil genius of Alva, and 
other agents of this busy mischief-maker, turned the tide in 
a contrary direction. A rise again took place under the five 
great princes of the house of Orange. This ceased rather 
suddenly after the death of William III (1702) and did not 
again commence within the next hundred years, — during 
which time royal leadership in Holland was conspicuously 
absent. 

The showing made by the people of the Netherlands in the 
direction of autonomous growth is not nearly so good as that 
of Great Britain during the same historical epoch. It would 
seem as if the Dutch race must be lacking in certain qualities 
which are necessary to make statesmen. Surely their Hall 
of Fame is deficient in men of this calling, especially notice- 
able if compared with some other fields of activity, — art, 
for instance. Circumstances can hardly explain the defi- 



112 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

ciency, since the very forces that might be expected to bring 
forth political leaders were active in the Netherlands to an 
exceptional degree. They had an early start in civic self- 
government. Patriotism might well have been stimulated 
in the days of the Dutch Republic. The decline during the 
eighteenth century, with its national disruption, called loudly 
for great leaders, yet none appeared. On the other hand, a 
more mediocre frugality and an industry of a widely dis- 
seminated sort among the middle classes saved the country 
from any such cankerous decay as took place in Spain, Por- 
tugal, Sicily, or Greece; and the nineteenth century brought 
forth a flourishing growth in the Netherlands deep-rooted 
in the strength of the entire population. 



CHAPTER IX 

DENMARK 

In analyzing the history of Denmark it is best to begin 
with the reign of Valdemar III (1340-1375). It is often dif- 
ficult to get information concerning the characteristics of 
the early kings, and the general history of the nation is too 
dark and misty prior to the middle of the fourteenth century. 
A few strong royal figures stand out in the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries, such as Eric III, Valdemar I, Canute VI, 
and Valdemar II, and during their sway the country invari- 
ably progressed in strength and importance. Between these 
spasmodic bursts of vigour, weakness and confusion generally 
prevailed. A more detailed and systematic study of early 
Danish history (before Valdemar III) would be difficult, 
would require special research beyond the usual printed 
volumes, and would not, I should say, be particularly in- 
structive. 

Looking over the trend of Danish history from the middle 
of the fourteenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth, 
the comparatively few reigns which are progressive is a strik- 
ing fact. From Valdemar III to Frederick VI there are 
only seven such periods out of twenty. This is a low pro- 
portion, and is related to the fact that Denmark happened 
to have few great sovereigns. At times she held sway out- 
side her own narrow dominions, notably in Scandinavia, but 
this territorial growth and decline also followed the strength 
or weakness of the sovereigns. 

Valdemar III commenced his reign in 1340. In the 
beginning he possessed little more than the very restricted 
area of North Jutland. There had been a long period of 
I 113 



114 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

internal weakness: "No monarchy and no revenues, Scania 
and Halland were in the hands of the Swedes : Funen 
and Jutland were forcibly held by the counts of Holstein ; 
Zealand and Laland obeyed another chief ; and the rest of 
the isles had each its own ruler who regarded it as his own 
estate, to be inherited by his children. The anarchy of so 
many years had caused the laws to be forgotten, and the 
feeble were everywhere a prey to the strong, and the poor 
were at war with the rich, the native with the foreigner ; 
and nobody thought of obedience to authority." ^ Yet with 
this troubled and unpromising beginning, Valdemar, by 
skilful administration, made Denmark the strongest country 
in that part of the globe, recovering, consolidating, and 
extending his dominions, — making his authority everywhere 
realized. He conferred great blessings on all classes except 
perhaps the nobility, whose rapaciousness had found a check. 
Valdemar was succeeded by Olaf III, but this prince being 
a minor, the regency was given to Margaret, who afterwards 
ruled in her own right. This minority was not a weak one. 
Margaret triumphed over Albert of Sweden, twice bringing 
to naught his invasion of Denmark. The general adminis- 
tration was so well maintained that on the death of little 
Olaf in 1387 she was willingly accorded the full sovereign 
power. This woman ranks as one of the most intellectual 
queens in history. The general state of Denmark was 
distinctly high during the reigns of Valdemar and Margaret. 
After this, there was no growth worth mentioning for one 
hundred and twenty years. A particularly sharp decline 
set in on the death of Margaret in 1412, and lasted through 
the reign of the weak Eric. Then Christopher III, Christian 
I, and John successively followed, — kings of a mediocre 
stamp, and paralleled by conditions likewise without interest. 
Denmark lost and won territory in the Swedish kingdom 
and then lost it again. The various long-drawn-out rivalries 

' The picture here quoted from the older writer, Dunham, is confirmed by 
Bain. 



DENMAKK 115 

led to no advantage. The general march of events was slow 
and heavy. 

An intellectual sovereign appeared in Christian II, but 
not a really wise and suitable one. His mind was bold, 
enterprising, and gifted, but his disposition was obstinate, 
capricious, and excessive. His successes and failures appear 
as a very natural outcome from a nature so brilliant but so 
ill-arranged. His was a character to suppress rebellions, and 
this he did with pitiless severity. The broad ideas of 
Christian II may be seen in such improvements in the legis- 
lature, the commerce, and the condition of the peasantry as 
make up the favourable side of this period. But the many 
wars with Sweden appear to have been of no advantage to 
Denmark. These wasting wars and the excessive cruelties 
towards clergy and nobles make his reign far from a golden 
age ; but it would seem, everything considered, that more 
was gained than lost under this brilliant, half-mad king. 
Christian carried his tyranny too far ; his downfall was 
plotted by nobles and senators alike, and a popular movement 
finally deposed him in favour of his uncle, Duke Frederick, 
a man of only ordinary capacity, but cautious and peace- 
loving. 

Denmark was occupied during the reign of Frederick I 
(1523-1533) by the events of the Reformation. There is no 
special tendency in regard to political or material affairs. 

The interregnum from 1533-1534 was a period of weakness, 
disruption, and violence. Religious questions had divided 
the kingdom into two warring parties. Roman Catholics 
had declared for John, a younger son of Frederick I. Protes- 
tants were in favour of the eldest son of Christian. The 
latter prince carried the day and within a year was well 
established in royal power as Christian III. His reign was 
strong, characterized by comparative peace and prosperity, 
commercial advance, and judicial improvements. 

The reign of Frederick II (1559-1588) was also prosperous, 
and more notable than that of his predecessor. He was a 



116 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

superior king, and also was served by a group of able states- 
men. " With the assistance of these men Frederick succeeded 
in raising his kingdom to a rank of great power, prosperous 
at home and respected abroad. Never before had Denmark 
been so well governed, never before had she possessed so 
many political celebrities nobly emulous for the public 
good."^ The public money was managed with great skill, 
so that the exchequer was enriched without the taxes becom- 
ing burdensome. Copenhagen's university was enlarged 
and more amply endowed, and many colleges and academies 
were founded in various parts of the kingdom, as well as 
schools in the towns and villages. Although this reign was 
followed by a regency of eight years during the minority of 
Christian IV, the conditions remained prosperous and or- 
derly. "All four men were of great experience and acknowl- 
edged ability, and they exercised their trust in such a manner 
as to afford much satisfaction to the nation at large. Minori- 
ties have generally been seasons of trouble, and if the present 
was not, the honour might be awarded to the able government 
of the regents." 2 

With Christian IV (1596-1648) we return again to con- 
ditions in which the personal influence of the sovereign is 
omnipotent. Christian IV is the best known king in Danish 
history. He approaches more closely to genius than any 
ruler since Margaret, but still is far from being a king of the 
first rank. The talents and defects of Christian IV are both 
clearly mirrored in the history of his reign. The early part 
shows a commercial and internal prosperity which seems a 
direct result of Christian's activities ; the last part gives the 
picture of disastrous wars, the outcome of that same ambi- 
tion now excessive and unrestrained. A few quotations from 
Bain and from the older writer, Dunham, will suffice to show 
how the events of the time followed naturally from the 
leadership of such a man as Christian IV. "Agile and ath- 

1 Bain, "History of Scandinavia," p. 85. 

2 Dunham, "History of Denmark," etc., iii, p. 139. 



DENMARK 117 

letic, always extraordinarily energetic and tenacious. . . . 
His writings and sketches testify to a sure hand and a sense 
of form. Everything decorative attracted him. He was 
a good linguist. Naturally cheerful and hospitable; he 
delighted and shone brilliantly in lively society, but he was 
also passionate and irritable, with strong sensual inclinations, 
of a plethoric and pleasure loving temperament. Yet he 
was not without the elements of many noble virtues. He 
possessed uncommon courage, a vivid sense of duty, and 
indefatigable love of every sort of work, and all the inquisitive 
zeal, all the inventive energy of a born reformer. Want of 
self-control ruined the fine qualities. He was of the stuff of 
which great princes are made, yet he never attained greatness 
... in the decline of life the bitter fruits of his lack of 
stability became miserably obvious ; and he sank into the 
grave a weary heart-broken old man." ^ 

''That Christian, without any great, had many useful, 
qualities is certain. He encouraged literature and com- 
merce, and patronized literary and scientific men. He 
founded cities and fortresses. In all these respects he is 
deserving of high praise. Active, intrepid in danger, con- 
stant in adversity, he would have commanded our appro- 
bation had not his object been personal rather than national, 
had not self been his ruling passion." ^ As for his good 
works, "the harbours of Copenhagen, Elsinore and other 
towns were enlarged, a postal system for the whole of Den- 
mark was established in 1624. Many decaying towns were 
abolished and new ones founded under more promising 
circumstances. On the national defences he also bestowed 
much care." ^ Christian IV was evidently a brilliant king, 
but he made the fatal mistake of attempting to conquer a 
far greater man, Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden. For this 
reason the last half of his reign is filled with disasters. To 

1 Bain, " History of Scandinavia," p. 150. 

* Dunham, " History of Denmark," etc., iii, p. 160. 

' Bain, " History of Scandinavia," pp. 160-151. 



118 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

quote Bain again, "Impatience, ambition, an over-sangine 
confidence, and above all, jealousy of Sweden induced him 
to plunge into a war against the combined forces of the 
Emperor and the League without any guarantee of coopera- 
tion from abroad." These long wars, instituted to suit the 
personal ambition of Christian IV, brought lamentable 
misfortune to Denmark. The king lost the respect of his 
subjects and of foreign powers as well. The army was' 
defeated, the navy annihilated. Three years before his 
death a humiliating peace was concluded at Bromselro. 
''The peace of Bromselro was the first of a long series of 
treaties extending down to our present day, which mark 
the progressive shrinkage of Danish territory into an irre- 
ducible minimum." 

In the two reigns which follow, from 1648 to 1699, the con- 
ditions are difficult to estimate. Her continuous wars with 
Sweden represent the weakest side of the era. These were 
either quite useless, or brought territorial advantage not to 
the Dane but to the Swedes, who at this time were under 
the strong rule of the house of Vasa. The monarchs Fred- 
erick III and Christian V were not distinctive. Christian 
V was, I should say, somewhat below the average, and 
Frederick slightly above. The period covered by these two 
kings is not especially important. 

. There is still one interesting point here to be noted on 
account of its bearing on questions of psychology and 
historical causation. In the year 1670, during the reign of 
Frederick III, there occurred a sharp change in the form of 
government and the constitutional position of the crown. 
Before that time Denmark was one of the most limited of 
monarchies. After 1670 until 1848, she was the most abso- 
lute in Europe. I have already referred in "Heredity in 
Royalty" (pp. 225-226) to this peculiar phenomenon, and 
have pointed out that this most absolute of monarchies 
failed to produce, as some might expect, arbitrary or tyran- 
nical rulers. In fact, the kings of Denmark during this 



DENMARK 119 

period were, as Weitemeyer says, "good-natured, upright, 
and not more than ordinarily gifted." In the earlier history 
of the country there came forward, as we remember, a rather 
unusual number of able statesmen originating from the 
commoners ; later they were quite as conspicuous by their 
absence, — as absent in Denmark as they have ever been 
in Spain or Portugal. 

There is one reign more in Danish history (prior to the 
Napoleonic period) which should be pointed out as being 
distinctly prosperous. This covers the years 1699-1730 
under Frederick IV. The acquisition of new territory 
(Schleswig), and also many inward improvements, financial, 
industrial, educational, and agricultural, mark the reign. 
Frederick IV was a rather striking character, extremely 
ambitious and well above mediocrity, perhaps unprincipled, 
but withal an amiable, popular, and well-meaning prince. He 
was one of the very few strong kings in Denmark, and we 
see the nation well responding. 

The next reigns were also prosperous, though not as much 
so. The country enjoyed two generations of peace, a rare 
event in any nation. This period was characterized on its 
best side by commercial and industrial advance. There was 
one feature of national life, nevertheless, that bore a cloudy 
aspect. That was the state of agriculture and the condition 
of the peasantry. This passed through a severe crisis during 
the reign of Christian VI, and extended into that of his 
successor, Frederick V, so that the first of these reigns has 
a doubtful merit, while the second is a period in which growth 
somewhat outweighs decline. The personal influence of 
the sovereigns is quite marked during both reigns. Neither 
were great men, but both were well-intentioned, and lent 
their influence in the right direction. The various treaties, 
acts, and laws which brought about the commercial and 
industrial, and later the agricultural, development appear to 
emanate from the sovereign will. Thus, from the beginning 
of the eighteenth century a period of about seventy years 



120 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

occurred when Denmark, blessed with good rulers, made 
creditable though not distinguished advance. 

This suddenly came to an end with the accession of 
Christian VII, a poor, degraded, half-witted creature, who 
had neither the capacity nor the desire to rule. The govern- 
ment came naturally into the hands of others. A young 
German doctor named Struensee, a man of brilliant gifts 
and insinuating ways, but with a character utterly selfish, 
brutal, and corrupt, gradually gained the leadership at court. 
He appears to have had some grand notions of raising the 
fame of Denmark and became imbued with the idea of 
changing the whole state of society, but his radical and revo- 
lutionary reforms only led to a condition of chaos. Stru- 
ensee's ascendency over the imbecile king, and his notorious 
relations with Queen Caroline Matilda, together with his 
general overthrow of the rights of Danish nobles, fomented 
a conspiracy which ended in the arrest and execution of this 
extraordinary man, whose theatrical career still excites a 
peculiar interest. This portion of the reign of Christian 
VII, that is, from 1766 to 1772, was not progressive; the 
reforms which fill its history are of doubtful merit, but the 
last part, on the contrary, probably had success and value 
in spite of the weakness and imbecility of the king. This 
was practically under the rule of Ove Hoegh-Guldberg, who 
overcame and reconstructed the evil work of Struensee. In 
his desire to give liberty and importance to the lowest classes, 
Struensee had actually crushed the upper classes and over- 
turned valuable traditional and conservative forces. Besides 
recovering from this upheaval, Denmark gained steadily in 
commercial importance, being especially favoured by the 
American War of Independence. 

A new period of sane reforms, especially in agriculture 
and tariff legislation, began in 1784, directed towards ame- 
liorating the unfortunate condition of the peasantry. The 
eighteenth century closed with Danish affairs running along 
in a fairly prosperous condition. There were three promi- 



DENMARK 121 

nent names connected with this generation, the Crown Prince 
Frederick, Andreas Bernsdorff, and H. D. Reventlow. 

To summarize, we may say, in a broad way, that Denmark 
was steadily, though rather mildly, progressive from the 
thirteenth to the nineteenth century. Out of eighteen 
periods twelve show a well-nigh perfect correlation between 
the kings and the conditions, and four of the other instances 
are not far from it. At least five minor or special occasions 
are noticeable in which progress emanated from a non-royal 
source. The number of able, non-royal political leaders, 
and the number of times a country has progressed under 
weak kings, ought to be good measures of a nation's supe- 
riority. Looked at from this point of view, Denmark would 
have a position following closely upon England and Scotland, 
and at least on a par with Sweden and the Netherlands. 

One particularly important generalization from the history 
of Denmark is that, after the fourteenth century, this country 
had no great kings, and continually remained restricted in 
territorial and political importance. A comparison of the 
history of the various nations of modern Europe convinces 
me that the chief reason why Denmark remained small was 
that she did not happen to have kings inherently great; 
and that if great kings had been born to the house of Olden- 
burg, Denmark would have expanded, at least for a time, as 
did Sweden, 1 From the standpoint of heredity there is no 
expectation of anything more than mediocrity, or moderate 
talents in the Danish line of the Oldenburgs. The full 
pedigrees for each Danish king from 1559 to 1818 contain 
nothing in the way of genius, and are even curiously devoid 
of moderately illustrious names. By this I mean that one 
can follow up all the ancestral branches (maternal included), 
until all the great-grandparents of each king have been 
searched out, and until 132 names have been found, and 



1 For arguments which prove that the kings caused the conditions, and not 
the reverse, see page 280 of this work. 



122 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

yet not a single illustrious or eminent name will be en- 
countered.^ 

Both the political history of Denmark and the pedigree of 
the Danish kings may be likened to several of the small 
Germanic principalities and duchies. These have drawn 
their blood-royal from many families in Teutonic Europe, 
yet they never grafted on to their main trunk any of those 
rare branches of genius that narrowly spread their way through 
the otherwise monotonous pages of genealogical folios.^ 

Thus these countries were foredoomed to play minor roles 
in the ever-changing spectacle of history, yet this did not 
mean that a more gradual and more widely diffused progress 
might not take place without the royal initiative. That it 
has taken place in most countries of northwestern Europe 
is well known ; but before one dogmatizes on the causes of 
this movement or the direction of its tendencies, let him first 
recognize the modernness of its appearance and the un- 
traditional nature of its activities. Among those European 
estates which can lay some claim to an early awakening of 
such a really national (non-royal) activity, Denmark must 
always have a creditable place. For this reason its history 
merits far more attention than has been generally bestowed 
upon it. 

1 See "Heredity in Royalty," pp. 225-226. 

2 Christian II married a sister of the Emperor Charles V from a stock con- 
taining much genius ; but the subsequent Danish kings were not from this 
union. 



CHAPTER X 



SWEDEN 



The history of Sweden from 1060 to 1250 is one of tran- 
sition, of long and severe internal religious and territorial 
conflicts. Gradually out of a rather homogeneous and free 
peasant population there evolved a class of land-owning 
nobles and influential families, who more and more got the 
wealth and political power into their own hands. Historical 
material for a knowledge of this period is unfortunately very 
limited. From remote times petty kings were elected by the 
people, but not until late do we find a considerable number 
of important rulers with extensive dominions. 

One peculiar point is that Sweden slowly evolved her own 
nobility and did not import them ready made, in the form of 
Norman or Teutonic emigrants. She did not draw from the 
tap-roots of the great royal strains of the continent. This 
may be the reason why Sweden was slow in emerging from 
small separate kingdoms into a large united government. 
The extent of the territory and difficulty of communication 
are usually held to be the causes of this delay towards a 
wide monarchical sway, but we may advance with equal 
right this purely biological cause. It is a question whether 
such geographical facts as extent of territory and natural 
difficulty of communication have much to do with limiting 
a regal dominion. Perhaps; but when one thinks of the 
work of the Asiatic conquerors, of Charlemagne, and the 
vast sway of the Incas, one is at least entitled to doubts. 
In fact, all Scandinavia, including Denmark, Norway, and 
Sweden, was very successfully managed by the great queen, 
Margaret (1375-1412). 

123 



124 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

There are in addition a few other notable figures from the 
thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries in Sweden (the noble- 
men Englebrekt and the Stures), but these were not members 
of royal families, so their study does not properly come within 
the scope of this work. A hasty inspection indicates that 
on further study evidence would be found of a rather 
high general level of character and intelligence on the part 
of the early Swedish people. 

For about a hundred years after the time of Margaret, 
Sweden was more or less under Danish rule and constantly 
struggling to free herself from the hated yoke. At times 
she seemed to succeed, but the independence was only tempo- 
rary. There were no great kings in Denmark during this 
era, nor were they, with the exception of Eric, distinctly 
weak. If the Danish kings had been frankly of one type 
or the other, the question of separate independence for Swe- 
den might have been definitely decided before it actually 
was. 

It turned out to be not so much the weakness of the 
Danish kings as the genius of a single Swedish nobleman, 
Gustavus Vasa, that gave political independence to his 
country. This nobleman was raised to the sovereign power 
in 1523, and from that time monarchical Sweden began as 
a united and independent nation. From then until the 
assassination of Gustavus III in 1792, there is a very clear 
course to Swedish history, the ups and downs of which make 
excellent material for collecting and analyzing after a his- 
toriomctric method. The annals of this country are unlike 
Denmark's in two important ways : first, there were many 
members of the royal family with rare mental gifts, in fact, 
royal figures of the greatest eminence ; and second, there 
was a time when Sweden played a very important role in 
European political history, something Denmark never did. 
The whole period (1525-1792) is easily divided into two sub- 
periods, an age of growth and an age of decline, the begin- 
ning of the downward tendency being initiated by the mad 



SWEDEN 125 

ambition of Charles XII (1697-1718). In a broad way the 
two sub-periods outline the story, but there are many counter 
tendencies which show the personal influence by their sharp 
reversals in the general state of affairs, as the great leaders 
come and go. 

The man who freed the Swedes and gave them a perma- 
nently separate national history was not of royal birth. 
His family connections were, however, high, being among 
the leading nobility. When Gustavus Vasa was finally 
elected king of Sweden, that country had, what is really 
rare in most monarchies (except the Germanic), a truly 
native sovereign, — that is, a sovereign whose maternal and 
paternal ancestry are both grounded in the land over which he 
rules. Gustavus Vasa must unquestionably be considered a 
very marked personality. He had all the traits essential to a 
nation's liberator, — the magnetic enthusiasm, the untir- 
ing energy, and the single-minded devotion to a patriotic 
ideal. Even such faults as a passionate temper and tyran- 
nical behaviour furthered the success of his career. 

The most important work which the first Vasa accom- 
plished appears, however, not to have been the mere de- 
livery of his native land (for this might have been temporary), 
but rather the internal improvements which occupied his 
long reign. Gustavus Vasa was, says Bain, "the greatest 
constructive statesman of a dynasty of empire makers. 
. . . The whole burden of government weighed exclusively 
on the shoulders of the new king, a young man of seven and 
twenty. He had to see to everything personally and act 
on information which he could trust none to collect but him- 
self. Half his time was taken up in travelling from one end 
of the kingdom to the other, and doing purely clerical work 
for the want of competent assistance. Gustavus was, in 
very deed, not merely Sweden's king, but Sweden's most 
overworked servant. His officers did literally nothing with- 
out first consulting him, and his care extended to everything, 
from the building of a smithy to the construction of a fleet, 



126 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

from the translation of the Scriptures to the reformation of 
the Church." 

Under his personal direction there was first the establish- 
ment of a vastly more orderly and peaceful state of affairs 
than had existed before. The religious ferments, so universal 
at that time, were not without their expression in Sweden, 
here taking the form of peasant rising. These called for 
and received vigorous repression. The next important 
requirement was to restore an exhausted exchequer, not an 
easy task to accomplish in a country so long ill-managed by 
foreign overlords. It was a fatiguing, uphill task, but 
towards the close of the reign, the public wealth was well 
increased, and the taxes were rendered less burdensome. 
Even more than in these ways, this reign is famous as initiat- 
ing the commercial and industrial progress of Sweden, espe- 
cially her agricultural and mining developments, which from 
this time began to be very important. 

A turn in affairs promptly ensued and precipitated Sweden 
into a period of decline as soon as Gustavus Vasa died. 
Eric, who succeeded his father, had many of the brilliant 
mental gifts of the family, but was lacking in practical 
wisdom and common-sense, so that as a sovereign he was 
utterly incompetent. He had no ability to command the 
situation. Eric was an orator, poet, musician, and painter, 
but these gifts were not needed. His nature was cruel, 
suspicious, changeable, and untrustworthy, and very soon he 
showed the signs of that insanity which attacked a consider- 
able number of the brilliant family of Vasa. Eric XIV was 
undoubtedly insane at times. During the greater part of 
the year 1567 he became so deranged that a committee of 
senators had to be appointed to govern the kingdom. His 
conduct at best was insupportable either to his own family 
or to his subjects, and the result was that he was deposed 
in 1568 by his two brothers, John and Charles, backed by a 
popular movement. The whole reign of Eric was a dark one. 
The rebellions and disorder in the court and government 



SWEDEN 127 

were attended by an extravagant depletion of the public 
revenue which brought general discontent and misfortune 
to the masses. 

The reign of John III shows the same general disorder, 
— popular discontent and extravagance on the part of the 
crown, and cessation of that material progress in industry 
and agriculture which made the period of the first Vasa so 
glorious. John III resembled his brother Eric XIV very 
closely. His mind was gifted, but chiefly in a theoretical or 
bookish way. He was an expert linguist and considered 
very learned, especially in religion. Like Eric, his mind 
was unstable and his character described as violent, cruel, 
and headstrong. It is difficult to grade such kings as Eric 
XIV and John III, and, moreover, the latter has been treated 
by historians in a partisan spirit. Support of the Catholic 
reaction has probably prejudiced the Swedes against John, 
but we can be reasonably sure that neither of these two men 
belong among the great kings of history or in a class with 
Gustavus Vasa or Gustavus Adolphus the Great. We also 
know that Sweden made no important progress during their 
rule. The reign of Eric was distinctly weak, and considered 
as a monarch he cannot be classed as more than mediocre. 
The reign of John, though internally unsatisfactory, contains 
important territorial conquests on the opposite shores of 
the Baltic, so that on the whole its totality is doubtful. 

During the brief reign of the weak Sigismund, religious 
disturbances and unsettled conditions continued for a few 
years accompanied by a series of changes which make a page 
of reading not by any means peculiar to itself, except in the 
names of the actors and the details of the events. Time and 
again we find disorganization and decline under a weak 
monarch, a personal struggle with some close relative, 
usually a brother or uncle, and then after a "survival of the 
fittest" the nation again is seen to emerge from the discord 
and travel along the upward road. John had ousted Eric, 
and John was doubtless the more worthy of the two, but 



128 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

John was himself unfit, and the same was true of Sigismund, 
his son and successor. 

On the contrary, the Duke Charles was, of all the sons 
of the first Gustavus, the one to inherit not only the genius, 
but also the rugged practical wisdom, of his father. After 
five years' struggle, accentuated by religious bitterness, 
Charles came off the victor, and Sigismund was formally 
deposed. The influence of Charles IX was immediately 
beneficial. Order was again established after thirty years of 
disruption, and once again the wheels of progress moved in 
those matters relating so directly to the welfare of the nation 
as a whole. "He laboured earnestly to improve the judicial 
system of Sweden, which had as yet no code. He reorganized 
local administration and the levying of taxes. He favoured 
commerce and industry with all his power." All writers 
agree in extolling the success of the brief but important 
reign of Charles IX. " As a ruler he is the link between his 
great father and his still greater son. He consolidated the 
work of Gustavus Vasa, the creation of a great Protestant 
state ; he prepared the way for the creation of the Protestant 
'empire' of Gustavus Adolphus. Swedish historians have 
been excusably indulgent to the father of their greatest ruler. 
Indisputably Charles was cruel, ungenerous and vindictive ; 
yet it is impossible not to respect a man who seems, at all 
hazards, strenuously to have endeavoured to do his duty as 
he understood it, during that most difficult of periods, a 
period of religious and political transition, and who, despite 
his fanaticism, possessed many of the qualities of a wise and 
courageous statesman. The nobility whom he depressed 
and persecuted were no doubt justified in regarding him as a 
tyrant ; but the Swedish people frankly trusted and cheer- 
fully obeyed a monarch under whose protection they felt 
happy and secure, and who loved his country in his own 
rough way, above all else." ^ 

This was the commencement of Sweden's famous and 

1 Bain, "Scandinavia," p. 142. 



SWEDEN 129 

continuous rise to a position of importance in the world's 
politics. It began with the first years of the seventeenth 
century and coincided in point of time with that century 
almost exactly. The growth was remarkably uniform. 
There have been but few examples in these tables of European 
history of any national progress extending a full century with- 
out some serious set-backs. Turkey in the fourteenth and 
again in the fifteenth centuries, and England in the eigh- 
teenth, are examples of such long and steady advance. Here 
in Sweden there were two periods when it is rather difficult 
to say that the real welfare of the country was enhanced. 
The outward glory of Charles X's reign (1654-1660) may 
have cost too great a price, and the burden on the lower 
classes, in this and the succeeding period, needs to be taken 
into account ; but we can very safely say that there was no 
time of true retrogression in Sweden during the seventeenth 
century, or at least until 1697. 

The great names of Charles IX, Gustavus Adolphus, the 
minister Oxenstjerna, Christina, Charles X, and Charles XI 
loom large in European history. The impulse from six able 
rulers falling in sequence ought to be considerable if my thesis 
be correct ; and so it actually was, or at least the six are corre- 
lated to a great epoch. Sweden was not only raised to a 
diplomatic power of the first rank, but her commercial and 
industrial progress was no less noteworthy. A second inspec- 
tion brings out the fact that her two greatest gains were made 
under the leadership of the two, of all the six, who would 
surely be given the highest rating; namely, Gustavus 
Adolphus and the minister Oxenstjerna. 

The great work of Gustavus Adolphus as a champion of 
Protestantism is well known, but there are certain other 
facts in regard to his life which are sometimes overlooked, — 
facts which make it perfectly clear that the man was a born 
genius, that he was a moulder of circumstances and not their 
creature. First, we should recall his precocity. He was 
only eighteen when he ascended the throne, and had already 



130 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

at sixteen distinguished himself in war against the Danes 
as the actual leader of a successful army. Then we should 
remember the great difficulties ^vith which he was beset 
from the commencement of his reign. With a small army 
and an exhausted treasury, Gustavus came upon the throne 
at a time when his country was simultaneously at war with 
Russia, Poland, and Denmark, and when it seemed as if the 
Swedish nation would break to pieces in the hands of her 
united enemies ; yet Gustavus not only gave them defeat 
but actually gained territory at the close of these wars. 
Afterwards he had Tilly and Wallenstein, both consummate 
generals, as opponents, and fought against great odds when 
he united the shattered Protestant party and led it against 
the great house of Austria. 

Another direct proof of the genius of Gustavus Adolphus 
is that he introduced entire changes in the methods of war- 
fare. He discovered a more effective system than that in 
vogue before his time. These changes made possible the 
rapidity of movement and assault which characterized his 
victories. At that time the greatest reliance was placed in 
large, unwieldy masses of cavalry. These Gustavus arranged 
in small, rapidly moving detachments. At the same time he 
separated the battalions of infantry at a greater distance 
from each other, so as to give room for the play of the smaller 
units. The system of Gustavus was soon adopted by all 
the European countries and produced a revolution in the 
art of warfare. Gustavus also instituted reforms in the 
artillery, using lighter guns. He is said to have first estab- 
lished in modern Europe the true principles of cavalry 
tactics.^ The occupation of warfare did not by any means 
exhaust the energies of this "Lion of the North" or prevent, 
as was often the case with other monarchs, needful develop- 
ment of the country internally. The growth of old towns and 
the foundation of new ones, the increase of educational 

1 For the proof of the great influence which Gustavus Adolphus had on the 
art of war, sec his life by T. A. Dodge, in "Great Captains" series. 



SWEDEN 131 

facilities, of means of transportation, and the general improve- 
ment in the administration of justice were all remarkable. 
Much territory had been added, and Sweden had risen in a 
period of twenty years to a position of real grandeur among 
the nations of Europe. Gustavus Adolphus perished on the 
field of Liitzen in 1632 when only thirty-eight years of age. 
What he might have accomplished had his life been spared. 
During the minority of Christina there were twelve years 
of strength though the nation had no royal leader. At the 
head of affairs was the eminent Oxenstjerna, who had been 
valuable to Sweden in the reign of Gustavus Adolphus. The 
nation continued to play in general a successful role in the 
Thirty Years' War, and the internal conditions remained 
prosperous. That the good results really depended upon this 
one man appears evident enough. Thus Bain, in describing 
the administration of Oxenstjerna during the minority of 
Christina, says: "During his absence in Germany the pol- 
icy of the other regents had been vacillating to the verge 
of cowardice ; but on his return all branches of the adminis- 
tration awoke to new life. . . . Oxenstjerna always pre- 
sided at the frequent meetings of the Rad, his strong hand 
and watchful eye influenced every branch of the adminis- 
tration ; and anything like slackness, disorder, or venality 
was impossible during his sway. Many useful reforms too 
were inaugurated. A committee of experienced jurists was 
appointed to improve and simplify the course of legal pro- 
cedure. Trade and industry, especially the fabrication of 
iron and copper wire, were vigorously promoted, and flour- 
ished exceedingly, so that Sweden held control of the estuaries 
of all the principal rivers of Germany. The regular army 
was reorganized and raised to 40,000 men, an enormous 
force for a nation with a population of only 1,500,000; 
while the fleet in 1640 consisted of no fewer than 40 men- 
of-war, and 40 galleys with 1300 guns, besides the skar- 
gardsflotta or skerry-flotilla of 150 galleys for special service 
among the fjords of Sweden and Finland." 



132 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

After Christina became of age, she assumed the chief 
direction of affairs, and the first portion of her reign was full 
of glory. In 1645 Sweden extorted from Denmark the 
humiliating peace of Bromsebro. "Henceforth for the next 
twenty-five years Sweden was justly regarded as the greatest 
military power in Europe." The peace of Bromsebro was 
the crowning work and final service of the great Oxenstjerna. 
In 1648 the peace of Westphaha gave Sweden the duchies 
of Bremen, Verden, and Western Pomerania. The last 
portion of this reign was not so successful. The results of 
Christina's strange individuality are everywhere to be seen. 
Though she had great wit, learning, and intellectual acumen, 
her gifts were rather more in nature of brilliancy of accom- 
plishments than judgment and practical ability ; and added 
to this, her nature was so erratic, headstrong, and passionate, 
that she was not at all suited to be a successful ruler. Chris- 
tina began her reign promisingly and encouraged trade, 
manufactures, industries, and also education, science, and 
scholarship ; but her eccentricities increased and her attach- 
ments to unworthy favourites and the general extravagance 
and recklessness of her conduct brought about a very de- 
moralized state of affairs. Christina herself became tired of 
ruling and the country tired of having her. The general 
discontent became more and more marked, until her abdica- 
tion, voluntary as it originally was, became absolutely 
necessary. It is a little difficult to estimate the tendency of 
Sweden during her ten years' sway. The early part of it 
was strong and made notable by the treaties of 1645 and 
1648, and contained many inward marks of growth. The 
last part was clearly one of disintegration. 

One of the best decisions which Christina made was to have 
her father's nephew, Charles of Zweibriicken, become her 
successor. Thus Sweden got another strong king. Under 
Charles X order and unity were restored ; the country main- 
tained the high diplomatic prestige which she had won in 
former reigns. This monarch was a very able general. His 



SWEDEN 133 

wars with Denmark were successful, and the new territory 
acquired was extremely important to the future of Scandi- 
navia. It was then that Sweden acquired Scania, Halland, 
and Blekinge, which together form the southern tip of the 
peninsula. The expenses of foreign campaigns under 
Charles X were very great, and perhaps the wars were not 
worth the price, but at least they extended the domain and 
enhanced the national prestige. This monarch died in his 
thirty-eighth year. If he had lived, he would probably have 
benefited the country in many lasting ways, since he seemed 
to be outgrowing the excessive martial spirit of his youth. 
Be that as it may, it is very clear that his reign exhibits a 
course of events entirely in keeping with the reputed traits of 
character of this ambitious and warlike sovereign. 

Charles XI, his son and successor, being only four years 
old, a regency was appointed, composed of various mediocre 
characters, and the government sank into an extremely 
weak state. The finances were very badly managed. 
Sweden became a mercenary of France, and there was a 
sudden drop in her political status. Trade and industry, 
however, remained in a good condition, so that the total 
effect'of the regency was not as harmful as might be expected. 
The period covered twelve years until Charles XI was 
considered to have reached his majority in 1672. He was 
then but seventeen. His education had been entirely neg- 
lected, and at first he took no interest in affairs of state, 
which continued for the first few years in the same bad 
condition, and the foreign wars were unsuccessful. These 
years (1672-1679) cover about the first third of the reign of 
Charles XI, which portion was weak from every standpoint, 
but the remaining and more important part was correspond- 
ingly strong. By a vigorous and even tyrannical method 
of reform, which unjustly injured a few, yet benefited the 
nation as a whole, Charles brought about a restitution of 
financial strength ; and so we find Sweden under this rude 
but vigorous monarch, again advancing, not only in finances, 



134 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

but also in agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, es- 
pecially cloth and silk. Reforms in the army and navy 
strengthened the national defence, making the major portion 
of the reign of Charles XI a time of peace and prosperity. 

Another minoritj^ of less than a year's duration must be 
mentioned, just before the famous reign of Charles XII. 
The tendency is not clearly marked, but it appears to be 
on the whole a successful regency. Geijer states that the 
government was weakened by an ununited regency, that 
there were disturbances and general discontent ; but on the 
other hand, financial management remained good. Bain, 
in his history of Charles XII, thus comments upon the 
regency. It is worth quoting in full, because, picturing a 
considerable number of well-disposed gentlemen acting in a 
sensible manner for the general welfare of their country, 
it calls to mind one similar occurrence in Denmark, and the 
comparative rarity of this phenomenon in any country dur- 
ing this age. "The members of this regency, if not exactly 
great statesmen, were yet at any rate practical hard-headed 
politicians who had not served under such a master as 
Charles XI in vain, and during the seven months that they 
held sway no blunders were made and no national interests 
were injured; which, considering the difficulties that con- 
fronted them at home and abroad, is saying a good deal." 

But all the work of construction which Sweden made in 
the last years of Charles XI was shattered to the ground by 
the career of one of the most extraordinary personalities of 
modern times, Charles XII, who showed what genius can 
do when "ambition is madness and valour is ferocity." It 
is not necessary to follow this monarch in his great war, the 
audacity of which made all Europe gasp, or to go into details 
regarding the inner condition of Sweden. It is enough to 
state that his policy brought disaster to his country, that the 
finances w^ere exhausted, trade and industry dechned, and 
Sweden "sank to a fourth-rate power." 

The Swedish empire was never a homogeneous structure 



SWEDEN 135 

or a cohesive collection of similar racial elements with a 
natural basis for political unity. There were within its 
boundaries, besides the native population, Finns, Esthonians, 
Letts, Lapps, Slavs, and Germans, It could only be held 
together by force of arms. Charles directed this force of 
arms, and all his active attention, not towards the internal 
consolidation and management of this unwieldy mass, but 
spent his nation's resources in a foolhardy attempt to subdue 
overwhelmingly greater external powers. Intoxicated by his 
brilliant early successes, Charles never would listen to rea- 
sonable terms of peace, and in the end Sweden lost her 
lordship of the north. Russia, her ancient enemy, won it. 
The balance turned in favour of the country that was ruled 
by the greater man. Peter the Great, the inveterate rival 
of Charles XII, was as much a developer of Russia internally 
as he was a conqueror in war. Charles XII, before the end 
of his mad career, found himself with exhausted resources, 
opposed not only by the Great Czar, but also by the 
neighbouring states, Denmark, Prussia, Hanover, Saxony, 
and England. Thus isolated and abandoned, Sweden was 
obliged to submit to such terms as were dictated by her 
combined opponents. The results of the Great Northern 
War were complete loss of the extensive provinces on the east 
of the Baltic, and at the same time, internal ruination and 
deepest humiliation. All this had been brought upon a land, 
so shortly before on the pinnacle of pride and power. 

After the death of Charles, a drastic change took place in the 
methods of government so that the position and importance 
of the crown were entirely altered. It came about in the 
following manner. It so happened that the legitimate heir, 
Charles's nephew, the young Charles Frederick, Duke of 
Holstein, was a weak, irresolute person, and also that no 
other close relative of the deceased monarch could command 
pretensions of leadership. Charles XII had no direct de- 
scendants. He had no brothers, and his two sisters were 
mediocre or mentally deficient. The elder of these was 



136 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

childless, the younger had but a one son, the above-named 
Duke of Holstein. It was natural, that Sweden after her 
experience under Charles XII, should have longed for some 
change, but it is improbable that a form of monarchy so very 
limited in powers could have been forced upon the crown if it 
had not been for this accidental paucity of royal material 
and absence of heirs in the male line. My belief is that, 
had there been many direct male heirs, some of them would 
have had the strength to maintain the old despotism. 
Charles' only surviving sister was elected queen by the 
Riksdag, but only on condition that she should surrender 
the sovereignty to them. This gives us an opportunity to 
see how well or how ill Sweden could prosper from 1719 to 
1771, directed by her own statesmen, and under an extremely 
democratic form of government. All three of the sovereigns 
of this era were merely figureheads whose duties consisted 
of signing such documents as were presented to them. In 
character and intellect, they were all either mediocre or inferior. 

For the first twenty years affairs were very well directed 
and the work of restoration went on under the firm but 
cautious control of the chancellor. Count Arvid Bernhard 
Horn. This period was fairly characterized by peace and 
prosperity in which commerce, and especially iron, copper, 
and lumber industries, made creditable advances. This 
much must be accredited to the Swedish people themselves, 
or at least to non-royal persons. 

That this progress depended more upon the chancellor, 
Arvid Horn, than upon general forces, seems likely; since 
the following thirty-one years which complete the democratic 
era are quite the opposite in their tendencies. Peace and 
prosperity did not satisfy the nation. They must have 
the glories of war. A party of Jingoes, called the Hats, 
came into power in 1738. Horn was compelled to retire, 
and the new party was not long in bringing on a war with 
Russia on the most trivial pretext. The state of affairs in 
Europe and the complications caused by the Austrian sue- 



SWEDEN 137 

cession and the death of the Russian Empress Anne led these 
ambitious politicians to imagine that a war against their old 
enemy across the Baltic might give them an easy victory. 
So far from this turning out as they expected, delays and 
mismanagements were such that no attack was made until 
six months after the war had been declared. Then the 
Russians dealt the first blow, which virtually settled the 
whole affair ; and instead of winning anything, Sweden 
lost some more territory. Her position was ridiculous. 
Peace was patched up, and the greater part of Finland was 
given back to Sweden on condition that a candidate accept- 
able to Russia (an insignificant cousin of the Russian Em- 
press) should be elected to the throne once made famous by 
the Vasas. 

During the reign of this mild and weak puppet, Adolphus 
Frederick ( 1751-1771 ), the conditions grew steadily worse. 
Internal commotions, and general discontent, alternated 
with a state of lethargy, in which manufactures de- 
clined so that only about half as many persons were 
so employed in 1770 as in 1754. This so-called "Age 
of Freedom" was not an age of improvement. It was rather 
an age of license for the nobles. They wheedled all the 
control away from the fourth estate, bought and sold their 
political influence, and even betrayed their country into the 
hands of foreigners. Towards the close of the reign the 
corruption in Swedish politics became notorious all over 
Europe. The republican form of government had degen- 
erated into a corrupt oligarchy. Thus after fifty years 
(that is, during the activities of fully two mature generations) 
Sweden proved herself unfit for democratic self-government. 
Under practice and experience, instead of improving, she 
went backwards and was worse at the end than she was at the 
start. There is every reason for thinking that these wretched 
conditions would not have developed, had Sweden been for- 
tunate in having a statesman of the type of Axel Oxenstjerna 
or Arvid Horn. One sees a considerable number of 



138 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

first-rate statesmen before and after this time. There are 
several instances which show that Sweden had some abihty 
to progress without royal aid, but everything indicates that 
this has been due to the chance appearance of isolated and 
exceptional statesmen. The revival of agriculture, industry, 
and commerce which took place during the years 1771-1792 
bears out the same view. In this instance the statesman was 
also the king, Gustavus III, the brilliant nephew of Frederick 
the Great and the last of a long line of illustrious princes. 

Out of nineteen periods there are five deviations from strict 
parallelism between the grades for sovereigns and for con- 
ditions. Only two of these are in the form of opposed devia- 
tions. The minority of Christina (1632-1644) was very 
strong though devoid of royal leadership. The great states- 
man Oxenstjerna was at the head of affairs. In a similar 
way Arvid Horn appears responsible for the progressive 
conditions during the first part of the reign of the puppet 
king, Frederick I. The minority of Charles XI (1660-1672) 
and the seven months' regency for Charles XII were in some 
ways successful, and in so far as they were so, the force of 
inertia seems to be the cause ; motion once well started 
remained in motion. Aside from these comparatively unim- 
portant instances of departure, the kings themselves seem to 
be the entire story in Sweden. The beginning of the great 
movement of territorial expansion, the rise and fall, the 
minor fluctuations within the major wave, the crash from the 
Great Northern War under the half-mad Charles, and the 
reconstruction at the close under Gustavus III, — all mirror 
the remarkable personalities of the monarchs of Sweden, 
— the eccentricities, the absurdities, and the weaknesses 
of some, but above all the extraordinary energy and the 
idealized creative genius of others, who as prime movers in 
international events, brought a poor and backward country 
into a nation of the first rank, for a time unrivalled on 
the continent of Europe. 



CHAPTER XI 

RUSSIA 

Muscovite greatness begins with Ivan III in the latter part 
of the fifteenth century. Like several modern countries, 
France, Spain, Portugal, and Prussia, the territories which 
pass to-day under these names were at first very restricted 
in area. For this reason the question of mere land expansion 
becomes here especially important in relation to national 
power. Russia was not only consolidated and founded by 
Ivan III, but also greatly extended under this ruler. The 
most cursory glance at Russian history makes it noticeable 
that the great territorial expansions, the most broad and 
striking facts in Russia's growth have taken place under her 
four greatest sovereigns, Ivan III, Ivan IV, Peter the Great, 
and Catherine II. Furthermore, the expansions practically 
tell the whole story because losses of territory have hardly 
to be considered. 

Pomerania and Finland came in under Elizabeth, Smolensk 
and Chernigov under Alexis, otherwise no important terri- 
torial expansion took place, except under the four above- 
mentioned rulers. This means that there were twenty 
periods of rule between Ivan III (1462) and the beginning of 
the nineteenth century in which territorial expansion did 
not take place. Thus a broad initial survey of Russian 
history shows a high correlation between conditions and 
rulers. Other important fluctuations of fortune, the ques- 
tions of relative amount of law and order, condition of the 
army, treasury, commerce, agriculture, etc., also follow 
fairly closely the royal influence, but there are here and 
there unexpected deviations which need to be observed and 
counted. 

139 



140 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

For the first five periods (1462-1584) the whole trend is 
almost perfectly in accordance with the dynastic facts. 
Under Ivan the Great the land was almost doubled in extent, 
and the internal state of the country was also much improved. 
This continued in a less notable way during the reign of his 
son Vassili V, who followed the policy of his father. He was 
more industrious and brilliant, was exceedingly tenacious 
of purpose, and succeeded in most of his undertakings. 

Five years of minority (1533-1538) which are not "minus" 
in their tendency followed, but the nine years which close 
this minority are in every way disastrous. The first portion 
of the regency was in the hands of an able and resolute 
queen-mother, Helen Glinska, who kept the disruptive forces 
in check. The last part was devoid of royal control, was 
characterized by intrigues, murders, uprisings, and disorders, 
in which the Tatars again harried the empire. Russia's 
future at this time looked very dark. 

Under Ivan the Terrible (1547-1584), who with all his 
mad excesses was an intellectual, energetic, and able states- 
man, another period of progress occurred. Ivan was no 
soldier and his successes were the result rather of astuteness 
than generalship. The conquest of Kazan in 1552 was very 
important, as it opened the whole Volga basin to the Rus- 
sians. Ivan led his troops in person, but their victory was 
due more to overwhelming numbers than to merit. In the 
other direction, towards the Baltic, Ivan IV was not success- 
ful. Here he lost territory, though not to an important ex- 
tent. On the other hand, the home region of the Cossacks 
was annexed, and also the first conquest of Siberia must be 
noted as having taken place during this reign. This was 
accomplished by the Cossacks themselves, a mere handful 
of whom under their leader, Yermak, brought the country 
under their nominal subjection. Yermak then presented his 
conquest to the Czar, in exchange for which, he received full 
pardon for certain former offences. Previous to this he had 
carried his raids in the wrong direction, had been called a 



RUSSIA 141 

robber instead of a conqueror, and a price had been put on his 
head. Ivan had a considerable faculty for getting other 
people to take the burden of the risks. In this way part of 
the Crimea of the Tatars was conquered in 1555, and suc- 
cessful raids were made in this territory by the Polish Cos- 
sacks while Ivan remained at home. All these conquests 
appear to be due chiefly to the general weakness of the op- 
ponents. The Siberians were too primitive and widely 
scattered to offer any resistance. Kazan and Astrakhan, 
though important cities, were comparatively easy of subju- 
gation owing to their location and poor defence. Ivan's 
merit was that he realized where the weakness lay and ap- 
preciated what could and what could not be done, and 
stopped there. Thus, against the advice of his counsellors, 
he refused to claim jurisdiction over the entire Crimea, the 
actual realization of which would have been very doubtful 
at that time. In all the wiles of statescraft Ivan IV showed 
himself very astute, and in spite of his fiendishly brutal 
character, his reign was in many respects beneficial to Russia. 
He put a stop to anarchical conditions. He strengthened the 
defence of the empire by building many fortresses. He fa- 
voured trade with foreign countries and welcomed foreigners, 
especially the English and Scotch, who came to Russia in 
great numbers. It was then that Russia first emerged from 
her northeastern isolation. Activity in the arts" and much 
building in Moscow, the capital, give some impression of an 
advancing civilization, where also for a very brief time a 
printing-press was set up. 

The reign which follows counts one against sovereign rule 
strictly speaking, for it was in most respects favourable and 
progressive, yet the Czar Feodor was a roi faineant, almost an 
imbecile. The empire was strengthened, the Tatars re- 
pulsed, Smolensk fortified. Archangel built, Swedes driven 
into Narva, and the Siberians still further subjugated. In 
addition to feats of arms the general commercial relations of 
the country were broadened, trade passing through new 



142 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

channels. The above picture is one to suggest the presence 
of some single vigorous personality. The real ruler is found 
in Boris Godunov, a Russian nobleman who later raised 
himself to the actual throne. This man had married a sister 
of the Czar, and was, at the death of Feodor, elected his 
successor. His actual reign (1598-1605) was a continuation 
of his efforts when merely the power behind the throne ; yet 
it was an unprogressive period, — an instance of circum- 
stances being too powerful. The famine of 1601-1603 is said 
to have killed a million people. The results were horrible 
in the extreme. Like so many famines in other countries 
during the Middle Ages, the inevitable sequences followed, 
— robberies, murders, pestilence, and even cannibalism. 
The Czar himself acted nobly and did what he could to 
alleviate the widespread sufferings, but neither in this, nor 
in other ways, did he succeed in making himself popular, 
either with the lower or upper classes. He was an upstart 
and a tyrant. That his rule was really beneficial to Russia 
as a whole was not appreciated either by the ignorant masses 
or the self-seeking nobles. There had always been a story 
that the younger brother of the late Czar Feodor had 
been poisoned, and that the parvenu Boris knew something 
about it. 

The real fate of this prince, whose name was Demetrius, 
is still shrouded in mystery, though it has given rise to much 
interest and speculation on account of the various impostors 
who came forward in his guise. The first false Demetrius 
was a remarkable character. Of this we may be certain, 
although it does not appear clear just who he was, where 
he came from, or by whom he was first supported. It was 
his appearance upon the scene, in October, 1604, which occu- 
pied the last six months of Boris's rule in the disturb- 
ances of civil warfare. Before the rivalries were settled, 
Boris suddenly died, leaving a son, Feodor II, who was then 
but sixteen years of age. This lad ruled but seven weeks 
before he was put out of the way. Demetrius was crowned 



KUSSIA 143 

Czar and gave proofs of personal strength and wisdom, but 
his reign was brief, as he in turn was treacherously murdered 
before a year had passed. There was a temporary reestab- 
lishment of a much more peaceful state of affairs. The im- 
postor made himself very popular, both before and after 
his coronation. In fact the Czaritza Martha, the mother 
of the real Demetrius, did not dare do otherwise than pretend 
to identify him and acknowledge him as her own son, so 
great was the enthusiasm which he had created. All his 
measures were extremely just and humane. A number of 
beneficial laws were enacted. There was even in this short 
time evidence of a more flourishing condition of trade and 
commerce. "The diligence of the new Tzar was exemplary. 
He presided over the Council every day, and after listening for 
hours, with an indulgent smile, to the interminable and un- 
profitable debates of the boyars, would, in a few moments, 
unravel and elucidate the most complicated questions. 
Sometimes he gently reproached the boyars with their ig- 
norance. 'I must send you abroad to learn things,' he would 
say. He attended to all petitions personally. When his 
friends the Poles warned him to beware of suspicious char- 
acters, he replied, 'There are two ways of ruling subjects, by 
tormenting or by encouraging them. I prefer the latter 
way.'" ^ A too great freedom from suspicion was, however, 
the cause of his untimely death at the hands of his rival 
Vassili Shuiski. We may well regret that history gives us so 
little certainty as to the antecedents of this extraordinary 
usurper, the first Demetrius, and so brief a measurement of 
his potential possibilities. 

His rival obtained the object of his ambitions, and was for a 
short time theoretically Czar, but his position was always a 
disputed one. His reign (1606-1610) and the three years 
following form together the darkest period in Russian his- 
tory. Vassili Shuiski must be credited with a certain amount 
of ability, especially in craftiness and intrigue, but his timid- 

1 Bain, "Scandinavia," pp. 173-174. 



144 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

ity and weakness forbid him a higher than mediocre rating. 
Bain gives a fair summary thus: "Vassili's peculiar vices 
tended to increase the general confusion. He was a near- 
sighted, nervous, little old man, very shrewd and very stingy, 
a firm believer in magic, averse from action, and with his 
ears ever open to spies and detractors. As if his authority 
was not already sufficiently limited by his character, he pro- 
ceeded to limit it still further by swearing to punish nobody 
without the consent of his Council. At the same time he 
foolishly afienated his own partisans by withholding from 
them the promised rewards for their services, although they 
knew him to be very wealthy. In these circumstances, a 
fresh crop of pretenders was only a matter of time." 

Not only did three pseudo-Demetriuses appear upon the 
scene as instigators of lawlessness and rebellions, but in the 
general confusion and disintegration which ensued, all the 
old enemies of Moscow pounced upon her. Poles, Cossacks, 
and Tatars all invaded Russian territory, either separately or 
as allies of each other. The burning, slaughter, and pillage 
which Russia suffered at this time nearly reduced her to 
annihilation. Shuiski was defeated, captured, and sent 
away to Poland. Russia was finally saved from the Poles, 
and this particular national recovery came about in a pe- 
culiar way. The end of the disintegration and the beginning 
of a brighter outlook took place under a national religious 
movement which was initiated by a certain monk, Diony- 
sius. Three other leaders. Prince Pozharski, and Kuzma 
Minin, a butcher of Novgorod, and one of the gentry named 
Lyapunov should also be accredited with the work of ex- 
pelling the Poles, which seems to be much more of a general 
than personal movement. There is one point, however, on 
the other side of the question ; the king of Poland at this 
time was the weak Sigismund III. The victories over the 
Poles make a good count towards progress ; but general 
disorder and lawlessness persisted. The Poles still held 
many districts, and also, as the national treasury was plun- 



RUSSIA 145 

dered, the period known as the interregnum is not more 
than of middle grade. 

Sigismund III of Poland, though the candidate of one 
party for the throne of Russia, was either too feeble or too 
unlucky to meet with success. After that, the Russians 
looked about to find some one of their own countrymen on 
whom to confer the crown. The choice fell on a young prince 
of the noble family of Romanov, Michael by name, who as 
nearest heir to the old dynasty was elected boyar and re- 
ceived with acclamation by the people. This prince, then 
only sixteen years of age, owed his election, in part at least, 
to the great influence of his father, Philarete. The father 
was raised to a position of joint ruler along with the son. 
It does not appear that Michael was ever very vigorous. 
Certainly he was entirely a negative factor at the commence- 
ment of his reign. Both father and son were amiable char- 
acters, just and generous, and praised for their many virtues. 
Philarete, the father, is highly lauded for his energy and 
administrative ability, and the amelioration of Russia during 
this reign is usually attributed to him. Nothing extraor- 
dinary or revolutionary took place, but in comparison to the 
immediate past, the general tone was decidedly favourable. 
There was a diminution of lawlessness and robbery and an 
improvement in the army. The reign is especially noticeable 
for an increased activity in trades, crafts, and arts, brought 
into Russia by Germans, who emigrated there at the instiga- 
tion of the throne. After the death of Philarete in 1633, 
Michael carried on the government alone in a creditable 
manner. "Michael was not perhaps a great, but he was 
certainly a good ruler. The universal belief in his honesty 
and conscientiousness was fully justified, and during his reign 
the down-trodden and overburdened Russian people looked 
to the throne alone for relief and justice, nor looked in 
vain."^ 

During the five years' minority of Alexis (1654-1650) the 

1 Bain, "The First Romanovs," p. 67. 
L 



146 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

government remained in strong hands. Boris Morosov 
(non-royal) was in control, and if he erred, it was on the side 
of too rigid severity. The army was strengthened and im- 
proved and there was also an important codification of the 
laws (1648), but the value of this legislation is problematical. 
The chief points which count against this regency are the 
numerous revolts and uprisings. Altogether this period 
is not a long or important one. It was a fairly reputably 
managed minority. The actual reign of Alexis was one of 
progress and importance. It paved the way for the greater 
period of Peter the Great. The character of Alexis was sim- 
ilar to that of his father and grandfather. He had an active, 
diligent, and well-balanced mind. The facts most worth 
noting are tliat he was extremely kind and affectionate, 
courteous in his manners, not at all a t3^rant, yet was able 
to rule successfully over this wild and disorderly people. 
Save for occasional outbursts of passion (which appear to 
have been rather examples of righteous indignation) his 
character was almost saint-like in its mildness. 

Alexis died in 1676. His son, Feodor III, followed upon 
the throne ; but as he was only fourteen at that time, and 
died before he became twenty-one, it is best to consider his 
reign (1676-1682) is if it were a minority. ^ There was some 
intrigue in settling the question of succession, but after that 
events are singularly favourable considering the state of 
rule. It is true that Feodor was granted his majority and 
thus became the titulary ruler in 1679. But as he was then 
but seventeen and there is not sufficient evidence that he 
acted otherwise than under the direction of his favourites,^ 
it is more in keeping with the plan I have attempted to 
follow not to accredit the events of 1679-1682 to him per- 



1 Feodor was extremely weak phj'sically but not mentally. The characteri- 
zation "imbecile" in "Heredity in Royalty," pp. 219 and 221 is an error. 
This Feodor, 749, as he did not reach adult years, should not have been in- 
cluded in lists and grades. 

* Waliszewski Le Berceau d'une dynastie, p. 536. 



RUSSIA 147 

sonally. The reforms seem to be part of the general in- 
filtration into Russia of western ideas. A more humane 
penal code was introduced, also better control of the pauper 
classes, but the most important change concerned the army 
and consisted in the abolition of the Myestnichestvo or "prior- 
ity of place." This system of family precedence had been 
carried to a ridiculous extreme, all ranks both civil and 
military being determined by an appeal to pedigrees. The 
measure which led to its abolition is thus described by 
Bain: "The initiator of this salutary measure was Prince 
Vassili Vasilevich Golitsuin, sometimes called 'the great 
Golitsuin,' who now comes prominently forward for the first 
time. Golitsuin, who belonged to one of the most ancient 
families in Muscovy, was unusually well educated. He 
understood German and Greek as well as his mother-tongue, 
and could express himself fluently in Latin. Born in 1643, 
he entered the service of Alexis at an early age, and in 1676 
was created in boyarin. Sent to the Ukraine to provide for 
its defence against the incursions of the Turks and Tatars, 
he served with distinction during the famous Chigirin cam- 
paign, and returned to Moscow with the conviction that 
the Myestnichestvo was at the root of Muscovy's deplor- 
able military inefficiency. The young Tzar was readily 
convinced by his arguments, and a special ukaz forthwith 
removed at one stroke an abuse which has so long ap- 
peared unassailable. The razryadnuiya knigi, or records 
of rank, to which the boyars had been wont to appeal 
as infallible authorities in all their claims for precedence, 
were at the same time destroyed. Henceforth all appoint- 
ments to the civil and military services were to be deter- 
mined by merit and the will of the Gosudar. The fact 
that the dying Theodore (Feodor) could so easily remove 
so deep-lying and far-reaching an abuse is a striking testi- 
mony to the steady, if silent, advance of liberal ideas in 
Muscovite society, even since the death of Alexis. It is 
often too much taken for granted that Peter created modern 



148 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

Russia. The foundations of modern Russia were laid while 
he was still in the nursery." ^ 

After the death of Feodor the power was seized by his 
sister Sophia, a woman of great will and ambition, which 
she directed towards gaining her own selfish designs. 
Golitsuin became her paramour, and was openly acknowl- 
edged as such. Both were mentally gifted, but they did not 
succeed in bringing about prosperity. General circum- 
stances here appear to hold the sway. Golitsuin conducted 
an expedition of 150,000 Muscovites and Cossacks against 
the Tatars of the Crimea in 1687-1688, a disastrous under- 
taking, not because of the superiority of the enemy, but on 
account of the nature of the country and vast fires which 
obliged a retreat. Intrigues, plots, and insurrections fill 
the period. 

The figure who next appeared upon the scene was an 
example, if ever there was one, which proved that circum- 
stances may be the sport of men. In Peter the Great there 
is a royal personality whose genius is unquestioned. As a 
little boy he showed no precociousness and was rather back- 
ward than otherwise, but by seventeen his real qualities 
began to appear. It was at this early age that he first took 
matters into his own hands and became the actual ruler of 
his vast and turbulent country. His education had been 
grossly neglected. Everything that he learned after he was 
eight years old was self-taught. He was extremely restless, 
inquisitive, and bent on vast schemes, the precise direction 
of which he scarcely at first knew. Russia must have a 
navy and a sea-door for her trade. No pains were spared 
to effect this gigantic work. Internally the nation needed 
to be aroused to western civilization; no opposition could 
withstand his passion for reforms. The energy, the will, 
the courage, and above all, the magnetic enthusiasm of 
Peter the Great alone make him a gigantic figure in history. 
For purely intellectual qualities Peter does not perhaps 

1 "First Romanovs," pp. 193-194. 



RUSSIA 149 

belong in the very highest grade of royalty, but there is no 
doubt but that his mental capacity was great ; neither is there 
any doubt but that his long reign (1689-1725) was one of 
the greatest eras of progress for Russia. Important increase 
in territory at the expense of Sweden, especially the ac- 
quisition of a seaboard, and founding of St. Petersburg, the 
betterment of the army, and the creation of a navy, and 
increase in the trades, commerce, and arts, are the chief 
features. There is nothing of importance to record on the 
detracting side. 

After the death of the great monarch his widow Catherine 
became Empress of all Russia, but as she had neither educa- 
tion nor the inclination to govern, the real control of affairs 
was divided and in the hands of a newly constituted bureau 
or Supreme Privy Council of eight or ten persons. The 
government was conducted in a very creditable manner, 
and, although a brief and unimportant period, must be 
counted, as far as it goes, in the "plus" direction. There 
are but two features worth mentioning, first the diplomatic 
policy, which was peaceful and cautious and sufficiently 
dignified to command respect, second a lightening of the 
poll-tax which had weighed heavily on the peasantry. 
Although Menshikov exercised the ascendency it does not 
appear that he, or any other one person, is to be accredited 
with this period of progress. 

After the death of Catherine I the Supreme Privy Coun- 
cil acted for three years (1727-1730), but there is little to 
admire in their conduct, nor are the events of sufficient im- 
portance of definiteness to make worth while any comments 
on this brief period. 

The reign of Anne Ivanovna (1730-1740) is more impor- 
tant, but its total value is difficult to estimate. If it be as 
Bain contends, a progressive period, then it must be ac- 
credited to some other cause than the direct influence of the 
Empress, who at least was not more than mediocre in ca- 
pacity. For the sake of the argument we may count that 



150 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

much against royal influences, but it must be conceded with 
Morfill that, "the reign cannot be said to have added much 
lustre to the annals of Russia." 

The next two periods occupy the minority of Ivan IV. 
They are very brief (1740-1741), devoid of any interest other 
than court intrigues, and are if anything retrograding in 
their tendency. Elizabeth, who reigned from 1741 to 1762, 
though uncultivated and immoral, possessed a very keen 
mind. Russia made great gains during her period. Even 
if one is reluctant to credit much to the individuality of 
Elizabeth, the same cannot be said of Catherine the Great. 
The expansion of Russia under this woman's management 
(1762-1796) is as notable as the decline which followed 
under Paul (1796-1801). 

On the whole Russia shows less identity between "ruler" 
and "conditions" than might be expected. There are six 
conflicts against ten parallelisms, but these conflicts do not 
appear verj^ significant when looked into one by one. The 
progressive period (1584-1598), though under the titular 
rule of the weak-minded Feodor I, was really in the hands of 
Boris Godunov, who became an actual sovereign later. 
The minority of Alexis (1645-1650) was progressive, and its 
success may be ascribed to Boris Moroscov. The period of 
Feodor III is more difficult to explain, but lasted only six 
years. The reign of Catherine I does not mean much, as 
this was terminated inside of two years (1725 to 1727). The 
reigns of Anne (1730-1740) and Sophia (1682-1689) on the 
contrary seem to have been much affected by general causes, 
one reign favourably and the other unfavourably. Still, the 
great epochs in Russia's expansion took place under her 
great sovereigns, and that this was not due to the absolutism 
of her form of government is proved by comparisons with the 
more democratic periods in Sweden and the Netherlands, early 
Spain, and early Portugal. 



CHAPTER XII 



PRUSSIA 



Looked at from the standpoint of comparative history 
and in the light of a long range of time, no modern nation 
has been more uniformly and continuously progressive than 
Prussia, This progress is notable for its comparative freedom 
from temporary declines ; but until the middle of the seven- 
teenth century it was not more than a dull growth, silent, local, 
and uninteresting ; save that to-day this history happens to be 
the primitive history of what has actually become the lead- 
ing state in one of the most formidable of the Great Powers. 
The activity of the Hohenzollerns has been almost without 
rest. In warfare, in politics, in finance, in government, and 
in the royal marriage mart as well, the successive princes of 
this line have usually gained some advantage, — each added 
something, little though it may have been, to the work of 
his predecessor. On only two or perhaps three occasions 
did sloth or decay become manifest. Thirteen reigns show 
enhancement of political power or national resources, though 
some of these, it must be said, do not more than barely turn 
the scales in the favourable direction. 

The history of all that territory now comprised in the 
kingdom of Prussia would lead one far afield ; but inasmuch 
as the main theme of the present investigation concerns 
itself with the relations of dynasties to national welfare, it 
will be sufficient to confine the early portion of this account 
to that small circle of modern Prussia, the mark of Branden- 
burg, the nucleus of the larger State. The name Preussen 
(Prussia) was originally applied to territory on the shores 
of the Baltic adjacent to Lithuania, Courland, and Poland. 

151 



152 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

This was for a long period under the control of the Teutonic 
knights, and came by degrees under the sway of the Hohen- 
zollerns, as did also Pomerania, which lies to the west of 
Preussen and to the north of Brandenburg. These various 
unions were brought about during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. They came slowly into existence, so 
there is no clearly defined point at which to begin the his- 
tory of the modern State. Specialists may dispute as to 
whether this starting-point be taken from the period of the 
Great Elector, from Frederick I, or Frederick the Great ; 
but these differences do not bring confusion into the present 
inquiry because this survey shall consider the conditions of 
only such geographical areas as come under the direct 
primogeniture line of the present royal family. As soon as 
these accretions add scope and material to the earlier limits, 
the new and expanded nation shall be measured as a single 
entity. 

The mark of Brandenburg was, during mediaeval times, 
an outpost of the empire, — an advance line of defence for 
the Teuton against the Slav. In 1415 the Emperor Sigis- 
mund rewarded Frederick of Hohenzollern, burgrave of 
Nuremberg, with the government of the mark, as a return 
for services already rendered and as a pledge for a loan of 
400,000 gulden. Frederick was made Markgraf (margrave) 
in 1415 and an elector of the empire in 1417 with permanent 
possession of the mark. 

For a century previous to the arrival of the Hohenzollerns, 
the internal conditions in Brandenburg had been weak and 
declining. Since the extinction of the Ascanian line in 1319, 
the central authority had become relaxed, lawlessness and 
rapine had reduced the country to the lowest state of misery. 
Robber barons fought with each other, and powerful neigh- 
bours took such portions of the territory of Brandenburg as 
they were able. Thus the dominion which the Hohenzol- 
lerns acquired was at first both small in extent (about 11,000 
square miles) and very unpromising in future outlook. 



PRUSSIA 153 

Frederick I of Brandenburg did not wholly succeed in re- 
storing order and affluence, but he did bring about a decided 
improvement compared with conditions which had persisted 
for many years. He was much occupied with the business 
of the Emperor, the Hussite wars, and affairs outside of 
Brandenburg ; but in spite of manifold distractions, the new 
guardian of the frontier stemmed the rising tide of lawless- 
ness within the mark, and started the country on its long 
career of growth and uplift. After many, not always suc- 
cessful, wars with Mecklenburg and Pomerania, he succeeded 
in uniting again the ukermark to Brandenburg, thus con- 
siderably extending his jurisdiction to the north. Frederick 
I was the wonder of his contemporaries. In the opinion of 
Ranke ^ he was a genius of the first order. Though this rat- 
ing seems too high, one may easily agree with Tuttle ^ that 
"he was one of the first soldiers and one of the best scholars 
in Germany." 

The improvement continued under Frederick I's son, 
Frederick II, though the changes were not so notable. The 
towns of Berlin and Cologne had suffered much during the 
lawlessness of the previous century. These had gladly 
welcomed Frederick I as a champion of law and order, but 
now that the burghers had grown richer they sought more 
prerogative. Instead of getting it, they were obliged to 
bow all the lower in submission, and Berlin saw a royal 
castle within its walls. It would be difficult to say whether 
this was good for the cities or not, but it is evident that the 
cities had not shown themselves competent to guide their 
own fortunes during the extended era of sovereign absence. 
During Frederick IPs reign the neumark was added. 
Treaties were made with Mecklenburg, Saxony, and Hesse, 
— treaties advantageous to Brandenburg. The only point 
worth mentioning not on the favourable side was an increase 
in the national debt. Frederick II, though not as great as 

' "Preussischc Geschichte," I, 104. 
* "History of Prussia," I, 67, 



154 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

his father, the founder, had many exceptional qualities, — 
tenacity of purpose being the chief. He was called by his 
contemporaries "the Iron Man." He was equal to the 
average of rulers or perhaps superior. 

The third of the Hohenzollerns to fill the post of elector 
became the most famous of the earlier members of the 
family, that is, the most famous of any from the tenth cen- 
tury to the Thirty Years' War. Albert, surnamed Achilles, 
was perhaps not greater than some of the others of his line 
who are less remembered, but his type easily appeals to 
the imagination. A brilliant cavalier, active, adventurous, 
lavish in his display, his influence was not entirely for good 
but his personality was paramount everywhere. Wars and 
the burdens of wars, enemies humbled, but at a gigantic 
cost, — such were the natural happenings under the guid- 
ance of a ruler like Albert Achilles. There is little more to 
be said of this reign, except that a strong hand kept fair 
order, — the first essential of all prosperity. Albert Achilles 
was too much taken up with the business of the empire, too 
ambitious and self-seeking, to do justice to the land of his 
home. At all events the mark of Brandenburg did not 
become weakened. 

From 1486 to 1619 a long period elapsed during which 
the history of the HohenzoUern patrimony offers little to 
interest the general reader, and all this dull routine came 
at a time when the history of many other European coun- 
tries is filled with the stirring events of the Renaissance and 
the Reformation. From 1619 to 1640 mediocrity gave way 
to disruption, and Brandenburg became interesting, but 
only on account of its disasters, caught as it was in the 
greater whirlpool of European wars and politics. From 1486 
to 1619, which carries the story as far as the accession of 
Frederick William, the Great Elector, no master mind was 
born to the house of HohenzoUern. As stated at the begin- 
ning of the chapter, the efforts of the royal family of Prussia 
have been almost without rest, and their activities have been 



PRUSSIA 155 

rewarded with a success both rare and remarkable. Even 
during the period of partial eclipse some very shrewd moves 
were made, some acts or innovations which looked to the 
future welfare of the land. But comparatively speaking, 
taken either in terms of their subsequent control, or meas- 
ured against the progress made in other parts of Europe, 
this hundred and fifty years spells stagnation for the Prus- 
sian State. Seven princes ruled during this era, only two 
of whom rise a little out of the middle grade. Joachim I 
and John George were vigorous persons and strong of will. 
They seem the largest of the seven. The two periods which 
are frankly the most favourable and progressive occurred 
under the rule of these two men. 

This group of seven more or less mediocre princes with 
concomitant period of medium conditions was brought to a 
close with the death of John Sigismund in 1619. Prussia 
then until 1640 took a very marked drop and then rose again 
after 1640 until 1685. This makes the reign of George 
William one of exceptional interest, coming just before the 
towering period of the Great Elector and following after a 
long era of creditable though not remarkable conditions. 
Again, following the Great Elector, another sharp downward 
break occurred. One genuinely glorious reign is thus placed 
between two which are acknowledgedly retrogressive, fur- 
nishing the student of politico-historical movements a par- 
ticularly fine opportunity for observation. For this reason 
I have made a critical study of this group of characters, and 
weighed carefully the various facts, in order to utilize to the 
fullest extent their important teaching. I have taken this 
period of history as a subject for analysis and dissection in 
Chapter XVII, in connection with the larger question of the 
possibilities of arranging historical causes in the order of 
their weight or importance. The detailed discussion of 
these well-known fluctuations in Prussian development can 
there be seen. 

The upturn of 1640, which saved the State when at the 



156 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

point of seeming annihilation, was sudden in its beginnings. 
It began even in the confusion of the Thirty Years' War, 
and flowed out of, more than anything else, the young elec- 
tor's genius for army organization. Afterwards the same 
master-mind made itself seen in every feature of national 
life. One European event which especially favoured Prussia 
was the expulsion of the Huguenots from France. The 
elector wisely offered the refugees asylum, but the coming 
of these desirable citizens, and the advantage which they 
brought to Prussia, may be as much the result of the folly 
of Louis XIV as the wisdom of Frederick William. 

The defect of the reign of the Great Elector lay in its 
supreme concentration. It was a one-man power. All 
forces of a popular nature had been strenuously depressed. 
The estates had ceased to have any importance. Naturally 
with the death of the supreme head such a system would 
fall to pieces unless a strong successor followed. The elector 
has been blamed for carrying the arbitrary policy too far, 
and from this point of view, and this only, was his regime 
unprogressive. The reply is, that at this time, or up to this 
time, no other form of progress was possible save it hinged 
upon a more or less beneficent despotism. One must always 
look at history in something of a pragmatic and not in an 
idealized and Utopian way. Personal liberty is to be de- 
sired, but "the rights of man" cannot be counted as a 
national asset unless there be some assurance that the com- 
bined voice of the proletariat will work to the national and 
social advantage. It might be fairly contended that the 
Great Elector would have done better had he trained his 
people to self-government and his subordinates to self- 
reliance ; but how was he to take on the additional task of 
teacher? We know that he worked a wonderful result and 
pursued autocratic methods. Is it not justifiable to suppose 
that his work would have been injured just in proportion 
as he delegated authority and decision to others beneath 
himself? We do not know and no one can assert whether 



PRUSSIA 157 

or not a more liberal policy would have been more advis- 
able. 

After his death, affairs did go very much to pieces, and the 
criticism of his policy finds its chief justification here ; but 
it must be remembered that Frederick I (1688-1713), the 
son and successor, was by nature a weak man, weaker than 
the average of rulers by all the indications that one can 
obtain. If he too, like his grandfather George William, is 
depreciated and blamed unjustly because of circumstances 
which no one could be expected to control, then how strange 
it is that these circumstances become uncontrollable during 
the years of Frederick I's tenure but were controllable from 
1640 to 1688; and afterwards from 1713 to 1786 were again 
controllable. 

The troubles during the reign of Frederick I seem to have 
sprung from corruption among those high in office, from 
loosening the bonds of discipline among those lower down, 
and from the lack of a determined and self-reliant policy in 
dealing with other nations ; just the sort of rotting away to 
be expected from lack of leadership. The public treasure 
was squandered both by the king and by his corrupt fa- 
vourites. The army did not deteriorate as much as some 
other departments, though it also lost rather than gained. 
Immigration continued to be encouraged. Some few thou- 
sand refugees entered Prussia during the reign of Frederick I, 
but the picture of the rural and agricultural conditions is a 
dark one. "When he died, desolation reigned everywhere; 
immense spaces remained uncultivated." ^ The one favour- 
able happening, which proved of great advantage to Prussia, 
was the acquisition of the full royal title "kingdom" render- 
ing the nation independent of the empire, and placing it on 
terms of equality with other nations of Europe. Much has 
been written of the importance of this step, — an advance 
which did come under a weak ruler. Yet this is never 

1 Lavisse, pp. 233-243. The refugees numbered less than 10,000 ; also 7000 
came to Magdebourg. 



158 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

ascribed to other influences than the personal activities of 
Frederick himself. In fact, the success of Frederick in this 
line is sometimes cited as a proof of his regal ability. The 
truth appears to be that the three strongest traits of this 
ruler's nature were (in the more favourable and the less 
flattering wording) ambition or vanity ; amiability or supine- 
ness ; persistence or doggedness. Frederick was determined 
at all costs to have the crown, and he got it. He toadied to 
the Emperor and spent a fortune for it. It is profitless to 
inquire into the motives which lay back of what proved to 
be a far more valuable acquisition than people supposed 
at the time. 

It so happened that the two successors of Frederick I 
were ordained to add greatly to the national strength, to 
improve the finances, to expand the army, to increase the 
domain, and consequently to vastly enhance Prussia's inter- 
national prestige. So it happened that the title worked 
advantageously; but one might ask, did the rank of "king- 
dom" confer any advantage per se; would it have meant 
any real political advantage if the men who followed the 
first king had not been eminently constructive ? Judged 
by analogy with other countries we must answer in the 
negative. Denmark, Portugal (after 1580), and Poland, 
though kingdoms, remained innocuous to their rivals. Hol- 
land under stadtholders gained a position among the first 
powers which under her kings she afterwards lost and never 
recovered. Though rank may count for something in in- 
ternational success, it is as yet unproved that any formal 
status, under which a nation is known, brings prestige and 
consideration without the actual and practical wherewithal 
to back up its claims. Material resources, military strength, 
actual or potential, combined with abiUty on the part of 
the government to control the same, would seem to be the 
essentials. 

It was fortunate for Prussia that the financial depletion 
should cease and that the next king, Frederick William I 



PRUSSIA 159 

(1713-1740), should develop into a sovereign entirely differ- 
ent from his father. The contrast was complete. The father 
had amiability and generosity, — qualities which might have 
stood as virtues had not weakness and prodigality ruined 
the State. The son was devoid of anything bordering on 
generosity, — cold, suspicious, cruel, determined to have his 
own way in everything. His brutal and domineering policy, 
harsh as it was towards liberality and culture, worked well 
for the restitution of Prussia's then declining strength. 
According to Ranke, Frederick William I occupied a place 
beside Charles XII of Sweden and Peter the Great, equally 
original in his measures for the organization of his military 
administrative and rigorously independent state. At the 
outset of the reign, Frederick William introduced a system 
of conscription, which, however, had the effect of driving 
young men out of the country. Finding this to be the result, 
this measure was s,uspended at once. The king wisely con- 
sidered the question of population and introduced foreign 
colonists. From 12,000 to 15,000 Salzburgers were drawn 
into Prussia, so that 60,000 miles of deserted land came 
again under the plough. Fifty-nine royal domains, three 
hundred and thirty villages, and six cities were repeopled. 
Training, collecting, and improving the army was a passion 
with Frederick William, who, in spite of his peppery temper, 
was a man of peace in international questions. The country 
enjoyed practically twenty-five years of peace, which was 
utilized in developing home industry, collecting the taxes, 
saving the money, reforming the judiciary and building up a 
well-organized despotism. Before the death of the king the 
revenue of Prussia had been doubled. 

Thus Frederick the Great came into a rich inheritance. 
Yet the favourable circumstances do not in the least explain 
his great success. The position of the Great Frederick 
among royalty, reaching as he certainly does the first rank 
and comparing favourably with any of the picked military 
heroes of the world, makes it superfluous to more than point 



160 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

out this celebrated instance of a country coming into great 
importance under a great king. 

Altogether, the history of the Hohenzollern dominions from 
1415 to 1786 gives a correlation as high between conditions 
and rulers as the history of any European country, even the 
Spanish and Portuguese monarchies. In Prussia and Bran- 
denburg there are no cases of "plus" ruler associated with 
"minus" conditions or of "minus" ruler associated with 
"plus" conditions. 



CHAPTER XIII 



AUSTRIA 



The history of that portion of Europe which is now ruled 
by the house of Hapsburg, and spoken of as the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire, or sometimes less correctly as the 
Austrian Empire, contains, within its record of shifting 
events, much to complicate and render difficult the study 
and presentation of a unified national development. This 
country, like France, Spain, Portugal, Prussia, and Russia, 
has grown by accretions of territory, but the new additions 
have been less well amalgamated by the Hapsburgs. Es- 
pecially is this true in contrast to the three first-mentioned 
countries, where almost immediately the new lands became 
French, Spanish, or Portuguese in spirit and character. The 
great diversity in race, language, religion, habits, and in- 
terests among the various elements included within the 
Austro-Hungarian limits, makes it inconvenient to treat this 
territory as if it were a single nation. Furthermore, large 
portions of the empire have been gained and lost from time 
to time by the Austrian house, gained and lost and finally 
reincorporated without this fluctuation having any signifi- 
cance at all commensurate with these outward titular 
changes. At times the same sovereign has ruled over Hun- 
gary, Bohemia, and Austria. At other times different 
members of the Hapsburg family have divided the larger 
patrimony. At times Hungary, or Bohemia, or minor dis- 
tricts have been ruled by sovereigns of other dynasties, 
while the extinction of a male line may have reinstated a 
Hapsburg by inheritance, marriage, or election. For these 
various reasons it will be simpler to confine this analysis of 
M 161 



162 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

Austrian political and economic welfare, as far as possible, 
to that geographical area generally known as Austria proper ; 
that is, Upper and Lower Austria together with the closely 
lying southern districts, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, and the 
Tyrol. These form a fairly large, well-defined, continuous 
region, the fortunes of which, both geographically and politi- 
cally, may be satisfactorily followed, analyzed, and tabulated. 

All these possessions came to the Hapsburgs as early as 
the fourteenth century and have remained under the guid- 
ance of their descendants ever since. First and foremost 
among the progenitors of this august dynasty stands Rudolph 
the Emperor (1276-1291), whose single-handed effort raised 
his family from obscurity to consequence, and laid the real 
foundation for the Austrian growth. Rudolph was chosen 
Emperor, not on account of his wealth and power, but for 
the very reason that he lacked the resources which might 
make him dangerous in the eyes of the electors. 

Just as Duke Hugh Capet was raised to the French 
throne when competition for that position was at its lowest, 
and no one thought the crown worth the taking, so the 
patriarch of the Hapsburgs acquired a title that for twenty 
years had been as valueless as it was high-sounding. Ru- 
dolph, like Hugh, took a bankrupt business, reorganized, and 
rehabilitated it. Although the Holy Roman Empire was 
never to be again what it was in the Middle Ages, the activi- 
ties of Rudolph prevented a complete abandonment of the 
ideas and traditions which had for so long clung about this 
venerable institution. The period known as the Great 
Interregnum and the meaningless incumbencies of Richard, 
Earl of Cornwall, and Alfonso, king of Castile, had reduced 
the imperial dignity to a shadow. Rudolph directed his 
attention far more towards internal affairs than to the 
larger questions of empire. His great merit was that of an ad- 
ministrator, a ruthless suppressor of rebeUion and anarchy. 
In addition to this, his fame has been chiefly enhanced 
through the successful series of wars which he carried for- 



AUSTRIA 163 

ward ; and all these wars added very materially to the total 
area of territory which henceforth became incorporated 
more or less closely under the dominion of Austria proper. 
Rudolph was a man of gigantic physical proportions, seven 
feet tall and wiry of muscle, and adamantine of will. He 
had a great sense of justice, a practical wisdom, and was 
greatly beloved by the people, over whom he ruled after the 
type of the beneficent despot. He is typical of a large class 
of early sovereigns. 

Rudolph died in 1291, and the history of Austria for the 
next two hundred years is not particularly important. The 
general growth of Austria during these centuries, if not con- 
spicuous, was nevertheless creditable, and there were not 
more than two or three periods, brief in duration, when 
forces of retrogression mastered the slowly moving train of 
progress. The work of Rudolph was continued under his 
son Albert (elected Emperor in 1298), who inherited a full 
share of the vigour, ambition, and ability of his father. Al- 
though mixed up in the affairs of the empire, and dominated 
by efforts to strengthen that disorganized institution, he did 
not neglect the ever-pressing exigency — the prime need 
during those ages — the quelling of lawless barons, the 
punishment of robber knights, and the protection of the 
weak against the strong ; in a word, the maintenance of good 
governance. 

Between Albert I, the Emperor, and Albert II, the Wise, 
lie twenty-two years of doubtful tendency under the joint 
rule of the mediocre dukes Frederick and Leopold (elder 
sons of Albert I), and then again from 1330 to 1359 came a 
return to the positive conditions of the earlier reigns. There 
were territorial gains and judicial improvements of some 
importance during this period. The two younger sons of 
Albert I, grandsons of Rudolph the founder, now divided 
the government. Otto, the youngest, is historically obscure, 
but Albert seems to have been the one on whom the mantle 
of the father and grandsire fell. He was called "the Wise," 



164 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

able as a soldier and political organizer, learned for the 
times, and had the same magnanimity and sense of justice 
that characterized his grandfather in such a high degree. 
He was altogether a man useful to the best interests of his 
country and an important person in the long and gradual 
process of family aggrandizement. 

Albert's reign was followed by another progressive period 
under Rudolph IV, which, though brief in duration, contains 
many events of importance in the development of the coun- 
try. Chief among these may be mentioned the acquisition 
of the Tyrol, an event directly traceable to the personal 
negotiation of Rudolph IV, a youthful and ambitious sov- 
ereign whose picturesque activities leave a lasting impres- 
sion. Rudolph IV appreciated that, on the death of 
the widowed Margaret Maultasch without direct heirs, the 
Tyrol might revert to the house of Bavaria. Therefore, 
seizing the psychological moment, he crossed the Alps in 
the winter of 1363, paid a visit to Margaret, and by adroit 
persuasion forestalled the Bavarian claims and got immedi- 
ate control, inducing Margaret to renounce the burdens 
of government in exchange for the care-free pleasures at 
the court of Vienna. Margaret returned to the Austrian 
capital, and the Tyrol has since that time remained among 
the hereditary possessions of the Hapsburgs. 

Rudolph then turned his attention to home affairs, and 
here also he succeeded in gaining practical results. He in- 
creased his income by levying taxes on wine and beer at the 
same time that regulations were promulgated favourable to 
other lines of trade and manufacture, essentially more pro- 
ductive and economic in value. The public revenue was 
spent in useful directions, and his name is memorable as the 
builder of the great Cathedral of St. Stephen, and as founder 
of the University of Vienna, modelled after the University 
of Paris, to which were called distinguished men of learning 
from various parts of Europe. Rudolph IV came to the 
throne when only nineteen years of age, and died before he 



AUSTRIA 165 

was twenty-six. Considering the maturity of his ideas, the 
soundness of his judgment, and the breadth of his plans, it 
seems fair to suppose that if Rudolph IV had lived he would 
have equalled in fame his namesake, the celebrated founder 
of the dynasty, and perhaps have risen even to the eminence 
of Frederick the Great or Peter of Russia. 

Thirty years of doubtful value (1365-1395) followed his 
death. The younger brothers, Albert and Leopold, jointly 
held the government until 1376, when a division was made, 
Albert keeping Austria and allowing Styria, Carinthia, and 
the Tyrol to go to Leopold. Both the brothers, though 
differing in character, belong to the uninteresting, colourless, 
middle grade. 

Albert the Patient, and William "der Freundliche" fol- 
lowed (1395-1406). The same remarks apply to them and to 
their period. From 1406 to 1411 occurred a distinct relapse 
into conditions of anarchy. This cannot be attributed to 
lack of ability on the part of the sovereign power, since one 
of the two brothers who governed at this time, Ernest, 
called "Iron," was from all accounts a superior person 
intellectually, and his appellation referred to his iron will. 
Ernest and Leopold were appointed joint regents until their 
nephew Albert should come of age. Both the uncles used 
every effort to enrich themselves at the general expense, and 
divided the country in a civil war. Though this weak reign 
is not connected with weak royal mentality, the behaviour of 
these two princes gives the clue to the events of the reign. 
The nation suffered bitterly between the savage rivalry of 
the uncles and lawless depredations of the barons, who, 
together with the robber knights and banditti, completed 
the devastation of the land. 

These conditions were reversed under Albert V (1411- 
1439). A period of notable progress set in. The credit for 
all this good work is unhesitatingly given to Albert by all 
Austrian historians, who unite in praising a prince whom 
even the Bohemian chronicler admits was "Good for a Ger- 



166 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

man," This Albert, "the Magnanimous, " as he is called, 
also rendered an important service to Christian Europe by 
checking for a time the then rising wave of Mussulman con- 
quest, and defending the frontier kingdom of Hungary against 
the Turks. Albert was elected Emperor shortly before his 
death ; this elevation and his marriage with Elizabeth, 
heiress of Hungary and Bohemia, contributed of course, in 
so far as those events had importance, that much towards 
increasing the prestige of the Hapsburgs and foscussing atten- 
tion upon Austria proper. 

The people lamented Albert's death and feared for the 
future. There were two daughters but no direct male heir. 
The queen was, however, pregnant, for which reason all three 
countries, Austria, Hungary, and Bohemia, deferred the ques- 
tion of sovereignty until the expected birth. This proving 
to be a male, the infant Ladislaus, called in history "the 
Posthumous," was recognized as heir by the Austrians and 
Bohemians, and the three nations were in theory united, 
though actually the entire period was characterized by na- 
tional and personal rivalries, intrigues, and internecine wars. 
Hungary became divided on the question of accepting Ladis- 
laus as king. The Austrian party failed to make valid its 
claim in the kingdom, and Hungarian affairs came under the 
control of the afterwards famous John Hunyady. In the 
wars against the Turks this great general won long-remem- 
bered glory. Though the Christians did not do more than 
hold their own against the aggressions of Murad II, this in 
itself was an achievement for which Western Europe had 
good reason to feel grateful. Austrian affairs continued to 
ferment during the reign of Ladislaus "the Posthumous." 
There was no settled government ; the king himself, a weak 
and unpromising youth, died in 1457 before reaching ma- 
turity. The part played by Austria proper in this urgent 
defence of Christendom was at that time inconspicuous. 
No great change came about for fully half a century. The 
disputes between the brothers, Frederick and Albert, occu- 



AUSTRIA 



167 



pied seven uninteresting years. A more firm and enter- 
prising prince than Frederick might have secured control 
of the three countries, Austria, Hungary, and Bohemia, for 
circumstances then seemed propitious. As it was, affairs 
dragged along without much significance, backward if any- 
thing in their movement under the divided supervision of 
the two brothers. 

There was little change under Frederick's own control 
when from 1463 to 1493 he reigned as Roman Emperor and 
Archduke of Austria (Frederick III). During this period 
the Turks made frightful inroads under the great Ma- 
hommed II ; and to troubles from this quarter were added 
greater troubles arising nearer home. Matthias Corvinus, 
king of Hungary, had a grievance to avenge. Before ques- 
tions were adjusted, the Austrians found themselves no 
longer masters of their own capital. The Hungarians were 
on every side victorious, and it was only through promises of 
a large money payment that the conquered territory was 
allowed to retrocede to its former owners. The internal 
administration of Frederick III was weak, and he was unable 
successfully to manage either his own territory or the larger 
affairs of empire. Yet there was one important achieve- 
ment which enhanced the power and prestige of Austria. 
Frederick III worked in a slow persistent way, always with 
an eye to benefiting his own family and private interests. 
He succeeded in procuring for his only son, Maximilian, the 
richest heiress in Europe, Mary of Burgundy, daughter of 
Charles the Bold. She was the last representative of the 
Burgundian line, and inherited the then enormously rich 
Low Countries. The bringing about of this marriage, viewed 
in the light of its subsequent importance, may well be con- 
sidered a counterbalance to the internal commotions which 
marked this reign. "Possessed of no genius whatever, but 
endowed with extraordinary tenacity of purpose, Frederick 
knew how to wait and also how to outlive all his neighbours 
and all his enemies. It was thus he was able laboriously to 



168 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

unite the whole of the territories of the house of Hapsburg 
and to secure to his own line the almost unbroken succession 
to the imperial crown." ^ 

There is much to be said on both sides of the question if 
one is to form any estimate of the personal characteristics 
of the reign of Frederick III, for he belongs in that border- 
line between true superiority and a larger group of the 
moderately endowed. Ranke gives a succinct, summarized 
judgment worth quoting here in full. "His frugality bor- 
dered on avarice, his slowness on inertness, his stubbornness 
on the most determined selfishness, yet these faults were 
rescued from vulgarity by high qualities. He had at bottom 
a sober depth of judgment, a sedate and inflexible honour; 
the aged prince even when a fugitive imploring succour, had 
a personal bearing which never allowed the majesty of the 
empire to sink," In speaking of the general condition of his 
reign, Ranke says: "We see that the reign of Frederick III 
was by no means as insignificant as is commonly believed, 
his latter years especially, so full of difficulties and reverses, 
were rich in great results. The house of Hapsburg by the 
acquisition of Austria and the Netherlands, had acquired a 
high rank in Europe. The intestine wars of Germany were 
almost entirely suppressed. The Suabian League gave to the 
house of Austria a legitimate influence on Germany such as 
it had not possessed since the time of Albert I."^ 

If the period and personality of Frederick III are of dubious 
merit, the same cannot be said for Maximilian I. From 
this time begins the real greatness of Austria and her entrance 
into the congress of the powers. This came through mat- 
rimonial alliances more than the fortunes of war. The chief 
military exploits occurred in foreign lands, and while the 
desultory and erratic campaigns do not as a whole spell 
success, they do not appear detrimental to Austria, except 
as they abstracted large sums of money from that country. 

1 Himly, quoted by Leger, "History of Austro-Hungary," p. 153. 
* "History of the Reformation in Germany," pp. 50, 51. 



AUSTRIA 169 

Maximilian lent important aid towards establishing the 
Bavarian succession, for which he demanded and received a 
number of valuable cities and minor districts : Kuffstein, 
Geroldseck, Nyburg on the Inn, Kirchburg in Suabia, the 
lordships of Rottenburg, Kitzbuhl, and Weissenhorn, and 
the landgravate of Alsace. He had already added the coun- 
ties of Gorica, Mitterburg, and Pusterthal, and afterwards 
gained some increased jurisdiction on the Adriatic. 

Thus from the territorial aspect this reign was progressive. 
It was also extremely so from the more important standpoint 
of internal administration. Beneficial reforms took place 
in all ways, leading to the better establishment of authority 
and peaceful jurisdiction. Maximilian was an autocrat, a 
brilliant, persuasive, and acknowledged leader. Such re- 
sults as there were, both for good or evil, came directly from 
him. His talent for organization cannot be doubted. It 
is clearly to be seen in all those reforms associated with 
military affairs and particularly military technique. He 
formed the first standing army in Austria. In the improve- 
ment of the then primitive art of gun and cannon construc- 
tion and the manufacture of powder, he was considered one 
of the leading authorities of his day. 

In diplomacy he was too impulsive to succeed well, but 
in one regard his external policy led to the most im- 
portant results. Maximilian had a great deal to do with 
arranging the marriages of his offspring, and it is well 
recognized that these marriages enormously raised the power 
and prestige of the Hapsburgs. Maximilian brought about 
the marriage of his only son, Philip, with Joanna, heiress of 
the great Spanish possessions. He arranged the marriages 
of his grandchildren, Mary and Leopold, each in a way to 
bring afterwards into his family the kingdoms of Hungary 
and Bohemia. Although the fortunes of these countries 
must be considered independently and not as additions to 
the empire of Austria, the fact that Austria was the home 
territory naturally raised that country in prestige and ren- 



170 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

dered it that cynosure of attention which it held in the eyes 
of Europe for many years to come. Charles V succeeded 
Maximilian, but his reign is not important owing to its 
brevity. Within two years a settlement of the West Haps- 
burg possessions gave Charles the Low Countries, Spain, 
Naples, Sicily, and the Indies, while the younger brother 
Ferdinand received the Austrian estates including Carinthia, 
Carniola, and Styria. 

Ferdinand I (1521-1564) was prudent, learned, amiable, 
and well intentioned, and withal a man of wisdom. He was 
especially noted for his many virtues, and his reign of 
forty-three years, everything considered, gave satisfaction 
to the majority of his subjects. In the foreign and domestic 
wars, success about balanced failure ; there were territorial 
additions to offset territorial losses. The army improved 
while the finances declined, although an important act 
was passed to regulate the value of coinage. It was a 
period full of more than usual difficulties, owing to the con- 
fusion of the Reformation. If the reign of Ferdinand I does 
not stand out as one of importance or glory, it is at least of 
considerable merit that the disruptive forces of the time were 
not allowed to take a headlong course, and liberality and 
moderation earned a fair success.^ 

The reign of Maximilian II (1564-1576) appears to have 
been more successful than his predecessor's, at least if we are 
attempting to judge purely materialistic conditions. In the 
great religious questions of the time Maximilian II steered 
a middle course. In this way he naturally gave satisfaction 
to neither party, was criticised for his lack of firmness, and 
as it turned out he only delayed the final settlement. But, if 
the actual conditions of his reign be alone considered, these 

1 1 have placed Ferdinand I in the medium grade for mentality. Many- 
would doubtless place him higher, but it must be remembered that there is a 
constant tendency to grade every one too high, and the middle grade extends 
out in both directions, so that it necessarily includes a considerable number 
of those both above and below the exact average. 



AUSTRIA 171 

years of recuperative strength, spent in the enjoyment of 
profound peace, must be accepted as "plus" in their value; 
and they also call forth at least a passing comment on 
their significance and relation to the great idealistic move- 
ment. Here was a time when religious controversies filled 
all men's minds, when the age of the Reformation was in 
full swing all over Europe ; and yet twelve years of peace and 
religious quiet are to be found in Austria, reflecting perfectly 
the characteristics of a sovereign described by all as moderate 
and peace-loving in his nature. 

These conditions did not continue after Maximilian's 
death in 1576. The whole character of affairs changed. The 
government became weak and corrupt. Religious disputes 
were not the only source of trouble. To these were added 
political and economic difficulties, party intrigues, and a 
peasant's war. Rudolph II was a markedly weak ruler, in- 
dolent, self-indulgent, and finally a drunkard, subject to 
periods of melancholia. He resigned in 1611, but his brother 
Matthias (1612-1619), who had intrigued for the throne, 
though ambitious in spirit, proved no better as a sovereign. 
His abilities were mediocre, and increasing years only brought 
indifference to affairs of State. The reign of Matthias was 
a period of distinct decline. 

Under Ferdinand II (1619-1637) there were a variety of 
forces at work, the whole presenting a doubtful picture. It 
was the period of Tilly and Wallenstein, of the famous events 
of the earlier portions of the Thirty Years' War. Austria 
barely held her own in the giant struggle. It was not like 
the reign of Maria Theresa, important in the development 
of Austria. Nor can Ferdinand II be classed among the 
great of royalty. 

The reign of Ferdinand III (1637-1657) gives equal diffi- 
culty to the classifier of historical events. Internal peace, 
constitutional progress, and monetary betterment stand 
against failure in foreign policy ; in addition to which must 
be noted a continuance of the phenomena — depopulation 



172 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

and emigration — which marked the previous reign. Fer- 
dinand III was not himself a remarkable individual. 

Under Leopold I (1655-1705) a decided improvement set 
in. The army was strengthened and gave a good account 
itself. The peace of Carlowitz closed the Turkish situation 
greatly to the advantage of Austria. Finances alone showed 
decline. It cannot be said that Leopold himself was a great 
sovereign. He was a faithful, hard-working man, remarkable 
more for his private virtues than his mental abilities. The 
success of his reign must be ascribed to other sources. Two 
eminent persons who aided Austria at this time were John 
Sobieski of Poland and Eugene of Savoy. 

Joseph I (1705-1711) was a keen and vigorous personality, 
and stamped his impress on the six years which followed the 
death of Leopold. The actual management of affairs was 
much in the hands of the great prince, Eugene of Savoy, but 
no attempt will be made to separate their respective shares 
of influence. 

Charles VI (1711-1740) is also reflected in precisely the 
opposite way. The latter part of his period is one of the 
weakest in Austrian history, both internally and externally. 
The finances were seriously depleted, the army reached a 
wretched condition ; the wars against the Turks brought 
disgrace to Austria. Demoralization characterized all af- 
fairs of State. Industry and commerce received encourage- 
ment, and here a creditable advance was made, but the reign 
taken by and large must certainly be adjudged disastrous. 
When the personal traits of Charles VI are considered, one 
has difficulty in placing this monarch in any ordinary scale 
for intellectual gradation, from the fact that he was not 
really lacking in natural capacity, yet it happened that the 
kind of things he chose to learn are little valued in a ruler. 
He was proficient in music, interested in science, and a patron 
of the arts, and at the same time willing enough to work on 
the more urgent affairs of State. But his mind was incapable 
of dealing with the large practical question of his time. He 



AUSTRIA 173 

did not command respect. Though he founded academies 
and composed an opera, he could not manage his own house- 
hold. "His intentions were honest and he was anxious to 
govern with wisdom and justice. These good qualities were 
counteracted by narrow jealousy, love of adulation, and 
obstinacy. He succeeded to his dominions in a high state 
of power and splendour and left them in the lowest degrada- 
tion and weakness." 

Again Austria raised herself, this time under the rule of 
one of the most famous women of history. When Maria 
Theresa came upon the throne in 1740 the finances were 
exhausted, the national credit was gone, agriculture was in 
a bad state, a general helplessness pervaded everything. It 
seemed as if Austria was to be devoured by her enemies, 
Saxony, Bavaria, Prussia, Spain, and Sardinia. Before 
Maria Theresa's death, forty years later, everything was 
changed. Financial strength was reestablished by a rigid 
economy, coupled with improved taxation ; the various 
portions of the nation were unified, commerce and agriculture 
improved, the army was reorganized, the navy began to be 
a force, — in fact, Austria had become a decisive power in the 
affairs of Europe. Industrial improvement had taken several 
forms ; skilled foreign artisans were encouraged to immigrate ; 
technical schools were established ; restrictions concerning 
trade removed ; and spinning and weaving increased con- 
siderably. 

A few quotations will give a fair view of the importance of 
the reign of Maria Theresa and of the characteristics of the 
Empress herself. "On the accession of Maria Theresa," 
writes Sonnenfels, "the monarchy had neither external 
influence nor internal vigour, for ability there was no emu- 
lation and no encouragement, the state of agriculture was 
bad, trade miserable, finances badly managed, and credit 
bad. At her death she left to her successor a kingdom im- 
proved by her many reforms and placed in that rank which its 
size and fertility and the intelligence of its inhabitants ought 



174 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

always to enable it to maintain, Maria Theresa had cer- 
tainly greater claims to the title of "great" than had Cath- 
erine of Russia." ^ 

"A woman distinguished for beauty and for a character 
far surpassing in vigour that of many of her ancestors," ^ 

Wraxall gives a few personal touches as follows: "Pleas- 
ures in the common acceptation of the term she can scarcely 
be said to allow herself. She rises at five in summer, six in 
winter. , , . Parsimonious of her. time she usually dines 
alone and instantly resumes the consideration of public 
affairs. . , . Nourishes many narrow and illiberal prej- 
udices unworthy of a great sovereign. . , . Those who 
judge severely incline to condemn her for too great a pro- 
pensity to munificence, , . , Little has age dried up or 
closed the channels of her liberality. She delights to give, 
to relieve distress and to extend assistance to merit. Her 
talents are confessedly good and much above mediocrity. 
It is not saying enough merely to assert that she possesses 
more capacity than her father or her grandfather [Leo- 
pold], both of whom were princes of very moderate endow- 
ments." 

Coxe describes her thus: "Easy of access to all her 
subjects, affectionate to her family, kind to her domestics, 
and unboundedly charitable but without ostentation. She 
combined private economy with public liberality, dignity 
with condescension, elevation of soul with humility of spirit, 
and the virtues of domestic life with the virtues which grace 
a throne. But it must not be concealed that she was sub- 
ject to the failings of human nature from which the best 
characters are not exempt. She readily gave ear to spies and 
informers, encouraged tales of private scandal, and indulged 
in unwarrantable curiosity in prying into the secrets of fam- 
ilies. Her death, however, was a general loss to the people, who 
adored her ; her reign is considered as the best and most glori- 
ous era of their history, and the halcyon days of Maria Theresa 

1 Quoted by Leger. * Menzel. 



AUSTRIA 175 

are still proverbial throughout the whole extent of the Aus- 
trian dominions." 

Maria Theresa's son, Joseph II (1780-1790), was a strange 
character, built of absurd contradictions. Here was a man 
who wished to bring about democratic equality, yet sought 
to do so by autocratic coercion. Little educated himself, 
he was partial to the encouragement of the sciences and the 
arts. Though his ideals seem prompted by the highest 
altruism, his methods were tainted by duplicity, selfishness, 
and vanity. Personally brave, ambitious, and eager for 
military renown, he was a very poor general and could not 
even inspire ordinary respect. A mania for reforms of the 
most sweeping and ill-digested nature characterized his 
policy. Austro-Hungary was a country unevenly broken 
up and diversified in races, religions, languages, customs, 
laws, and institutions. All this was to be obliterated, and a 
unified and centralized nation was to bring about a speedy 
and ready-made Utopia. Joseph tried to abolish all dis- 
tinctions of religion, language, and manners. He divided 
the Austrian monarchy into thirteen departments to be 
governed under a uniform system. Paying no heed to the 
natural forces of conservatism, or the innumerably diverse 
habits and ideals of different social classes and ethnic groups, 
such revolutionary reforms shocked and alienated all parties. 
At first the peasantry, expecting benefits, were on his side, 
but enforced conscription turned even the lower classes 
against this new absolutism masking in the guise of phi- 
lanthropy. This reign occupied a decade, unsuccessful as 
regards internal administration, and inglorious in war and 
diplomacy. The personal eccentricities of Joseph II are 
everywhere to be seen ; and to the accidental appearance of 
this one man must be ascribed the unusual trend of historical 
events. During the last part of this reign Austria gained a 
number of victories over the Turks. For these successes 
the country had to thank the veteran marshal Loudon and 
the Duke of Coburg ; but apart from these victories the con- 



176 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

ditions during the reign of Joseph II are clearly enough the 
handiwork of the monarch himself. 

The next sovereign, Leopold II, naturally had a hard task. 
His rule was brief, lasting only two years, yet time enough 
elapsed to completely alter the state of affairs which prevailed 
under Joseph II. The whole policy of the nation was re- 
versed. The Einheitsstaat theory was abandoned, a return 
was made to the old forms of government and the Church 
was again looked to for strength and support. Leopold's 
reign is so transitory, and the conditions of the whole con- 
tinent of Europe became so momentous and threatening at 
that time — owing to the French Revolution — that opinions 
naturally vary as to the wisdom of Austria's internal policy 
and diplomatic position. One thing is certain, — that a 
distinct change was brought about on the death of one sov- 
ereign and by the initiative of another, and this change was 
on the whole for the better. Leopold had shown himself 
an able administrator during his protracted residence in 
Tuscany, and it would have been interesting to have seen 
how well he would have managed the larger affairs of empire 
had he lived longer. Archdeacon Coxe closes his history of 
the house of Austria with the following passage: "Leopold 
is known rather as a grand duke of Tuscany, which country he 
ruled twenty-five years, than as sovereign of the Austrian 
dominions and Emperor of Germany, because he did not 
move long enough in this elevated sphere to fix the public 
opinion. But if we may judge from effects we cannot with- 
hold great praise from a sovereign, who, within the short 
space of a single year, relieved the country from foreign war 
and internal commotion, who baffled a great combination 
which threatened the independence of his house, and estab- 
lished a throne which at his accession was tottering to its 
very foundations." Other historians agree that Leopold was 
a clever, tactful administrator. 

Thus Austrian successes have been very much bound up 
with the personal qualities of the Hapsburgs. For a long 



AUSTRIA 177 

time their country figured little in European affairs, although 
often the Caesars of empire sat on the throne of St. Stephen. 
Except for Rudolph the Founder, no sovereign of high mental 
rank came in the Austrian line until Maximilian I and Charles 
V, and these rather celebrated rulers do not match up well 
with Peter of Russia, Gustavus of Sweden, Frederick "the 
Only," or the Great Elector. The Emperor Charles V for 
that matter was but a short time in control of Austrian 
affairs. These two aside, Maria Theresa is certainly the most 
intellectual sovereign among the Hapsburgs from the death of 
Rudolph to the French Revolution, and it is a fact that under 
Maria Theresa, the one great national movement took place, 
the one period when very much is to be said concerning Aus- 
tria's advance. Because of all this, I am inclined to advance 
the view that Austria might have figured far more powerfully 
in European history, and the Holy Roman Empire might 
have remained for a longer time something more than a 
figment and a fancy, had there happened to be born more 
great monarchs among the Hapsburgs. 



CHAPTER XIV 

TURKEY 

No history makes more remarkable reading than the rise 
and decay of the Turkish Empire, and none proves more 
clearly the vast importance of individual leadership. Prob- 
ably no other dynasty can show such an almost unbroken 
succession of great rulers, such single-minded despots as the 
early descendants of Osman, who for three centuries and a 
half ceaselessly conquered and welded out of Hellenistic 
ruins that vast Mahommedan world power. Nor, on the 
other hand, can we easily find another country where the fall 
from eminence is so sudden or where so many weak rulers 
directly follow one another. Nine vigorous and able leaders 
are associated with the construction of the Ottoman Empire. 
Six weak Sultans follow these and parallel the rapid and con- 
tinuous decline. Turkey should be compared in this respect 
with Castile, Aragon, United Spain, and Portugal, where the 
political and dynastic changes were similar, being first strong 
and then weak, but the peninsular monarchies never showed 
so many repetitions of the same types without contrasts 
scattered here and there to break the uniformity. 

The first seven Sultans were Osman, Orkhan, Murad, 
Bayezid, Mahommed I, Murad II, and Mahommed II, "the 
Conqueror." These were, without exception, very able 
personalities, and the father of Osman, who, though not an 
independent Sultan, did a great deal to pave the way for the 
great dynasty that was to follow him, might also be included. 
This nomad adventurer, Ertoghrul by name, was at first but 
the leader of a small wandering tribe, who, for service ren- 
dered to the Seljukian monarch, Ala-ud-din, received grants 

178 



TURKEY 



179 



of land in northwestern Asia Minor, which small nucleus 
became the starting-point of the Turkish Empire. Each 
of the seven Sultans who followed added considerably to 
the power of the one who had gone before. The steadiness 
of the growth from the middle of the thirteenth century to 
the death of Mahommed II in 1481 is as unusual as is a suc- 
cession of seven strong rulers. In the course of the uplift 
an interesting and instructive break occurred between 
the years 1402 and 1413. For a time weakness and disrup- 
tion became great. It seemed certain that the Ottoman 
Empire would fall speedily to pieces. This period, an in- 
terregnum, gives us definite dates and undeniable facts. 
The sharp and brief decline goes a long way towards proving 
that the progress really depended upon the presence of the 
strong rulers, and that affairs at any time would have turned 
in the opposite direction had the central support been with- 
drawn. 

As it happened, Mahommed, who was the fittest of the 
rival princes, won his right to the succession and brought 
about a reorganization of the tottering empire. This 
struggle, giving rise to a true "survival of the fittest," took 
place in at least two of the ten generations which produced 
in all nine extraordinary Sultans. If nothing of this sort had 
occurred, and in each instance the first-born son had received 
the insignia of sovereignty, we should not expect from the 
probabilities of heredity that a series of strong types would 
thus have persisted.^ This would have been very improb- 
able for the reason that some of the eldest sons would have 
inherited the mediocre qualities which formed the greater 
portion of their maternal pedigrees. 

1 Even as it is, the continuation of such a strong line seems at first beyond the 
expectations. No comparable dynasty is to be found among those studied 
in " Heredity in Royalty." Every persistently strong line is there shown to have 
been maintained by exceptionally strong maternal blood uniting with that 
of the male line. The exception, or partial exception, which the early Turkish 
line presents is not more unexpected than an occasional remarkable sequence 
in a game of cards. 



180 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

There is no evidence that any of the mothers of the Sultans, 
with the exception of the mother of Orkhan, had distinguished 
forbears. 

The first nine strong Sultans are broken by the interregnum 
already spoken of between the fourth and fifth, and by the 
mediocre Bayezid II who is number eight. His reign, from 
1481 to 1512, was not signalized by any advance against the 
Christian frontiers, and is the first period in which the 
Mahommedan progress is not perfectly evident. Bayezid II 
was a peace-loving monarch whose many virtues are highly 
praised. The conditions of the country were in the main 
stationary. His son and successor, Selim I, was another 
instance of the selection of the fittest from the standpoint of 
governing ability, and during the rule of this noted warrior 
the Turkish domain became doubled in extent. Kurdistan, 
Syria, and Egypt were conquered. Suleiman "the Magnifi- 
cent" ends the list of the nine great Sultans, and under his 
sway (1520-1566) the Ottoman Empire reached the summit 
of its glory and power. Hungary, Transylvania, Rhodes, 
and a large part of Armenia had been conquered. This, 
together with the territories acquired by the earlier Sultans, 
made a realm so vast and powerful that Christendom trem- 
bled for its very existence. It is not necessary to enumerate 
the various cities of antiquity that were included in the Ot- 
toman suzerainty, nor to enlarge upon the wealth, splendour, 
and great building activity which characterized this period. 
It is enough to point out that Turkey reached its apogee in 
the middle of the sixteenth century, and that this was co- 
incident with her most progressive single reign, which event 
took place under the greatest of her great Sultans, Suleiman 
"the Magnificent." 

It is worth while to take a survey of the various types of 
moral character exhibited by these remarkable Sultans of the 
early period from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century. 
Fierce, cold-blooded, cruel, and unjust might be the type 
expected, if the age in which men live has anything of that 



TUKKEY 181 

influence which so many claim for it ; but, as a matter of 
fact, only three of the first ten Sultans conform to this picture 
of a "terrible Turk" and fulfil this preconception. Bayezid 
"the Thunderbolt" was such a character, and so was the 
cruel and faithless Mahommed II and bloodthirsty Selim 
I ; but examples of the opposite type are more numerous, 
— the upright Orkhan, who was not in the least cruel, the just 
and magnanimous Mahommed I, the humane and equally 
just Murad II, the mild and virtuous Bayezid II, and the 
three others, namely ; Othman I, Murad I, and Suleiman I, 
were essentially well meaning, with an excellent sense of 
justice and possessed many virtues. They were not wan- 
tonly cruel, but it cannot be denied that various isolated 
crimes, especially murders, must be charged against these 
three rulers. These high-handed acts of lawlessness which 
would seem impossible in a modern western civilization were 
carried out in a cold-blooded way against the members of the 
Sultan's ministry or of his own family. They seem to have 
been actuated usually by fear of rivalry, and were generally 
looked upon as necessities of State policy. Indeed it was a 
settled custom that the Sultan, upon coming to the throne, 
should either cause his brothers to be killed or kept in close 
confinement. Here we have, it seems to me, an example of 
what "the spirit of the times" may do, and what it may not 
do. It could not make the first ten Sultans conform to any 
definite type of character ; it could not eliminate the ex- 
travagance of the contrasts, — three cruel and tyrannical, 
but four mild and humane. But as far as the other three 
are concerned it would seem that surrounding circumstances 
had at least determined or allowed the acts of violence. 

The Ottoman Empire, formed under great organizers and 
military leaders, became a power so extensive and an organi- 
zation so perfect, that even eight years under the besotten 
and imbecile son of the great Suleiman could not more than 
barely turn the balance in the opposite direction. Under 
the weak Sultan Selim II the inevitable personal intrigues 



182 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

among those high in the circles of the court worked their 
fatal consequences and the defeat of the Turks at Lepanto 
gave the first serious setback ; but for the most part the 
generals and statesmen trained under Suleiman continued 
to act as before, and even some new territory (Cyprus and 
Tunis) was added to the empire. The presence of the grand 
vizier Sokolli probably had much to do with the continuity. 
He was a very able man and had been Suleiman's chief lieu- 
tenant, and exercised great ascendancy over most of the 
affairs of State during the reign of Selim II. ''When Sokolli's 
authority was weakened and broken by the corrupt influence 
of favourites and women at the court of Selim's successor, 
Murad III, the shock of falling empire was folt throughout 
the Ottoman world ; spreading from court to capitol, from 
the capitol to the provinces, and at last becoming sensible 
even to foreign powers." ^ Murad III (1574-1595), under 
whom the great decline first began, was the second in the 
continuous chain of six weak Sultans ; after this came one 
strong ruler, then one weak, and then one strong, and then 
seven weak. A line of as many as six or seven weak rulers 
in uninterrupted succession is extremely rare in European 
history. This is the only instance I recall of such protracted 
misfortune. Even in early Scotland, where there were so 
many minorities, and where feeble rulers were so numerous, 
there were never six in continuity. The line of weak Sultans 
carries us from 1566 to 1623. The picture of one reign is 
characteristic of all. Insubordination, revolts in the army, 
defeats in battle, loss of territory and of prestige, internal 
misery, intrigues, disorders, murders, and robberies, — these 
are the headings of page and paragraph. 

Then from 1623 to 1640 a sharp right about face occurred. 
The army was reformed. Order and discipline were estab- 
lished. The revenues were much more honestly adminis- 
tered. Bagdad was retaken from the Persians, and Turkey 
began to regain her former position. Murad IV, who reigned 

1 "Creasy," p. 224. 



TURKEY 183 

during these years, was, in spite of his cruelty and vices, a 
particularly vigorous, decisive, and courageous character. 
Under his weak brother, Ibrahim, the downward movement 
recommenced and runs into the minority of Mahommed IV ; 
and then sharply the years 1656 to 1676 mark a contrasting 
picture. The whole merits some detailed description. First 
let it be fully realized how strongly these twenty progressive 
years stand out in the chronology of declining Turkey. 
These dates correspond exactly to the beginning and end of 
the rule of the two famous grand viziers, the elder and younger 
Kuprili. They were father and son, both men of high ability 
and lofty aims. A few lines from the historian Creasy will 
give a good idea of the importance which is attached to the 
careers of these two statesmen. 

"A stern correction of abuses was required; and Ku- 
prili [the elder] applied it, not indeed with the ostentatious 
cruelty of Sultan Amurath (Alurad IV), but with the same 
searching and unsparing severity which had marked that 
monarch's rule. No delinquency, past or present, no prep- 
aration for plot or mutiny escaped the vizier's vigilance. 
He planted his spies in every province and town and secured 
the agency of trusty and unquestioning executioners of his 
commands. The impress of a resolute will was felt through- 
out the empire ; and men obeyed without hesitation the man, 
whom they perceived never to hesitate himself, never to 
neglect or abandon those who served him, and never to forgive 
those who thwarted or disobeyed him. The revolts which 
had raged in Transylvania and Asia Minor were quelled, 
the naval strength of the empire was revived ; the Darda- 
nelles were fortified ; the Ottoman power beyond the Black 
Sea was strengthened by the erection of castles on the Dnieper 
and Don, and, though the war in Candia still lingered, the 
islands of Lemnos and Tenedos were recovered from the 
Venetians. His own authority in the empire was unshaken 
until the last hour of his life ; and he obtained for his still 
more celebrated son, Ahmed Kuprili, the succession to the 



184 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

grand vizierate. Ahmed Kuprili was the real ruler of Turkey 
from 1661 to his death in 1676, and he is justly eulogized 
both by Ottoman and Christian historians as the greatest 
statesman of his country. The value of such a minister as 
Ahmed Kuprili to Turkey was soon proved by the rapid 
deterioration in her fortunes under his successor in the viz- 
ierate, Kara Mustafa or Black Mustafa : a man whose char- 
acter was in every respect the opposite of Kuprili's." 

All this offers excellent proof that the broad decline in the 
Ottoman Empire, which began with the death of Suleiman, 
"the Magnificent," in the middle of the sixteenth century, 
was not due to essentially external or general causes. Here 
a hundred years after that time two periods of distinct 
reorganization and progress were possible under the Kuprili 
and Murad IV. The peculiar fact that a period of de- 
cline under Ibrahim comes in between the two should be 
especially noticed. This makes it unlikely that any gen- 
eral forces of a favourable nature were at work at about that 
time, between 1623 and 1676, to favour Murad IV and the 
Kuprili. 

This brief analysis of the empire of the Turks is brought 
to a close by a second succession of weak sovereigns, covering 
little more than a century, showing nothing of interest be- 
yond a rapid decline, and then a low dead level of apathy, 
during which the "Sick Man of the East" may be said to 
have temporarily convalesced on only two occasions. The 
early part of the reign of Mustafa II shows a slight recovery. 
The Sultan himself led his troops against the Austrians, 
gaining an important victory, and then applied every effort 
towards improving the internal condition of the country. 
Much was accomplished during that year, but after Prince 
Eugene of Savoy appeared upon the field of battle, "the 
Crescent soon went down before him." This sudden spurt 
terminated abruptly; and very shortly after this the char- 
acter of the Sultan took on a complete change. He became 
as indifferent and dissolute as he was formerly vigorous 



TURKEY 



185 



and decisive. Everything went to pieces. Even the tem- 
porary organization of forces under the last of the great 
Kuprili amounted to nothing. The famous peace of Carlo- 
witz in 1699 proclaimed the final exodus of Turkey from the 
ranks of the directly aggressive European powers. Since 
then her importance became diplomatic, not for what she 
herself might do, but for what other ambitious powers might 
do with her. It is true that the Ottomans were occasionally 
successful in warfare, and there is a broad general improve- 
ment during the first half of the eighteenth century, which 
is the only movement of its nature in Turkish history that 
is not associated with great names and personal leadership. 
This recovery in the strength of the Porte appears to be due 
to general European conditions, and to weakness and mis- 
management on the part of her rivals. The success of the 
Turks against Peter the Great at the Pruth in 1711 was 
probably due to the ill-advised campaign of the Russians 
who had an army far too small to cope with the numerically 
powerful Ottomans. The great activities of Sweden under 
Charles XII also indirectly favoured the Turks. The reign 
of the weak Mahmud I (1730-1754), which followed this 
period, was even more a time of triumph for the Turks. It 
would appear that the support of France and especially the 
work of Villeneuve and Bonneval had much to do with the 
consideration shown Turkey in the treaty of Belgrade in 
1739. Probably the mismanagement of the Austrians had 
contributed much. It was not the good fortune of the Sub- 
lime Porte to long enjoy an easy couch for insouciance, nor 
did her tormentors long remain in abeyance. The reign of 
Othman III passed briefly (1754-1757) without any impor- 
tant significance. Four years of prosperity followed, until 
1761, under the guidance of the able statesman Raghib. 
The remaining years of the rule of the mediocre Mustafa III 
were filled with disasters. This is equally true of the period 
of the weak Abd-ul-Hamid, so that the twenty-nine years 
which bring Turkish history to 1789 are years of disorder, 



186 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

defeat, and further loss of territory. Here Russia and Austria 
became triumphant. 

Thus the whole history of Turkey from the thirteenth to 
the nineteenth century, in its growth and decline, shows ten 
progressions under strong, and ten declines under weak Sul- 
tans. Her great and able viziers, especially the Kuprili 
family, who formed an inner dynasty behind the throne, 
did much from time to time, but the areas of progress under 
the grand viziers were not as important or as numerous as 
those under the Sultans. There are four occasions during 
which Turkey advanced under weak monarchs but strong 
viziers. There are ten periods when the progress is directly 
traceable to the Sultans themselves. There is but one period, 
that between 1730 and 1754, not almost perfectly paralleled 
by the mental capacity of individual leaders. 



CHAPTER XV 



SCOTLAND 



The early history of Scotland is one of great confusion. 
Even down to the eighteenth century the annals are filled 
with party strife, border raids, and petty warfare. Frequent 
changes in the government make the national conditions of 
progress and decline not as definitely marked as in most 
countries. Scotland was a very backward nation, and con- 
tinued until recent times in a condition of lawlessness, rude- 
ness, and ignorance, long after some parts of the continent 
had reached a high degree of culture and splendour. 

I shall not attempt to trace the history of Scotland prior 
to 1306, the accession of Robert Bruce. This national hero, 
who stands in comparison with his successors somewhat iso- 
lated in grandeur, did a great deal for his country besides 
freeing it from the overlordship of England. He, to a con- 
siderable extent, consolidated the rival elements, and the 
legal aspects of his administration should not be overlooked. 
At the parliament at Scone in 1318 "many wise laws were 
passed touching the administration of justice, the organiza- 
tion and mustering of the army, and freedom of the Church." 
It is true that the long wars of Bruce's reign had their dark 
side, especially in their effect on the condition of the poorer 
classes, but the general tenor of the period was doubtless 
successful. He was not only beloved in his own day but his 
memory was long after venerated, — a notable career and 
an excellent instance of personal influence. 

The next administrator was the Earl of Moray, who acted 
as regent from 1329 to 1332. Here one notes, as elsewhere, 
that minorities themselves are not to blame when conditions 

187 



188 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

are found to be weak. Macaulay cites Scotland to prove 
that minorities are harmful, but the fault lies not in the form 
of government, but in the absence of a strong hand.^ The 
Earl of Moray was a just, vigorous, and wise man. His 
administration was eminently successful. The next regent, 
Donald, Earl of Mar, a nephew of Robert Bruce, held the reins 
but a very short time, for he soon led the nation to disaster, 
and was defeated and slain in 1333. Mar is described as 
having no qualifications for the office. The remaining years 
of the minority of David II were equally unsuccessful. Dis- 
aster, defeats, and confusion fill the period. Four different 
persons occupied the office of regent, but no vigorous char- 
acters can be found. David II himself proved a weak king. 
He is summarized as incapable, headstrong, extravagant, 
passionate, and addicted to pleasures. As for national 
affairs, the Scots were defeated at Neville's Cross, the Eng- 
lish overran the southern part of Scotland, and the king was 
taken a prisoner to England, being released only after his 
countrymen had paid a large ransom. The internal state of 
the nation was deplorable. Turbulent nobles impoverished 
the commoners, and the commoners flew at each others' 
throats. Notwithstanding this, some parliamentary ad- 
vance can be discovered. In attaining parliamentary growth 
under a weak king Scotland resembled England. She did 
the same, it should be noticed, under a later weak king, 
Robert III. These facts should be contrasted with the 
stunted growth of the parliaments in Castile, Aragon, and 
Portugal. 

Under Robert II (1371-1380), who founded the house of 
Stuart, there was some improvement. The Scots were vic- 
torious at Otterbourne, which did much to remove the dread 
of England, and gave a greater national prestige ; but still 
the internal affairs of the northern kingdom remained very 
unsatisfactory. Continued warfare exhausted the country and 
social and material progress was much retarded. Robert 

» See page 248. 



SCOTLAND 189 

II was not a great, though he was a naturally clever, person. 
He was lazy, and at that time of life already in declining 
health. The portrait of the first of the Stuarts is drawn by 
Froissart as a man, "not valiant, with red bleared eyes, 
who would rather lie still than ride." His son Robert III 
was even more indolent and was furthermore deficient in 
natural parts. He held no power over the nobles or over his 
jealous and turbulent brothers ; and the whole picture of 
Scotland is one of dire confusion, of English raids, and private 
warfare. As before noted, in spite of this lack of leadership, 
parliament met and enacted new laws which somewhat 
bettered the condition of the lower classes. 

In the next period occurs the first able and vigorous leader 
since the Earl of Mar. This man was Robert, Duke of 
Albany, a younger son of Robert II. Although no sudden 
complete and wonderful change took place, there is no ques- 
tion but the sixteen years accredited to him count for de- 
cided improvement, — first, the complete subjection of the 
malcontents, second, the important victory of Harlaw 
(though under the leadership of another of the Stuarts), 
and third, the foundation of the earliest university in Scot- 
land, St. Andrews. A quotation from the " Dictionary of 
National Biography" will give a fair view of Albany and 
also his influence. 

"Of his strong personality and great ability, his remark- 
able ascendancy over the turbulent nobility is sufficient proof. 
Chroniclers of the period, while they bear witness to his im- 
posing presence, are almost equally unanimous in extolling 
his affability, temperance, justice, fortitude, and wisdom." 
Albany died in 1419, and at once three years of weakness, 
disruption, and retrogression set in under his son, the indolent 
and incompetent Murdoch. There was soon no doubt as to 
the incompetence and corruption of his rule, and "the ma- 
jority of the nation became more than ever anxious for the 
return of the king." 

This refers to King James I, who since boyhood had been 



190 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

held captive in England. It is worth noting that a sudden 
break occurs here between two strong periods. The reign 
of James I (1424-1437) proved the most uniformly and en- 
tirely progressive in all early Scottish history, — the founda- 
tion of the statute law, the suppression of private warfare, 
regular and frequent meetings of the parliament, a general 
survey of the kingdom for the purpose of valuation, a regula- 
tion of weights and measures and coinage, in fact the begin- 
nings of something worthy of the name of civilization, and a 
progress that might have endured and developed, had Scot- 
land continued to have rulers like James I. James I was, 
without doubt, the greatest Scottish king since Bruce, and 
the general excellence and variety of his gifts and his noble 
moral character make him compare favourably with royalty 
of the first grade. He was strong, brave, and hardy, just 
and liberal, and besides being an able legislator, adminis- 
trator, and organizer, was one of the most accomplished 
princes of his time. Indeed, for Scotland he was far ahead 
of his time. The policy of James I in reducing the power 
of the baronage as against the clergy and the commoners, 
though generally so welcome to the mass of the people, could 
naturally not appeal to the barons themselves. A conspir- 
acy took root among some of the latter class, which ended in 
the murder of this excellent king in 1436, when he was only 
forty-three years of age. 

Scotland enjoyed no more progress for a number of years, 
and, moreover, the peaceful and settled state of affairs ter- 
minated abruptly. The minority of James II was not con- 
trolled so much by weak hands, as it was by overgrasping 
ones. Confusion and the old game of party warfare filled the 
period. The conditions here appear to be directly due to 
the outward form of government, not to lack of ability in the 
regency. 

With the maturity of the king came a gradual improve- 
ment. It took some time to suppress the civil wars, for the 
party of the Douglases was very strong. The defeat at 



SCOTLAND 191 

Arkinholm in 1454 placed everything to the advantage of the 
Stuarts, and Douglas's subsequent flight over the border left 
James free to restore the much-needed order within his own 
domain. This he did with astonishing success. James II 
had all the energy of his father, and was even more successful 
in suppressing the lawless barons, and in giving to Scotland 
some little hope of that stability of government which is the 
first necessity for national advance. Border raids had be- 
come chronic, and these did not wholly cease ; yet, compara- 
tively speaking, the brief reign of James II, was an advantage 
to Scotland, There was further progress in legislation, es- 
pecially in measures looking towards agricultural improve- 
ment, finance, and the rights of the lower classes. Unfor- 
tunate accidents took off the good rulers of Scotland before 
they had time to develop their best selves, or demonstrate 
beneficent influences. James II was killed at the siege of 
Roxburgh, aged thirty, by the bursting of a cannon. Ar- 
tillery was new in Scotland, and James, whose interest was 
great, was watching it within too close a range. 

Another minority followed, which brings added argument 
that such an arrangement of the government is not neces- 
sarily a disadvantage. The man at the head of affairs was 
Kennedy, Bishop of St. Andrews, a grandson of Robert III. 
He has been very highly praised for wisdom and excellence of 
moral character. His death, in 1466, after a six years' regency, 
was lamented as a public calamity. The peaceful and 
moderate rule had given the law-abiding class a hope for a 
permanently well-ordered future, but this was not to be. 
As soon as Kennedy died the troubles began again. From 
that date, all through the remainder of the minority of 
James III, and during his own feeble rule, nothing but plots 
and counterplots, weakness and criminality, fill the dreary 
pages of the history of the period. 

James IV, differing from his father, was at least brave 
and energetic, and with his accession there came a decided 
improvement over the conditions which existed under his 



192 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

father. The capacity of James IV was not equal to his ambi- 
tion, and his deficiencies were very clearly marked in the 
results of his sovereignty. Bold and imaginative, his 
somewhat quixotic designs served a very good purpose up to 
a certain point, but carried with them a chain of evils. 
James IV was brave and sufficiently firm to quell the nobles, 
energetic enough to lay the foundations for a considerable 
naval power, skilful in diplomacy, and we see Scotland 
entering the field of European politics ; but the results of 
his personal weaknesses are no less noticeable. James IV's 
extravagance, his rashness, his poor generalship are seen, 
first, in the impoverishment of the exchequer, and second, in 
the disastrous defeat at Flodden Field, the death roll of 
which surpasses any other battle in Scottish history. 

Again a long minority and again unsettled conditions 
followed the reign of James IV. More than a passing word, 
too, must be given the duke of Albany, who was a cousin 
of the king and held the regency during part of this troubled 
period. It is difficult to get the truth about this Albany; 
he seems an enigmatical character, about whom differences 
of opinion can easily exist. Perhaps the best view is that 
Albany was a naturally able man, and that the first part of 
his administration was successful, the latter part unsuc- 
cessful. His task of restoring order among the nobles was 
exceedingly difficult, and he lacked the ideals and the moral 
courage necessary for such a discouraging task. He sought 
repeatedly in France respite from his burdens, and a rule 
over Scotland in the sixteenth century without constant, 
vigorous, personal circumspection was out of the question. 

With James V (1528-1542) the nation's fortunes changed. 
He was not a very great king, but he was active and vig- 
orous, well inclined towards the lower classes, while at the 
same time he kept the refractory nobles in check. With 
the exception of the Scotch defeat at Solway this reign 
may be called prosperous. There is little of interest in the 
four periods which follow, at least as concerns advance or 



SCOTLAND 193 

decline in the economic and strictly material conditions of 
the country. A weak regency under a weak regent, the Earl 
of Arran, is followed by a regency under a very able woman, 
Mary of Lorraine. The events of the Reformation occupy 
nearly the entire period, and it is much to the credit of the 
queen-regent that the years of her rule (1554-1560) were 
not a time of distinct retrogression. The reign of Mary, 
Queen of Scots, interesting as it is from so many points of 
view, has very little bearing on the present inquiry because 
like that of the regent which precedes it, the material or 
economic affairs are so confused that it is impossible to say 
which way the scales turn. All the interest is converged 
around religious questions. Perhaps it would be only fair 
to call this reign one of decline owing to the civil conflicts 
which form its most conspicuous features. 

In the minority of James VI (1570-1587) there are five 
distinct sub-periods. At two points we notice superior or 
"plus" conditions. The first of these is clearly due to the 
energy and firmness of Murray. The second was under 
Earl Morton, not a member of the royal family. This 
man was entirely unscrupulous and merciless, but "he put 
the country in order and gave it peace." The other three 
sub-periods of the regency were under weak control and are 
characterized by the usual turmoil and disorders. 

James VI of England was a shrewd, learned, and pedantic 
person. He was both strong and weak, both wise and foolish, 
but is not rightfully described as the "wisest fool in Chris- 
tendom." James was not very wise. Wisdom in the sense 
of good judgment was what he lacked. He certainly was 
no fool, for no fool could ever have left such an interesting 
impression of himself upon historical memory. However 
we may view the curious make-up of James's nature, it has 
no special importance here, for the reason that the course 
of Scotland's progress is, at this time, too ill-defined, too 
difficult to measure. The king's influence appeared in 
many small matters, but in a larger way it is enough to say 



194 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

that this is a mediocre, or weak, period under a mediocre, or 
weak, king. Nor do the civil wars of Charles I's time fur- 
nish that sort of historical reading which makes it easy to 
affirm whether the general national tendency is upward or 
downward. In spite of all the evils of internecine wars, 
perhaps it is true that ''viewed from a political and moral 
standpoint the Covenanting struggle was a very important 
factor in Scottish civilization." However that may be, the 
march of material progress is not easy to measure. 

Under the vigorous control of Cromwell there was a short 
period of uplift clearly traceable to his own iron hand. This 
is perhaps the last occasion when this country received any 
aid in its development directly as a benefit from any one 
person in supreme control. Scotland had never been so 
fortunate as to have many with the capacity and position 
to confer blessings of this heroic nature. Slowly, but surely, 
she has been able to work out her own destiny and develop 
her own civilization, almost entirely unassisted by centrif- 
ugal forces springing from central authority. Still the 
absence of that central authority, which the pure hazard of 
fate made it her lot to endure, was not without marked 
retarding power for a long time. Scotland and England 
are almost alike in having developed, prior to the nine- 
teenth century, respectable and representative governments 
by themselves and from their own people. England and 
Scotland, anterior to about the seventeenth century, were 
both very greatly affected by the personnel of their kings 
or regents, but not entirely so, not quite so much so as 
continental countries. Both kingdoms gained in parlia- 
mentary strength and importance under weak and inefficient 
sovereigns, but in this respect England notably exceeded 
her northern neighbour. 

After the seventeenth century both England and Scot- 
land made almost constant political, material, and social 
progress in spite of comparatively weak rulers. This later 
history of Scotland, requires, I think, no further detailed 



SCOTLAND 195 

analysis just here. One searches for the royal influence but 
one finds it comparatively nil. Other forces come into 
play which raised the whole mass of the population, or at 
least a considerable portion of it. Here the king stepped 
out, the commoner stepped in. 

Let us not be rash in jumping to a conclusion as to the 
cause of this important change. Let us not suppose that 
the usual references to the spread of education and the 
growth of political liberty will suffice. The question of 
the rise of the commoner in northwestern Europe is an in- 
teresting one, and looked at in a broad way, it is one of the 
most extraordinary and unparalleled phenomena in the whole 
history of the world ; but we have scarcely begun to measure 
those forces, biological and political, both internal and 
external, hereditary and environmental, which, hidden and 
complicated as they are, can yield to disentanglement only 
by the prolonged investigations of science. Questions like 
the rise of the commoner in modern Great Britain had better 
be left for future investigation. 



CHAPTER XVI 



ENGLAND 



Of all European nations, not one can show such growth and 
progress unassisted by sovereign aid as England. From the 
days of Magna Charta, and even before that memorable 
event, there were already to be seen movements beneath the 
surface, indications of the coming forth of a nationality which 
was to show a type of organic structure new to the history 
of the world. As the centuries have done their work many 
other nations have become transformed, evolving into 
aggregations patterned more or less closely on the consti- 
tutional form, but the first rudiment of this new growth 
must always be sought somewhere among the tap-roots of 
the Anglo-Saxon race. 

The republics and democracies, so-called, of antiquity, 
the Greek and Roman modes of political control, the small 
societies and independent cities, variously organized and 
more or less democratic in character, bear but slight analogy 
to the great constitutional nations of to-day. The theory 
of widespread suffrage, that all classes and all sections shall 
be represented in sovereignty, finds its origin in the Wite- 
nagemot of the Anglo-Saxons or perhaps in the assemblies of 
the Teutonic tribes, not in the Roman senate or the Greek 
ecclesia. 

England is proverbially "the Mother of Parliaments," 
and her history presents excellent opportunity of observing 
and recording those forces which are the reverse of that 
single force which it has been the aim of this book syste- 
matically to record and measure. I shall not attempt to 
discuss the causes of this important difference, or try to 
explain why the history of England exceeds all other mo- 

196 



ENGLAND 197 

narchical histories in offering exceptions to my main thesis. 
It would lead, if justice be done the subject, into a multi- 
plicity of debates over questions alien to my present inquiry. 
It would strain the sciences of anthropology, psychology, and 
sociology, and all the theories of civilizing influences, from 
ethical to climatic ; yet agreement would scarcely be reached. 
In fact, I do not believe that the special science of treating 
historical causation has yet reached a stage to make such 
speculation profitable, except in so far as suggestive discus- 
sion may sometimes have a stimulating value for the interest 
aroused. 

I shall do no more than review briefly the well-known 
facts of English history, systematically calling attention to 
each point indicative of a ruler's import, just as I have done 
for other countries. I shall also be at pains to point out 
each instance of progress under weak sovereigns. These 
rare periods, once fixed and limited, beckon one on to further 
research, to deeper analysis of their underlying causes and to 
the hope of discovering factors common to them all. I shall 
show that there have been an exceptionally large number of 
able political men in England as compared to other countries, 
and their names will be referred to in passing, though only 
in the way of mentioning those who seem the more important.^ 

The influences of the kings themselves remained, however, 
a most important force even down to Stuart times. It is 
strange that so few historians have realized the personal 
weight of Norman, Plantagenet, and Tudor kings. Many 
individual authors, specialists in their various fields, have 
felt the ponderous personalities of such men as William the 
Conqueror, Henry II, Edward I, Henry VII, and Henry VIII. 
Indeed, it is rare to find an historian who does not unhesi- 
tatingly ascribe to each of these kings, undividually, an im- 
measurable importance in the history of his time. Yet, 

1 It would not be difficult to make a special study of the influences of the 
great English statesmen on economic and political advance along the lines and 
methods followed in these pages. 



198 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

when not focussed upon the kings separately and attentively, 
the same historians seem to wander and to overlook the 
importance of royalty as a generalized idea. Other causes 
are brought forth freely in a dogmatic manner, but the 
reader who desires proof will search in vain. 

Two English historians, John Richard Green and William 
Cunningham, take cognizance of royalty as a prime factor, 
but only for the Norman and pre-Norman rule. Their 
assertions, which I will now quote, are the only generalized 
conceptions of the paramount importance of royal leadership 
which I have happened to run across in any of the standard 
histories. Green's remark refers especially to the eleventh 
and twelfth centuries. In referring to the Danish and 
Norman rule he says: "Time for the varied progress was 
gained by the long peace which England owed to the firm 
government of her kings, while their political ability gave her 
administrative order, and their judicial reforms built up 
the fabric of her law. In a word, it is to the stern discipline 
of these two hundred years that we owe not merely English 
wealth and English freedom, but England itself." 

It might be remarked, by way of comment, that imme- 
diately before the Conquest and afterwards in the middle of 
the twelfth century during the reign of the weak Stephen, 
there was neither law, nor order, nor progress ; and as for 
the last clause, I cannot refrain from a more vigorous 
protest. There is not a grain of proof that the "stern 
discipline" of one period can be carried along in its influ- 
ence so as to be still effective on even one subsequent genera- 
tion, much less on several. Numerous instances could be 
cited from the history of Spain, Portugal, Prussia, France, 
Russia, etc., to disprove such an idea, — a typical dogmatism, 
and in conflict with recent biological beliefs. Entertain- 
ing as such writers' ideas are from the literary point 
of view, they have a pernicious influence on the sciences 
of historical philosophy and race psychology. Of course I 
should also contend that neither Green nor any one else could 



ENGLAND 



199 



know from the study of English history by itself whether the 
kings had any influence or not. The field would be too 
narrow, the number of instances too few, and the comparative 
standpoint lacking. Out of a score of historians, some 
devoted to one set of causes, some running after another, 
Green and Cunningham happen to favour kings, at least for 
the early period. They are right and the others have 
overlooked a tremendously important factor; but the proof 
comes only in the form of high probability printed in more 
or less impressive type, and drawn from the observation 
of the repetition of similar instances over and over again 
in other lands where all the other factors, save this one 
factor, are changed, but where the human relation between 
herd and leader remains the same. r 

The statement of William Cunningham is explicit ^^\i/^Ji^ 
worth quoting in full from "The Growth of English [History] 'T ^,,>^ 
and Commerce," page 121. "Of all the cant which is 
current in the present day about history, none is more 
pernicious than that which despises the story of real per- 
sonages and real events, and busies itself about abstractions 
which tell us that it is not concerned with kings and battles 
but with the life of the people. It is true indeed that in 
modern times the life of the people can be treated apart 
from the consideration of the personal character of George 
IV or William IV. But in the Norman reigns this was not 
the case ; security for person and property, intercourse with 
other nations and commercial advance were directly con- 
nected with the personal character of the king ; the life of 
the people was most deeply affected in every way by the 
strength or weakness of his disposition. It would be inter- 
esting to try to explain the reasons of this change, and to 
show why the personality of the king, which was so all- 
important long ago, is of comparatively little moment now; 
but it is merely idle to ignore the fact or to try to understand 
the history of the Norman reigns without taking it into 
account." 



200 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

This paragraph is the only statement I have found closely- 
embodying my own theory. Its uniqueness shows how very 
unfashionable the "great-man" view of history has become. 
Cunningham makes no effort to bring proof to support his 
conviction that the life of the people was most deeply affected 
in every way by the strength or weakness of the king's dis- 
position. Perhaps the historian deserves credit, who in 
default of any scheme for presenting real proof, disdains 
the pseudo-scientific habit of citing a few examples favourable 
to his theory. His remark that it would be interesting to 
try to explain the reasons why the personality of the king, 
which was so all-important long ago, is of comparatively little 
moment now, is delightfully scientific in its unassuming 
attitude and desire to know the truth. One too rarely finds 
in historial writings such words as "it would be interesting 
to try to explain the reasons." Usually the reasons flow 
gratuitously enough. In saying that the personality of the 
king is of comparatively little moment now, Mr. Cunning- 
ham is referring, I take it, to England solely ; but it might 
give a reader the belief, unconsciously enough, that the same 
is true everywhere, even outside the English-speaking race. 
As a matter of fact the differences on this score between 
some countries and others are among the most important 
points that I have been able to bring to light. 

This calls to mind what is perhaps the chief reason for 
the unwarranted neglect of the "personality" theory of 
history at the present time. To so many, the history of 
civilization means western civilization and the development 
of liberty means English liberty, that they are blind to the 
really exceptional nature of the very happenings and ten- 
dencies which interest them most. The expansion of the 
democratic idea, the growth of parliament, and the develop- 
ment of constitutional government are not the less glorious, 
conceived also in the light of their modernness. If the his- 
tory of most European countries, as late as the nineteenth 
century, and indeed England itself during the Middle Ages, 



ENGLAND 201 

favours a doctrine the opposite of democratic in its tenor, these 
facts are the more worth bringing together as soon as other 
facts can be placed against them in contrast ; for it is by the 
appreciation of significant differences, the rearrangement 
and grouping of like facts with like, that a basis for an ana- 
lytical and descriptive science is obtained. 

The history of England as a distinct nation begins so 
definitely with the year 1066 that this date serves as the 
natural starting-point for the present outline. The Norman 
Conquest ushered in one of the great celebrities of the 
world's history. William I was not a mere creature of cir- 
cumstances. Evidences of his genius are at every hand. 
No authority on the period of the Conquest, so far as I am 
aware, has ever raised the question or entertained the least 
doubt that William the Conqueror was anything less than a 
man of genius. Precociousness of talent, something diflB- 
cult to explain in any other way than through inherent com- 
position of the germ-plasm, is often a concomitant of genius, 
and William showed precociousness to the extreme. As 
sole though bastard heir to Robert of Normandy, he had 
inherited that duchy in accordance with his father's wish; 
and being but a boy of eight, a guardianship was at once 
appointed. The wildest anarchy accompanied his boyhood 
years. In no part of the world were the barons stronger 
or more disposed to lawlessness than in those dominions 
afterwards compacted into the French nation. Three of 
the guardians of the youthful duke had been murdered in 
rapid succession. William had been hidden away in order 
that he might escape a similar fate. About the age of 
sixteen he began to emerge from obscurity and to act in a 
way indicative of that growing spirit of mastery which was 
to make him in the end one of the most feared of men. By 
the time the duke was twenty he had taken upon himself 
the supreme control and had settled, by the decisive battle 
fought at Val-des-Dunes (1047), the question whether he 
should rule the nobles or the nobles should rule him. 



202 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

Before his twenty-third year, William had sufficiently 
disembroiled Norman affairs to be able to cast his eye 
towards the English crown, and in 1051 he made a visit to 
Edward the Confessor with the idea of strengthening his 
claim and obtaining a promise of the succession. It will be 
unnecessary here to rehearse the particulars of the Norman 
Conquest or the changes which came over England, ushered 
in by that important event. All I wish to emphasize is the 
uniform way in which criticism pays homage to the remark- 
able qualities of William, thus making the period 1066 to 
1087 reflect the sovereign quite at the maximum rate. 

"Whoever dwelt in the land. Englishmen, Normans, or 
any other, William was their master and moulded them to 
his will. A less discerning conqueror might have made 
simple havoc of all that he found established in the land 
which he conquered. A man of meaner mould might have 
indulged in mere paltry and wanton tyranny. But Wil- 
liam neither changed one whit nor tyrannized one whit 
beyond what his position and purposes demanded. His 
position as Conqueror, combined with that craft in which 
none could rival him, enabled him to put the final seal to 
the work of Eagbert, of Eadward, and of Ji^thelstan and 
make England one United Kingdom, which, since his days, 
no man has ever dreamed of dividing." ^ 

''He was a man of iron will and remarkable genius; no 
consideration could divert him from the pursuit of his aims 
and he was unscrupulous as to the means he employed to 
attain them. Though not delighting in human cruelty he 
was callous to human suffering. In addition to his two signal 
acts of cruelty he amassed great riches by oppression and 
became avaricious. Assertions that he had any illegitimate 
children or that he was unfaithful to his wife lack historical 
basis. But the characteristic by which he is most dis- 
tinguished from the other men of his time is one which he 
shares with many of the conquerors of history — a char- 

1 E. A. Freeman, "Norman Conquest," iv, 18. 



ENGLAND 203 

acteristic indispensable to that kind of success — an utterly 
relentless determination to succeed, if necessary without 
hesitation at the means employed, and without considering 
in the least the cost to others." ^ 

"Violence was common and there were but few signs of 
advancing prosperity or civilization when an entirely new 
set of influences came into existence with the Conquest." ^ 

"The contests of the years immediately following 1066 
led to a sort of period of decay, but very soon increasing trade 
and handicraft led to still greater progress. London espe- 
cially made good its position as one of the great cities of 
Europe and that preeminence among English towns which 
it has never lost." ^ 

J. R. Green summarized the situation thus: "It was 
in fact this vigorous personality of William which proved 
the chief safeguard of his throne." "Stark he was," says 
the English chronicler, "to men that withstood him; earls 
that did aught against his bidding he cast into bonds ; 
bishops he stripped of their bishoprics, abbots of their 
abbacies. He spared not his own brother ; first he was in 
the land but the king cast him into bondage. If a man 
would live and hold his lands, need it were that he followed 
the king's will. But stern as his rule was, it gave peace to 
the land. Even amidst the sufferings which necessarily 
sprang from the circumstances of the Conquest itself, from 
the erection of castles, or the enclosure of forests, or the 
exactions which built up the great hoard at Winchester, 
Englishmen were unable to forget the 'good peace he made 
in the land, so that a man might fare over his realm with 
a bosom full of gold.' Strange touches of a humanity far 
in advance of his age contrasted with the general temper of 
his government. One of the strongest traits in his char- 
acter was his aversion to shed blood by process of law; he 

1 "Dictionary of National Biography." 

2 E. P. Cheyne, "Industrial and Social History of England." 
"Ibid., p. 17. 



204 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

formally abolished the punishment of death, and only a 
single execution stains the annals of his reign. An edict 
yet more honourable to him put an end to the slave trade 
which had till then been carried on at the port of Bristol. 
The pitiless warrior, the stern and awful king, was a tender 
and faithful husband, an affectionate father. The lonely 
silence of his bearing broke into gracious converse with pure 
and sacred souls like Anselm. If William was 'stark' to 
rebel and baron, men noted that he was 'mild to those that 
loved God.'" 

Archbishop Anselm figures conspicuously in the following 
reign. He did not immigrate to England until after the 
Conqueror's death. Another prelate, Lanfranc, born also 
in Piedmont, is the man who of all others towers in the 
multitude, second only in eminence to the king himself. 

William II (Rufus) likewise stands as a king whose influ- 
ence on the affairs of his time must be reckoned paramount. 
Tyrannical and godless beyond all bounds, a wild and erratic 
half-genius, all the strange and exceptional traits of the 
"Red King" are reflected in the principal features of his 
reign. An overpowering will preserved good order through- 
out the land, no other than he himself was allowed to rob, 
while profligacy, extravagance, pride, and ambition exhausted 
the royal purse. The English people were oppressed in 
this reign more than ever before or since, and few kings in 
any country have been equally wicked and at the same time 
abundantly endowed with all talents necessary for the main- 
tenance of a position of supreme and diabolical power. 
William Rufus was impossible to repress ; at least it appears 
that no single person or combination of persons came for- 
ward in this reign, as they did for instance in the reign of 
John, to deliver the nation from its insufferable burden. 
The revered Anselm attempted some check on the king's 
demoralized actions and rapacious seizure of Church prop- 
erty and Church governance, but the worthy old archbishop 
was forced to bow his head. He resigned his post and left 



ENGLAND 205 

for the Continent. The good people marvelled that so bad 
a man could continue to challenge the wrath of God and yet 
prosper so persistently. The king was a good fighter in 
every sense. Some say that as a soldier he was little inferior 
to his father. This counted a good deal in England's favour 
and realized itself in many conflicts, the successful issue of 
which led to the amalgamation of those various elements 
which the Conquest had but recently half welded together. 
The crushing out of the turbulent baronage, the quick 
suppression of Scotch inroads, and the settlement of the 
northwestern frontier were of great practical value to the 
future development of England ; and the insular power 
is now seen for the first time reversing history and appearing 
on the Continent in the guise of the aggressor. 

The next Norman king was not inferior in energy and de- 
termination of purpose to his father, the Conqueror, or to his 
brother Rufus. Henry I was a good, we might say excellent, 
soldier, but he was essentially a man of peace ; he preferred the 
wily arts of diplomacy to those of war, and his long reign was 
very successful. The personality of the king is to be observed 
in all the most important features of the reign. First, his 
practical sense and good judgment is to be seen in the famous 
charter of liberties which was granted immediately on 
accession. The strong mailed fist was not lacking to keep 
good order in the land. The learned mind initiated the new 
courts of justice. His temper drew him away from ambi- 
tious and unnecessary wars, and a long period of peace at 
home gave England a chance to develop her economic re- 
sources, so that the rather burdensome taxes were fairly well 
borne. The barons hated and feared him, but the peace and 
order which he established were greatly appreciated by the 
people. Henry I in his marriage with Edith-Matilda, and 
in all his subsequent actions, including the appointment 
to high ofiice of new men not Norman in blood, did a great 
deal to bring about that fusion of the elements which so soon 
created the modern English race. The principal lieutenant 



206 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

of Henry I was the great justiciar, Roger, Bishop of Salisbury. 
In this reign Anselm figures again, but his influence is more 
confined to matters ecclesiastical. 

In 1135 the sceptre passed into weak hands, and for the 
first time in seventy years constructive social forces turned 
into disintegration. The debacle under Stephen is in every 
way as pronounced as the typical weak periods found in the 
history of countries other than England, Stephen who was 
active, ambitious, and well-meaning, rushed around the 
country here and there, attempting to conciliate all parties. 
It was a clear case of simple lack of ability. Stephen was 
no fool. Very likely he was quite the equal of the average 
baron of his day. Such scenes of anarchy and misery as 
this reign pictures only bring out in stronger relief those 
colossal figures who were able to hold their leadership 
and enforce an iron order on an unwilling baronage. 

The next sovereign, Henry II, fitted more in the mould 
of the Conqueror. Henry II was a very strenuous person. 
Though not usually counted among the greatest of world 
geniuses, an intimate study of his make-up and his career 
compels full admiration for his capacities, and at the same 
time vividly flashes before the mind how truly great the 
great kings were, when here is one who stands somewhat 
below the very highest grade. For this reason I will show 
as a specimen that a collection of quotations from the 
standard historians paints a portrait of a man who, if only 
a king among kings, was certainly a giant among men.^ 

"Young as he was, Henry mounted the throne with a reso- 
lute purpose of government which his reign carried steadily 
out. His practical, serviceable frame suited the hardest 
worker of his time. There was something in his build and 
look, in the square, stout frame, the fiery face, the close- 

1 It is scarcely necessary to add that the method pursued in bringing 
these accounts together is impartial in its aim. I have, of course, selected 
only those paragraphs which best convey the picturesque impression, but I 
can fairly state that no statements have been met with which could be taken 
as refuting these opinions. 



ENGLAND 207 

cropped hair, the prominent eyes, the bull neck, the coarse 
strong hands, the bowed legs, that marked out the keen, 
stirring, coarse-fibred man of business. 'He never sits 
down,' said one who observed him closely; 'he is always 
on his legs from morning till night.' Orderly in business, 
careless in appearance, sparing in diet, never resting or giving 
his servants rest, chatty, inquisitive, endowed with a singular 
charm of address and strength of memory, obstinate in love 
or hatred, a fair scholar, a great hunter, his general air that 
of a rough, passionate, busy man, Henry's personal char- 
acter told directly on the character of his reign. His acces- 
sion marks the period of amalgamation, when neighborhood 
and traffic and intermarriage drew Englishmen and Normans 
rapidly into a single people. A national feeling was thus 
springing up before which the barriers of the older feudalism 
were to be swept away. Henry had even less reverence for 
the feudal past than the men of his day ; he was indeed 
utterly without the imagination and reverence which enable 
men to sympathize with any past at all. He had a practical 
man's impatience of the obstacles thrown in the way of his 
reforms by the older constitution of the realm, nor could he 
understand other men's reluctance to purchase undoubted 
improvements by the sacrifice of customs and traditions of 
bygone days. Without any theoretical hostility to the 
coordinate powers of the state, it seemed to him a perfectly 
reasonable and natural course to trample either baronage or 
Church under foot to gain his end of good government. He 
saw clearly that the remedy for such anarchy as England had 
endured under Stephen lay in the establishment of a kingly 
government unembarrassed by any privileges of order or 
class, administered by royal servants, and in whose public 
administration the nobles acted simply as delegates of the 
sovereign. His work was to lie in the organization of judi- 
cial and administrative reforms which realized this idea. . . . 
"There is no ground for thinking that Thomas Becket in 
any degree influenced his system or rule. Henry's policy 



208 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

seems for good or evil to have been throughout his own. The 
work of reorganization went steadily on amidst trouble at 
home and abroad." ^ 

"Justice and peace, in the sense which these words con- 
veyed to the men of his day, were to be the main char- 
acteristics of his reign in England. The old machinery of 
justice, of finance, of general administration, was at work 
again. Yet the work that he did for England was only the 
part of his work that outlasted his own life, and it has lasted 
for seven centuries. It was by his power that England, 
Scotland and Ireland were brought to some vague acknowl- 
edgment of a common suzerain lord. It was he who abolished 
feudalism as a system of government and left it little more 
than a system of land tenure. It was he who defined the 
relations established between Church and State, and decreed 
that in England churchman as well as baron was to be held 
under the common law. It was he who preserved the tra- 
dition of self-government which had been handed down in 
borough and shire-moot from the earliest time of English 
history. His reforms established the judicial system whose 
main outlines have been preserved to our own day. It 
was through his 'constitutions' and his 'assize' that it 
came to pass that all over the world the English-speaking 
races are governed by English and not by Roman law. It 
was by his genius for government that the servants of the 
royal household became transformed into ministers of state. 
It was he who gave England a foreign policy which decided 
our continental relations for seven hundred years." ^ 

"Of all kings between the Conqueror and Edward I he 
has the best right to the name of law giver. . . . Within 
the island world of Britain the power of England rose for a 
moment under Henry II to a greater height than it had 
ever risen at any earlier time." ^ 

» Green's "History of the English People," pp. 197, 198, 199. 

' Kate Norgate writing in the "Dictionary of National Biography." 

' E. A. Freeman writing in the ninth edition of Encyclopsedia Britannica. 



ENGLAND 209 

"Foreign affairs were undeniably successful. He held 
France in the hollow of his hand. He built up and kept 
together in a marvellous manner a Continental dominion." i 

"The legislation of his reign was probably in great part 
of his own contriving. His supervision of the law courts 
was close and jealous. He transacted a great amount of 
judicial business in his own person even after he had formed 
a high court of justice which might sit without his personal 
presence. To these activities he devoted his scanty intervals 
of leisure. His government was stern; he over-rode the 
privileges of the baronage without regard to precedent; 
he persisted in keeping large districts under the arbitrary 
and vexatious jurisdiction of the forest courts. But it is the 
general opinion of historians that he had a high sense of 
his responsibility and a strong love of justice; despite the 
looseness of his personal morals, he commanded the affec- 
tion and respect of Gilbert Foliot, and Hugh of Lincoln, 
the most upright of the English bishops." ^ 

"Whatever may be said against his private character, the 
wisdom and steadiness with which he pursued these aims, 
and the permanence of the mark that he left upon the con- 
stitution, secure him the title of a great king." ^ 

The next English king is one who always appeals to 
the popular imagination. The relations of Richard Coeur 
de Lion to his home country, were, however, very unim- 
portant, compared with many sovereigns of an earlier and 
later date. Spending most of his time in foreign lands, 
perhaps the chief and only way his personality is directly 
mirrored in domestic affairs is that a continual drain was 
placed upon the exchequer which had to be met by high 
taxation. The king departed for the Great Crusade in the 
summer of 1190, just after his accession. Then he spent 
something over a year in captivity. The remainder of his 

> Sir J. H. Ramsay, "The Foundation of England," pp. 248, 257. 
«H. W. C. Davis, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th edition. 
» G. W. Prothero in Encyclopajdia Britannica, 9th edition. 
P 



210 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

reign was chiefly taken up in warfare with Philip Augustus 
of France. Richard was only twice in England for a few 
months during his entire sovereignty. The country was 
ruled, and ruled wisely, by three or four ministers or justi- 
ciars. 

This is a very important point, as it signalizes one of the 
earliest proofs of England's fitness for self-government, — 
for constitutionalism and autogenous growth. The ma- 
chinery so well set up by Henry II continued at work. The 
bureaucrats acted honestly and the barons remained re- 
markably peaceful. Important constitutional advances 
took place, and despite the onerous demand for taxes, 
wealth seemed to have been increasing and the general 
picture of England at that time is far from gloomy. I 
will not attempt to discuss the causes for the phenomenon. 
I merely call attention to the period as a very early indica- 
tion of an advance non-royal in character. The more emi- 
nent men of this decade were William of Longchamp, Walter 
of Constances, and Hubert Walter. The last, decidedly 
the greatest of the three, held the offices of chief justiciar and 
Archbishop of Canterbury. He was a relative of Ranulf 
de Glanvill, the great justiciar of Henry II. Any minister 
had a difficult task at that time to stand between the king 
and his people and to satisfy the constant demands for 
money, most of which was intended to be sent outside of the 
kingdom. Hubert Walter not only managed taxation in an 
honest way, but appears as the true originator in England of 
the principle of representation and election for public ser- 
vice ; the election of coroners or registrars of the "pleas of 
the crown," and more important, the use of juries to de- 
cide on questions of assessment and taxation. The knight- 
hood class rose in power, and, taken all in all, the reign of 
Richard I was very fruitful in the growth of institutions 
favourable to popular liberty. 

The reign of John also illustrates, and in a well-known 
way, the early English determination not to abide a sover- 



ENGLAND 211 

eign who should carry tyranny too far. John may or may 
not have been intellectually superior ; there is some disagree- 
ment as to this side of his make up, but as far as his moral 
character is concerned, there is but one verdict. 

"All the vices of his house appear in his character unre- 
deemed by any greatness. He was mean, false, vindictive, 
and abominably cruel. At once greedy and extravagant, 
he extorted money from his subjects and spent it in an ignoble 
manner. He had a violent temper and a stubborn disposi- 
tion, but he lacked real firmness of mind and was at heart 
a coward. Although not without capacity, he was so frivo- 
lous and slothful that at the most critical time he behaved 
like a fool. ... He was self-indulgent and scandalously 
immoral."^ 

"'Foul as it is, hell itself is defiled by the fouler presence 
of John.' The terrible verdict of the king's contemporaries 
has passed into the sober judgment of history." ^ 

"John's lack of insight was on the moral side, not at all 
on the intellectual. ... It is of some interest that in all 
the contemporary discussion of this case no one ever sug- 
gested that John was personally incapable of such a viola- 
tion of his oath or such a murder with his own hand. He 
is of all kings the one for whose character no man, of his 
own age or later, has ever had a good word. Historians 
have been found to speak highly of his intellectual or mili- 
tary abilities, but words have been exhausted to describe 
the meanness of his moral nature and his utter depravity 
. . . his utter falsity, the impossibility of binding him, his 
readiness to betray any interest or any man or woman, 
whenever tempted to it." ^ George Burton Adams, author 
of this paragraph, makes the comment before closing his 
account of John, that the failure of modern students to find 
redeeming features assures us of their absence. 

1 "National Biography," Rev. William Hunt. 

2 Green's "Short History," p. 231. 

' Hunt and Pool, vol. II, pp. 401-403, section written by G. B. Adams. 



212 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

The personality of this king gives the student of royalty 
a lowest mark for the development of moral character and 
a prototype of all that royalty may be at its very worst. 
This furnishes, therefore, a valuable point of departure and 
gives aid in estimating and grading kings not quite as 
bad as John, — those possessed of some redeeming virtues. 
Thus the compiled and systematically arranged opinions 
of authorities fit the law of probability, because there should 
be theoretically only one or two, a very few at most, out of a 
large number of kings (or other individuals) who inherit no 
good qualities whatever. There are so many traits that are 
generally accounted good, that some at least will reach almost 
every one. 

This gametic view of John's character which I here sug- 
gest will be understood by an analogy. It is as if in a large 
assembly, black, gray, and white cards were dealt out twenty 
to each. There would be, say, only one person who would 
receive all black. Such a one was John. Of course this 
would be carrying it a little too far, as it is impossible to be- 
lieve that some moral traits of John's were not at least gray, 
but it matters not as far as my point is concerned ; which is 
to show that King John was thoroughly bad, according to 
all accounts, that one or two such monsters are to be expected, 
and that having this agreed upon, one is more inclined to be- 
lieve what is said about the others who are not quite so 
wicked, and who increase in frequency until the average 
type is reached. 

King John's influence on the England of his time was not 
unimportant. At the close of the reign the situation was 
one of dire calamity. For this the king himself seems chiefly 
to deserve the blame. Yet this reign is marked by common 
consent as the time from which Englishmen and English 
descendants first date their chartered liberties. Although 
most of the Magna Charta was but a recognition of prin- 
ciples already won in earlier reigns, the significance of the 
meeting at Runnymede is such, that both in its intellectual 



ENGLAND 213 

and material bearings this event may be felt to outbalance 
the adversities and afflictions of a tempestuous reign. 

The importance of Magna Charta was much exaggerated 
in later ages, and doubtless its importance is in no way com- 
mensurate with its fame ; but in the pages of a special study 
like the present, the happenings of the year 1215 in England 
are unparalleled, or at least unprecedented, and are very 
provocative of thought and theory. Some great historical 
movements have their obvious leaders, who may have been 
the initiators or may themselves been the product of their 
times. Other movements seem to generate en masse. The 
winning of the Magna Charta appears to belong to the latter 
category. It must not, however, be supposed that the 
people, as a whole, or even a large part of the middle or upper 
middle classes either demanded the Great Charter or got 
much out of it. It was a demand springing from the great 
clergy and the barons, and designed by them to benefit 
themselves. Stephen Langton was the most prominent 
among the prelates and Robert Fitzwalter was leader of the 
barons. The latter appears more in the role of agitator ; 
he was not a great man, at least judged by his subsequent 
career. Stephen Langton, however, takes hold upon the 
fancy. The record of his life portrays a man of genius. 
Perhaps if a "soul of the movement" is to be unveiled in 
any one person more than another it must be identified with 
the Church primate, Stephen Langton. The baronial party 
had another really great man in William Marshall, Earl of 
Pembroke. His name is especially mentioned in the pre- 
amble along with a few other prominent persons, but there 
is nothing to connect this statesman with leadership in the 
events anterior to the meeting and signing of the Charter. 

Be all this as it may, there is one feature of the whole situ- 
ation which no one should fail to notice, and that is that here 
was concerted action. One can espy many places in the tables 
which are printed in the Appendix of this volume where 
villainous, incapable, and tyrannical kingship ought to have 



214 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

led to happenings similar to those in England in 1215. For 
instance, one can cite from France, the reign of Philip I, 
Philip IV, and his three sons, Philip VI, John II, Charles 
VI; from Castile, Uracca, Peter the Cruel; from Portu- 
gal, Ferdinand I, — from Scotland, David II ; from Den- 
mark, Eric (1412-1439); from Sweden, Eric XIV and 
John III; from Russia, Basil Shuiski (1606-1610) and 
Sophia (1682-1689) ; from Turkey, Murad III (1574-1595), 
Mahommed III, and Osman II. Not but what other reigns 
show disturbed conditions, weaknesses that needed to be 
taken well in hand, great wrongs endured by the masses that 
called for aid yet did not receive it ; but these sovereigns 
here enumerated are the ones who most resemble King 
John of England. These instances show that intolerable 
tyrants do not give rise to concerted action on the part of 
the oppressed. To say that England gained constitutionally 
because of John's wickedness does not reach the heart of the 
matter. It does not pick out the peculiar point of difference. 
England gained at this point because of something inhe- 
rently peculiar in the English baronage of that time, or 
in a small number of them, or in one of them, or in the special 
circumstances of the situation. The problem is open for 
further enlightenment. I shall show later that the last 
of these suppositions is rendered highly improbable by sub- 
sequent historical developments. 

The short period directly following the death of John 
(1216-1219) furnishes an instance of a minority not retro- 
gressive in its tendency but quite the contrary. The single 
man responsible for all this, William Marshall, Earl of Pem- 
broke, was exceptionally great and good, a loyal and noble 
character, as is shown through all the deeds of a varied and 
brilliant career before he was made "Governor of the 
King and Kingdom." 

"His regency was the worthy finish of his long life. The 
great and special work of Marshall was the pacification of the 
realm after the period of disorder. This task he accomplished 



ENGLAND 215 

by the firm but conciliatory policy of his three short years of 
rule, and it is because he thus made possible the realization 
of the charters that he deserves an honorable place among the 
founders of English liberty," ^ 

"The expulsion of the French, the restoration of order, 
and the securing of the validity of the Great Charter by suc- 
cessive and solemn confirmations were the chief debts that 
England owed to William Marshall." ^ 

The remaining years of Henry Ill's minority were also 
progressive though not quite so much so. Control of the 
government was divided under a sort of triumvirate, of 
which the justiciar, Hubert de Burgh, was chief, and of 
which the papal legate, and Peter des Roches were members. 
In Hubert de Burgh England had found another able 
champion of the public welfare. 

Henry III, however, failed to appreciate a man who might 
have saved him from many misfortunes. In 1232 he deposed 
the justiciar and took affairs into his own hands. His 
reign of fifty-six years is from the constitutional side one of 
considerable importance inasmuch as it initiated in England 
the practice of calling together parliaments in which various 
classes and sections found representation. This must be 
counted as far as it goes towards political betterment, and 
therefore of influence on material affairs. In addition it 
must be said that the era of Henry III was not a time of 
economic decline as is sometimes stated. The English people 
were very heavily taxed and for purposes foreign to their 
own interests. The royal revenues were squandered and 
the nation sunk in debt, but it does not appear that in wealth 
and civilization the people were not better off at the end of 
the reign than at the beginning. This might naturally be 
expected as a part of the world movement of the thirteenth 
century which was very productive in many quarters of 
Europe. 

• "Dictionary of National Biography." 
2 Stubbs, "Early Plantagenets," p. 170. 



216 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

Certainly the good side of the reign was not due to King 
Henry III or the royal favourites. Their influence is clear 
enough. They are responsible for the maladministration, 
while the good features spring from the people as a whole, 
or at least a considerable number of persons, or perhaps from 
other causes. Simon de Montfort, more than any other 
one man, is entitled to the credit of leadership, but the whole 
movement seems to spring more from concerted action than 
from the inspiration of a solitary genius. For many years 
the policy of the king had been opposed by many of the wiser 
and more patriotic men of prominence, including Edmund 
of Abingdon, Robert Grosseteste, and Richard, Earl of Corn- 
wall. It was only after Earl Simon took up the good cause 
that anything was actually done to assuage the sufferings 
of the nation. The parliament of 1258 and the legal limita- 
tions, placed upon the monarch at this time, were in the 
direction of reform, but they failed to furnish the only real 
remedy, which meant the actual seizure and restraint of the 
king himself. This was accomplished at Lewes, 1264, 
where a minority of the barons under Montfort's skilful 
generalship won the day. For the rest of his life, until 1272, 
Henry III was kept in confinement or under tutelage, and his 
name disappears from English history. After the death of 
Montfort at Evesham, Prince Edward became the real ruler 
of the kingdom. 

Just how great a part Earl Simon "the Righteous" played 
individually in delivering the people from a wretchedly incom- 
petent king one might hesitate to say. To my mind the 
most interesting aspect of the reign of Henry III is the un- 
expected nature of its successful termination. It is missing 
the mark widely to think that the weakness of the king and 
the insufferable irritation which his ill-advised policy had 
aroused among all classes of citizens was the cause of his cap- 
ture and downfall. Of course in one sense it was a cause, be- 
cause if he had been great and wise surely all this would not 
have happened. But weakness in a king at that period (say 



ENGLAND 217 

between the tenth and seventeenth centuries) usually did not 
find itself followed by a like result. Let one pick out the 
rulers of that age who most resembled Henry III and see how 
many instances one can find where popular liberty advanced. 
As examples of incompetent sovereigns under whom constitu- 
tional advance should have taken place but did not, I will 
cite Robert II, Philip III, and Louis X of France ; Ferdinand 
IV, John I, and John II of Castile ; Ramiro II and Alfonso IV 
of Aragon ; Alfonso V of Portugal ; James III of Scotland ; 
Christopher III and Christian I of Denmark ; Feodor I of 
Russia, and George William of Prussia. Besides these, one 
can point to Edward II and Henry VI of England. Against 
these sixteen instances of failure on the part of nobles (or the 
people) to exact constitutional advance, I can find but three 
instances outside of England where a growth took place some- 
what like that under Henry III. Under Louis VII of France 
that concessions were granted to townspeople and to the lower 
classes. Under Robert III of Scotland, in spite of the general 
lawlessness, parliament is to be accredited with the passage of 
certain new statutes favourable to the masses. And under 
Mary of the Netherlands the people were able to gain their 
important "Great Privilege" of 1477. All this shows that 
the really significant and peculiar cause for the successful 
and valuable features of the reign of Henry III lies somewhere 
not far from the character of Simon de Montfort or others 
closely associated with him and high up on the social ladder. 
That it was not due to the temper of the English people as a 
whole is at least disputed if not disproved by the long parlia- 
mentary lethargy from Henry VI's reign onward, lasting as it 
did nearly two centuries. 

Edward I, who already came to the front as a national hero, 
in his father's lifetime, saved the royal party, and did much to 
restore the nation to tranquillity, though he was still a mere 
youth of twenty-five or six. He did not disappoint his early 
promise, but developed into one of the greatest kings England 
has ever had. The many economic and political influences of 



218 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

Edward I are always freely recognized by English historians. 
It is only necessary to consult the most easily accessible ac- 
counts, to see that authors writing without any generalized 
theory of genius and its influence do not fail to appreciate the 
special significance of King Edward I. Let me merely quote 
some paragraphs written by Professor C. W. C. Oman in the 
article on "EngHsh History" in the new Encyclopaedia Bri- 
tannica : — 

"Edward I was a remarkable figure, by far the ablest of all 
the kings of the house of Plantagenet. He understood the 
problem that was before him, the construction of a working 
constitution from the old ancestral customs of the English 
monarchy plus the newer ideas which had been embodied in the 
Great Charter, the Provisions of Oxford, and the scanty legis- 
lation of Simon de Montfort. Edward loved royal power, but 
he was wise in his generation and saw that he could best secure 
the loyalty of his subjects by assenting to so many of the new 
constitutional restraints as were compatible with his own prac- 
tical control of the policy of the realm. He was prepared to 
refer all important subjects to his parliament, and (as we shall 
see) he improved the shape of that body by introducing into 
it the borough members who had appeared for the first time in 
Montfort 's assembly of 1265. He would have liked to make 
parliament, no doubt, a mere meeting for the voting of taxa- 
tion with the smallest possible friction. But he fully re- 
alized that this dream was impossible and was wise enough 
to give way whenever opposition grew too strong and bitter. 
He had not fought through the civil wars of 1263-1266 with- 
out learning his lesson. There was a point beyond which 
it was unwise to provoke the baronage or the commons, and, 
unhke his flighty and thriftless father, he knew where that 
point came. The constitutional quarrels of his reign were 
conducted with decency and order, because the king knew his 
own limitations, and because his subjects trusted to his wisdom 
and moderation in times of crisis. 

" Edward indeed was a man worthy of respect, if not of affection. 



ENGLAND 219 

His private life was grave and seemly, his court did not sin by 
luxury or extravagance. His chosen ministers were wise and 
experienced officials, whom no man could call favourites or accuse 
of maladministration. He was sincerely religious, self-re- 
strained and courteous, though occasionally, under provocation, 
he could burst out into a royal rage. He was a good master 
and a firm friend. Moreover, he had a genuine regard for the 
sanctity of a promise, the one thing in which his father had been 
most wanting. It is true that sometimes he kept his oaths or 
carried out his pledges with the literal punctuality of a lawyer, 
rather than with a chivalrous generosity of a knight. But at 
any rate he always endeavoured to discharge an obligation, even 
if he sometimes interpreted it by the strict letter of the law and 
not with liberality. A conscientious man according to his 
lights, he took as his device the motto Pactum serva, 'keep 
troth,' which was afterwards inscribed on his tomb, and did 
his best to live up to it. Naturally he expected the same ac- 
curacy from other men, and when he did not meet it he could 
be harsh and unrelenting in the punishment that he inflicted. 

" To sum up his character it must be added that he was a very 
great soldier. The headlong courage which he showed at 
Lewes, his first battle, was soon tempered by caution, and al- 
ready in 1265 he had shown that he could plan a campaign with 
skill. In his later military career he was the first general who 
showed on a large scale how the national EngUsh weapon, the 
bow, could win fights when properly combined with the charge 
of the mailed cavalry. He inaugurated the tactics by which 
his grandson and great-grandson were to win epoch-making 
victories abroad. . . . 

"Despite the chequered fortunes of his later years, the reign 
of Edward had been a time of progress and prosperity for Eng- 
land. He had given his realm good and strong governance; 
according to his lights he had striven to keep faith and to ob- 
serve his coronation oath. He had on more than one occasion 
quarrelled with his subjects, but matters had never been pushed 
to an open rupture. The king knew how to yield, and even 



220 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

opponents like Winchelsea and the earls of Norfolk and Here- 
ford respected him too much to drive him to an extremity. 
The nation, however much it might murmur, would never have 
been willing to rebel against a sovereign whose only fault was 
that he occasionally pressed his prerogative too far. Edward's 
rule was never oppressive ; the seizure of the merchant's wool 
in 1297 was the only one of his acts which really caused fierce 
and widespread indignation. For his other arbitrary proceed- 
ings he had some show of legal justification in every case. It 
would have been absurd to declare that his rule was tyrannical 
or his policy disastrous. The realm was on the whole contented 
and even flourishing. Population was steadily increasing, and 
with it commerce ; the intellectual activity which had marked 
the reign of Henry HI was still alive ; architecture, religious and 
military, was in its prime. He was himself a great builder, and 
many of the perfected castles of that concentric style which 
later ages have called the 'Edwardian type,' were of his own 
planning. In ecclesiastical architecture his reign represents 
the early flower of the ' Decorated ' order, perhaps the most 
beautiful of all the developments of English art. In many 
respects the reign may be regarded as the culmination and 
crowning point of the middle ages. It certainly gave a promise 
of greatness and steady progress which the fourteenth century 
was far from justifying. 

"With the great king's death a sudden change for the worse 
was at once visible. The individual character of the king was 
still the main factor in political history, and Edward II was 
in every respect a contrast to his father. He was incorrigibly 
frivolous, idle, and apathetic ; his father had given him much 
stern schooling, but this seems only to have inspired him with 
a deeply rooted dislike for official work of any kind. He has 
been well described as 'the first king since the Conquest who 
was not a man of business.' Even Stephen and Henry III had 
been active and bustling princes, though their actions were 
misguided and inconsequent. But Edward II hated all kingly 
duties ; he detested war, but he detested even more the routine 



ENGLAND 221 

work of administration. He was most at his ease in low com- 
pany, his favourite diversion was gambling, his best trait a love 
for farming and the mechanical arts of the smith and the 
gardener." 

The reign of Edward II in England is almost identical in its 
lawlessness, its misery, and its hopelessness with typical weak 
periods so frequent in other parts of Europe. There were no 
great and patriotic leaders in England at just that time. The 
prominent men, Gaveston, Thomas of Lancaster, Pembroke, the 
Mowbrays, the Despensers, were all lacking in capacity or 
character. Mere partisans in spirit, they wasted their own and 
the nation's opportunity in quarrels among themselves. This 
lack of leadership offers a suitable and satisfactory explanation 
why the reign of Edward II presents fewer favourable aspects 
than the reigns of Henry III or of John. No one seemed great 
enough to command the concerted action of parliament or 
harmonize the rival factions. During the whole period of 
twenty years there is but one progressive action to record. In 
1322 the parliament which met at York gained the important 
constitutional advance that from that time onward no statute 
should be technically vahd unless the consent of the commons 
had been obtained. In this way alone did the reign of Edward 
II differ from any other age of anarchy ; and it is worthy of 
comment that even in such a blind and leaderless period as 
this, some success was gained, slight though it be, along a line 
for which England has been most famous. 

The minority of Edward III (1327-1330) shows little change 
either for the better or the worse. The government was the- 
oretically in the hands of a Council of State ; practically, the 
queen and Mortimer exercised complete authority, but not to 
the credit of themselves or the nation which allowed the dis- 
graceful pair to control its destinies. England, with all her 
spirit of freedom, her parliament, and her Council of State, 
unable to save herself from a wretched decay that had been 
eating into every portion of her being for more than twenty 
years, at last found a deliverer in a boy of eighteen. Exagger- 



222 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

ated as this may sound, it is no more than a recital of the facts 
of history. The date of the birth of an individual is no more 
clearly fixed than the date of the rebirth of England, on the 
night when the boy king, Edward III, secretly entered Notting- 
ham Castle by the subterranean passage, took Mortimer pris- 
oner, declared himself free from all guardianship, and com- 
menced his work of restoring order. The period of Edward 
III (1330-1377) is one of the longest and most important in 
English history. In some ways it was very progressive, in 
others not so much so, but in most ways an expression and out- 
growth of the king's own forceful, magnetic, but half-quixotic 
personality. Edward III was not so great a man as his grand- 
father, Edward I, not so broad and deep, but no one typifies 
better than he the real chivalry of the fourteenth century, — 
knighthood without the veil of virtues read in by poets old and 
new. In all the clash of arms and brilliant fetes, the Enghsh 
king outrivals all his contemporaries. The marvel of his age, 
the central figure, admired and even beloved by his subjects 
who willingly followed him in foreign wars. Edward himself 
liked to fight. This was enough, all others must rally to his 
standard. He knew how to blind the common eye in a blaze 
of glory or the "light that beats about a throne." And until 
he grew too old he was very successful. One thing is certain, 
England began to prosper again as in the days of Edward I. 
The restoration of order, giving of wise laws, the victories of 
Halidon Hill and Crecy were especially the result of the king's 
activities. Even in a very general way, the reign taken in its 
entirety seems as much an expression of Edward's own nature 
as do many reigns in other countries where the wilful and able, 
warlike and extravagant type of ruler brings victory to his 
country, stimulates economic fife, wastes much of the public 
treasure, and perhaps overburdens the people by taxation.^ 



1 The following sovereigns most resemble Edward III in being brilliant, 
energetic and warlike, magnificent in their tastes and not over-virtuous : 
Henry IV and Louis XIV of France, the Emperor Charles V, Alfonso the 
Battler, James the Conqueror, James the Justice, and Peter the Great of 



ENGLAND 223 

For a few years before the death of Edward III the condi- 
tions in England had been far from satisfactory. Disasters 
abroad and domestic strife at home, with the work of the Black 
Death still unredeemed, the nation had to face exceptional 
difficulties when Richard II came to the throne, at that time 
but ten years of age. The Council which had been appointed 
to govern the country was not equal to the task. A great social 
uprising, partly political and partly economic, forms the most 
notable feature of the regency of Richard II ; in addition to 
which, defeat after defeat met the English army abroad. The 
channel fleet, which in the early part of Edward's reign had won 
the important victory of Sluys, was now no more ; and the 
French actually invaded Sussex and burned Rye and Hastings. 
The whole period (1377-1399) presents scarcely a single meri- 
torious feature. Parliament, though it accompHshed nothing 
in the way of bringing about coordination of rival interests, 
and hence a better practical administration, did gain something 
for its own internal development. 

One picturesque happening, the turn in the tide of the peas- 
ants' uprising at the time Wat Tyler was killed, was directly 
brought about by the bravery and initiative of the boy king 
himself. He was then less than fifteen years old. The mob 
at Smithfield had lost their leader and were about to draw their 
bows, shouting, ''Kill, they have slain our captain." "What 
need ye, my masters," cried the boy as he calmly cantered up 
and met them. "I am your captain and your king, follow me." 

It seems probable that if Richard II had developed the char- 
acter which this event foreshadowed, many of the evils and mis- 
fortunes of his reign would have been avoided. He did indeed 
show bravery and insight on many occasions, but his conduct 
was extremely undependable. He was nervous, fitful, head- 

Aragon, John I of Portugal, James V of Scotland, Philip the Good of Burgundy 
and the Netherlands, Maximilian I of Austria, and Leopold who died in 
1386, Charles X of Sweden, Suleiman the Magnificent of Turkey, and perhaps 
most of all Albert Achilles of Brandenburg. There are naturallypoints of differ- 
ence but the general type is much the same, and the influences which they 
appear to have exerted have much in common. 



224 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

strong, easily elated, or depressed. ''A creature of moods, and 
the moods always visited him at the wrong time. If he had not 
been thoughtless, arrogant and overbearing in 1398 he might 
have reigned for many a year. . . . Richard cannot be called 
cruel, nor was he a notorious liver, nor a thoughtless weakling. 
Nevertheless he fooled away the crown which kings intellectu- 
ually as well as morally his inferiors preserved to their death- 
day. . . . No sovereign was ever more entirely the author of 
his own destruction." ^ 

The reign of Richard IPs rival, Henry IV, was one of great 
confusion, ill-defined in its direction, filled uith civil wars, 
blights of nature, famine, and plague. Extreme poverty more 
than anything else characterizes the worst feature of this four- 
teen-year period, while diplomatic successes and the sturdy 
and praiseworthy behaviour of parliament must be reckoned 
on the side of progress. "We have no evidence of any wise 
counsellors on whom he could rely, and we are led to infer that, 
as he headed his campaigns in person, so he directed the coun- 
cils of the country without reference to any will but his own." ^ 

Henry IV is not reckoned among the great, but was at least 
a man of many excellent virtues, and on the score of energy 
must be placed in the first rank. He was brave in battle though 
cautious in politics. Few speak directly of his ability. In the 
words of J. R. Green: "The mere maintenance of his power 
through the troubled years of his reign is the best proof of the 
king's ability." By far the most singular and this far the most 
interesting phenomenon is the strength and action of parlia- 
ment, especially as no eminent personalities emerge above the 
average nobleman or knight of the shire. "Never before and 
never again for more than two hundred years were the commons 
so strong as they were under Henry IV, and in spite of the dy- 
nastic question the nation itself was strong in the determined 
action of the parliament. All the intelligent knowledge of the 
needs of the nation, all the real belief in the king's title, is centred 

1 Wylie, "History of England under Henry IV," vol. iv, p. 151. 

2 W ylie. 



ENGLAND 225 

in the knights of the shire ; there is much treason outside, but 
none within the walls of the House of Commons." ^ 

Henry V, the much admired hero of Agincourt, doubtless 
influenced history greatly, but the value of his conquests across 
the channel can hardly be thought to outweigh the national 
exhaustion which the long wars brought to England or the 
mischievous consequences flowing from the now continuous 
policy of pretension to the throne of France. It was a genea- 
logical and personal claim. It would seem that Henry sincerely 
believed that in forcing that claim he did only what was right. 
However that may be, all the chief events and important 
changes, both for good and evil, sprang from the activities and 
interests of the king. Parliament and ministers sank into the 
background. At the time he mounted the throne, restoration 
of domestic peace was the most pressing need ; and the accom- 
plishment of the same is unstintingly credited to the firmness 
and prudence of Henry. He it was who first realized the im- 
portance of the British navy, and is generally regarded as its 
true founder. He took a very adroit position in relation to the 
schism in the Church, and shares with the Emperor Sigismund 
the credit of bringing this long quarrel to an end in the election 
of Pope Martin V. Diplomatic success, the restoration of 
internal peace, the glory of external conquest, the wasting of 
men and money, which are the four cardinal points in express- 
ing in rough form Henry V's era, seem well enough to be the 
handiwork of the regal craftsman, the natural expression of a 
character quite clearly defined and described by all historians 
in much the same way. ''A brilliant soldier, a sound diploma- 
tist, an able organizer, a consolidator of all forces at his command. 
A typical mediaeval hero." 2 "One of the greatest of warriors 
and statesmen." ^ "As a general he far surpassed all of his 
own time. As a diplomatist he was able, firm but conciliatory, 
and even in the midst of his busy warfare found time to form 

' Stubbs, "Constitutional History," vol. iii, p. 72. 

* Stubbs, vol. iii, p. 75. 

» Freeman, writing in the Encyclopsedia Britannica. 



226 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

and maintain a system of alliances which included almost all 
the states of Western Europe, of which he was himself the centre. 
In work of civil administration he was less engaged, though in 
England he healed the animosities which had distracted the 
previous reigns." ^ 

Oman admires the moral character of Henry V somewhat 
less, but does not depreciate his intellectual caliber except to 
call his religious and diplomatic policy narrow. "Chaste, 
abstemious, patient, courteous, a good master and a faithful 
friend . . . hard and narrow. ... In politics he saw clearly 
what was profitable to his dynasty, and sought that end un- 
swervingly, unconscious apparently that a Christian king has 
any duty towards his neighbours. . . . He commands our 
intellectual respect but no one can call him sympathetic or a 
love- worthy character." 

The minority of Henry VI (1422-1444) presents a picture 
rather different from any other minority. Gloucester, the 
king's uncle, was regent in theory, but all extra powers were 
taken away from him by the Council of State. Gloucester was 
fairly able, but self-seeking and unpatriotic ; his influence was 
always in some pernicious direction. Bedford, the other uncle, 
was the big figure of the time, a fine character in every way. 
He was chiefly employed in carrying forward the war in France, 
which failed disastrously, seeminglj'^ through no fault of his own. 
It may have been typically one of those occasions when men find 
themselves helpless in the storms of fate ; or shall we attribute 
the unusual outcome to one unusual and astonishing happening, 
— the advent upon the scene of the Maid of Orleans ? What- 
ever view we may take of this historical episode, the scene re- 
mains unparalleled and at best not well understood. The whole 
minority of Henry VI was inauspicious in the extreme. No 
good progress of any consequence can be cited. The entire 
nation seems under a cloud. Parliament acting as an oligarchy 
did nothing creditable, and even lost ground. Restriction of 
the right of franchise under the statue of 1429 made the commons 

> Kingsford, writing in the "Dictionary of National Biography." 



ENGLAND 227 

less truly representative of the will of the middle-class free- 
holders and burghers. This disastrous period (1422-1444) 
does not reflect the influences of royalty in a straightforward 
way, since both Bedford and Beaufort (the latter a son of John 
of Gaunt) were able and patriotic princes ; yet the personal 
element is not lacking. Probably no one would contend that 
these events could be understood apart from the behaviour of 
the various princes, most important of all being Humphrey 
of Gloucester, whose role was to thwart continually the more 
noble aims of the others. Bedford did well in his early cam- 
paigns abroad. It was the evil machinations of the Duke of 
Gloucester more than anything else which prevented the suc- 
cessful continuation of the war, — at least from the standpoint 
of the English offence. 

Looking on the other side of the conflict, on the question of 
French defence and French attack, Joan of Arc completely 
turned the scales. France was in utter despair by the year 
1429, just before Joan of Arc appeared on the scene. Then 
Philip of Burgundy went over to the winning party. It was 
not until 1435, the date of Bedford's death, that the English 
cause was hopelessly lost by this transference of allegiance on 
the part of Philip from the English to the French side. Paris 
was abandoned the following spring. The Burgundian alliance, 
which weighed so heavily in the political scales after they had 
turned in France's favour, was clearly enough a "royal influence." 
Philip le Bon of Burgundy, a self-willed person if ever there was 
one, made every decision an expression of his own desires ; and 
furthermore, no monarch in Europe was more powerful and able 
to carry out his every wish. Philip had very nearly bolted from 
the English cause at the time the same self-seeking Humphrey 
attempted to gain the inheritance of Hainault and Holland by 
marrying Philip's cousin, the countess Jacqueline. It was Bed- 
ford's tact that soothed the quarrel, and as long as he lived this 
stout old patriot was the mainstay of his party. 

Thus the scenic changes of this more than usually confused 
minority are very much a matter of entrances and exits of the 



228 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

principal characters, — Bedford, Philip le Bon, Gloucester, 
Beaufort, and Joan of Arc. Other more general causes like the 
essentially strained and impossible nature of the struggle ought 
to be considered, but such would transgress the Hmits of method 
set for the thesis in hand. This period is very complex. The 
most that one can say is that the personal element is present, 
but is not so easy as usual to demonstrate. It is masked by 
counter-currents, most of which seem the result of the perverse 
agitations of the Duke of Gloucester. 

The actual reign of Henry VI was in reality little more than 
a protracted minority owing to the extreme weakness of the 
king. Henry was not an imbecile but in his relations to his- 
torical events he might as well have been one. Politically he 
amounts to almost nothing. His moral character was good, 
indeed exceptionally so from every standpoint, and his interests 
in education show that he was no fool. The foundations at 
Eton and King's College, Cambridge, were the results of genuine 
royal initiative. But his inability to judge men, his utter 
rehance on others, and his disinclination for the business of 
government and the burden of kingship make his position in 
the intellectual grade-scale of kings a low one. At one time, 
for a year or so, his mind entirely gave way, and he was declared 
legally insane, which malady was in all probability an inheritance 
from his grandfather, Charles VI of France. 

Henry VI is a character worth thinking about. Here is a 
king who, according to all accounts and in all liberality, can- 
not be graded among kings or among male royalty without at 
least from 70 to 90 per cent of all tabulated persons being given 
precedence over him for intellectual rating. He would most 
probably be placed in grade (3) among the groups collected for 
"Mental and Moral Heredity in Royalty," possibly in (4) or 
(2) but not above (4). 1 If he were placed in (4) there would 
be 70 per cent above him. If he were placed in (2) there 
would be 92 per cent superior. 

The position which Henry VI occupies among actual kings is 

"See pages 19-22 of "Mental and Moral Heredity in Royalty." 1906. 



ENGLAND 229 

necessarily even a little worse than this, because the average 
standard or mean of the kings is higher than the mean of all 
royalty in the widest sense, as when kings, princes, and dukes 
of small countries are massed together as they are in the fre- 
quency table on page 19 of "Mental and Moral Heredity in 
Royalty." 

If Henry VI were a very intellectual sovereign from the purely 
theoretical or hterary standpoint, and at the same time lacked 
practical business qualities, like Alfonso X of Castile for in- 
stance, it would be difficult to offset one kind of gift against the 
other ; but there is nothing to show that Henry VI was more 
than an educated man, interested in furthering the cause of 
education. 

"Lacking resolution and without knowledge of men, he was 
always under the influence of a stronger mind, and though sus- 
picious, liable to be deceived. In the latter part of his reign 
he was the puppet of every faction ; the kingdom drifted into 
anarchy and his mind broke down beneath his troubles. Yet 
Henry was no dullard. Hall is probably right in describing 
him as neither a fool nor very wise. But although he recognized 
his position as a constitutional sovereign and had some sound 
political views, his heart was never in business. He was well- 
educated. His life was that of a scholar and pious recluse. His 
piety was no mere form and he was devoted to his family." ^ 
"He ought to have been a monk or a schoolmaster." ^ 

Except for the period of insanity, the intellectual caliber of 
Henry VI seems fully equal to that of the average monk or 
schoolmaster of his day, equal or above the average of all Eng- 
lishmen of that time. Yet when judged side by side with roy- 
alty, he belongs only in a grade somewhere from ten to thirty 
in a scale of one hundred. Comparisons hke this confirm the 
belief that royalty as a whole is much above the average in 
natural capacity.^ The reign of Henry VI {cir. 1442-1461) 

1 ij. p Tout, "Dictionary of National Biography." 
'Oman, "Political History of England," iv, 336. 
» See p. 257 of Chapter XVII. 



230 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

presents no good features that can be recalled. Also there were 
no great statesmen. Suffolk, Somerset, Warwick, Edmund 
Beaufort, York, and Margaret of Anjou were not more than 
politicians or partisans. The history of England at this point 
is just as disgraceful and no more so than the numerous accounts 
of demoralized national life found in other countries when 
strong leadership happened to be absent. 

Edward IV, who defeated the incompetent Lancastrians, and 
therefore deserves some credit, is not an easy king to grade for 
intellectual merit. His pecuUar trait was spasmodic energy, 
his cerebral functioning a patchwork of light and dark. Great 
gifts as a soldier and all the wily astuteness of a successful 
diplomat, all the briUiant and popular quahtics, eloquence, wit, 
good-humour, and pleasing maimers were counterbalanced by 
periods of extreme lethargy, sensuousness, laziness, and utter in- 
difference to anything save gadding about and having a good 
time. Edward IV was a very bright man. He was a better gen- 
eral than Warwick. The medium grade in which he, perforce, is 
placed, since for much of the time spasmodically his intellectual 
activities were much below the average, fails to give a true view. 
At any rate it makes little difference. The good events of the 
period were probably not much the direct outcome of the per- 
sonality of Edward IV. The gains are chiefly on the economic 
side, — a discernible beginning of manufacture, comparative 
prosperity among the peasantry, and great activity in the con- 
struction of costly buildings, such as new and improved types 
of manor-houses, and the large churches in the perpendicular 
style. Apart from the widespread moral decay (in spite of 
the churches) , which does not come under the scope of the present 
research, as I have not attempted to study intellectual and 
spiritual progress, the worst feature appears to be constitutional, 
— a decline in the power of parliament. The Wars of the Roses 
make a complex story, especially if causes be sought. They do 
not appear to have much affected the prosperity of the middle 
and low^er classes, and the cities were almost entirely removed 
from the theatre of w'ar. 



ENGLAND 231 

Richard III reigned such a short time (1483-1485) that im- 
portant internal or economic changes are scarcely worth notic- 
ing. His only parliament of 1484 passed one great law re- 
straining a special abuse of royal power. 

Richard's successful rival, the first of the Tudor dynasty, a 
cool, sly, cautious, hard-working king, stamped his impress on 
the reign in the most unmistakable manner. Henry VII was 
served by able ministers, Morton, Foxe, etc., but it is not 
thought that they were ever more than lieutenants placed in 
power to carry out a perfectly definite and continuous royal 
policy, and one for which England on the whole had much to be 
thankful. The suppression of disorder, the elimination of 
Lancastrian and Yorkist pretenders, the reburnishing of the 
crown, gave a problem of more than usual difficulty at the com- 
mencement of the reign, and it was not until the reign was half 
over that the new monarch found himself secure. The last 
part of Henry VII's reign was very prosperous. A patient, if 
tortuous, non-belligerent diplomacy secured peace for England 
between the balanced rivalries of France and the Hapsburgs, 
and even earned some subsidies. Most important were the 
commercial treaties which Henry made with Flanders, Scan- 
dinavia, Denmark, and Venice. The growth of commerce is 
the most distinctive economic aspect of the time. The navy 
also took on some small development. Finances were so well 
managed that the national coffers fairly burst with the plethora 
of coin hoarded by the monarch, an avaricious old fox, an ex- 
tortionist and despot perhaps, but none the less a benefactor to 
his country, an undisputed master of a new nation now well 
ordered and disciplined and on the highroad to prosperity. 

This impetus continued under Henry VIII (1509-1547) and 
England became a greater power than ever before, both in 
native strength and continental influence. Almost every eco- 
nomic and poUtical aspect is "plus" in its trend. The suppres- 
sion of the monasteries, it is true, caused individual suffering. 
Educational advance was thereby injured, and its spiritual 
effects would be hard to weigh ; but economically this change 



232 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

was of advantage to agriculture and to the public revenues. 
Wool-gro\\ing increased especially. The general commercial 
prosperity found a parallel in the far greater importance of 
England as a sea power with reliance on the navy. The greater 
influence over Ireland and incorporation of Wales were part of 
the larger political role which Henry, though always actuated 
by the most selfish and insatiable ambitions, left as heritage to 
his nation. Henry VIH was guided in his decisions very httle, 
by opinions or wishes other than his own. There is no proof 
that any of his ministers or subordinates ever overrode him. 
In the early part of the reign, before the king was, say, twenty- 
three years old, and took interest only in hunting and in sports, 
Richard Fox and Wareham, and afterwards Wolsey, controlled 
the government, but after that Henry grew to be more and more 
his owTi master. It is significant that the period when Henry 
and Wolsey worked together (1514-1529) was not crowned by 
diplomatic successes. Nor was Thomas Cromwell ever any- 
thing more than a very eflicient agent in carrying out policies 
originating in the mind of the king. "Henry's unique position 
among English kings is owing to the extraordinary degree of 
personal weight that he was able to throw into the government 
of the realm. Strictly speaking he was not an unconstitutional 
sovereign ; all his doings were clothed vnth the form of legality. 
But the whole machinery of state, both legislative and executive 
moved simply in accordance with his pleasure, and however 
unpopular might be his government at home or his policy abroad, 
no one could venture to impugn his acts or could doubt his 
consummate statesmanship." ^ 

"The increase of English influence abroad during this reign 
was in fact due rather to the personal qualities of the king and 
to the skilful use which he made of European complications than 
to the number or excellence of the troops at his command." ^ 

"He worked for the good of the state because he thought his 
interests were bound up with those of the nation, and it was the 

> J. Gairdner in "Dictionary of National Biography." 
* "Cambridge Modern History," ii, 473. 



ENGLAND 233 

real coincidence of this private and public point of view that 
made it possible for so selfish a man to achieve so much for his 
country." ^ 

The reign of his successor gives another proof of the personal 
weight of Henry VIII in the poUtical and economic disruption 
which followed his death. " England altogether fell from the 
great European position which she held imder Henry." ^ Agra- 
rian discontents, financial exhaustion, and political mistakes 
are the chief features which mark the minority of Edward VI. 
"It is clear that England must soon have risen against the 
misrule of the Protectorate if the Protectorate had not fallen 
by the intestine divisions of the plunderers themselves." ^ 
England also declined during the reign of Mary (1553-1558). 
"Never had the fortunes of England sunk to a lower ebb than 
at the moment when Elizabeth mounted the throne. The 
country was humiliated by defeat and brought to the verge of 
rebelhon by the bloodshed and misgovernment of Mary's reign. 
. . . France, mistress of Calais, became mistress of the Channel, 
. . . Scotland a standing danger in the north. ... In the 
presence of this host of dangers the country lay helpless without 
an army or fleet, or the means of manning one, for the treasury, 
already drained by the waste of Edward's reign, had been ut- 
terly exhausted by Mary's restoration of the Church lands in 
possession of the Crown and by the cost of her war with France." '* 

Mary was herself an inefficient ruler, though she did not lack 
mentality. On the contrary, her precociousness as a child was 
remarkable, but the high spirit, courage, and mental activity 
could not make headway against a pathological constitution, 
and growing bodily infirmities became accompanied by a dis- 
ordered mind. The infamous persecutions of her reign have 
gained her the name of Bloody Queen Mary, though quite 
unjustly, for the troubles, religious as well as political, lay in a 
too great reliance on others ; her own nature would have shrunk 
from barbarities in every form. Mary, though not dull, lacked 

' A. F. Pollard, article Henry VIII, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th edition. 
» E. A. Freeman. ^ j. r. Green. * Green, pp. 731, 732. 



234 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

judgment. Her reign was certainly a period of decline. What- 
ever one may think of the general causes responsible for the 
state of England during the years 1553-1558, the point remains 
incontestable that even as late as the sixteenth century and in 
England, a wretched and deplorable reign is to be found which 
seems to reflect the lack of royal leadership. Mary's reign and 
the reign of Edward VI point back to the first two Tudor periods, 
and indicate by their contrast the reality of the greatness of 
the work of Henry VII and Henry VIII. Mary's reign is also 
interesting as the last in English history during which decline 
outweighs advance. 

Elizabeth had far more influence than her elder sister over 
the affairs of her nation. Without pretending to estimate 
minutely the part she played in an age made glorious by so 
man}' forms of activity, one can at least remark that her era 
presents the parallelism and identity of sovereign and politico- 
economic variation, the listing and counting of which is the 
chief burden of this thesis. 

It would seem unwise to hazard an opinion as to whether 
England would or would not have progressed at this time under 
a weak monarch. It is, however, no assumption but rather a 
conclusion, both from intensive study of the reign itself and 
from the generalization concerning strong monarchs, that the 
personal impetus from Elizabeth herself added to the national 
momentum. The personal influence of the ruler is much more 
difficult to quantitate here than in most history, and is inter- 
woven with a -widespread evolution of the entire English 
race. 

From James I to George III (1603-1811) no great sovereign, 
with the exception of William III, sat upon the throne of Eng- 
land, yet not a single reign-period can be adjudged other than 
progressive. The royal factor becomes so reduced that it is 
sufficient to pass very rapidly over this entire era. The main 
requirement is to point out that it is an age of non-royal growth 
and is moreover very long in duration, and, comparatively 
speaking, very early in the date of its beginning. Nothing is 



ENGLAND 235 

comparable to it in European history except the same age in 
Scotland. 

The first two Stuarts cannot be thought to have contributed 
much to England's progress, yet theirs was a time of great 
commercial activity, of voyages and discoveries, of conquests 
abroad, and a new Ufe within the British Isles. It was particu- 
larly an era of colonial expansion, growth in manufactures, 
increase in population and in wealth, improvement in agricul- 
ture and activity in building, — essentially an economic pros- 
perity. The condition of the lower classes remained perhaps 
the same, the civil wars naturally brought much distress, but 
the success of the popular cause, and above all the stanch and 
determined resistance of parliament against the impositions of 
tyranny make the reigns of James I and Charles I of important 
moment in pohtical growth. It is only in diplomatic work and 
in the bellicose potentialities on which diplomacy leans that 
weakness looms in the balance. 

Cromwell's personality overcame these conditions. The navy 
became vastly improved, and England could be again aggressive. 
The period of the Commonwealth was, both politically and 
economically, a glorious one. If Cromwell was not a king, and 
so properly has ho place in this study, there is this to be said, 
that he behaved like a king, and his single authority became 
supreme. He was, all in all, the same as many founders of royal 
dynasties, and if his son Richard had been made of the stuff of 
his father, perhaps a Cromwellian line might have come to the 
throne of England. The birth and public appearance of men 
Uke Cromwell from the ranks of the commoners gives the 
philosophically inclined one kind of measurement of a nation's 
power of development independent of royal leadership, — a 
phenomenon, as I have often remarked, rare for long periods of 
time in many parts of Europe. 

Charles II was of little use to his country, yet his reign was 
marked by most important constitutional advance. The gov- 
ernment was utterly incapable and its foreign policy shameful, 
yet the House of Commons marched forward as never before. 



236 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

It was a wonderfully broad movement and, comparatively 
speaking, uninitiated by any very famous statesman. Agricul- 
tural conditions and the wool trade were not so progressive, 
but a trade in silk grew to respectable dimensions. Commer- 
cial and financial interests made continued strides. Much the 
same may be said of James II and his reign. At the close of 
the struggle between parliament and the crown it became 
settled that England was ever afterwards to be ruled by a 
constitutional king. Yet it cannot be asserted that the good 
government which England afterwards enjoyed, came about 
because of this legal development and long training in the art 
of self-government. The having of many voices representative 
of the entire nation can scarcely suffice to explain why the 
Anglo-Saxon has ever been an outrider in the march of modern 
democracy and the preceptor of popular hberty. The causes 
must lie deeper than this. For if early training in representative 
government were a cause worthy of being spoken of as the cause, 
it ought to find a general support in the relations of constitu- 
tionalism to successful government in other parts of the world, 
a question which I have discussed at the close of the chapter on 
Spain. 

Thus William III came to the throne as a constitutional king. 
He was the last English king to whom one applies the mystic 
word genius. Whatever his shortcomings may have been, and 
they were frankly numerous, there is something in the majesty 
of William III, in the breadth of his grasp, in the unconquerable 
heroism of his nature, and insight into the destiny of nations, 
gifts of leadership and of prophecy, that make the frail little 
eagle-beaked figure irresistible. The impression in the end 
is always the same, that it was WilHam III who held Europe 
together in the struggle which delimited the greed of Louis XIV 
and the overgrowth of France. William III was one of the 
greatest diplomats of modern times. Here his influence is 
undoubted ; but much of the successful side of this reign, the 
naval victories, progress, — legislative, financial, industrial, and 
commercial; — can scarcely be credited to the king. 



ENGLAND 237 

England continued to expand under Queen Anne, a sovereign 
of the dullest type. The foreign policy and continental wars 
were brilhantly successful. Blenheim Oudenarde and Malpla- 
quet brought both profit and inspiration. By the Peace of 
Utrecht the objects at which England had aimed at the outset 
of the war were attained. Her trading interests were secured 
and extended ; she obtained Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and 
Hudson's Bay Territory in America, and Gibraltar and Minorca 
in Europe. France was humbled and England's future was 
laid bare. The great man of the hour, Marlborough, must 
receive at least a mention, though no pretence be made to 
estimate the personal note. 

So under the Georges, throughout the eighteenth century, 
the advance continued, slow at first, faster as it grew, cumula- 
tive, and, on the whole, unprecedented both in length of time and 
magnitude. The twenty years of peace from 1719 to 1739 
were utilized by the people in a development, material and 
mundane, it must be confessed, yet it was this economic strength 
which aided the greater political expansion and militant re- 
nown, "The Empire on which the sun never sets." The 
closing quarter of the eighteenth century saw in England the 
greatest activity of industrial forces that had ever been wit- 
nessed in the history of the world. Notable progress in agri- 
culture followed the new science of cultivation, the rotation of 
crops. Cattle breeding became important as the science of 
that art brought greater results. It was the beginning of the 
age of iron and of coal. The flying shuttle, the jenny, the mule, 
and the steam-engine gave England a pioneer leadership in that 
form of evolutionary civilization which was so particularly to 
characterize the nineteenth century. Great statesmen and great 
scientists there were in plenty, but the Hanoverian kings sink 
into nothingness, so great is the country and so little are they, 
soulless and uninspiring, scarcely emerging at all into the really 
interesting happenings of the time or aiding in the great con- 
structive efforts. George III was scarcely the nonentity that he 
has been sometimes pictured ; for his portraits, more than those 



238 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

of most kings, have been darkened and blurred by party prej- 
udice. He was better than the first two of his name, but the 
best we can read of him still leaves us cold and unmoved. 
No, we cannot get more than the feeling that George III was 
a prig, a man great in little things and little in great. The 
names of Walpole, Chatham, Burke, Fox, and Pitt stand in 
the world's Hall of Fame unquestioned. Criticise and dissect 
as we may, the fact remains that there have not been greater 
non-royal statesmen than these. If there have been, then 
who are they? After one or two great statesmen are picked 
from Greece and Rome, and three or four from modern times, 
my point will be proved, for the above five English luminaries 
of the eighteenth century will still be in the first score, and in 
this sense, twenty is a small number.^ The almost synchronous 
appearance of four or five of that never numerous species, the 
great statesman, is a factor to be reckoned with, no matter 
what may be the elements of England's remarkable political 
and economic advance. 

Some of us who believe that, after all, the real differences 
among nations, as among the individuals who compose them, are 
caused by arrangements of chromosomes within the gametes, 
will look upon these great statesmen as born and not made, and 
will also believe that the nation as a whole was much favoured 
by certain forces almost hidden and unsuspected as yet, forces 
inborn in their nature, such as may well be acting all the time 
without easy detection, — differences brought about by natu- 
ral selection, by immigration and emigration, by differences 
in net fertility, sexual selection, the formation and development 
of the caste system, and other eugenic or aristogenic movements 
but little understood. 

1 The general impression which I have followed in writing the above para- 
graph finds an interesting support in the objectively compiled list of eminent men 
published by J. McK. Cattell in Popular Science Monthly, vol. Ixii, p. 363. 
The order here is Burke, Pitt, Fox, Pitt [presumably the younger], and Walpole. 
The first four are, according to this test, evidently worthy of "the high- 
est grade." Burke is number twelve and Pitt (probably Chatham, though the 
author does not state) is number eighteen in the list, even when all nations and 
all forms of human activity are included in the competition. 



ENGLAND 239 

However that may be, my purpose in this chapter has been 
to show that by carefully measuring one single force (namely, 
the royal influence in England) I have been able to establish 
and definitely mark out a difference, a something to be compared 
and contrasted with other European nations. As I have said 
before, the personal influence of the sovereign was very strong 
in England prior to the time of Elizabeth, though there are to 
be found a number of milestones marking the rather spasmodic 
growth of democratic evolution earlier than this, and even 
earlier than John. Those interested in either defending or 
explaining the anti-aristocratic doctrinaire will do well to con- 
centrate upon these peculiar early periods; above all they 
must satisfactorily explain the wonderfully continuous budding 
forth which commenced with the EHzabethan era. But they 
must not fail to take into the reckoning the regal and indi- 
vidual equation, the exposition of which has been alone the 
object of this chapter. 



CHAPTER XVII 

INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS 

Having viewed the undulating waves of economic and politi- 
cal prosperity in detail, it now behooves us to leave the micro- 
scopic method for the macroscopic and to take a broad survey 
of the whole matter. Standing back at a distance, the main 
outlines are still clearly enough visible, — the rise and decline 
of Spain and Portugal, Sweden and Turkey, the cumulative 
but spasmodic growth of France, the early slow, and late accel- 
erating, growth of Prussia and Russia, the evanescent impor- 
tance of the Dutch, the retarded development of Scotland, the 
comparative negativeness of Austria, the unexpanded state of 
Denmark, and the early hesitating but afterwards continuous 
progress of England ; these all present themselves en masse in 
bold relief. And with these variations are the concomitant 
variations in the intellectual strength of the monarchs them- 
selves. Some correlation is evident. How much that correla- 
tion is, becomes the first question. The cause of the correla- 
tion is the second. 

The following table shows numerically the correlations 
(as derived from the tabulation in the Appendix) between the 
three grades for conditions and the three grades for rulers. 
At the bottom are the totals for all countries, and these figures 
are the basis for the general correlation approximately obtained. 
The figure eight in the upper line for France means that there 
were eight cases where the ruler was "plus" at the same time 
that the conditions were ''plus." Next to the right the four 
means that four instances occurred in France when a "plus" 
ruler was associated with medium conditions. There were 
no cases in France when a "plus" ruler was associated with 
"minus" or declining conditons. 

240 



INTERPRETATION OP THE RESULTS 



241 



ElTLEB 



TABLE I 

Conditions 



+ 


± 


— 


8 


4 





1 


2 


1 


3 


2 


16 


+ 


± 





10 


2 








1 











10 


4- 


± 


_ 


10 


3 





2 


1 








1 


4 


+ 


± 


— 


4 


1 


2 


1 





1 


2 





4 









France, 987-1793. 



Castile, 1036-1479. 



Aragon, 1036-1479. 



Spain, 1479-1778. 



242 



THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 



Rl'LEE 



+ 



+ 



TABLE 1— Continued 
Conditions 
+ ± - 



12 





2 


3 


4 


3 


1 


2 


7 


+ 


± 


— 


9 


3 


1 








2 


1 


2 


3 


+ 


± 


— 


5 


1 





3 


5 





2 


1 


2 


+ 


± 


— 


6 


1 


2 





1 


2 


3 


1 


4 









Portugal, 1094-1788. 



Netherlands, 1436-1795. 



Denmark, 1340-1808. 



Sweden, 1525-1792. 



INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS 



243 



TABLE 1— Continued 

Ruler Conditions 

+ ± - 



6 


2 


1 


3 


1 


1 


5 


3 


4 


+ 


± 


— 


4 


1 





3 


4 











2 


+ 


± 


— 


8 


4 


1 


o 


7 


3 





1 


3 


+ 


± 


_ 


9 








1 


1 


1 


2 


4 


10 









Russia, 1462-1801. 



Prussia, 1415-1786. 



Austria, 1276-1792. 



Turkey, 1288-17^ 



244 



THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 



RULEK 



+ 



TABLE I— Continued 
Conditions 

+ ± - 



5 


1 


2 


2 


2 


3 


3 





11 


+ ± - 


8 


4 





1 


2 


2 


2 


1 


7 


+ ± - 


1 








3 


- 








6 








+ ± - 


105 


27 


11 


143 


26 


31 


19 


76 


30 


18 


87 


135 


161 


76 


117 


364 















Scotland, 1306-1626. 



England, 1066-1603. 



England, 1603-1811. 



Totals. 



INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS 245 

All taken together the totals show one hundred and five 
instances of a superior ruler associated with advancing condi- 
tions against eleven associated with decline. The true numbers 
are probably less than eleven and greater than one hundred 
and five, as I have thrown all the doubtful cases (all those 
with two signs) into squares which are least close to repre- 
senting identity. Thus if the ruler were + and the conditions 
(± or — ), it has been counted as one case of ruler "plus," condi- 
tions ''minus," and so for each case on the border line of doubt. 

The figures for each country separately are too small for mathe- 
matical treatment ; but they are not too small for a uniform 
result. With the exception of modern England, all show an 
unmistakable correlation. An idea of this is gained by compar- 
ing the greater weights of the numbers in the upper right and 
lower left hand squares (multiphed together) with those in the 
upper left and lower right (multiplied together). If there 
were no correlation (r = 0), the products would balance each 
other. If the correlations were perfect (r = 1.00), all the 
numbers would fall in the upper left, the centre and the 
lower right squares. The amount of deviation from this 
(r = 1.00) is measurable and, in this research, for the total, is 
about r = .60 to .70 with a probable error of about .05. I 
have not given more than an approximate value to r, but I 
feel secure in placing it at r = .60 for the lowest limit of its 
value. This, it must be remembered, is a very high correlation 
in comparison with the general run of anthropometric and bio- 
logical results. 

The correlation coefficient must not be confused with a per- 
centage. As a matter of percentage, it is possible to express the 
results in the table for totals thus : out of 354 cases, 41 or 
less than 12 per cent show conflict, 223 or more than 63 per 
cent show identity, and 25 per cent divide this significance. 
If the cases with the double sign (± or +, etc.) are halved and 
one half allotted to increasing the percentage of identity, then 
70 per cent of the cases would show identity of signs, and less 
than 10 per cent show conflict, while the remainder would 



246 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

divide their significance. A summarized statement of the 
results, in terms of percentages, would be : strong, mediocre, 
and weak monarchs are associated ^vith strong, mediocre, and 
weak periods respectively in about 70 per cent of the cases. 
Strong monarchs are associated with weak periods, and weak 
monarchs (including non-royal regents) with strong periods in 
about 10 per cent of the cases. In about 20 per cent of the 
cases mediocre monarchs are associated with strong or with 
weak periods, or mediocre periods are associated with strong 
or with weak monarchs. 

To return to the correlation coefficient and its significance. 
The reader will now see 'that the coefficient of correlation is 
obviously more convenient than percentages as it expresses in 
a single fraction all that can be put into an unwieldy para- 
graph. Other correlations can in the future be worked out and 
compared with it, as, for example, the correlations between 
politico-economic conditions on the one hand, and on the other, 
a number of likely concomitant variables, — the personalities^ of 
prime-ministers, the condition of war or peace, intellectual, re- 
ligious, or artistic activity, adventitious opportunities such as 
changes in the great trade routes, climatic changes, forms of 
government, and amount of liberty, or any other series of 
changes which by hypothesis may be thought correlated. 

As stated above, a correlation of r = .GO is a high one, in 
comparison with most correlations. It is greater than that 
expressing the mental and bodily resemblances between chil- 
dren of the same parentage. The correlation coeflficient for 
brothers is not over r = .50 ; for parents and offspring it is 
about .40 ; for a man's strength of pull and stature, .22 to .30 ; 
for strength of pull and weight, .34 to M} Some correlations 
are much higher, as, for instance, those representing the re- 
semblances between twins, where the correlations approximate 
.80, and are often .90 or more.^ Such high correlation ratios as 

1 K. Pearson, "Grammar of Science," London, 1900. 

* E. L. Thorndike, "Measurements of Twins," New York (Science Press), 
1905. 



INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS 247 

these represent that sort of resemblance between twins which, 
to the casual observer, seems like identity, and leads to all 
those amusing mistakes and confusions, anecdotes of which 
every one recalls. 

So, if I had found a correlation between rulers and conditions 
running as high as .80 or .90, it would be about the same as 
complete parallelism. Having found a substantial, indeed a 
very high, correlation (r = .60 or more) between mentalities of 
rulers and the conditions of their realms, the next step is to 
inquire the causes of this phenomenon. It may be that the 
monarchs have influenced the conditions ; it may be that the 
conditions have influenced the monarchs ; or both may be 
caused by some third external agency ; or any combination of 
the three hypotheses is tenable. 

Let us first see if it is possible to find any evidence that con- 
ditions have influenced monarchs. Has any country ever 
moulded its rulers according to a type? The early history of 
Turkey would seem to support such a view, or at least it pre- 
sents a coordination of facts, a repetition of events, formed in 
the sort of way one might expect if general or external conditions 
were forceful enough to make themselves measurable. There 
are seven strong Sultans, one after another, in the Ottoman 
dynasty from 1288 to 1481. A mediocre Sultan comes next, 
and two more very high in mental grade extend the chain as far 
as the year 1566. Is it not unlikely that such a line of strong 
Sultans should be caused by the forces which we call "heredity" 
(i.e. predetermined in the germ-plasm) ? A wonderful pedigree 
on the maternal side would make such an heredity expected, 
but this cannot be claimed. The mothers of the Sultans were, 
with one exception, the daughters of undistinguished ancestors. 
On the other hand, reasons can be easily imagined why the 
Ottoman power should have expanded as a result of general 
causes. Therefore, the study of this country by itself, and 
during this epoch, would undoubtedly induce any historian to 
a conviction favourable to the force of events, rather than a 
belief in the power of individuals. Here is a good illustration 



248 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

of the danger of drawing generalizations from limited historical 
perspective. 

If any one country is chosen at random, a series of repeti- 
tions of practically ten progressive periods is not to be expected 
unless the pedigrees are very strong, but on the contrary one 
such curious repetition of "plus" periods is to be expected 
from the laws of chance, if a large number of countries and 
periods is made the subject of study. That is, we may rightly 
conclude that for once the strong qualities passed directly down 
the male line from father to son for many generations without 
diminution or loss. "Heredity in Royalty" shows that 
practically all the other families that continued to reproduce 
genius did so only when selection of similar strains, on the 
maternal side, supported the male line. The strength of the 
Turkish reigning line was somewhat maintained by struggles 
between the brothers, but even setting this aside, there 
is nothing in the single instance of ancient Turkey to refute 
the general position which I maintain, provided it is the 
only instance. Looking over the tabulations, one sees that 
ancient Turkey is the only example of such extensive repeti- 
tion, and therefore no argument can be drawn from it in 
support of the view that long-acting circumstances have 
influenced monarchs. 

Modern England furnishes the only other example of a long 
unbroken series of "plus" periods, but here the monarchs are 
not "plus" and the history of England, from the age of Ehza- 
beth onward, has been constantly granted as not belonging to 
or resembling the major portion of the history which the present 
volume discusses. Next in number of repetitions of "plus" 
reigns Sweden counts five, but the total periods covered is only 
from 1600-1660. There are but two instances of a whole cen- 
tury covered by continuously progressive reigns, in Aragon 
from 1035-1134 (three reigns), and again in Aragon from 1228- 
1327 (four reigns). The other case of as many as four pro- 
gressive reigns coming together is found in the Netherlands 
from 1507-1559. 



INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS 249 

Table II ^ proves that no analysis of the whole series of signs 
can be made so that cycles of prosperity and adversity can be 
demonstrated. Such cycles if present would doubtless be an 
argument in favour of surroundings as against personality, and 
the absence of such cycles is an argument in favour of person- 
alities. The run of signs is, with the exception of modern 
England, nothing more than a chance or random distribution. 
There is no tendency for the same signs to be grouped into series. 
At least the tendency is not strong enough to be measurable 
in the data here presented. The whole series departs so little 
from a random arrangement that nothing can be predicted 
from one symbol as to the character of the next. In other 
words, the conditions of one reign do not sensibly influence the 
conditions of the next, nor is there any evidence that several 
reigns (say three) are, as a whole, so much influenced by any 
general or continuous force that they are moulded to a common 
resemblance. Nor is there any evidence of small waves of 
gradual rise and fall as would be expressed by — followed by ± 
followed by + or the series +, ±, +, ±, — , ±, +. 

Table II shows twenty-eight cases where -|- is preceded by 
+ and also followed by +. There are eight cases where -|- is 
followed by -f and preceded by ± . There are nine cases where 
+ is followed by -f and preceded by — . This last is a type 
of sequence showing a sudden jump from — to -f. The first 
shows no change, the second but slight change. The types 
showing an abrupt change are numbered III, VI, VII, VIII, 
IX, XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, XXV. The average of these 
is 12.8 cases showing abrupt change. The average of all the 
other cases (those showing gradation or similarity in the signs) 
is 11.3. This is somewhat artificially lowered by the greater 
total number of ± signs in this group. If all those cases be- 
tween X and XVIII are omitted, we eliminate this error, but 
the average of the transitional cases is not much raised. The 
number of gradual changes then averages 13.4. It can be seen 
that number IX shows twenty cases of progressive reigns sand- 

* Compiled by treating all the " conditions " signs as if they formed a string. 



250 



THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 



wiched between two periods of decline; number XIX shows 
fifteen cases of the reverse. Thus both the types which illus- 
trate the most abrupt changes are equal to and even in excess 



TABLE II 





Number op Cases 


SEyrENCE 


I 


28 


+ 


+ 


+ 


II 


8 


± 


+ 


+ 


*III 


9 


— 


+ 


+ 


IV 


16 


+ 


+ 


± 


V 


10 


± 


+ 


± 


* VI 


9 


- 


+ 


± 


* VII 


13 


+ 


+ 


— 


* VIII 


8 


± 


+ 


- 


*IX 


20 


— 


+ 


- 


X 


12 


+ 


± 


± 


XI 


9 


± 


± 


+ 


XII 


3 


- 


± 


+ 


XIII 


13 


+ 


± 


± 


XIV 


11 


± 


± 


± 


XV 


8 


- 


± 


± 


XVI 


12 


+ 


± 


— 


XVII 


8 


± 


± 


- 


XVIII 


9 


— 


± 


- 


*XIX 


15 


+ 


_ 


+ 


*xx 


11 


± 


— 


+ 


*XXI 


19 


- 


- 


+ 


* XXII 


10 


+ 


- 


± 


XXIII 


3 


± 


— 


± 


XXIV 


8 


- 


- 


± 


*xxv 


14 


+ 


— 


— 


XXVI 


17 


± 


— 


— 


XXVII 


17 


— 


— 


- 



* These are instances showing abrupt changes. 

of random expectation. These figures twenty and fifteen may 
be matched against the figures seventeen and twenty-eight at 
the bottom and top of the lists. The numbers of cases are all 



INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS 251 

about of equal significance. The +, +, + combination occurs 
a few more times than any of the others, but would not present 
such excessive repetition except for the exceptional series in the 
late history of England. 

There should be a slight correlation between the signs and 
their neighbouring signs, as a result of the action of heredity 
moulding successive rulers towards the same type of ability. 
The introduction of minorities and the starting of new dynastic 
lines tend to lower this correlation, but even so I should expect 
a correlation ratio of about r = .10 to .15. This ratio being 
small could not be measured without a far greater number of 
cases. The total 354 is large enough to measure a high corre- 
lation like that between monarchs and the condition of their 
countries (r = .60 or more), but is not great enough to measure 
a low correlation like that which probably exists between one 
reign and the next. It is, however, a total of sufficient magni- 
tude to prove that the correlation is not large between the 
conditions in one reign and the next. A high correlation would 
certainly have been detected even with the small total of 354. 
The material which I have collected is sufficiently extensive to 
give an answer to this particular question and to prove that 
there is no great tendency for periods of prosperity to be clus- 
tered in groups. 

Thus to recapitulate : The first reason for believing that the 
conditions have not caused the variations in the monarchs 
themselves to any considerable extent, is drawn from both an 
intensive and extensive examination of the transitional periods 
between the different states of progress. These transitions are 
indicated whenever the symbols for conditions of the country 
change ; especially when they change from + to — , or from — 
to +. If these usually merged into each other through the 
gradual transition of an intervening sign (which is ± ) , we should 
naturally explain the gradual change not as a personal but as a 
general force. On the contrary, if there are many cases of 
abrupt change occurring on the death of one king and the 
accession of another, then there is that much in favour of the 



252 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

hypothesis of personal influence. An examination of the whole 
material demonstrates a great number of abrupt changes in the 
signs ; and moreover it may be added that a detailed reading 
of the actual histories dealing with these times of transitions 
shows numerous examples of direct statements of the abrupt- 
ness of these changes, the whole taking place in a short time. 

A second argument in favour of monarchial influence is drawn 
from minorities and interreigns. Here we have several known 
and admitted facts to start with. The fact that it was a 
minority or interregnum is known, and if no member of the 
royal family is in control as regent, this fact is also known. 
This furnishes a case of "monarch minus" that may be accepted 
with certainty. These sure cases of "monarch minus" can 
then be compared with cases of "monarchs minus" presumably, 
based on the opinions of history. If the advance in prosperity 
were due to propitious circumstances, why did not the countries 
advance during minorities ? They did during some minorities, 
when under the control of some one strong leader who was 
virtually a monarch and acted like a monarch. 

Table III shows thirty-six minorities or interreigns that 
were "minus" or retrograding in their conditions (beginning 
at the top the minorities of John II, Charles VI, of France, etc.). 
Twenty-nine of these were either under weak regents or were 
governed by councils with divided power. Twenty-one of the 
divided regencies turned out disastrously. The right-hand 
column shows but two divided regencies associated with "plus" 
conditions. The whole series of facts and statements concern- 
ing both the disastrous and propitious conditions during 
minorities is understandable enough on a basis of "monarch 
causing conditions," but is not understandable on the reverse 
view. 



INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS 



253 



TABLE III 

Regencies, Minorities, and Interreigns 

"Divided" = power divided in a council 



" Minds " or Declining 
Conditions 



Charles V, -, for 
John II 

Divided, for 
Charles VI 

Divided, for 
Francis II 

Marie de Medici, 
for Louis XIII 

De Luynes (non- 
royal), — , for 
Louis XIII 

Duke of Bourbon, 
for Louis XV 



' Divided, for 
Alfonso VIII 

De Lara (non-royal), 
for Henry I 

Divided, for 
Alfonso XI 

Divided, for 
Henry III 

Divided, for 
John II 

Marie Anne, — , for 
PhiUp IV 

Divided, for 
James I 

Divided, Interregnum 
before Ferdinand I 



± " Plus or Minus " or 
Doubtful Conditions 



Catherine de' Medici, 
+, for Francis II 

Anne of Austria, ±, 
for Louis XIV 

Philip of Orleans, +, 
for Louis XV 



Ximenes (non- 
royal) , for Joanna 



+ "Plus" or Progres- 
sive Conditions 



Baldwin, +, for 
Philip I 

Blanche, +, for 
Louis IX 

Anne, +, for 
Charles VIII 

Card. Fleury (non- 
royal), for 
Louis XV 



Maria, +, for 
Ferdinand IV 

Ferdinand I of 
Aragon,+, for 
John II of Castile 



254 



THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 



TABLE HI— Continued 



- 


"Minus" ok Declining 
Conditions 


± "Plus or Minus" or 
Doubtful Conditions 


+ "Plus" or Progres- 
sive Conditions 




Mar, - , for 
David II 


Robert Stuart, ±, for 
David II 


Mory, — , for 
David II 




Douglas and Moray, 
for David II 




Albany, +, for 
James I 




Murdock, — , for 
James I 




Kennedy, +, for 
James III 


Q 
^; 

^ ■ 

H 
O 

o 


Divided, for 
James II 

Divided, for 
James III 

Divided, for 
James V 

Arran, — , for 
Mary 

Divided, for 
James VI 




Morton (non- 
royal) , for 
James VI 




Maximilian, +, for 
Philip the Hand- 
some 


Maximilian, +, for 
Charles V 


Margaret of Savoy, 
+ , for 
Charles V 




Di\aded, for 
PhiUp II (I) 


The States, 
1650-1672 


Mary, +, for 
Charles V 


H 


Alva, for 
Philip II (I) 

Requesens, for 
Philip II (I) 




Emmanuel Phili- 
bcrt, +, for 
Philip II 




The States, 
1702-1747 

Anne, ±, for 
William V 

The States, 
1759-1766 







INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS 
TABLE III— Continued 



255 



- 


"Minus" or Declining 
Conditions 


± "Plus or Minus" or 
Doubtful Conditions 


4- "Plus" or Progres- 
sive Conditions 




Divided, Interregnum 
before Christian III 


Divided, for 
Charles XI 


Margaret, +, for 
Eric 


w 

Q . 


Divided, Charles IX 
and Sigismund 




Divided, for 
Christian IV 


02 


Divided, for 
I Charles XII 




Oxenstjerna, for 
Christina 




Divided, for 
Ivan IV 


Helen GUnska, ±, 
Ivan IV 


Feodor, for 
Michael Romanoff 


< 
^ 


Divided, for 
Feodor II 


Boris Morosoff, for 
Alexis 


Divided, for 
Feodor III 




Divided, Interregnum 
1610-1613 


Divided, for 
Peter II 






Sophia, +, for 
Peter the Great 


Anne, — , for 
Ivan VI 





The third argument pointing in the same direction is drawn 
from studies in the pedigrees of monarchs. The individuals 
who compose these pedigrees resided in various European 
countries. As a result of the policy of international marriages 
so common among royal families, a maternal grandfather of a 
French king may just as likely have been Spanish or English, 
yet the maternal grandparents are correlated as closely and are 
as similar in mentality to their grandsons, as the probabilities 
of heredity through the germ-plasm demands. I have shown 
in "Heredity in Royalty," ^ that royal persons resemble their 
maternal grandfathers as much as their paternal, and the 
correlations for individuals with all grandfathers and all great- 
grandfathers is as high as is expected. The circumstances 
(conditions of the countries) which we might suppose acted 
upon and influenced the earlier generations were necessarily 

1 See pp. 278, 283, 294. 



256 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

different from those acting upon the third or younger genera- 
tion. Now if these circumstances had a significant impor- 
tance, they would show that importance by lowering the 
correlation ratios for heredity. These are not lowered. The 
lines of great kings and princes had correspondingly great 
pedigrees. The only conclusion is that all the individuals 
developed as they did by reason of irmate differences. The men 
moulded the circumstances, and not the reverse. "Without 
such a view we could not explain the pedigrees, for neither the 
men themselves, nor the events in which they individually 
lived, could have arranged the marriages of their ancestors of a 
hundred years previous." ^ In other words, the special con- 
ditions in any one country might conceivably have influenced 
the kings, but these circumstances could not be retroactive and 
form pedigrees. The conditions are correlated with the pedi- 
grees. The conditions could not cause the pedigrees. There- 
fore, the monarchs are the results of the pedigrees, and the con- 
ditions the result of the monarchs. By this triangulation of 
reasoning the question is settled once and for all. No other 
explanation will suffice. 

This does not mean that the surroundings have not played 
some share in the whole story, it does mean that such influences 
are trivial, illusive, and difficult to measure. It may be that 
both the monarchs and the conditions have been moulded some- 
what by some extraneous forces, but here again these effects 
must be trivial, illusive, and difficult to measure. The absence 
of system in the arrangements of the symbols in Table II dis- 
courages a hope of finding any such force, but I do not wish 
to be understood as saying that such a third category of forces 
may not indeed exist ; but the question is not, do environmental 
forces exist, but how great is their importance, and where and 
when are they to be found ? 

I have looked at the recorded evidence from many points of 
view with the wish to decide if the observed fluctuations in 

* "Heredity in Royalty," p. 218. 



INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS 257 

material conditions of the various countries could be due to the 
immediate influence of the sovereigns, and have come to the 
conclusion that this is the only explanation consistent with 
all the observations. A further inquiry will now be made to 
see if there is any way of comparing royalty with other social 
classes, — those lying beneath them in point of inherited wealth, 
prestige, and power. Royalty has had exceptional opportu- 
nities and a peculiar and isolated position. It will not affect 
the general conclusion of this research, — which declares the 
positive and initiative influence of monarchs, whether one thinks 
that royalty as a whole has been much favoured by matters 
environmental, or whether one takes the extreme view regard- 
ing heredity and explains everything by inherent mental su- 
periority. The influences are there just the same, no matter 
what be the ultimate source of these influences. Even if all 
the kings be thought really very stupid, and all the observable 
effects could be imagined due to blind and implicit obedience 
to the divine right of kingship, the influences and moulding 
powers of the monarchs on history would be just the same. 
Also the superiority might be real, but nevertheless favoured 
by education, or preferment, or any other external fact. The 
problem, up to the present, has been simply to measure the 
influence of A on B not to estimate the magnitude of A in its- 
self, or to compare A to anything else. 

I will now attempt first to compare royalty with other social 
classes in point of actual ability ; and then take up the ques- 
tion of how far such ability depends on inherent (gametic) 
causes. 

In " Heredity and Royalty," page 301, I made the assertion 
that there is no doubt but that modern ^ royalty as a whole 
has been decidedly superior to the average European in capacity ; 
and we may say without danger of refutation, that the royal 
breed, considered as a unit, is superior to any other one family, 
be it that of noble or commoner. I have no wish to modify 
this extreme statement. Capacity is here used as meaning 

' Meaning from the tenth century a.d. onward. 



258 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

natural (inherent) ability, and the word family as one large 
interrelated group of persons. 

Several converging lines of argument lead to the view here 
expressed, and it is not easy to see just why the statement 
should ever be disputed, except for the first thought that 
superior opportunities have been enjoyed by those born to the 
purple. While this is a very natural feeling, allied perhaps to 
human vanity and supplying the middle class with a comforting 
excuse for not achieving more glory, such a view will hardly 
fit in with all the facts. Nor is there any good reason why a 
person should be any more ashamed of being born with a poor 
protoplasm than of being born with a poor environment, since 
both are matters of birth. Monarchs have doubtless had very 
different opportunities from commoners, and in some ways 
they have had superior advantages, but in other ways they have 
had greater disadvantages, greater responsibilities to bear, 
and greater difficulties to overcome. It is difficult to weigh one 
against the other, but granting for the moment that the advan- 
tages outweigh the disadvantages, is there any indication that 
such propitious opportunities have had a discernible effect in 
raising the estimation in which royalty has been held ? First, 
is the reputed ability greater than the real ability ? Second, 
is the real ability, such as it is, and whatever it is, caused in 
part by environmental differences ? The answer to both these 
questions is the same, and is : Yes, but not to any great extent ; 
not conspicuously so, not in an easy way, measurably so. The 
affirmative answer is given from a priori considerations, from a 
feeling that there must be something to this side of the question. 
The qualifying and limiting clause is derived from the failure 
of tests to bring forth supporting evidence, and also from 
several considerations of a widely different nature. These 
may be enumerated as follows : 

1. Younger sons of kings are not less eminent than heirs to 
the throne. 

2. The precocity of royalty. 

3. Their success in government as compared with ministers. 



INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS 259 

4. Their success in war as compared with non-royal gen- 
erals. 

5. Their genius or talents in other directions. 

6. The proportionate number of recognized geniuses to the 
total. 

7. The slightly excessive amount of insanity. 

8. A priori considerations : Election of early rulers. Strug- 
gles and survival of the fittest. 

(1) Comparing the eminence of younger sons with those who 
have inherited the succession, while it does not give a chance 
of directly comparing royalty with non-royal classes, does serve 
somewhat the same purpose. If evidence could be produced 
that the actual monarchs ranked higher in intellectual ability 
than their younger brothers, then we might infer that 
opportunity had aided the actual sovereigns in gaining 
their celebrity or reputed ability. As a matter of fact, 
the younger brothers are, according to the accounts of his- 
tory, just as eminent intellectually as are the inheritors of the 

crown. ^ 

(2) A large number of the scions of royal houses have been 
exceedingly precocious. Not that the early manifestation of 
exceptional talent proves the existence of genius, but precocity 
is one of the symptoms of genius, therefore its presence is to be 
expected and if found becomes an argument in favour of the 
genuineness of the reputed ability. Most of the princes who 
were precocious in youth were great in maturity. William the 
Conqueror showed his incisive military genius before he was 
twenty-one. Henry I of England ruled wisely in the Cotentin 
when only twenty-one years old. Edward I, when only fifteen, 
became ''the soul of the reconstructed royalist party," and at 
twenty-six defeated Simon de Montfort at Evesham and met 
the demands of a difficult crisis. Edward III took matters 
into his own hands when eighteen and soon reversed the declin- 
ing conditions which had marked the reign of Edward II. 
William III of England, like Charles XII of Sweden, wasawon- 

1 " Heredity in Royalty," p. 285. 



260 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

derful example of premature mental development. Charles 
XI of Sweden is also an example of precocious talents. When 
barely twenty years of age he brought his country out of a con- 
dition of disaster and anarchy and was unquestionably the 
initiator of all important movements from that time until his 
death. William the Silent received his first mihtary appoint- 
ment at eighteen, and was soon pitted against experienced 
and formidable opponents like Nevers, Chatillon, and Coligny, 
but held his own against them.^ In 1555 he was but little 
over twenty-two years of age, and he was preferred to the 
command, at a critical moment of the Emperor's career, over 
the heads of veteran soldiers much senior to himself. Even 
at that age he was more of a statesman than a soldier.- Philip 
Augustus of France, "was but fifteen when he began to reign 
alone ; yet, boy though he was, he never for a moment swerved 
from his course, or made a false step." Other great rulers 
who showed marked precocity were Louis XI of France, Isa- 
bella the Catholic, Margaret of Denmark, Gustavus I (Vasa), 
Charles IX, Christina and Gustavus III of Sweden, Ivan the 
Terrible and Peter the Great of Russia, and the Great Elector 
of Brandenburg. 

(3) Another scries of facts pointing to the mental supe- 
riority of royalty can be drawn from considerations concerning 
prime-ministers, their work, their personalities, and their total 
number. Richelieu was strong and Louis XIII was weak; 
Sully aided Henry IV of France; and Pombal, in the eigh- 
teenth century, remade Portugal. If it should be found that 
the total number of such prime-ministers exceeded the number 
of sovereigns supposed to equal them in natural ability, achieve- 
ment, influence, or whatever serves as the criterion, then it 
would be something to the discredit of royalty. But even 
then (as the statesmen were drawn from many families and from 
a class numbering many thousands, whereas the great monarchs 
came from one interrelated family, and a total of less than one 

1 Putnam, op. cit., i, pp. 54, 71. 

2 Frederic Harrison, "William the Silent," pp. 12, 13. 



INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS 261 

thousand) it would not prove royalty inferior in natural ability 
to the nobles and commoners. As a matter of fact, the total 
number of statesmen alleged to be great is less than the total 
number of monarchs. This does not in itself prove the monarchs 
and the caste of monarchs superior to other castes ; but it does 
present the sort of facts that one would meet were the royal 
breed actually mentally superior. Opportunity may have helped 
the monarchs more than the ministers ; but, as differences of 
opportunity are shown by other tests to be usually of slight 
causative value, it is not at all likely that such differences of 
opportunity could account for the vast differences in the numeri- 
cal ratios, — differences that make it thousands of times more 
likely than among average people that the breed of kings will 
produce a statesman. 

(4) The same sort of indication is furnished by the records 
of monarchs as military leaders. Matching non-royal generals 
against royal, the comparison favours the generals of royal 
birth. There have been comparatively few generals of the first 
rank from other than royal families. Many others of sub- 
royal birth have been placed in the highest command, so that 
it is not true that they have wanted opportunity. In this 
way the two classes can be fairly compared in terms of success 
and failure. The dozen greatest non-royal generals do not show 
any equal amount of success, or in any way the same evidence 
of genius. Marlborough is better remembered than Eugene, 
but the latter actually won more battles and with fewer 
men. Wallenstein is outranked by Gustavus. Even Napoleon 
belongs in part to royalty, since the great parvenu augmented 
the strength of royalty, inasmuch as he became royal and allied 
his family with royalty. Also the great changes and improve- 
ments in the art of war have been introduced (with the excep- 
tion of Napoleon) not by generals who were of lower origin 
but by those actually born in the regal caste. All this falls 
in with the fact that the highest geniuses in this direction, those 
who are by all authorities acknowledged at the head of the 
profession of arms, tally the highest known number of eminent 



262 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

relatives close of kin.^ Therefore, the whole series of observa- 
tions fits in with the theory of heredity. 

(5) Monarchs and princes have shown their genius chiefly 
in war and government. They have become distinguished 
more as men of action than as men of thought. They have 
belonged essentially to the ultra-practical type. But the domain 
of literature and poetry seriously claims a number of important 
royal contributors, chiefly in the olden times. Alfonso X in all 
probability actually deserves the credit of founding Castihan 
prose. He was the chief literary man of his generation. His 
grandson King Diniz occupies the same position in regard to the 
language of Portugal. He was the chief poet in a court famous 
for its romancistas. James I of Aragon also is entitled to a 
high place in the early literature of the Peninsula. He wrote, 
in addition to other works, a chronicle of his own life, an artistic 
autobiography which has excited much interest apart from its 
historical value. All these men should be judged in comparison 
with their contemporaries, and so judged, they loom large, and 
also have the important merit of having been pioneers. There 
is some doubt if James I of Scotland wrote "The King's Quair," 
but if he did, he was a man of genius, and bears somewhat the 
same relation to the literature of Scotland. Charles of Orleans 
and Thibault of Champagne have a notable place in the his- 
tory of literature, and Sancho IV of Castile and Juan Manuel, 
a nephew of Alfonso X, must also be mentioned. Thus four 
of the early literary princes were closely related. 

Among more recent members of royal families the amount of 
literary activity is great, though their productions seem hardly 
worthy of being deemed works of genius. If the question is 
made one of quantity of books published per thousand inter- 
related persons, probably no other group of a thousand persons 
could be found to match royalty. So that even on the side of 
mentality, where royalty is weakest, there is evidence of con- 
siderable activity; quite as much as is to be expected, when 

1 See Galton, "Hereditary Genius," p. 141; Woods, "Heredity in Roy- 
alty," pp. 74-78. 



INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS 263 

we remember that the quahties that first brought their an- 
cestors into prominence, and have held their descendants in 
place, have been essentially practical rather than literary 
qualities. 

In the domain of science (with exception of military science) 
their activity has been slight, never approaching genius and 
rarely exceeding the merit entitling them to be classified as 
patrons, Henry the Navigator is in a way an exception. He 
was doubtless the personal initiator of the great maritime 
discoveries of the fifteenth century. Everything points to his 
being truly a great character, a soul filled with grand ideas ; 
but from the fragmentary information we possess he seems more 
of a colonizer and crusader than man of science in the strict 
sense of the word. It may be that the desire to make dis- 
coveries for their own sake, which is the distinguishing mark 
of the man of pure science, is so much a peculiar trait 
apart from other traits, that it is not correlated with those 
practical mental gifts for administration which characterize 
royalty and which at one time or another have been ab- 
solutely essential to the formation of dynasties and to their 
maintenance. 

(6) The best argument in favour of the real and inherent 
nature of the intellectual gifts of royalty and their average 
superiority when judged as a single breed comes from thinking 
of proportionate ratios. If all questions are set aside except 
the total number of men of unquestioned genius as compared to 
the total within the group, a striking fact is brought out. In 
"Heredity in Royalty, " I showed that out of a total of 823 royal 
persons there were about twenty of the intellectual eminence 
of Frederick the Great, Peter the Great, Gustavus Adolphus, 
William the Silent, Eugene of Savoy, etc. Let this proportion 
(one in forty) be compared with the number of great men who 
arise out of a total population at any period or in any country, 
and the contrast is astonishing. There have not been at most 
more than two hundred men of such unquestioned genius born 
in any of the nations, England, France, Germany, or America, 



264 THE INFLUENCE OF MONAKCHS 

during their entire history.^ Each has had a population of 
twenty, fifty, or a hundred milhon or more, yet only a hundred 
or two hundred of such great geniuses have been produced. 
The differences are overwhelming. The chances in favour of 
royalty are several hundred thousand times as great. In 
other words, the average prince throughout modern times has 
a small chance of becoming a man of genius. There has been 
only about one chance in forty, but this is more than a hundred 
thousand times as good as the chances for an average child of 
average parents. Even if there be thought to be but two mon- 
archs whose natural ability is granted to be equal to the natural 
ability of other great men, there would still be ten thousand 
times as many men of genius among royalty as is expected 
from the general population. 

So there seems to be no way of getting around the fact that 
royalty has far exceeded the masses in the production of men 
of genius. The same is true for several grades approaching the 
modal or average t}^e of royalty, as their supremely gifted 
types merge gradually into types less and less gifted. These 
average sovereigns are certainly more intelligent than the 
average commoner, probably superior to the average pro- 
fessional man, but I do not wish to lay particular emphasis 
on this point as it is nothing more than my own impression 
about the matter. I am not concerned for the present with 
establishing a measure for the medium or ± grade for roy- 
alty, so much as with showing that there must have been 
very frequently enormous deviation in the "plus" direction. 
These are the persons who have so profoundly affected his- 
tory. 

(7) There has always been a great deal of insanity in royalty 
and this in itself is an argument in favour of the genuineness 
of their genius. The usual amount of insanity in a general 
population is less than 1 per cent. Among men of genius 

' Statement based on a consideration of mental qualities of those in Cat- 
tell's list of the thousand most eminent men of all time. Published in Popular 
Science Monthly for February, 1903. 



INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS 265 

and their kinsmen it is at least 4 or 5 per cent, and the same is 
true for royalty.^ 

Before discussing the a priori reasons for considering as valid 
the foregoing seven direct reasons, it will pay to summarize 
the general characteristics of royalty, as this will lead the way 
to clearing up the whole matter and bringing everything in 
line with modern ideas concerning the inheritance of particular 
traits. Enough has already been said concerning their men- 
tal ability. As for other important elements of character, 
courageousness is the attribute most frequently found. Only 
very few have lacked this quality. They have frequently been 
ambitious, often excessively so, but there is a considerable 
percentage of persons showing the absence or reverse of this 
trait. Selfishness, greed, and a thirst for power are very 
commonly found joined mth ambition. Not satisfied with 
already wielding more power than any of their countrymen, 
and burdened with a plethora of worldly goods, the avaricious 
and domineering rulers have, seemingly impelled by inward 
instincts, continued to strive for more and more. A very com- 
mon trait also is jealousy, though one reads the word more 
between the lines than in the direct statements of historians. 
Diligence, like ambition, is met with in fully one-half of all the 
rulers, but in perhaps a third it is replaced by sloth and in- 
difference. 

Cruelty and licentiousness alternate in about half of the 
cases with amiability and chastity respectively. Contrasts 
are everywhere met with ; and these contrasts call for a great 
deal more study and along more exhaustive lines than can 
be presented just here ; but as so little has been done to bring 
these psychological and ethical problems into touch with the 
facts of history, the two lists which I will here present are worth 
considering. In all probability the same contrasts would be 
presented by a more extended study, — one embracing all the 
modern rulers, or indeed any historical families who have been 

iHavelock Ellis, "A Study of British Genius," 1904; Woods, " Heredity in 
Royalty," p. 271. 



266 



THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 



sufficiently in the light of publicity. It will be observed that 
there is not any marked tendency for the cruel and licentious 
types to occur in the earlier ages. Also it should be noticed 
that intermediated types are not very common ; even if all the 
doubtful persons are allotted to the medium grade including 

those who are obscure. 

FRANCE 

Early Rulers 



Licentious 



Philip I 

Philip Augustus 
Charles VI 
Charles VII 
Louis XI 
Charles VIII 
Louis XII 
Francis I 
Henry II 
Charles IX 
Henry III 
Henry IV 



Doubtful 



Philip IV NM. 1 
Charles IV N-M. 

Louis XNM- 

Philip V ■^•^'• 
John^M. 

Catherine de' Medici 
Marie do Medicis 



Chaste 



Louis VI 
Louis VII 
Louis VIII 
Blanche of Castile 
Louis IX 
Philip III 
Charles V 
Louis XIII 



1 N.M. means no material exists to bear evidence on this point. 

ENGLAND 

Earlt Rulers 



Licentious 


Doubtful 


Chaste 


William II 


Henry II 


William the Con- 


Henry I 


Edward II 


queror 


Richard I 


Richard III 


Stephen 


John 


James I 


Henry III 


Edward III 




Edward I 


Humphrey, Duke of 




Richard II 


Gloucester 




Henry IV 


Edward IV 




Henry V 


Henry VIII 




Henry VI 
Mary 
Elizabeth 
Charles I 



INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS 



267 



FRANCE 
Early Rulers 



Cruel 


Doubtful 


Not cruel 


Philip Augustus 


PhiUp I NM. 1 


Louis VI 


Philip VI 


Charles IV ^ «• 


Louis VII 


John 


Louis X N.M. 


Louis VIII 


Louis XI 


Philip V NM. 


Blanche of Castile 


Catherine de' Medici 


Philip VI NM. 


Louis IX 


Henry III 


Louis XII cruel in war 


Philip III 


Marie de Medicis 


Francis I persecuted the 


Charles V 


Louis XIII 


Huguenots 


Charles VI 




Henry II 


Charles VII 
Charles VIII 
Henry IV 



* N.M. means no material exists to bear evidence on this point. 



ENGLAND 

Early Rulers 



Cruel 


Doubtful 


Not cruel 


William II 


William I 


Stephen 


John 


Richard I 


Henry III 


Edward IV 


Edward I 


Edward II 


Richard III 


Edward III 


Humphrey, Duke of 


Henry VIII 


Henry IV 


Gloucester 


EUzabeth 


Henry V 


Henry VI 




Mary 


Richard II 




Charles I 


James I 



268 



THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

CASTILE 

Early Rulers 



Not false, deceitful, cruel, 


or tyrannical 


Opposite traits 


Ferdinand I 








Urraca 


Alfonso VIII the Noble 








Alfonso X 


Ferdinand III 








Sancho IV 


Maria (Regent) 








Ferdinand IV 


John I 








Alfonso XI 


Henry III 








Peter the Cruel 


John II 








Henry II 


Isabella (except in her relation 


to 


the 




Inquisition) 











ARAGON 

Early Rulers 



Not false, deceitful, cruel, or tyrannical 


Opposite traits 


Peter I 


Alfonso I 


Ramiro II 


James I 


Raymond Berenger 


Peter IV 


Peter II 


John II 


Peter III the Great 


Ferdinand the Catholic 


Martin the Humane 




Ferdinand I the Just 





The considerable number of early sovereigns in England and 
France who were either chaste or not cruel (merciful, kind, or 
benevolent) is to my mind extremely significant. The same 
lesson is dra\\Ti from the early history of Castile and Aragon. 
Witness the number of rulers who were not false, deceitful, 
cruel, or tyrannical. Why are historians continually explaining 
the bad characters by the influence of the habits and customs 
of the ages in which the individuals lived ? "He was no worse 



INTERPRETATION OP THE RESULTS 269 

than his contemporaries" is a phrase frequently met. It is 
easy to say and has a reasonable sound, so the reader accepts 
it unquestioningly, but generally such statements are utterly 
contrary to facts. "Due allowance must be made for the age 
in which he lived" is another favourite phrase; but I should 
like to ask just what that "due allowance" is. The result of 
counting 568 cases of royal persons, all classes and both sexes, 
has been to prove that vicious types of character are not much 
more numerous in one age than in another, even if judged by 
"standards of to-day." ^ 

If the matter were gone into carefully, I have no doubt that 
it could be demonstrated that a slight increase in the percentage 
of moral types marks each generation. But this is not the chief 
or first fact. In descriptive science we search for differences, 
and here the most conspicuous differences are those which 
exist within one single generation, one age, and one country. 

Now the significance of all this lies in the remarkable way in 
which the diversified facts fit into the theory of heredity. The 
expectations of gametic inheritance are fulfilled by every 
feature of the series of observations. There are two main 
sub-divisions to the argument. The first derives itself from the 
fact that the characters are contrasted. The second from 
the generalizations that have been made as to the mental traits 
of royalty as a whole. All the biological researches on the 
subject of heredity that have been recently made have united 
in making it more and more clear that all inheritable charac- 
teristics tend to be segregated in the course of transmission 
from generation to generation. This segregation of separately 
inheritable factors is the essential feature of Mendelism as it is 
understood to-day .2 Thus, while the separation into cruel and 
non-cruel types, licentious and chaste, ambitious and indolent, 
etc., is not clearly and absolutely defined, the tendency to seg- 
regation which is observed is to be expected from the usual 

1 The statistics for this conclusion are presented on page 293 of "Heredity in 
Royalty." 

*Cf. footnote, p. 274, " Heredity and Royalty." 



270 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

workings of heredity. And furthermore nothing of the sort is 
to be expected as a result of environment. 

In "Heredity in Royalty" I continually dwelt upon the 
phenomenon of segregation and its significance to those who 
aim at understanding human character. Therefore, the sub- 
ject will not be discussed further, except to refer to the fact 
that a large number of recently compiled pedigrees show alter- 
native inheritance for a wide variety of human characteristics, 
anomalies, and diseases. These include eye-colour, colour-blind- 
ness, night-blindness, hair colour and curliness, albinism, diabetes 
insipidus, split foot, polydactylism, brachydactylism, pulmonary 
tuberculosis, deaf-mutism, marked ability, chronic trophoedema, 
angio-neurotic oedema, hermaphroditism, hemophilia, imbecility, 
insanity and allied characters. If diseases and other pecul- 
iarities of the body are transmitted in the all-or-nothing prin- 
ciple, there is so much more reason for believing that pecul- 
iarities of the mind are transmitted in the same maimer. It 
lends subsidiary support to the view which I advanced in 1902- 
1903 and have since many times defended, that it is impossible 
to understand human nature and the differences between one 
man and another except on the double assumption, first that 
the main differences are due almost entirely to inherent (pre- 
determined or gametic) differences, and second that those dif- 
ferences tend to be inherited on the ''all or nothing," "yes or 
no," "present or absent" principle. 

Besides the confirmation which modern statistical researches 
and the development of the pedigree chart method of intensive 
analysis lend to the extreme view of gametic causation, another 
entirely different line of support comes from the biological 
laboratory, especially from microscopical research on the 
structure of elementary cells. Since 1901 it has become more 
and more generally admitted that the sex of the offspring is 
predetermined in the egg, and not the result of environmental 
stimuli. In many of the invertebrates (notably the insectivora) 
and in some of the vertebrates and perhaps among human 
beings, it has been proved that differences in sex are due to 



INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS 271 

differences already present in the gametes from which these 
individuals are formed. The behaviour of the minute granules 
which in a nuclear arrangement govern the growth and func- 
tioning of these gametes, the number and arrangement of the 
granules (chromosomes), in a word, all the recently discovered 
phenomena in regard to sex bear out the view of the importance 
of predetermined causes. The same application is to be made 
of microscopical study of enz3Tiies in relation to Mendelian 
heredity ; and finally it may be added that the researches con- 
cerning the causation of twins point in the same direction. 

It is necessary for historians, psychologists, and sociologists 
to know something of the results of such investigations ; even 
if it is impossible for them to follow the details, or to interest 
themselves much in these questions while they remain suhjudice. 
They can at least avail themselves of the condensed conclusions 
as soon as these conclusions have passed into the domain of 
verified and accepted knowledge. If they fail to do so, they 
will surely be to that extent behind the times, and less able to 
understand human nature, either in the actuality of the present 
or a vision of the past. 

(8) Another survey of the whole series of historical observa- 
tions that have been made and arranged within this volume 
compels the same conclusions, both as to the genuineness of the 
heredity factor, and the supposed superiority of royalty. I refer 
to the a priori point of view. All the peculiarities which the 
members of royal families are found to possess in a more or less 
excessive degree are just the sort of traits that they ought 
to possess if heredity and germinal selection are the all- 
important forces. The formation of royalty as a biologically 
isolated caste dates from very ancient times. The pedigrees 
of reigning princely houses of Europe usually go back in the 
male line to the ninth or tenth century. Lehr's genealogy^ 
gives also all the ancestors in the female lines. On view- 
ing these fan-shaped pedigrees one can see at a glance that 

'P. E. Lehr, "Etudes sur I'histoire et la g^nealogie de quelques-unes des 
principales maisons souveraines de I'Europe." Paris, 1866. 



272 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

nearly the entire lineage of the royalty is made up either of 
members of the royal families, strictly speaking, or of the 
nobility. Of course if one could trace the lines far enough into 
the past, they would finally merge in the general population ; 
but the point is that royalty, as a result of selection and breed- 
ing, has gradually been formed into a distinct sub-variety of 
the human race, and this process of separation has been going 
on for many centuries. During that time new men have been 
coming forward usually from the ranks of the nobility, rising 
in the social scale, and some of these have been themselves taken 
into the royal fold. Others, like the rich and powerful nobles 
whose daughters have married into royalty, are in that way 
included in the pedigrees. The caste of royalty is genealogically 
speaking surrounded by a fringe of the nobility without any 
definite demarcations. 

That there has been a genuine survival of the fittest within 
the ranks of royalty there can be no question. The history of 
each country shows this. The kings who have been forced to 
abdicate, and the lines that have become sterile have been the 
weaker rather than the stronger. I have already proved in 
"Heredity in Royalty," Chapter XVII, that the inferior 
branches have left fewer adult descendants. A review of the 
reigning dynasties included in the present volume brings added 
proof that in the struggle for the possession of the throne the 
stronger rather tlian the weaker have survived and become the 
progenitors of future kings and princes. William the Conqueror 
was a greater man than any of the immediate kings of the 
Saxon time. Henry I defeated his weaker brother Robert. 
Henry II replaced Stephen. Henry IV was superior to Richard 
II ; William III to James II. Bruce won on his merits. William 
the Silent was greater than the rulers whom he displaced. The 
same is true of Gustavus Vasa, founder of the Swedish line. 
The weaker Sigismund was deposed by his stronger rival 
Charles IX. In early Russia there was much struggle and 
survival of the strongest. The Romanoffs began by the elec- 
tion to the throne of the able and judicious Feodor. In Portu- 



INTEKPEETATION OF THE RESULTS 273 

gal Alfonso III deposed his brother Sancho II and the line 
continued from its stronger stem. Also John of Avis, who 
became John I, was superior to Ferdinand I, whom he deposed. 
Examples of the selection of strong kings in early Spain are 
Sancho IV versus his nephew Alfonso, Henry II versus Pedro the 
Cruel, and the choice by James the Conqueror of Peter III of 
Aragon as his favourite son. Turkey furnishes many instances 
of struggles within the royal family. The military gifts of Ork- 
han (1326-1359) enabled him to gain the succession over his 
elder brother. The jealousy and rivalry among the princes of 
the house of Osman exceeded all bounds. The murder of 
younger brothers was a recognized custom. It is said that 
when the aged Sultana, who was a daughter of Mahommed I, 
came to Bayezid to move his fraternal feelings in Dj em's favour, 
Bayezid answered with stern brevity by citing the Arab proverb, 
"There is no relationship among princes." 

Also in the wars between the nations, the greater nations have 
all started with modest beginnings. Those nations that have 
never had great kings have remained small, or been absorbed by 
the larger. It can be easily shown that all the kingdoms that 
have remained small and unimportant have never chanced to 
fall under the guidance of men of genius. The bigger men, 
controlling as they did the bigger nations, fought against each 
other until the great absolute monarchies were constructed ; 
and so much of Europe came as it did, in the fifteenth century, 
under the sway of four men, Charles V, Francis I, Henry VIII, 
and Suleiman of Turkey. 

Besides contests among those already within the royal 
fold, to maintain their position or to gain a greater prestige, 
there have been at all times struggles on the part of the sub- 
royal or noble classes, those wishing admittance within the con- 
sanguinity of the actual reigning families. 

Thus history had been a process of natural selection. In the 
long struggle for wealth and power, royalty is merely a name 
applied to those interrelated families that have succeeded in 
getting and keeping the most of what most men want. Some 



274 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

branches of modern royalty have not recently added to their 
possessions and have been left in peaceful enjoyment of 
their estates for, say, two or three generations. This gives 
the superficial observer the idea that being born to the purple 
means ease without struggle. Nothing could be further from 
the truth. There may, or may not, be a necessary struggle 
to-day among scions of royal families ; but as far as the past 
is concerned there has been a tremendous struggle, which 
epitomizes the ceaseless human struggle and rises to the top, 
awe-inspiring from its duration, its distinction, and its success. 
And what would be the traits most probably found in per- 
sons able to win in the old game of war and plunder ? In the 
earliest days kings were elected ; but for the most part since 
the tenth century, when the genealogical record begins to be 
authentic, the breed of kings has been made up of such counts 
and barons as were successful in war and government. For 
such success bravery is obviously a primary need. Ambition 
and energy, mental insight and alertness, are also essential. 
Greed, jealousy, cruelty, and licentiousness would not be draw- 
backs ; the first two might indeed be aids ; but most important 
of all would be just those mental qualities, whatever they may 
be, that are essential to the leadership of men. These new men 
would reproduce their kind to very great extent, although it 
could not be expected that all their descendants would equal 
them. The pedigrees of royalty are peppered with the names 
of men of genius, but also included in the pedigrees are the 
wives and the ancestors of the men of genius, and the ancestors 
of the wives of the men of genius. For this reason varying 
degrees of ability are met with both in the pedigrees and in the 
monarchs. So it is to be expected that some of the monarchs 
would be deficient in ability, or in ambition, or in any given trait. 
But the essential fact still remains, — the extraordinary high 
percentage out of the total of persons naturally able to do just 
that sort of work that fate thrust upon them. And this explains 
why (barring a percentage of exceptions) they have always been 
so eager and willing to take upon themselves the burdens and re- 



INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS 275 

sponsibilities of their positions and, though having much, 
seek ever more and more. All living species represent 
adaptation. Had there been no adaptation, there could be 
no species and the same is true of this sub-variety of the 
human race. 

Thus the a priori point of view fits in with all the facts and 
offers a single, simple explanation. The "law of parsimony" 
is satisfied. It is illogical to introduce further causes when a 
single, simple explanation will suffice. This single, simple ex- 
planation I will call "the gametic interpretation of history," 
but before discussing the use and definition of this phrase, I 
will take up at this point the important question of a possible 
bias on the part of historians that might falsely magnify my 
conclusions. I have postponed this discussion up to the present 
because only now have all the facts been brought together 
which when viewed and cross-viewed give a sufficiently clear 
reply. 

The Question of False Bias 

In Chapter II, I have much insisted on the need of distin- 
guishing between random errors and constant errors. Random 
errors may be ignored if all one wishes is a lower limit to the 
degree of correlation. Constant errors may sometimes be 
ignored or looked upon in the same way as the random errors, 
provided it be known that they work towards lowering the cor- 
relation. Certainly they would then not lead to a false con- 
clusion. Thus the constant error, that I have introduced by 
intentionally and continuously placing the doubtful cases in a 
way to count against personal influences, may be treated as an 
error which can cause no anxiety. 

On the contrary, constant errors might tend to raise the cor- 
relation improperly, therefore it is important to consider the 
following possible source of fallacy. If historians have in their 
own statements overestimated the importance of kings, or if 
following sycophantic chroniclers, they have been inclined to 
overpraise the successful and underpraise the unsuccessful, then 



276 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

the correlation ratios would be thereby artificially raised. But 
a consideration of the whole question indicates a minimum of 
error from such a source. 

There are at least five reasons for holding this error as prob- 
ably slight. 

(1) For the early history of some countries such as Spain and 
Portugal, the reports of a few chroniclers under royal patronage 
form nearly the whole of the source-material. The later his- 
tory of these countries is much better authenticated and sup- 
ported by more varied materials. If the later history did not 
exhibit the strong correlation which it does, one would suspect 
that the early history were fallacious. The later history shows 
about the same correlation as the earlier. Therefore, there is 
evidence that the chroniclers were not unjustly biassed. 

(2) Also the nations which have been very exhaustively 
studied, such as Prussia and France, do not show a lowering of 
the personal influence ; and furthermore these much studied 
countries show the influence just as strong even as late as the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. All this tends to in- 
crease one's reliance on the opinions of the early chroniclers. 
It leads to a belief that the kings who were much praised or 
blamed were really not so very different from the pictures 
drawn of them by their contemporaries, or sometimes patched 
up by chroniclers hired by their descendants. 

(3) Estimates of historical characters have been but rarely 
reversed. The estimate of Edward II, which Froissart made, 
has never been reversed. Richard III of England is an excep- 
tion to the rule. As time goes on new evidence becomes forth- 
coming, but it is rare that a character needs to be much reshifted 
in the scale of estimates. Everything points to the great in- 
fluences of great personalities within the periods and regions of 
well-authenticated facts ; therefore, why should they not have 
been so in the age a little earlier ? Special instances doubtless 
come up which arouse suspicion, but these are few in number 
compared to the total number of monarchs studied in this 
volume. 



INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS 277 

(4) It must also be remembered that while more circumspect 
study sometimes lowers sovereigns in our estimate, sometimes, 
perhaps more often, the result of modern research is to act in 
the opposite direction. Therefore, it cannot be supposed that 
the correlation ratio is seriously affected or spuriously raised 
by the introduction of monarchs who are obscure or who are 
delineated only by partisan historians. 

(5) Additional arguments are derived from a general survey 
of the whole material. The suddenness of the changes on the 
deaths of monarchs indicates that the historians have been 
telling the truth. Why should they have described such a 
multitude of reversals in the fortunes of nations unless these 
actually occurred? Why should they have described so many 
minorities as disastrous (when the government was divided) 
unless indeed they were disastrous ? Furthermore, the distri- 
bution in pedigree charts of strong and weak kings in relation 
to their ancestry, particularly their maternal grandfathers, 
leads to the same sort of reasoning here as it did concerning 
the problem of whether the monarchs caused the conditions, 
or vice versa (see p. 240 et seq.). The strong contrasts between 
successive periods, the strong contrasts between monarchs 
close in period of time (which is expected by heredity), the 
rapidity of the changes are all in accordance with the truth 
having been told. It is highly improbable, virtually impos- 
sible, that historians could estimate all these monarchs in- 
correctly and make the latter generations tally with or properly 
resemble the earlier, — in a word, make the whole scheme hold 
together. 

For the view of history which postulates the extreme impor- 
tance of heredity and of selection, — this breeder's view of his- 
tory as one might call it, — I have proposed the phrase "gametic 
interpretation of history." This is preferable to using the 
word "genetic," as genetic has so many different connotations 
and has been used and abused until it has a variety of mean- 
ings. Genetics merely means the study of successive genera- 
tions. Of course history is genetic. Everything that has lived 



278 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

is genetic. Everything that grows is genetic. But the word 
gametic which is much in use among students of Mendelian 
heredity means something very specific. The gametes are the 
reproductive cells, both male and female. Gametically deter- 
mined qualities (differences) among adults are those that 
develop because of qualities (differences) already present in the 
reproductive cells from which the adult sprang. It is not con- 
ceivable that all adult differences can be due to gametic differ- 
ences, but it is conceivable that nearly all important adult 
differences are foreshadowed by differences within the germ- 
cells (gametes), and a gametic interpretation of persons, fam- 
ilies, dynasties, and nations is merely one which accounts for 
the great bulk of the observations in this way. "Gametic" is 
the antithesis of "environmental." 

The question now comes up, can we separate heredity from 
environment ? The answer from one point of view is, no ; 
from another, yes. The gametes unite and form the new in- 
dividual (zygote). The new individual must have an environ- 
ment to develop in. So from one point of view the gametic and 
environmental forces are inseparable. But as soon as the prob- 
lem becomes a problem of differences, it takes on an entirely 
new aspect. To prove that observed differences can be shown 
to be caused by one or the other and not both of these deter- 
miners, let us think of a simple illustrative experiment. An 
agriculturist cultivates two plots of ground side by side of ap- 
proximately equal richness. He then sows a large amount of 
seed of equal average quality. He then applies a fertilizer to 
one plot and not to the other. An observed difference would 
in this case be due to environment. By the same method he 
could, by keeping the other conditions identical and changing 
only the quahty of the seed, observe a difference which would 
be due to gametic differences. By this sort of reasoning it is 
already knowTi in a practical way that a great number of valued 
variations (differences) in domestic animals are due to gametic 
differences, and not to environmental. Differences in colour 
of the hair and eyes are caused by differences in the gametes, 



INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS 279 

while the linguistic differences among mankind are a good 
example of the action of environment.^ 

So it is with the interpretation which is given here for the 
influences of monarchs on political and economic history. It 
cannot be said that the monarchs caused the history or that 
they caused the conditions. But it can be contended that the 
differences between the conditions in one reign and the next 
were caused by the differences between the monarchs ; and this 
is the quintessence of this research. 

1 Woods, " Laws of Diminishing Environmental Influences," Popular Science 
Monthly, April, 1910; "Separating Heredity from Environment," American 
Breeders' Magazine, Vol. II, No. 3, 1911. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

CAUSATION IN HISTORY 

In this chapter I shall make an additional special and minute 
analysis of one period already covered, in order to show that 
authorities do corroborate each other, and that out of a number 
of causes one cause stands out preeminently. I shall then 
discuss other methods of unravelling historical causation and 
illustrate the need of a more exact and graphic representation 
of social and intellectual class-differences, and at the same time 
offer a new hypothesis for the rise and fall of the ancient oriental 
monarchies. 

From 1415 to 1619 the duchy of Brandenburg maintained 
an equilibrium, or gained slowly and steadily in importance 
under a line of Hohenzollern rulers either equal to or exceeding 
the average in ability and tenacity of purpose. During those 
two centuries there occurred no period of decline, nor was there 
a sovereign classified as weak. From 1619 to 1640 a sharp 
decline separated a strong reign, forty-eight years (1640-1688), 
from another reign of weakness (1688-1713), after which the 
grand expansion commenced which culminated in the Prussia 
of Frederick the Great. Here, then, being a well-plowed his- 
torical ground, and in comparatively modern times, it is there- 
fore an excellent field for deeper and more searching inves- 
tigation, for practical illustration as to the possibilities of 
measuring and verifying historical causation. 

The first of these periods of decline occurred during the 
rule of the elector George William (1619-1640). The regenera- 
tion occurred under his son, the Great Elector; the second 
decline corresponds to the reign of Frederick I ; and the second 
regeneration parallels the rule of Frederick William I, and Fred- 
erick the Great. 

280 



CAUSATION IN HISTOKY 281 

At the outset one must try to gain as clear a proof as pos- 
sible of the real mental and personal traits of George William, 
the occupant of the throne during the first of the debacles. 
Perhaps George William was unjustly blamed for a stroke of 
fate. Perhaps, because the times were hard, the king was 
despised by his contemporaries, while modern criticism has 
reversed the verdict. Perhaps the best historians will to-day 
be found to disagree among themselves. As a matter of fact 
historians do not take any other view than that George William 
was weak, though some like Voigt and Berner try to gloss over 
his failings and especially make a point of the difficulties of his 
position, coming as it did during the Thirty Years' War. 

It will pay to look closely into the question of George William's 
mentality and his relation to Prussia of the seventeenth cen- 
tury, for this prince may be taken as an example of a typical 
weak sovereign, placed in the "minus" grade on the basis of 
the usual statements. For this reason all the different authors 
are here quoted at the points where they make their most direct 
statement. Muirhead in the Encyclopaedia Britannica says : 
"This unfortunate prince may be described as the first utterly 
incompetent ruler of his line, though due allowance must be 
made for the extreme difficulty of his position." A. W. Hol- 
land in the eleventh edition of the same work says that George 
William "proved a weak and incapable ruler." According to 
Tuttle : "To the vacillation, the duplicity of this prince may 
be ascribed the inglorious part which Brandenburg played in 
the great religious struggle" . . . "a timid and capricious 
prince." Prutz gives the same idea : "He had neither nobility 
of ideals nor the sensitive conscience to lead him aright through 
great disasters. His nature was superficial." Pierson's com- 
ment is much the same : "The times demanded a prince of all 
ruggedness, and George William's nature was weak." Voigt, 
who does his best to exonerate George William's grandson, 
Frederick I (another inferior Hohenzollern), and is in general 
not in the least inclined to make harsh criticisms, shows by 
comparison with the high praise which he bestows on several 



282 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

other members of the family the sUght regard which he has for 
George Wilham. "This reign was one of the most unfortunate 
and harmful for the country. The Mark which since the end 
of the fifteenth century had been conserved for more than a 
hundred years in profound peace, by the wisdom of its princes, 
was dragged into the abyss of misery under George William. 
The cause for this has often been ascribed to the elector him- 
self and to his chancellor, Adam von Schwarzenberg, without 
considering if the circumstances of the times were not more 
to be considered than the men themselves. One thing at least 
is incontestable and that is that George William's lack of energy 
increased the evil." The position of Berner is much the same. 
He is reluctant to say a word against the sovereign, yet he 
cannot say a word in his favour. He puts it in this way : "In 
truth George William, all too much, lacked the Hohenzollern 
energy and decisiveness." None of these historians, it should 
be noted, attempt to credit George William with any ability 
whatsoever. They do not mention ability in any of its 
forms. 

Thus the picture is clear enough. Even if the last two 
writers had been alone consulted, the attitude they display 
towards George William, in comparison to their estimate of 
other Hohenzollerns, would result in the same grading. That 
is, — ■ the Great Elector, Frederick the Great, Frederick William 
I, Frederick of Brandenburg (d. 1440), and Albert Achilles would 
enter the "plus" grade. Eight or ten others would go in 
middle or doubtful grades, and George William and King Fred- 
erick I (d. 1713) would just as certainly find their way into the 
"minus" class. This does not prove that George William was 
weak, but it does prove that the standard historians agree in so 
placing him. Furthermore, no change has taken place from 
the opinions of contemporaries by whom he was held in just 
as little esteem. 

Now as to whether all authors may not have been very 
unjust and the man called weak because combinations of 
circumstances made him necessarily unsuccessful. This is 



CAUSATION IN HISTORY 283 

possible, but it is extremely improbable. Combinations giving 
rise to great difficulties had occurred in the lives of the mem- 
bers of this same family many times before, and did occur 
many times afterwards, yet these princes were not regarded 
as nonentities, but were valued and praised for one trait or 
another. Some were considered vigorous, able, masterful, 
some merely shrewd and thoughtful, some quiet and plodding, 
or their virtue and learning came in for recognition where the 
mental qualities failed to arouse enthusiasm. Frederick, the 
first elector, had great difficulties to overcome at the very 
start. His successor Frederick II had to deal with the turbu- 
lent cities, and to balance Mecklenburg, Saxony, and Hesse, one 
against the other. Albert Achilles had to master Pomerania 
and Mecklenburg, while the affairs of the empire occupied his 
attention at the same time. His successor John (Cicero) did 
not have to face any great problems. Here was a prince living 
in an entirely different period from George William, yet history 
places him in nearly the same inferior class. John (Cicero) 
was, however, a man of learning, and therefore gets some appre- 
ciation over and above George William. Joachim I may be 
said to have lived in comparatively easy times. He is pictured 
as narrow-minded and plodding and a shrewd politician. 
Joachim II lived during the period of the Reformation. The 
dates of his reign are from 1535-1571. He found serious com- 
plexities enough in the urgent religious questions of the time, 
and had he not been a clever politician and guided by the best 
of intentions, might have allowed his country to lapse into 
civil war. John Sigismund, who reigned from 1608 to 1619, 
also had the religious entanglements on his hands ; and he, 
also, dealt with them very successfully. More significant still, 
George William's son and successor had all the difficulties to 
overcome, which beset the father, yet this man not only brought 
the country out of its utter demoralization, but left it on the 
high road of prosperity. The sudden change is alone con- 
sistent with the view that the real trouble lay in lack of per- 
sonal leadership from 1619 to 1640 ; and the subsequent events 



284 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

which followed the death of the Great Elector only the more 
certainly confirm the idea. 

During the leadership of the Great Elector practically 
everything was in a flourishing condition. The nation was 
respected abroad and wonderfully active and progressive within 
its own, now considerably expanded, territory. The Great 
Elector was only twenty years of age when the death of George 
William, distracted and disconsolate, left him his Augean task. 
He carried it through to a wonderful completion. A definite 
policy was at once established. George William had no policy 
at all, unless his actions as described by Carlyle can be called 
a policy, "where the Titans were bowling rocks at each 
other, George William hoped by dexterous skipping to escape 
share of the game." George William expected to remain in 
neutrality, but it was a helpless neutrality, and Brandenburg 
became crushed between Denmark and the empire; while 
the eastern possessions (Prussia) fell between the upper and 
nether millstones, Sweden and Poland. The contestants in the 
Thirty Years' War had injured Brandenburg more than they 
had injured each other. The new elector sought neutrality, 
but it was to be an armed neutrality. The first thing to be 
done was to get rid of the half-hearted chancellor, Schwarzen- 
berg, who had been foolishly and obediently playing into the 
pocket of the Emperor. The elector then l)raved the anger 
of the Emperor and gave way temporarily in favour of Sweden ; 
but with a shrewd eye, and ^^^th the provision that the Swedish 
troops should be withdrawn from the electorate. 

By first turning his activities towards the army, by directing 
every effort to giving himself a weapon with which to back his 
claims, and command quest and attention, he was soon able 
to play one power against the other, to gain time in which to 
restore the wasted and scattered resources of his country. 
This was done so successfully that in eight years, at the treaty 
of Westphalia (1648) Prussia was able by its mere military 
potentialities to demand and receive excellent compensation. 
The satisfactory results of the treaty of Westphalia could not 



CAUSATION IN HISTORY 285 

have been carried through without an efficient army. This 
army, which had become one of the best organized in Europe, 
obviously came into being under the personal management of 
the Great Elector. 

" The reign of the Great Elector forms one of the most signal 
instances in history of the conquest of adverse circumstances 
by personal energy and merit. At the death of Frederick 
William, the new north German State of Brandenburg-Prussia 
was a power that had to be reckoned in all European combi- 
nations. Inferior to Austria alone among the States of the 
empire, it was regarded as the head and patron of German Prot- 
estantism, its area raised to 43,000 square miles, its revenues 
multiplied fivefold, and its small army nowhere surpassed 
in efficiency. The elector had overthrown Sweden and had 
offered a steady and not ineffectual resistance to the encroach- 
ments of France." ^ 

Most historians have acknowledged the importance of royal 
and individual leadership in Prussia ; especially at this point 
in the story. Naturally they notice the right about face, 
which conditions take just here. The truth is more obvious 
than usual ; but this is simply on account of the unusually 
contrasted types of character. The causative importance is 
not any greater here than elsewhere. It is merely more 
apparent. 

Granting for the moment that the favourable reversal in the 
nation's fortunes rose from the change in leadership, it is profit- 
able to speculate on a further set of questions concerning the 
common use of the word if. The failure of the reign of George 
William (1619-1640) has not unnaturally been ascribed to a 
number of causes, either isolated or combined. Though it has 
seemed futile to discuss the question of "i/s" in history, and to 
say that if such and such an event had not taken place then 
such and such consequence would not have followed, it may 
be of some clarifying value to show that there are probable and 

' J. F. Muirhead, Encyclopaedia Britannica. 



286 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

pertinent ways in which an '"i/" may be interpolated, as well 
as other ways in which such speculation is vague and vain. 

Among the excuses usually offered for the first Prussian 
setback are (1) weakness of the chancellor Schwarzenberg, 
(2) the chancellor's devotion to the Catholic faith, (3) the in- 
efficiency of the estates, (4) the jealousy and corruption of the 
ministers and advisers who surrounded the elector, (5) the elec- 
tor's o^vn poor education, and (6) the general difficulties of the 
Thirty Years' War. Of course actual and inherent weakness 
in the personality of George William is also recognized ; but 
the point is that, if we mention any other cause than this last 
one, the remark loses its pertinence. An open-minded con- 
sideration of the various possibilities will bring out the dif- 
ference between an explanation derived from the personality 
of George William and the above-mentioned first six explanations. 

As for the character of Schwarzenberg, it is probably true 
(as supported by the facts contained within this book) that all 
would have been well if the chief minister had been a great 
man. But the general history of Europe shows that able 
ministers were rare during this age, not nearly as numerous as 
able sovereigns, hence there was not any great likelihood that 
Prussia would find a man from non-royal ranks able to cope 
with the situation. Schwarzenberg favoured both Austria and 
the Catholic party, and as it turned out this was a bad policy, 
since, in the hands of Austria, he was continually hoodwinked. 
But to mention this Roman Catholic allegiance as a cause of 
Prussia's downfall is not to the point. It is merely another 
way of saying that Schwarzenberg lacked discernment. A 
more able man might have known which party to favour, or 
perhaps it was unwise to favour either party. There is no way 
of telling. Perhaps a greater man, like Frederick William who 
afterward did actually become the nation's restorer, would have 
favoured neither party and built up his owti integrity. 

As for the inefficiency of the estates it is obviously true that ij 
the estates had been sufficiently efficient, success would have 
stood in the place of failure ; but here again there was little 



CAUSATION IN HISTORY 287 

likelihood of a parliament at this time showing any concerted 
patriotism and organized intelligence. The same may be said 
about ministerial cabinets and the question whether the ad- 
visers of the king should be blamed for their personal jealousies 
and lack of light. 

In the ordmary affairs of life we are not interested in postu- 
lating a very improbable if as a crucial explanation in the turn- 
ing-point of a career. To take an extreme instance, — if a 
man were about to fail in business he would doubtless be saved 
if he discovered a gold mine in his backyard. Though such a 
remark would be inane, it would not be considered otherwise 
than to the point if some one should remark he might have been 
saved had his stepfather died one day earlier than his mother, 
instead of a week later. The difference in our interest in the 
two ifs lies in this, that the second chance is not so remotely 
improbable. It might easily have occurred. In the same 
way, if an untoward and unexpected accident befalls a person 
we then say — if this had not occurred, etc. In the ordinary 
affairs of life, common-sense or unconscious knowledge of 
probabilities comes to our rescue. The "fool" is the person 
who lacks the ordinary sense of proportion and consequently 
makes the foolish remarks. Ordinary common-sense will guide 
us up to a certain point in correctly allotting causes, but there 
IS a vast ground covered with entanglement and obscurity 
which can never be successfully plotted and measured by 
methods unsupported by the aid of instruments of precision. 
It IS here that statistical methods may properly be introduced. 
In the example of the man about to enter bankruptcy, our 
personal knowledge of the man himself may in some cases 
make us very sure just where the trouble lies, but in other 
instances the circumstances are too complex. It is a perfectly 
proper scientific question to inquire by statistical means how 
large a percentage of all business failures are due to incom- 
petency, how many to lack of capital, panics, or to exceptional 
accidents. This has been done and is done continually by 
the commercial agencies, although the returns are necessarily 



288 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

only an approximation. Although they do not help much in 
settling causes in the single instance, they would help if it 
could be shown that any series of effects is very strongly cor- 
related with any series of causes. If, for example, all the men 
who failed once in business always failed again sooner or later, 
and another type was found that always went steadily ahead, 
it might be concluded that for practical purposes, and broadly 
speaking, the whole trouble lies always with the men themselves. 
Suppose for the sake of argument that a very high correlation 
were found, not a perfect correlation or one represented by 
unity (r = 1.00), but one of, say, nine-tenths (r = .90). We 
should then be able to conclude for the special instance if we 
knew nothing of the particulars of the merits or demerits of the 
case. We could express our opinion as to the cause, be guided 
in our expectations as to the future success of the individual in 
question ; and all with a judgment now strengthened by a sense 
of proportion founded on probabilities. In other words, we 
depart from the position of the fool and his absurdly improb- 
able suggestions as to causes, and approach the position of wis- 
dom, just in proportion as we are able to measure and express 
probabilities. 

In this way an expression of opinion that the cause of the 
first Prussian downfall lay in the inherent weakness of the 
elector George William is a wiser remark than any other 
observation regarding the possible causes, for the simple reason 
that this is the more probable. There is more evidence that 
this factor in the totality might likely enough have been dif- 
ferent, and there is more evidence that if it had been different, 
a changed condition would have resulted. Why is this view 
as to the major cause, — that his inherent wealoiess was the 
real trouble, better than the view that his lack of education 
was to blame ? As a matter of fact, George William did not 
have a poor education. But supposing for the moment that 
his education had been neglected. My reply is that there is no 
evidence that differences in education have produced measur- 
able effects on the personalities of royalty. Some correlation 



CAUSATION IN HISTORY 289 

may exist, but this has not been proved as yet. From general 
consideration derived from various indications and modes of 
reasoning, this correlation is probably slight.^ There is on 
the other hand a great deal of collected evidence demonstrating 
that strength and weakness in royalty has resulted from heredity 
(combinations of the gametes) and is independent of ordinary 
environmental differences. 

To summarize the conclusions: the inherent personality of 
the elector is the most probable and the most important cause. 
This fits all the facts well. There is nothing to be said against 
such a theory; and the analogies of history hasten to lend 
support, by prop and pillar, brought from regions remote in 
time and place. The generalization that weak kings are usually 
associated with weak periods is rendered probable by a variety 
of indications all pointing in the same direction. These are 
discussed elsewhere. Now if the generalization is correct for, 
say, ninety per cent of the instances, then it has nine chances 
in ten, in this particular instance, of being the principal cause. 
No other isolated factor can stand up in the turmoil of hazard 
like this factor. No other factor had been, or is likely to be 
proved to be, so reliable as this under all the complexities which 
necessarily go to form the shifting drama of history. There- 
fore, knowing nothing certain as to the finalities of the actual 
reign under discussion, and remembering that no one can know, 
in the intricacies of the single instance, the "might have beens" 
that might have followed interposed and postulated ifs, the 
inherently weak nature of the elector remains as the best, 
most probable, and most important cause. To discuss the 
relative importance of the other six causes would carry me 
beyond the pretensions of this research, but this specific illus- 
tration has shown that the important underlying causes in 
history are not necessarily so difficult to demonstrate even for 
limited eras. In all attempts to imravel historical causation 
we must try to get explanations as far back as we can towards 

1 See "Laws of Diminishing Environmental Influence," Popular Science 
Monthly, April, 1910, for a summary and discussion. 
XT 



290 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

first causes ; the impossibility of ever actually arriving is no 
more a discouragement here than in the domain of those sciences 
whose length of life has been longer and whose oft-practised 
methods enable them to claim the adjective "exact." 

THE COMPLEXITY OF HISTORY 

It is sometimes erroneously thought that because an effect 
is the complex resultant of a large number of interwoven causes, 
it is hopeless to unravel the separate causes. Such may be 
true from the teleological point of view, but nothing can be 
further from the truth if the problem is looked at from the 
standpoint of everyday practice. If a motor car suddenly 
stops, the chauffeur is not concerned with final causes. He 
searches for the point or points that are not as they were before. 
He searches for differences. It is easy to give innumerable 
illustrations where practical problems of causation are made 
into problems of differences. For instance, the monetary value 
of introducing novelty of method into the management of a 
business corporation can be tested even though the intricacies 
of business management are infinitely complex. 

Let it be assumed that factors a, h, c, d, e, . . . n are the 
same before and after the test, and that the novel factor x is the 
cause of any change which may be observed. In strict truth, 
a, b, c, d, e, . . . n never are, at any successive period of time, 
exactly the same ; but if they are nearly the same it may suffice. 
Of course if x is found to be small, and the other factors a, h, c, 
d, e, . . . n are known for any reasons to change much, then 
only doubt and confusion could come to the investigator as a 
result of his laborious search. But in other cases x may be 
found large enough to be unmistakable. A decision as to the 
significance and value of the results belongs to the problem 
itself. There is no characteristic aspect to problems of history 
and nothing inherent to separate them from problems of every- 
day life. The idea, often expressed, that history cannot be 
made a science, that causes here cannot be properly sought for, 
because the various factors a, b, c, d, e, . . . n do not remain the 



CAUSATION IN HISTORY 291 

same, is an ill-founded one. In all the fluctuating realm of 
nature the subsidiary factors never do remain exactly the same. 
Even in the best cases that one can think of, the opinion that 
such and such a cause is the cause can be expressed only with a 
high degree of probability. 

Why did a certain man die? He was killed in a railroad 
collision. But how do we know that he did not die of some 
undeterminable bodily ailment just at the moment before the 
train was wrecked ? This is to the highest degree improbable ; 
so much so that we accept it as impossible and call the wreck the 
cause. Suppose it were a collision at sea and the man were 
drowned. Suppose the man were old and feeble and that some 
of the passengers in more robust health had been saved. We 
should still be unanimous in ascribing his death to the collision, 
if we had a belief (drawn from the probabilities of the case), 
that if this collision had not occurred, he would have lived much 
longer. Yet all along during the voyage the man's strength 
was declining. The conditions were not the same at any two 
periods of time, but this change in the a, b,c,d,e, . . . n factors 
does not prevent our calling x, the new factor, the main cause. 
But it is easy to see that these cases would gradually merge 
into cases which would give rise to argument as to the main 
cause of death. For instance, if all the passengers were saved 
but one, and if this one were in very poor health, say, in a dying 
condition, and died during exposure, it might be difficult to 
decide whether his death ought to be ascribed to the ship- 
wreck or not. 

It is just the same in dealing with historical causation. Some 
causes are impossible to separate, but other causes can be picked 
out as the real causes to a high degree of probability. It is 
not necessary that the series a, b, c, d, e, . . . n should be 
exactly the same, any more than in the questions of everyday 
life; it is only necessary that they should be probably, ap- 
proximately the same. The degree of this probability and of 
this approximation depends upon the necessities of the partic- 
ular case. There is no inherent objection to the application 



292 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

of such methods to history any more than to psychology ; for 
history is, after all, nothing but past psychology. Matters of 
history, it is true, never repeat themselves, but the same is true 
of everything else. In every problem the amount of accuracy 
required in the measurements depends upon the nature of the 
questions propounded. 

Many historians and economists have fallen into the error 
of supposing that the "method of differences," as it is called by 
logicians, is not adapted to the historical and social sciences. 
In order to apply this method they say that we must have two 
instances which tally in every particular except the one which is 
the subject of inquiry.^ While this is true, if a very exact deter- 
mination is required, it need not be read with such strict wording 
if a general and qualitative answer is wanted in the place of an 
exact and quantitative one. It is possible to imagine cases in 
which the expression "tally in every particular except the one 
which is the subject of inquiry" is made to read "tally in most 
particulars except the one which is the subject of inquiry." 
Here if the observed differences are comparatively great, we 
may be sure that the observed difference is a real cause of the 
result. 

Take, for instance, Mill's illustration of the failure of the 
"method of differences" to decide on the causative value of a 
protective tariff. It is true that it is impossible to find two 
nations which are exactly alike in every respect excepting 
only in the presence or absence of a protective tariff. But 
if all the nations in the world had a high protective tariff, 
and one of them suddenly abolished it and at the same time 
greatly declined or rose in economic strength in comparison 
with the others, we should be justified in postulating as our 
hypothesis the tariff change as the cause of the variation. If 
this were observed repeatedly, it would become more and more 
probable; even though all the nations differed in many par- 
ticulars. The reliability of the conclusion would depend upon 

' H. W. Farnam, on the contrary, makes a strong plea in " The Economic 
Utilization of History," Yale University Press, 1913. 



CAUSATION IN HISTORY 293 

the magnitude of the change and the repetition of the observa- 
tions, and might theoretically even become independent of the 
varying particulars within the nations themselves. 

The possibility of answering any problem of historical causa- 
tion must be decided on its own merits. We cannot tell until 
we try. If the observed difference is small we may be forced 
to abandon the analysis or inclined to give up the problem as 
affording too little certainty. If, however, a single observed 
difference be great, or, better still, if a repetition of similar dif- 
ferences (of considerable magnitude) be found running through 
a long period of historical time, we may have a result which 
can be rightly made to mean only one thing. The dynamic 
factor which history presents is its strong point as compared 
^^^th sciences like sociology, pedagogy, and psychology, where 
the observations have been made only for a short time. The 
differences which permeate history, "running differences" one 
might call them, are very important ; and it has not been ap- 
preciated what a great boon this time element is to the histori- 
ologist. Like the paleontologist his record is often faulty and 
uncertain in spots ; but the wide, sweeping curve over which he 
can view the panoramic changes makes it possible for him to see 
the trend of things and discover their causes in a way that would 
be impossible if he were obliged to concentrate his attention 
upon one age or one level of world strata. 

The time element of history, with its long series of repeated 
phenomena and its visible slowly moving points of change, 
outlining broad curves of recognizable contour, often teaches 
more than is revealed within the limits of the story itself. For 
it often gives a hint of what is to come. Within the units and 
minutiae, saltations may be found, but in a larger way nature 
makes no sudden changes ; the things which were will con- 
tinue to be, though never just the same. Still, for a time the 
same phenomenon will be likely to persist; and that is what 
gives a study of the past its practical value to the needs of the 
present and, in default of better prophecy, its claim to be in- 
dicator of the tendencies of the future. The personal influence 



294 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

of a few very great men is a phenomenon that doubtless started 
at a far earlier date than I have traced it in this volume. It 
was unmistakably of very great importance in Greece and Rome 
and even greater in Persia, Assyria, Babylonia, Jerusalem, and 
Egypt. Just how far back into the past, and in what neigh- 
bourhoods one must go to see the force at its maximum, cannot 
be said ; but there is every reason to suppose that, looking back- 
wards into the origins of human society, there was a time when 
the force was not nearly so great as it afterwards became. 

As the evidence stands, we may accept ten centuries in North- 
western Europe as a low limit for the duration of the importance 
of this power of royal or other personal leadership. Most of 
the fourteen nations have not been tabulated for centuries 
earlier than the fifteenth ; but the most cursory reading of the 
histories of earlier centuries shows the same coincidences, though 
the obscurity and confusion make all but the most towering 
personalities and the most notable material changes difficult 
to distinguish and unsafe to measure. 

It is unlikely that a phenomenon which started as long ago 
as the tenth century, and continued unabated in most coun- 
tries until the end of the eighteenth, should abruptly cease. 
The influence of monarchs in the nineteenth century must have 
been considerable. Napoleon, Alexander I of Russia, Leopold 
II of Belgium, Franz Joseph, and the Kaiser William II are 
positive forces that need to be reckoned with, as are the states- 
men Bismarck, Gladstone, Disraeli, Salisbury, Cavour, and 
Metternich ; while on the negative side the absence of statesmen 
of the first rank in minor and backward countries must also 
be taken into account in explaining political transformations. 
In many nations it would seem that the personality of the mon- 
arch is almost as important as ever. 

The facts brought forward in this volume must undoubtedly 
to a considerable extent support that view of history which 
attaches importance to the "great man" as a moulder of cir- 
cumstances. The facts, more than anjrthing else to my mind, 



CAUSATION IN HISTORY 295 

prove that whatever be the mental differences between the 
ordinary man and the man of genius, the differences are of 
great importance if judged by the results of their power. It is 
not easy to measure mental differences except in terms of achieve- 
ment ; nor from the standpoint of history do we much care what 
the natural talents of men may have been if they have failed 
to put them to the practical test. If from the pragmatic stand- 
point men differ much among themselves, and a few men may 
rise very conspicuously out of the masses in some nations and 
at some periods, then how very important it becomes not to 
think and talk of any people as if the individuals were all alike. 
To speak of "the Egyptians," "the Romans," "the Greeks," 
and "the English" without taking into account this question 
of intellectual and social variation within the nation, is to talk 
in the loosest and most confusing way. "The Egyptians" as 
a whole probably never had any highly developed building 
instinct, though some of their rulers had. "The Greeks" as a 
whole may never have been artistic and intellectual, though 
a percentage certainly were. "The Romans" may never have 
had a special faculty for law and government. Such talents 
may have been confined to the patrician families. Indeed the 
Roman people may never have declined for the simple reason 
that the Roman people may never have risen. The free citizens 
of Greece disappeared. They never were numerous. The 
Roman patrician families disappeared. They formed but a 
small proportion of the total population. 

The important point is that no investigations into the decline 
of countries can succeed without taking into account this matter 
of class differences and the approximate distribution of intel- 
lectual qualities. Such distribution, if represented graphically, 
must in the nature of things be different for different nations. 
As there are no two leaves on the same tree alike, so no two 
national curves of this sort could be just alike. Our present 
knowledge does not allow us to draw these curves with all 
desired accuracy, but it does enable us to sketch three extreme 
types of curves, and these graphs will at least help to clarify 



296 



THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 



much that I have had to say in former chapters, and also aid 
in an explanation which I am about to offer for the rise of the 
oriental monarchies of antiquity. 

If all the inhabitants of any community were made to stand 
in single file and a line were drawn along the tops of their heads, 
such a line would trace a curve something like half of a very 
broad bell (Figure I). Intellectual stature, natural ability, or 
ability judged by achievement, we may be sure, would also give 
a curve of the same general shape, though we do not know just 




FiGUKE I. 





jy] 




my 


^^^-"^"1^ 


^ ^ 


I 



Figure II. 

what its precise form would be. One way to gain some insight 
into the form of the curve for any one historical period is to 
measure the importance of a few leaders as against the masses. 
If the nation has gained ground -without the leadership of such 
men, then there is not much rise to the curve at the right as 



CAUSATION IN HISTORY 297 

compared with its centre. (Curves l-l or n-n express this dis- 
tribution.) But if the converse is true, then the few are much 
above the masses and the curve m-m is fulfilled (Figure II). 

For the period of history covered in this volume, Spain, Por- 
tugal, Turkey, and indeed most European countries would 
conform more to type m-m, while Great Britain since the seven- 
teenth century would be represented by the line n-n, with per- 
haps a greater percentage of defectives and dependents, cer- 
tainly a higher position of the masses, and a more gradual rise 
in the curve towards the right. 

The lower line l-l represents the mental distribution in savage 
tribes, the stage of evolution where hunting and fishing are the 
sole or chief means of livelihood. An example is furnished by 
the North American Indians of the United States at the time 
of the arrival of the Europeans. North of the tropics no great 
civilizations, so called, were found, no dynasties, no great kings, 
no men very much raised above their fellows, but all very much 
alike and all possessing such skill and force as gave them adap- 
tation to a life in the wilderness. In the regions to the south, 
on the contrary, in the warm lands of Mexico, Central America, 
and Peru, complex civilization had been established, and power- 
ful monarchs ruled over widely extended political groups and 
controlled the lives of myriads of people. The type of curve 
representing their state of society is of the order m-m. 

Now it requires very little historical observation to see that 
the first great civilizations of antiquity found their cradles in 
the warm and fertile regions of the globe, within the tropics or 
near the tropics ; always where the cultivation of the soil was 
easy and particularly in broad river valleys like the Nile, the 
Tigris, and the Euphrates. Furthermore, all these earliest civ- 
ilizations as far back as one can trace them by their monuments, 
even to their earliest beginnings, are always found under the 
control of dynasties of reigning monarchs. My hypothesis to 
account for both the appearance of the civilizations and the 
evolution of monarchial governments is as follows: — 

Whether man first originated in that part of the world where 



298 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

the Indian Ocean is now, or somewhere else, it is certain that he 
first made his appearance in a warm country ; also he must 
have from the first lived in groups or gregarious bands. As he 
multiplied he pressed farther and farther into the cooler regions. 
Not only would the more ambitious and energetic be the ones to 
depart, but long generations of life in the more rigorous climates 
would, by natural selection, cause an increase of the attributes, 
ambition, and energy. Man would become adapted to the hunter 
stage of civilization, to living in small groups or tribes. Such 
a condition may be pictured for Central Asia and Europe during 
long eons of time. Let any of these northern peoples return to 
the tropical river valleys, they would be able to conquer races 
that had never left the tropics — races that had never by natural 
selection acquired the qualities of ambition and energy. They 
would either exterminate the inferior tropical races or would 
bring them into slavery. In any event there would then take 
place a new set of changes causing a differentiation of all the 
people : A change from the type represented by the curve l-l into 
that represented by the curve m-m. It is not that the northerns 
arrived in the valleys of the Nile, the Tigris, and the Euphrates, 
and the fertile regions of America already men of genius, al- 
ready capable of controlling vast armies, constructing great mon- 
uments and predicting the movements of the stars ; but it is 
that only in such regions could the evolution speedily take place 
of castes mentally alert and superior to the masses, — castes 
from which men of genius would be likely to arise. The change 
within the community from type l-l to m-m is the kernel of the 
whole explanation. 

The reason for this change lies : — 

(1) in conditions of the climate and soil making agriculture 
easy; 

(2) in the accumulation of wealth ; 

(3) in legitimacy of descent ; 

(4) in sexual selection ; 

(5) in mental inheritance. 

In the hunter stage of society the accumulation of wealth is 



CAUSATION IN HISTORY 299 

not easy. Meat and fish soon spoil. There is no surplus to be 
striven for among the different members of the group, no prop- 
erty to be handed on to the next generation, no rights in land 
and buildings, cattle, corn, and slaves. But in a fertile agricul- 
tural country all these forms of wealth may become the objects 
of the fiercest warfare. The tropical man, strictly speaking, 
(the Ethiopian) does not now, nor did he ever, exert himself to 
acquire wealth. Wealth has no meaning for him. He does not 
want it, would not know what to do with it if he had it. He 
prefers his simple cabin and his life of good-natured ease. War- 
fare is between one tribe and another, not intratribal. 

It has been wrongly thought that this laziness and indifl'cr- 
ence of the tropical man is caused by the direct effect of the warm 
climate, but this cannot be true. It is not the direct but rather 
the indirect effect of the climate ; a question of natural selection. 
It is because none of his ancestors have ever lived for long pe- 
riods of time where natural selection could produce the opposite 
qualities. This must be so, for otherwise how are we to ac- 
count for the fact that in the hot climates there was at one time 
so much activity, indeed the earliest of the great mental awaken- 
ings of humanity, the beginnings of recorded history of archi- 
tecture and of accumulative thought ? Given a set of people 
now possessing ambition and energy, and in a territory where 
the accumulation of wealth is a natural phenomenon, there will 
inevitably take place a struggle. Even if the people differ very 
little among themselves, there \vill necessarily be some more 
desirous than others to acquire, and more able than others to 
have and to hold. Some will get more than their share, and as 
soon as this differentiation begins, it at once becomes self-ac- 
celerating, and for the following reasons. 

When the possibilities of amassed permanent wealth are 
introduced into the life of a community and some men are 
acquiring more than others, since life is short and none carry 
wealth beyond the grave, there soon arises a desire to bequeath 
this wealth to the close of kin in the next generation. In the 
earliest forms of society a loose relationship suffices. Descent 



300 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

of rights through the mother or through the sister suffices. But 
with greater property comes greater desire to know the exact, 
relationships, and the father wishes to know his own son, to 
whom he will leave his accumulated wealth. This means the 
beginning of family, in the modern sense, with legitimacy of 
descent through the male lines. In other words "father right" 
takes the place of "mother right." 

As soon as property is transmitted, and some fathers of 
families possess more wealth and power than others, and some 
sons and daughters are prospectively the heirs to more prop- 
erty than others, there will naturally arise a desire on the part 
of parents to unite their children in marriage with the children 
of other rich men. The ambitious will be more inclined than 
the unambitious to seek such unions. The ambitious and en- 
ergetic arc on the whole the ones who have succeeded most sig- 
nally in acquiring the property. Probably the more ambitious 
are on the whole the more able. Whether or not this last state- 
ment is true, certainly those who have most acquired property 
will, on the average, be the ones most endowed with ability so 
to acquire it. No matter how much the question of good luck 
may enter into their success, good luck \vill have to balance bad 
luck in a large number of cases, and the most successful will have 
to average the higher intelligence as far as intelligence means 
the practical acquisition of wealth and power. Thus the richer 
and more intelligent families will by the force of marriage unions 
(sexual selection) be brought together, while the poorer and 
less successful will be left to marry among themselves. 

When the rich and successful men were giving in marriage 
their sons and daughters to the sons and daughters of other 
successful men, they were seeking an immediate advantage for 
their family ; but they were really raising their families more 
than they supposed, for they were introducing the possibilities 
of new hereditary variations around higher levels. It is true 
that all the children of such selected unions would not equal 
their parents, some would revert to the general average level. 
But some would even exceed in natural aptitude the average of 



CAUSATION IN HISTORY 301 

their parents. Thus in each succeeding generation on the 
average there would be some whose natural ambitions and abil- 
ity to hold and control large fortunes would exceed any who 
had lived in the previous generations. The individual excep- 
tions to this tendency will make no difference except to delay 
the process. The whole matter hinges on the question of mental 
heredity. If mental qualities are inherited in the same way and 
to the same degree as physical, then this process of differentia- 
tion must take place wherever there is a large community and 
wealth is sought for. In a state of civilization where sympathy 
and charity are at a minimum, there soon becomes no room for 
a man who is not of either the lower or the higher caste. The 
people of the lower caste are allowed to remain because they 
are willing to serve their masters. Any men of the middle class 
who become pretentious are ruthlessly cut off. The process 
works towards forming more and more a caste small in numbers 
and smaller in percentage to the total population, but at the 
same time in point of power and intellect more and more raised 
above the general population. The high wave once formed, the 
struggles within the superior caste (for it must be remembered 
that these are the people most ambitious and grasping) tend 
towards the survival of only a few ; and lastly one family, the 
royal dynasty. Those willing to serve the dynasty and the 
ruling order of society (as the monarchs wish Heutenants, sol- 
diers, and priests) are allowed to survive and the curve m-m, 
with its aristocracy of the intellect,^ is formed. 

In the course of time there are so few persons in the extreme 
upper caste, and the whole nation is so dependent on their 
guidance, that a new danger is introduced. The whole had been 
formed into a sort of waterspout structure, the slender point of 
which, growing higher and higher and narrower and narrower, is 
liable to break. This is just what has happened so often in 
history. The whole civilization of the nation, depending on 

1 There never was an aristocracy that was not an aristocracy of the in- 
tellect, and there never was an aristocracy that was not an aristocracy of 
wealth. 



302 THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS 

the brain power of a few persons, soon passed away when those 
few were destroyed. 

Such I beheve to be the true account of all the early states 
of civilization, and such was to a considerable extent the sup- 
posed strength of Spain and Portugal, and several other nations 
of more recent times, though their dynasties were not self- 
engendered out of native stock. 

These latter dynasties, like all other modern European dy- 
nasties, were evolved out of the Germanic races — Norsemen, 
Scandinavians, Saxons, etc. The same five forces led to the 
same series of social and intellectual differentiations — the 
waterspout formation with the governing caste more and more 
elevated in natural ability at the same time fewer and fewer, 
not in actual numbers but in percentage of the whole population. 
This phenomenon did not take place in the north, any more than 
it did in the south, until the people passed from the hunting 
stage to the agricultural stage, until accumulated wealth became 
an object for intratribal competition. It was slower and later 
in the north because agriculture was more difficult. The curve 
also started in the northern' countries from probably a higher 
general level ; that is, the great mass of the people in Germanic 
and the northwestern countries had, even before the days when 
agriculture became the chief source of wealth, already acquired 
much in the way of mental alertness, and instincts of industry 
and ambition. 

On the whole it seems probable that the curve for modern 
Europe at the present time is more of the order n-n than m-m, 
at least in comparison with the civilizations of antiquity. Just 
why it is so we do not know, but it is perfectly clear that there 
are always at work two sets of forces, — one which we may call 
the aristocratic force tending towards the formation of m-m; 
the other, which we may call the democratic, tending to reduce 
the curve. The democratic force is made up for the most part 
of impulses belonging to the milieu, to ideas, institutions, com- 
binations on the part of proletariat, revolutions, diffusion of 
rights of suffrage, and perhaps to the greater extention of edu- 



CAUSATION IN HISTORY 303 

cation. It is not the province of the present book to discuss 
this — the environmental side of the question ; but it is the 
generalized conclusion from the facts here collected and re- 
viewed, that as far as the greater portion of human history is 
concerned, this leveUing tendency cannot have equalled its 
opposing force — for how otherwise could the supremely im- 
portant few have been engendered ? The aristocratic force is 
made up of impulses lying in the germ-plasm. Its consequences 
have been continually coming to the fore. No matter what may 
be the form of government, nor how much the laws of man give 
power, in theory, to the people, as long as sexual selection tends 
to mate like with like, just so long the laws of mental heredity 
will work towards the formation of governing .classes inherently 
superior to the sons of other men. Universal suffrage and uni- 
versal education, the most carefully equalized scheme of social 
opportunity cannot prevent this tendency of the homogeneous 
to pass into the heterogeneous, — this splitting up of mankind 
into sub-varieties, castes, and breeds. It is part of the trend of 
organic evolution. Nor does all this fail to have a significance 
in relation to the future. It is probable that this separation 
into castes is increasing rather than diminishing at the present 
day in all European countries and especially in the United States, 
where the opportunities for acquiring wealth are particularly 
abundant. Historical science can scarcely at present predict 
the future, but it can interpret the past. If the work of the 
world has been initiated and directed by a few very great men, 
and if these men are the predetermined products not of outward 
but of inward differences, the true interpretation of history 
must hinge upon the gametes, and the laws of history will be 
found to be but a part of the laws which govern all organic life. 



APPENDIX I 

BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR FRANCE 

a. Encyclopaedia Britannica. 9th and 11th editions. 
h. La grande Eneyelopedie. 31 vols. Paris, 1886-1902. 

A. Lavisse, Ernest (Editor). Histoire de France, depuis les 

engines jusqu'a la Revolution. PubUee avec collaboration. 
9 vols. Paris, 1901-1911. 

B. DuRUY, Victor. Histoire de France. Nouvelle Edition illustree. 

2 vols. Paris, 1870. — BB. same. Paris, 1879. 

C. Kitchen, G. W. A History of France. 3 vols. Oxford, 1873- 

77. [A widely read text-book.] 

D. Martin, (Bon Louis) Henri. Histoire de France depuis les 

temps les plus recules jusqu'en 1789. Nouvelle edition revue 
et augmentee. 4th ed. 17 vols. Paris, 1860-62. 
[Consulted for the less readily accessible periods.] 

E. VuiTRY, Adolphe. Etudes sur le regime financier de la France 

avant 1789. 2 vols. Paris, 1883. 

F. Levassettr, Pierre Emile. Histoire des classes ouvrieres et 

de I'industrie en France avant 1789. 2d edition. 2 vols. 
Paris, 1900, 1901. 

G. Beer, Adolf. Allgemeine Geschichte des Welthandels. 3 vols. 

Wien, 1860. 

[A compilation, very useful for statements concerning commerce 

and industry.] 

H. Wright, J. H. (Editor). A History of All Nations. 24 vols. 
Philadelphia, 1905. 

[Sparingly consulted to fill in lacunae.] 

J. GuizoT, F. P. G. History of France. 3 vols. London, 1880. 

K. Dareste, C. Histoire de France. 9 vols. Paris, 1874-80. 

L. GiBBiNS, H. de B. The History of Commerce in Europe. Lon- 
don, 1891. 

X 305 



306 



APPENDIX 



FRANCE 



Ruler 



Condition of Country 



Hugh Capet 
Prudent, bravo, conciliatory, 
and politic, perhaps unscrupu- 
lous, pious. Altogether an enig- 
matical person, about whom 
too little is known to form a fair 
opinion, a; b; A ii, pt. ii, 144; 
BB i, 211; C i, 191. 

— Robert II 

Weak and prone to insou- 
ciance. Pious and kindly, be- 
loved by his people. Literary 
tastes, a; A ii, pt. ii, 153 ; BB 
i, 214-5; C i, 195-6; H ix, 
86. 

Henry I 

According to some authorities 
he was weak and extremely indo- 
lent. Others think he may have 
been quite the reverse. There are 
no contemporary records by which 
to judge him. a ; A ii, pt. ii, 167 ; 
B i, 221 ; C i, 202. 

=fc or + Minority of Philip I 
Baldwin V, Count of Flanders, Regent 
He was a son-in-law of Henry 
I, was able and energetic and 
well Liked by the people, a ; 
H ix, 87. 

— PhUip I 

Of fair natural capacity, but 
lacking in ambition, industry, and 
courage. False, dissolute, grossly 
sensual, and without honour. 
i'The weakest of the Capetians." 
a; A ii, pt. ii, 168; B i, 227- 
8; C 1,205,212, 249; Hix,87. 



987-996 ± 

Country pacified, authority 
established. France definitely 
separated as a kingdom dis- 
tinct from Germany. A ii, 
pt. ii, 144; 149-153; B i, 214; 
C i, 184. 



996-1031 — 

An inglorious reign. Civil 
wars and constant struggles 
against barons, a; A ii, pt. ii, 
159-61; B i, 215, 219; C i, 
197-9 ; // ix, 86. 

1031-1060 — 

Kingdom invaded by the 
Normans. Discord and petty 
warfare, a; A ii, pt. ii, 161-3 ; 
B i, 221 ; C i, 200, 202, 209. 



1060-1067 



+ 



Order maintained and sedi- 
tion suppressed, a; B i, 227 ; 
C i, 208 ; H ix, 87. 



1067-1100 or 1108 — 

Interminable petty warfare 
and desolation. French terri- 
tory invaded by the Normans, 
who seized and burned Mantes. 
A ii, pt. 168-75; B i, 227-8, 
257, 283; C i, 209, 210, 213; 
H ix, 87. 



APPENDIX 



307 



Ruler 
+ Loxiis VI 

Able, brave, strong and gener- 
ous. A noble character. Pure 
in Ms private life. Universally 
esteemed by the people, a; b; 
A ii, pt. ii, 311-3; C i, 250, 258. 



zfc or — Louis VII 

It is difficult to gain a clear 
idea concerning this king. Not 
much is known about him. He 
was pious and was praised by the 
monkish chroniclers. In abiUty 
he was probably not above medi- 
ocrity, was well educated, just, and 
liberal, "de incurs pures^' (La- 
visse). o ; A iii, pt. i, 22, 25, 26, 
27, 59-63, 76, 78; B i, 301-3, 
304, 307 ; C i, 261, 262, 263, 266, 
275 ; H ix, 87. 



Condition of Country 

1108 or 1100-1137 + 

Establishment of national unity 
and authority over the lawless 
barons. Better days for the 
lower classes. Beginning of the 
organization of the communes. 
Increased power over the crown. 
Many cathedrals built, b; 
A ii, pt. ii, 314; 315-25; 328-9; 
B i, 285, 290. 

1137-1180 zt or + 

During the first part of the 
reign, in spite of the disastrous 
crusade (1147-1149), good finan- 
cial management and internal 
order maintained under Suger. 
Trade and agriculture made some 
progress. After 1152 the coun- 
try declined in dominion and re- 
source ; against which may be 
offset the growth in town life 
and concessions to the lower 
classes. Royal authority gained 
in importance, o ; b; A iii, 
pt. i, 22, 25, 26, 27; 59-63; 
76, 78; B I, 301, 303, 307; C i, 
262, 263, 266, 275 ; H ix, 87. 



-|- Philip II (Augustus) 

A cold, clear mind. Crafty 
and sagacious. Equally able in 
war and diplomacy. Charged 
with deceit and lack of generosity. 
Materials for a moral portraiture 
are meagre. Was at least more 
or less a libertine, a; b; A iii, 
pt. i, 222, 282-4; B i, 324; C 
i, 276, 287, 314. 



1180-1223 + 

France unified and greatly 
strengthened. Normandy, Poitou, 
Touraine, Anjou, Vermandois 
and Picardy conquered. Order 
and security maintained. Cities 
grew. Industry and commerce 
improved. Financial administra- 
tion good. A iii, pt. i, 89, 97-8, 
129-43, 151, 197, 211, 222-7, 
232-8, 238-50; B i, 309, 321, 
322, 324; C i, 276, 277, 286, 
296-7, 312, 313, 315. 



308 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 
Louis VIII 

Authorities differ as to his 
ability. Some credit him with 
vigour and understanding, others 
call him weak, and attribute 
his activity to the promptings of 
his queen. He was pious and 
chaste. ^ iii, pt. i, 284 ; Ci, 316; 
Div, 131; J u, 116; A' ii, 190. 



Condition of Country 

1223-1226 — 

English lost half their pos- 
sessions in France. Submission 
of lower Poitou, Limoges, and 
Perigord. Successful but costly 
crusade against the Albigenses. 
A iii, pt. i, 284-95 ; B i, 325, 326 ; 
Ci, 316; // ix, 250; J ii, 116. 



+ Minority of Louis IX 

Blanche of Castile (the queen mother) 
Regent 

Firm, prudent, masterful. Ex- 
ceptionally able and ambitious. 
Proud, imperious, and steadfast 
in her friendships. A good 
mother. Her chief faults appear 
to have been obstinacy and jeal- 
ousy, a; b; A iii, pt. ii, 5 ; B 
i, 321; Ci, 319, 321; Div, 133-4; 
H ix, 253. 



1226-1236 



+ 



Barons subjugated and tran- 
quillity established. Submission 
of Languedoc and territorial in- 
crease in the south. A iii, pt. ii, 
16-7; B i, 328; C i, 320, 321; 
D iv, 150-1 ; H ix, 253. 



+ Louis IX (Saint Louis) 

A great king and a great man. 
Firm, energetic, and just. Wise 
and profound. Hous, affection- 
ate, conscientious. His private 
life temperate and pure, a ; A 
iii, pt. ii, 18-40 ; fi i, 328 ; C i, 
337, 340. 



1236-1270 



+ 



A period of conspicuous prog- 
ress, the only detracting features 
being the brief and unsuccessful 
seventh and eighth crusades. 
More territory was acquired in 
the south of France. Security 
was everywhere maintained and 
private warfare suppressed. 
Population, commerce and in- 
dustry increased. Many im- 
portant public buildings were 
erected. A iii, pt. ii, 52-9, 82; 
B i, 333, 336, 338, 344, 347 ; C i, 
337, 340, 342, 344 ; H ix, 253-5. 



APPENDIX 



309 



Ruler 
— Philip III 

Weak and ignorant. Controlled 
by others. Pious, docile, and 
virtuous. He led a monklike 
life. A iii, pt. ii, 103 ; C i, 346. 



Philip IV (The Fair) 
Accounts are too meagre. 
Generally considered cold and 
merciless, but some contempora- 
ries picture him as pious, chaste, 
humble, and charitable. A iii, 
pt. ii, 119, 120, 122-3; B i, 373; 
C i, 353, 355, 380, 381, 388 ; H 
ix, 334. 



Condition of Country 

1270-1285 — 

Internal tranquillity continued. 
Catastrophe of the "Sicilian Ves- 
pers." French foreign influence 
decUned. Disastrous expedition 
against Aragon. A iii, pt. ii, 
113-7; B i, 361; C i, 346, 347, 
349, 351-2. 

1285-1314 ± 

Some increase in territory, the 
most important of which was 
the city of Lyons. Foreign pres- 
tige and influence considerable. 
France humbled the papal power 
and dictated in church affairs. 
Grinding taxation and much op- 
pression. Coinage debased. Com- 
merce injured. A iii, pt. ii, 230-8 ; 
B i, 362, 363, 364, 371, 372, 373, 
376 ; C i, 355, 358, 373, 381 ; E i, 
181, 325; F i, 469; H ix, 333, 
334. 



Louis X 

An obscure king, about whom 
little is known. Undoubtedly a 
cipher in the affairs of his time. 
Generally considered childish and 
pleasure-loving, leaving the af- 
fairs of state to others. A iii, pt 
ii, 119; Ci, 382; H ix, 353. 

Philip V 
We know almost nothing con- 
cerning his ability or character. 
A iii, pt. ii, 119. 

Charles IV The Fair 

Obscure, like his two brothers 
who preceded him. A iii, pt. 
ii, 119. 



1314-1316 — 

Lawlessness and private war- 
fare. Disastrous expedition 
against Flanders. Famine, a ; 
A iii, pt. ii, 309 ; B i, 377 ; C i, 
383 ; H ix, 353. 



1316-1322 — 

Short reign showing much con- 
fusion and persecution. B i, 
379 ; C i, 386 ; // ix, 355. 

1322-1328 

Brief and unimportant reign. 
Coinage again debased. A iii, 
pt. ii, 238 ; 25 i, 380 ; C i, 387. 



310 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 

— Philip VI 

Incapable and headstrong. Vio- 
lent, cruel, false, and heartless. 
He was, however, pious, and it is 
said that he loved his children. 
Some generous impulses in his 
erratic nature, a ; A iv, pt. i, 
13, 14, 88; B i, 397; C i, 391, 
393. 



Condition of Country 

1328-1350 — 

French defeat at Crecy. Com- 
merce hampered. Finances badly 
managed. Black Death. A iv, 
pt. i, 16, 19-26, 58-64, 73, 78, 
87, 88; B \, 382, 383, 390, 
392, 395, 396 ; C i, 393, 394, 397, 
417, 418, 421, 422; E ii, 217, 
220-66 ; F i, 523. 



— John II 

Rash, ignorant, obstinate, and 
incapable. Passionate, cruel, 
self-indulgent. Fond of gaycty 
and luxury. A iv, pt. i, 92, 170; 
B i, 397 ; C i, 423. 



1350-1356 — 

Evil days full of confusion 
and misery. Defeat at Poitiers. 
France humiliated. Fiscal de- 
pletion. Excessive taxation. A 
iv, pt. i, 95, 98, 100-2, 105-8; 
B i, 397, 405, 410, 417; C i, 
423, 434; E ii, 217, 207-270; 



— Charles V 

(Regent during the captivity of John II) 
At tliis period he was between 
nineteen and twenty-three years 
of age. A foolish, indifferent, 
and extravagant youth, even 
cowardly, cold, and dissembling. 
A iv, pt. i, 117; B i, 416; C i, 
435, 448., 



1356 1360 

Misery and despair continued. 
Jacquerie uprising and other 
acts of lawlessness. Humiliat- 
ing Treaty of Bretigny. Fur- 
ther financial decline. France 
obliged to pay a large ransom 
for King John, b; A iv, pt. i, 
117-9, 126-44, 131, 132, 145-56; 
B i, 411, 414 ; C i, 436, 444, 451 ; 
E ii, 293, 309. 



— John II 

(Returned to France for a brief 
space and then went back into 
capti\ity in England. Charles 
V again regent during John's 
absence. For characteristics see 
above .) 



1360-1364 — 

Deplorable condition of pesti- 
lence and disorder continued. 
The "free companies" ranged 
through the land. A iv, pt. i, 
161-5; B i, 416, 417; C i, 453; 
F i, 523. 



APPENDIX 



311 



Ruler 
+ Charles V 

In his mature years, clear, cold, 
prudent, patient, tenacious. 
Scholarly in his tastes. Pious, 
tolerant, benignant, chaste, and 
temperate. Somewhat unprin- 
cipled in his methods, b; A iv, 
pt. i, 182-90 ; B i, 418 ; C i, 435, 
454, 455, 470-3 ; H x, 66. 



Condition op Country 

1364-1380 -I- 

Advance in general prosperity. 
Reestablishment of order. Re- 
forms in the army. Good fiscal 
policy. Territorial increase by 
diplomacy and arms. Regain of 
Ponthieu, Querci, Rouergue, 
Limousin, Agenais, Poitou, 
Saintonge, a great part of Guy- 
enne, Bretagne, and also part 
of Normandy, b; A iv, pt. i, 
195-8, 205, 206, 208, 214-25; 
B i, 418, 425, 428, 429, 430, 431, 
436 ; C i, 455, 456, 463, 465, 466, 
470, 472 ; E ii, 162, 217 ; F i, 637. 



— Minority of Charles VI 

(Regency divided between the three 
uncles of the king) 



— Charles VI 

Weak and feeble mind. Be- 
came insane. Had temporarily 
lucid periods. Uncontrolled in 
his impulses and dissolute in his 
pleasures. His only merit was his 
good nature. A iv, pt. i, 308; 
C i, 477, 485-7, 489 ; // x, 66-7, 
71-2. 



1380-1388 — 

Lawlessness, revolts, disorders. 
Financial difficulties. A iv, pt. i, 
268, 269, 270-1, 272, 273-7; C i, 
474, 481, 483-4 ; F i, 510 -4. 

1388-1422 — 

French defeated at Agincourt. 
Rouen lost. Country torn asun- 
der between rival factions. Ex- 
cessive and burdensome taxa- 
tion. A iv, pt. i, 322-63, 368-70, 
374-82; B i, 455, 457, 459, 462, 
464; C i, 485, 486, 489, 491, 493, 
494, 507, 509 ; i^ i, 521-2. 



— Charles VII 

A selfish prince, fond of ease 
and luxury. Much given to de- 
bauchery. There were periods 
when he aroused himself to politi- 
cal work or to war, and then 
showed himself not without abil- 
ity. His judgment and prudence 



1422-1461 + 

Expulsion of the English from 
all France except Calais, Havre, 
and Guiness Castle. Financial 
reforms. Taxation regulated. 
Standing army organized and 
estabUshed. Lawlessness sup- 
pressed. The general misery 



312 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 

were always acute, until the last 
years of his life, when he was beset 
by morbid terrors. "Died of 
starvation, insane through fear 
that his son would poison him." 
a ; A iv, pt. ii, 20, 139, 228-9 ; B 
i, 449, 469, C i, 500, 546, 549. 



Condition of Country 

continued, though somewhat 
alleviated. A iv, pt. ii, 53-8, 
71, 74, 79-85, 8(>-93, 94^101, 
103-11, 126-8, 150-1, 233-5, 
253-4, 317-9; B i, 474, 478, 497, 
502-4, 508, 511-5; C i, 516, 
531, 545-6, 548-9, 552; F i, 
535-41. 



+ 



Louis XI 



Able, crafty, astute. Extreme- 
ly ambitious and industrious. 
Cold, notoriously unscrupulous, 
suspicious, irascible. Also a bad 
husband and father. A iv, pt. 
ii, 326, 418 ; fi i, 574 ; C ii, 28. 



1461-1483 + 

Gain in strength and unity. 
Increase in territory. Main- 
tenance of law and order under a 
strong hand. Advance in com- 
merce and industry, especially 
in the towns. Loss of personal 
liberty. 



+ Minority of Charles VIII 
Regency of Anne, daughter of Louis XI 
Resembled her father. Ener- 
getic and well informed. Firm, 
wise, and prudent. Haughty and 
austere. Selfish and perhaps un- 
scrupulous in her methods, a ; 
A iv, pt. ii, 421, 437; B i, 576, 
584 ; C ii, 103, 104. 



1483-1491 + 

Revolts suppressed. France 
triumphed over the rivalry of 
Austria. Allies defeated. Brit- 
tany forced to submission. Re- 
form in the mode of election of 
the States-General, o ; A iv, 
pt. ii, 423-4, 429, 433, 434 ; B i, 
583-6, 588 ; C ii, 103, 104. 



— Charles VIII 

Romantic imagination but in- 
ferior ability. Ignorant, heed- 
less, self-willed. Given to de- 
bauchery. His only good trait 
was his amiable disposition, a ; 
6; A V, pt. i, 3; B \, 576; C ii, 
118, 129. 



1491-1498 ± 

Wasting wars in Italy, bring- 
ing no advantage to the French. 
Loss of Cerdagne, Roussillon, 
Burgundy and Artois. Com- 
merce and industry continued 
good. B i, 582^, 586, 592, 593- 
596 ; C ii, 129 ; F i, 554-5. 



APPENDIX 



313 



Ruler 
— or ± Louis XII 

Intellect inferior or mediocre. 
Relied much on the judgment of 
others. His character is some- 
what puzzling. Lazy and self- 
indulgent, yet well-intentioned. 
Noted for his good nature and 
humane qualities, yet cruel in 
warfare. Frivolous and de- 
bauched in younger years, simple 
and domestic in later life, a ; b; 
A V, pt. i, 41-2 ; B i, 597 ; C ii. 
134, 139. 



Condition of Country 

1498-1515 + 

Weak foreign policy (Italian). 
Otherwise a period of progress. 
Improvement in the army. 
Finances brought into good order. 
Advance in agriculture. Main- 
tenance of law and order. Prog- 
ress in the arts brought from 
Italy, especially architecture, b ; 
A V, pt. i, 116; B i, 597, 614, 
618, 619-24 ; C ii, 137 ; F ii, 6 ; 
G ii, 229 ; H x, 324. 



± or -|- Francis I 

"The king of culture.'' Brill- 
iant, brave, ambitious and ac- 
complished, but shallow. Want- 
ing in judgment, resolution, and 
force of character. Chivalrous, 
but selfish and self-indulgent. 
Lacking in sense of duty, a; b; 
A v, pt. ii, 43, 97 ; B i, 628 ; C ii, 
169; H xi, 50-1. 



1515-1547 ± 

Wasted resources in unsuccess- 
ful foreign wars, though French 
territory remained intact. Com- 
merce, and especially industry, 
increased. The middle classes on 
the whole prospered, though there 
was much disorder and discon- 
tent. Taxes were burdensome. 
Judicial reforms. Some loss of 
political liberty, a; b; A v, 
pt. ii, 37, 43, 48, 62, 63, 67, 93, 
119, 120 ; B i, 628 ; BB i, 693-5 ; 
C ii, 169-71 ; F ii, 43 ; G ii, 229 ; 
H xi, 211-2. 



d= Henry II 

Of mediocre or inferior intelli- 
gence, duU, gloomy, and obstinate. 
He was perhaps honest and not 
evil in his intentions, but his 
character lacked strength and 
he was much under the influence 
of his aged mistress, Diana of 
Poitiers. Cruel at times, a ; A 
v, pt. ii, 98, 124, 125; BB i, 673; 
C ii, 259, 260 ; H xi, 300. 



1547-1559 ± 

Foreign wars, ending in the 
Peace of Cateau-Cambresis, may 
be regarded as indecisive. Pub- 
lic finances declined. Industries 
advanced, o; A v, pt. ii, 137, 
175-8; BB i, 673, 674, 681, 
684; C ii, 261; F ii, 52, 153; 
G ii, 230 ; H xi, 303. 



314 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 

— Minority of Francis II 

Regency divided 

Francis of Guise, — military 
affairs. 

Charles of Guise, — civil affairs. 

Catherine de Medici, — title, 
nothing more. 



Condition of Country 

1559-1560 — 

Violence, party factions, civil 

and religious strife. A vi, pt. i, 

25 et seq. ; BB ii, 1-12 ; C ii, 229 ; 

G ii, 231-2. 



+ Minority of Francis II 

Regency of Catherine de Medici 

A remarkable and highly gifted 
woman. A consummate schemer, 
unscrupulous in her means. 
Devoid of moral sense, a ; A 
vi, pt. i, 42 ; BB ii, 2; C ii, 294, 
357. 



1560-1571 ± 

A period of religious wars 
which injured mercantile and in- 
dustrial activity. Improvement 
in the financial conditions, and 
in the administration of justice, 
A \n, pt. i, 58, 63, 104; BB ii, 
13, 22, 23; F ii, 55, 56; G ii, 
231-2; //xi, 311. 



— Charles IX 

Weak and vacillating. Im- 
moral and false. Diseased in 
mind and body. Character at 
once feeble and \iolent. BB ii, 
32; C ii, 347, 357, 364; H xi, 
318. 



1571-1574 — 

Religious wars continued, 
bringing ruin and desolation. 
Taxes heavy. Trade and indus- 
try declined, a; A vi, pt. i, 
125-52; C ii, 359, 361; F ii, 
55, 56, 143; G ii, 231-2; H xi, 
322. 



— Henry III 

Idle, childish, deceitful, dis- 
sipated. Is accredited with nat- 
ural gifts, though he never put 
them to any use. A vi, pt. i, 
192-3, 212-3; BB ii, 42; C ii, 
366 ; H xi, 322. 



1574-1589 — 

Conditions similar to the 
preceding reign. Civil and re- 
ligious wars. Bands of lawless 
adventurers overrun the land. 
Public wealth squandered. Taxes 
become more burdensome. In- 
dustry languished. A vi, pt. i, 
223-7; BB ii, 48, 50, 55-8; 
C ii, 372, 394; F ii, 143-7; G 
ii, 231-2. 



APPENDIX 



315 



Ruler 
+ Henry IV 

Brilliant gifts. Tremendous 
energy. Dauntless courage. 
Not highly educated but intellect 
was vigorous and sane. Elo- 
quent as a speaker. By nature 
was fitted to be an arbitrary 
ruler and leader of men. Moral 
nature deficient. Selfish and sen- 
sual and craved excitement. In- 
gratiating in his manner and 
popular with all classes, a ; A 
vi, pt. i, 306-8 ; C ii, 441 ; // xi, 
427. 

— Minority of Louis XIII 

Marie de Medici, Regent 

Incapable, capricious, irreso- 
lute, b; BB n, 118; C iii, 45; 
also, Batiffol, "La vie intime 
d'une reine de France." Paris, 
1906. English translation, 1908. 



— Minority of Louis XIII 

De Luynes (non-royal) at the head of 
affairs 



— Louis XIII 

Weak in -will, childish in mind. 
Gloomy, ill-tempered, cold- 
hearted, even cruel. Usually 
described as chaste in his private 
life, but there is some doubt. BB 
ii, 160 ; C ii. 493. 



Condition of Country 

1589-1610 + 

First part of the reign devoted 
to the establishment of authority 
and order. Second part a period 
of exceptional advance. In- 
crease in trade and industry. 
Improvement in agriculture. 
Financial reforms. Better roads, 
bridges, streets. Many public 
buildings erected. Acquisition of 
new territory between Lyons 
and Geneva, a; A vi, pt. ii, 
1-18, 23-85; BB ii, 97, 101-4, 
106; C ii, 440, 448, 449; F ii, 
151-86 ; G ii, 232-4. 

1610-1617 — 

Government in a condition of 
feebleness and indecision. In- 
dustry suffered. Treasury de- 
pleted. International prestige 
weakened. The burdens of taxa- 
tion became increased. A vi, 
pt. ii, 171, 181, 190; BB ii, 118; 
F ii, 186 ; G ii, 234 ; H xii, 164. 

1617-1621 — 

Unsettled conditions continued. 
Unsuccessful attack on the Hugue- 
nots in Languedoc. B ii, 132. 

1621-1643 ± 

Acquisition of Roussillon, Cata- 
lonia, and Sedan. France at- 
tained a position of international 
importance. But the financial 
condition was bad, and the masses 
were impoverished. There were 
internal disorders and conspir- 
acies, and loss of personal liberty 
in the growth of absolutism, a ; 
A vi, pt. ii, 412-34 ; BB ii, 145, 
146 ; C iii, 49, 61-3 ; F ii, 183, 
188, 194-8, 201 ; G ii, 235, 236-8. 



316 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 
zfc Minority of Louis XIV 

Anne of Austria, Regent 

Ambitious and proud. Her 
intelligence was of a narrow sort, 
suitable only for intrigue. A vii, 
pt. i, 4 ; C iii, 85. 



Condition of Country 

1643-1661 ± 

Close of the Thirty Years' War, 
resulting in treaties of West- 
phalia and the PjTenees which 
were advantageous to France. 
Considerable territorial gain. 
To offset this, the internal ad- 
ministration was weak. Poor 
commercial and agricultural 
showing. Taxes increased. Fi- 
nancial resources declined. A vii, 
pt. i, 16-24, 27-9, 59, 60, 65, 66, 
81; BB ii, 167-9, 170, 192; 
C iii, 105; F ii, 199; G ii, 239. 



+ Louis XIV 

Great ambition and industry. 
A shrewd but narrow mind. Ex- 
cessively vain, egotistical, and 
selfish. Much of a libertine but 
had several popular and amiable 
qualities. A vii, pt. i, 119-38; 
C iii, 148. 



1661-1715 

First part of the reign marked 
by wise internal administration 
and brilliant victories over alien 
powers. The last part was a 
period of decline. The country 
was impoverished by foreign wars. 
The internal administration was 
bad. The revocation of the Edict 
of Nantes cost Prance much in 
wealth and population. A vii, pt. 
i, 168-404 ; BB ii, 195, 200-287 ; 
C iii, 356, 424; F ii, 204, 235, 
254, 366, 420; G ii, 239-245, 
253 ; L 159. 



+ Minority of Louis XV 

Philip, Duke of Orleans, Regent 

Endowed with a brilliant mind. 
Versatile and accomplished. Lit- 
erary, scientific, and musical 
tastes. Idle and indifferent, with 
a dissolute moral nature, o; C 
iii, 364. 



1715-1723 =fc 

Diplomatic position weakened. 
Disorder in the finances. Trade 
and industry increased. Im- 
proved roads and canals. Agri- 
cultural condition somewhat amel- 
iorated. BB ii, 346, 349-54, 
367; C iii, 388; G ii, 253, 254, 
256-65, 266. 



APPENDIX 



317 



Ruler 
— Minority of Louis XV 

Louis, Duke of Bourbon, Regent 

Dull and brutal, greedy and 
debauched. Completely under 
the influence of his mistress, the 
Marquise de Prie. a ; b; BB ii, 
357 ; C iii, 392. 



Condition of Country 

1723-1726 — 

Diplomatic and financial man- 
agement weak. Emigration of 
Huguenots. BB ii, 357, 358-9; 
C iii, 392. 



Minority of Louis XV 
Cardinal Fleury at the head of affairs 



1726-1731 + or ± 

Improvement in the financial 
condition. Trade and com- 
merce revived. The general 
administration was not, how- 
ever, particularly definite and 
strong. Maritime power al- 
lowed to decline. BB ii, 360-2; 
C iii, 393, 395-9 ; G ii, 282. 



— Louis XV 

Inferior capacity. Weak, in- 
dolent, timid, sensuous, and cold- 
blooded. Notorious for his dis- 
solute life, a ; 6 ; c ; C ii, 388. 



1731-1774 — 

Disastrous Seven Years' War. 
Loss of Canada. Decline in com- 
merce. Financial troubles. Un- 
der excessive taxes the peas- 
antry were reduced to extreme 
misery. BB ii, 360, 365, 376, 
381, 386, 387, 394, 395, 401, 
402, 403, 409, 411, 414, 416; C 
iii, 402, 467; F ii, 549-59; G 
ii, 282-4; L 161. 



± or — Louis XVI 

Well meaning and endowed 
with fair intelligence, but weak 
and vacillating. Obstinate and 
narrow-minded, and at the same 
time often under the influence 
of others. Had many private 
virtues. 6 ; c ; BB '\\, 434 ; C 
iii, 470. 



1774 1793 — 

First part of the reign shows 
some improvement in finances, 
agricultiire, and in international 
prestige. Last part of reign a 
horrible picture of general ruin, 
misery, and anarchy, terminating 
in the Revolution. a;BZ?ii, 435- 
437, 438, 443, 444, 448, 479, 464- 
505 ; C iii, 470, 480, 488 ; M 94. 



318 APPENDIX 



BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR SPAIN 

a. Eneyelopaedia Britannica. 9th and llth editions. 

A. Dunham, S. A. History of Spain and Portugal. (Lardner's 
Cabinet Cyclop.) 5 vols. London, 1832-1833. 

[Out of date but interesting to compare with modern opinions.] 

B. Lafuentk y Zamalloa. Historia General de Espaha. 30 vols. 
185Q-1867, etc. 

[Out of date for the medieval period.] 

C. Burke, U. R. History of Spain from the Earliest Times to the 

Death of Ferdinand the Catholic. 2 vols. London, 1895. CC. 
2d ed., 1900, contains additional notes, and an intro. by M. A. S. 
Hume. 

D. Altamira y Crevea, R. Historia de Espaha y de la civiUzacidn 

espanola. Barcelona, 1900. D.D. 2d ed., eorregida y aumen- 
tado. Barcelona, 1909-. 

E. Lembke, F. W. Geschichte von Spanien. 7 vols., 1902. 

F. Prescott, W. H. Ferdinand and Isabella. 3 vols. Boston, 1857. 

G. Hume, M. A. S. Spain, its Greatness and Decay. Cambridge, 

1899. 
H. RossEEUw St.-Hilaire, E. F. Historia d'Espagno. 14 vols. 

Paris, 1844-1879. 
J. Beer, A. Allgemeine Geschichte des Welthandels. 3 vols. 

Wien, 1860. 
K. Lea, H. C. A History of the Inquisition in Spain. 4 vols. Lon- 
don and New York, 1906-1907. 
L. CoLMEiRO, Manuel. Reyes Christianos desde Alonso VI hasta 

Alonso XI en Castilla, Aragon, Navarra y Portugal. Madrid, 

1891. 
M. Catalina Garci'a, J. Castilla y Le6n durante los reinados de 

Pedro I, Enrique II, Juan I y Enrique III. 2 vols. Madrid, 

1891-1893. 

+ Ferdinand I 1035-1065 + 

Exceptionally able and virtu- Garcia of Navarre defeated, 

ous. "One of the greatest and Castile extended south of the 
best princes.': a; A ii, 151, 152, Duero. Mohammedans also 
155, driven out of a large part of 

Portugal. Leon acquired by 
marriage and well administered. 
Fueros granted, a; A ii, 135, 154, 
155; B iv, 185-211; E ii, 349- 
356. 



APPENDIX 



319 



RtTLBR 

Sancho II. 
Obsciire 

4- Alfonso VI, the Brave 

A valiant and renowned war- 
rior. "Very fierce and astute 
but a keeper of his word." o ; A 
ii, 160 ; E ii, 408. 



— Urraca 

A notorious character. Vio- 
lent, fickle, licentious, incapable, 
a; A ii, 160-164; C i, 215; L 
25, 33-34. 

4- Alfonso VII, the Emperor 

Brave, firm, and ambitious. 
Headstrong and immoderate, a ; 
B ii, 167 ; L 35. 



Sancho III 
Characteristics unknown. 
168. 

— Minority of Alfonso VIII 
(Control divided) 



Aii, 



Condition of Countrt 

1065-1072 

Obscure. 

1072-1109 

"Dawn of Christian pros- 
perity in Spain." Thirty-nine 
victories and two defeats. Gali- 
cia in northwest secured. 
Toledo captured. People re- 
ceived privileges, o; A ii, 158; 
B iv, 225, 444 ; E ii, 373, 409. 

1109-1126 — 

Uninterrupted discord and 
party strife. Moors made in- 
roads, a; A ii, 160-164; C i, 
215 ; E iv, 35, 36, 37 ; L 15-34. 

1126-1157 + 

Order restored, dominion 
greatly enlarged from the Tagus 
to the Sierra Morena. a; A ii, 
165-7; B iv, 512-34; v 49, 82; 
C i, 216; Eiv, 121, 123,147,149, 
151; L35-8. 

1157-1158 ± 

Brief and unimportant reign. 
Two minor victories. 

115&-1168 — 

A period of anarchy and in- 
trigues. A ii, 169-170 ; E iv, 181, 
et seq., 676 ; F i, 48 ; L 51-7. 



+ Alfonso VIII, the Noble 

Able, resolute, unselfish. 
Rightly called "noble." a; Ci, 
218 ; E iv, 273, 291, 292. 



1168-1214 -f- 

Ruination of the Moham- 
medan Empire in the great 
battle at Las Navas de Tolosa, 
1212. Peace at home, a; A ii, 
46, 48 ; B V, 127-235 ; C i, 219 ; 
E iv, 255. 



320 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 
— Minority of Henry I 

(Queen Borengaria regent for 
less than a year, then Alvaro 
Nunez de Lara.) 

Ferdinand III, the Saint 

Distinguished for great miU- 
tary talent and bigoted religious 
zeal. A sincere friend of learning. 
Said to have been just, amiable, 
and well-meaning, a ; A ii, 183 ; 
D i, 370. 



— Alfonso X, the Wise ' 

Impractical and visionary. 
Especially distinguished for his 
learning and for his literary and 
scientific achievements. Ener- 
getic, restless, extremely ambi- 
tious. Well-meaning though 
arbitrary. A singular compound 
of weakness and strength. As a 
king he was weak, a; A ii, 183 ; 
184, 190; C i, 357; E iv, 677; 
Li, 112, 114, 119. 

+ Sancho IV 

Brave, able, warlike, tyranni- 
cal. "Not a Uttle cruel." False 
to his agreements. Had literary 
tastes and is considered to have 
written two works in prose, a ; 
B vi, 309-16 ; E iv, 360 ; H iv, 
308; Li, 139, 145, 151. 



' Would be + if all his mental traits 
be considered, see page 70. 



Condition of Country 

1214-1217 -1- 

Civil wars. "The House of 

Lara became the scourge of the 

country." A ii, 175-8; E iv, 

322-30. 

1217-1252 -I- 

Castile and Leon united. 
Great conquests of territory 
from the Mohammedans. Cor- 
dova, the whole of Murcia, and 
the cities of Jaen and Seville 
taken. Beginnings of commercial 
activity. Cortes composed of the 
three states met in 1250. a ; 
A ii, 178-180, 182; B v, 313- 
38; Di, 368-71, 437; E iv, 353, 
368, 379, 391, 408; / i, 217-8. 

1252 1284 — 

Much civil discord and some 
conflict. No gain against the 
Mohammedans. Language, 

literature, science, law, and 
commerce advanced. Bad fis- 
cal policy, a; A ii, 184, 185, 
186; B vi, 6-102; C i, 290; 
E iv, 443, 676, 677; L i. 111, 
114-9, 127-8. 



1284-1295 ± 

(Difficult to get the truth 
about this reign.) Family feuds 
and wasted resom-ces. The king 
continually obliged to defend his 
throne. Successful over the pre- 
tenders and rebels. Tarifa in 
Africa taken 1292, otherwise no 
gain against the Moors. Com- 
mercial advance, a ; A iii, 194— 
6; B vi, 315, 316; C i, 291; 
E iv, 629, 665, 666, 667, 670 ; H 
iv, 308, 309, 314, 316, 318, 319; 
Ji,218; Li, 139, 145, 146, 151. 



APPENDIX 



321 



Ruler 

+ Minority of Ferdinand IV 
Maria, Regent 

Great qualities of heart and 
mind. Skilful as a diplomatist 
and politician. B vi, 356; E v, 
501 ; H iv, 324, 325 ; L i, 154, 
399-401. 



Condition of Country 

1295-1302 ± 

Disasters and rebellions which, 
however, were surmounted in the 
end. Foreign enemies, especially 
Aragon, frustrated. "Herman- 
dad " (association of free citizens) 
founded, a; A ii, 196-9; B vi, 
360, 364, 365, 366; C i, 293; 
E V, 77, 79, 85, 89, 95; H iv, 
323, 325. 



— Ferdinand IV 

Died aged twenty-six. Weak 
and inferior capacity. His moral 
traits are difficult to judge. 
Some say vindictive, passionate, 
and unjust, others the opposite, 
a; Ci, 293; H'S36; Li, 178. 

Minority of Alfonso XI 
(Regency divided). 



+ Alfonso XI 

Hard, brutal, licentious, ty- 
rannical, but a just and vigorous 
ruler and warrior. His enemies 
are said to have honoured him. 
a; A ii, 86 ; CC i, 295-300 ; D i, 
575-6. 



± Peter the Cruel 

Bold, enterprising, not with- 
out ability. Lacking in judg- 
ment. Ambitious, tyrannical, 
and obstinate. Generally con- 



1302 1312 — 

Interminable dissensions and 
revolts. Gibraltar taken from 
the Moors, 1309. a; A ii, 196, 
197, 200; B vi, 370, 371, 374; 
C i, 205, 343; E iv, 115-6, 
121-3. 

1312-1324 — 

Civil wars and desolation, a; 
A ii, 205 ; C i, 296 ; E v, 145, 
153 ; // iv, 402-3, v, 106 ; L i, 
400-1. 



1324-1350 



+ 



A troubled reign, yet Castile 
grew in unity, importance, and 
political liberty. Great victory 
at Salado over the Moors, 1340. 
Algeria conquered. Cortes in- 
creased in importance. A ii, 205 ; 
C i, 296 ; D i, 575-6 ; E v, 187 ; 
H iv, 433-9, V, 100. 

1350-1369 ± 

A period of turbulence. Wars 
with Aragon. Civil war waged 
between Peter and Henry for 
the throne. No marked advance 



322 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 
sidered the incarnation of cruelty 
and vice.i B vii, 216-308 ; E v, 
500, 501 ; // iv, 445. 

+ Henry II 

Ambitious, forceful, cruel, and 
tyrannical. Is said to have 
shown clemency at times, a ; 
A ii, 232, 233 ; E iv, 30, 31 ; H y, 
107. 

— John 1 2 

Weak in body and mind. Mild 
and amiable. Just and generous. 
A ii, 240 ; B vii, 354 ; // v, 150. 



Minority of Henry III 
Regency in a Council 



Condition of Country 
or decline, a; A \\, 213-24; 



C i, 302, 312; D i, 576-585. 
V, 325-33 ; H iv, 473, v 106. 



E 



+ Henry III 

Wise, resolute, and just. Be- 
loved by his people, a; A i\, 
243 ; B ix, 9 ; E vi, 108 ; H v, 
160. 

— Minority of John II 

Ferdinand I of Aragon, Regent 

Prudent and able. An ex- 
cellent character, a ; A ii, 244 ; 
B viii, 167-8 ; C 2, 383-4. E vi, 
197 ; H V, 212-3. 

1 There has been an attempt to exonerate Peter from the charges of mad 
cruelty with which his name has always been associated, but it cannot be said 
that most writers have been won over from the older view. 

Ticknor, History of Spanish Literature i, 165; Schirrmacher, v, 500; Lafu- 
ente, vii, 308 ; and Dunham, ii, 230 ; give an extended discussion of the ques- 
tion of Pedro's cruelty. 

2 Virtues graded wrongly at (3) in "Heredity in Royalty." 



1369-1379 -I- 

Kingdom pacified and enemies 
subdued. Some progress in juris- 
prudence, a; il ii, 234; C i, 
324; E vi, 30, 31; // v, 106, 
109, 112; Mii, 3-146. 

1379-1390 — 

Castile defeated by Portugal 
in the important battle of Al- 
jubarota. In other encounters 
with the Portuguese the Span- 
iards were generally unsuccessful, 
a ; A ii, 237 ; D i , 587 ; ilf ii, 203- 

420. 

1390 1400 — 

Civil wars without security 

for person or property, a ; An, 

241 ; B viii, 37, 42, 43 ; E vi, 83 ; 

H V, 152, 153, 154. 

1400-1406 -I- 

Tranquillity restored. Diplo- 
matic successes. Legislature ad- 
vances, a; yl ii, 243; C i, 328, 
336 ; H V, 158. 

1406-1416 + 

Law and order maintained. 

Fortress of Antequera taken from 

the Moors, a ; A ii, 244 ; B viii, 

167, 168, ix, 14. 



APPENDIX 



323 



Rtjler 
Minority of John II 
(Catharine, Regent) 

Regency in a Council. 



Condition of Country 

1416-1418 — 

Rival factions and discord again 
extend their influence throughout 
the kingdom. B ii, 245. 



— John II 

Weak, almost an imbecile. 
Pleasure loving and indolent. 
Amiable and had some refined 
tastes, a ; A ii, 245, 257 ; B viii, 
168 ; F 1-5. 



1418-1454 — 

Deplorable condition of affairs. 
Anarchy and disorder. The 
Moors ravaged the country again. 
Spain, however, gained in riches 
(Burke), a; A ii, 245-57; B 
viii, 168, 425, ix, 97; C i, 357; 
E vi, 205, 207-10, 212-367; 
F i, 5-8. 



— Henry IV 

Extremely weak-minded, in- 
dolent, cowardly, and debauched. 
"Good-hearted." a; A ii, 266; 
jB viii, 496, 497 ; Fi, 164. 

-|- Isabella 

Remarkable ability and noble 
virtues. Prudent, resolute, and 
dignified. Sympathetic, unself- 
ish, and modest. The only im- 
putation against her is excessive 
religious zeal, o; A ii, 282; E 
vii, 358 ; F iii, 184-205. 



1454-1474 — 

Rebellion, disorders, disasters, 
decline, a; A ii, 257-266 ; B 
viii, 497, ix, 98 ; E vi, 438, 439, 
461, 477-9, 537. 

1474-1479 + 

Order established. Reforms 
in judiciary, finance, and legis- 
lation, b; A ii, 269-270; B ix, 
137-40, 146, 163, 164-96; E vi, 
587, 588, 589, 595, 601, 603; H 
V, 409-419-425, 433-7. 



ARAGON 



± or + Ramiro I 

Bold, ambitious, and enter- 
prising. Rather obscure, a ; 
C i, 198. 



+ Sancho I (Ramiro) 

Restless and enterprising. A 
successful warrior. A iii, 80 ; 
E ii, 335. 



1035-1063 -I- 

Aragon consolidated, began 
as a separate kingdom within 
narrow confines. Area and im- 
portance increased, a; A iii, 
79; B iv, 244-5; C i, 198; E 
ii, 332-5 ; H iii, 295. 

1063-1094 + 

Conquests from the Moham- 
medans. Area extended as far 
as the Ebro. A iii, 80 ; C i, 198 ; 
E ii, 335. 



+ Peter I 

As brave and enterprising as 
his father. Noted for his justice 
and chivalry. B iv, 449 ; H iii, 
356. 

-|- Alfonso I, the Battler 

Brilliant military leader. Bold 
and relentless. Accused of du- 
plicity and cruelty, a ; A iii, 83 ; 



1094-1104 + 

Important conquest of the city 

of Huesca. a ; A iii, 83 ; B iv, 

449 ; C i, 198 ; H iii, 356 ; / ii, 

341. 

1104-1134 + 

More territory conquered 
including the cities of Tudela, 
Saragossa, Tarragona, Catalonia, 
and most of the country south 
of the Ebro. a; A iii, 84, 87; 
C i, 190; Di, 371-2; E iii, 6- 
20; //iii, 371, 410. 



+ Ramiro II (The Monk) 

A man of little account. Lacked 
ambition and courage. Said to 
have been modest and well-mean- 
ing. B iv, 538 ; C i, 201 ; E iii, 
27. 



1134-1137 — 

Dangers and difficulties. 
Navarre immediately threw off 
the Aragonese yoke. Castile 
won best cities from Aragon. B 
iv, 538; E iii, 28, 29; U iii, 
410-2. 



324 



APPENDIX 



325 



Ruler 
4- Raymond Berenger 

Consort of Petronilla. He had 
a superior character. Intelligent, 
determined. Excellent moral 
traits. A iii, 90; C i, 214; D i, 
373 ; G iii, 42, 43. 



Condition of Country 

1137-1162 + 

Dominions consolidated and 
united with Catalonia. Three 
more cities taken from the in- 
fidels. 1153-1162 were peaceful 
and prosperous years. A iii, 90 ; 
B iv, 555, 556 ; C i, 202 ; D i, 
373 ; E iii, 43, 208. 



-f- Alfonso II 

Able, ambitious, and accom- 
plished. A patron of the trou- 
badours, and author of poems in 
Provengal. a ; A iii, 91 ; C i, 
217 ; D i, 374 ; E iii, 53. 



± Peter II 

Mediocre in ability. Not partic- 
ularly firm. Frank, generous, 
impulsive, sensuous. Evinced 
courage as a warrior on several 
occasions. A iii, 91-94; C; E 
iii, 70 ; H iv, 55. 



1162-1196 4- 

Several fortresses taken 
south of the Ebro. Prestige in 
foreign affairs enhanced. Ara- 
gon relieved from homage to 
Castile. First Cortes 1163, at 
which the Third Estate was rep- 
resented, called by Queen Pe- 
tronilla on the death of her hus- 
band. A iii, 91; B v, 155; D 
i, 374 ; E iii, 53, 54. 

1196-1213 + 

No special prosperity or prog- 
ress. One fort taken from the 
Moors. Aragon assisted Castile 
in the great and successful battle 
of Las Navas de Tolosa. Coun- 
try impoverished through trib- 
utes to the Pope, a ; A iii, 94 ; 
B V, 188, 190; C i, 217, 218; 
E iii, 70-1 ; H iv, 48, 56. 



Minority of James I 
(Regency divided) 



+ James I, the Conqueror 

A bold, powerful leader of men. 
Fiery, cruel, inexorable, licen- 
tious. Impulsive and magnani- 



1213-1228 — 

Internal disturbances. De- 
cline in law and order. A iii, 97 ; 
B V, 385, 387 ; E iii, 72, 82. 

1228-1276 + 

Important conquest of Valen- 
cia, Mureia, and the Balearic 
Isles. Improvements in juris- 



326 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 
mous on occasions. High literary 
talent, a; A iii, 104; B iii, 76; 
C i, 257 ; D i, 383. 



4- Peter III, the Great 

Able warrior and politician. 
Ambitious, enterprising, just, and 
merciful, o ; fi vi, 191 ; C i, 276, 
280, 283 ; F i, 100. 



Alfonso III, the Magnificent 
Twenty-one years old when he 
came upon the throne. Died 
aged twenty-six. Material is 
lacking for the proper estimation 
of his character, but he appears to 
have been a mediocre, perhaps a 
feeble, and certainly a prodigal 
prince. £; \a, 255, 256 ; // v, 352. 

+ or± James II, the Justice 

Brave, vigilant, diplomatic. 
Magnanimous and benevolent, 
but debauched, a ; A iii, 120, 
121, 123; B \-i, 426; H iv, 386; 
L i, 222. 



Condition of Country 
prudence. Increase in riches and 
trade in this and succeeding 
reign, a; A iii, 105; B v, 382; 
D i, 379-383 ; E iii, 140, 141, 142 ; 
F i, 110. 

1276-1285 -I- 

Sieily conquered. Malta re- 
duced. French invasion re- 
pulsed. Pri\alegio General (the 
Magna Charta of Aragon) granted. 
A iii, 109; B vi, 107, 112, 129- 
136, 180-6 ; C i, 283 ; F i, 100, 
110; Ji, 215. 

1285-1291 db or -l- 

Conditions remained station- 
ary. Pohtical intrigues. No spe- 
cial advance except in the power 
of the great vassals and com- 
munes. A iii, 116 ; H v, 352 ; L i, 
217-20. 



1291-1327 + 

Gain of sovereignty over Cor- 
sica and Sardinia. Successes in 
the Mediterranean. Peace and 
strength at home, especially in 
legislation. Sicily abandoned, a ; 
A iii, 124; B vi,409; C i, 286; 
E V 74:-, H iv, 384, 386; L i, 
220-2. 



— Alfonso IV, the Benign 

Feeble in energy and mind. 
Good-hearted. Fond of his peo- 
ple. On several occasions per- 
haps dishonorable and treacher- 
ous. A iii, 126; B vi, 454; H 
iv, 388, 390, 395, 396, 397. 



1327-1336 — 

An insignificant reign. No ad- 
vance. Commerce suffered some- 
what from the attacks of the 
Genoese, a ; A iii, 126 ; B vi, 
446, 451, 454; C i, 314; H iv, 
390-2, 395, 397. 



APPENDIX 



327 



Ruler 
+ Peter IV, the Ceremonious 

Active, sagacious, inflexible, 
but deceitful, violent, perverse, 
and extremely cruel. A iii, 143 ; 
144; B vii, 80, 142; C i, 314, 
316 ; H iv, 396, v, 1, 52-3. 



Condition of Cottntrt 

1336-1387 ± 

No marked advance or de- 
cline. Wars both civil and 
foreign, leading to disasters as 
well as glories. The chief gain 
was legislative. The ancient priv- 
ileges were confirmed, and con- 
stitutional Liberty reestablished 
under a firm central power, a; 
A iii, 127^4; B vii, 61, 71, 
84, 142; Ci, 315; Fi,94:; H iv, 
478, V, 1. 



— John I, the Careless 

Weak, indolent, and pleasure- 
loving. A voluptuary. Fond of 
hunting, music, and poetry, a; 
A iii, 146; B vii, 410, 420; C i, 
317. 



1387-1395 ± 

Short and unimportant reign. 
"Not without its troubles." Ef- 
forts to suppress insurrections 
in Sardinia and Sicily were but 
partly successful. Much discon- 
tent prevailed, a ; A iii, 145-6 ; 
B vii, 413-20; C i, 318; E vi, 
170. 



=b Martin, the Humane 

Of about average capacity. 
Good soldier, noted for benignity 
and justice. A iii, 147, 150; B 
vii, 447 ; H v, 176 ; E vi, 175. 



1395-1410 + 

Advance, offset by internal dis- 
orders. Sicily and Sardinia 
peaceful. Advance in the power 
of the justiciary. A iii, 147-50; 
B vii, 429, 432; E vi, 174, 
175, 176 ; // V, 176, 183. 



Interregnum 



+ Ferdinand I, the Just 

Vigorous, sagacious, moderate 
and just, a; A iii, 155; E vi, 
197 ; H V, 212-3. 



1410-1412 — 

Civil wars and disorders. A 
iii, 150-2; B viii, 118-20; H v, 
189-97, 202. 

1412-1416 + 

Peace and order established. 
A iii, 155-6 ; B viii, 134, 147, 
505 ; H V, 200, 202, 206. 



328 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 
± or + Alfonso V, the Magnanimous 
Firm, able, generous, humane. 
The only charge against his char- 
acter is that he was licentious 
and at times unduly severe ; but 
his virtues receive more praise 
than censure, a ; A iii, 157-8 ; 
B viii, 354 ; C i, 348 ; H v, 279- 
80. 



Condition op Country 

1416-1458 d= 

No marked advance or de- 
cline. Wars in Italy occupied 
most of the reign. Conquest of 
Naples, which proved a vain 
glory. Internal order well main- 
tained. Commerce injured, o ; 
A iii, 158, 165 ; B vui, 355; H v, 
276, 278 ; J i, 216. 



-j- John II 

Ambitious, enterprising and 

able. One of the shrewdest 

princes of his time. Ferocious 

temper, tyrannical, licentious, 

a; B viii, 421-2; C i, 354; F 
i, 175 ; // V, 390. 



1458-1479 + 

Wars and insurrections in Cata- 
lonia, in which the king triumphed 
in the end. Commerce and in- 
dustry made a creditable show- 
ing during these last two reigns, 
a; A iii, 165; B viii, 376-9, 
387, 417, 533-5, 543; H v, 
367, 368, 373, 387 ; F i, 55. 



Ferdinand and Isabella 
+ Isabella (see Castile) 

+ Ferdinand V, the Catholic 

Brave, active, ambitious. One 
of the shrewdest statesmen of his 
century. Impartial, temperate, 
and economical in his habits ; but 
is charged with duplicity, bigotry, 
selfishness, and lack of gratitude. 
o; A a, 283; E vii, 685-6; H 
183, 237-40. 



1479-1504 + 

Insurrection subdued. Good 
order established. Conquest of 
Granada. Final subjugation of 
the Mohammedans, who were 
either converted or driven out. 
Reforms in the government. In- 
creased prosperity of the country. 
Beginnings of colonial expan- 
sion. Growth of commerce, a ; 
A ii, 272, 273, 278, 279, xi, 48, 
68, XV, 10; E vii, 203, 204; 
H vi, 165; J ii, 141. 



+ Ferdinand V, the Catholic 
(Regent) 
{Vide supra.) 



1504-1506 — 

Turbulent epoch settling the 
regency. A ii, 285-8; B x, 
276-7 ; H V, 175 ; J ii, 143. 



APPENDIX 



329 



Ruler 
— Philip I, the Handsome 

Weak, insignificant, indolent. 
A profligate devoted to pleasure. 
Gentle and pacific. B x, 300 ; 
C ii, 247; F iii, 256-7; H vi, 
183. 



Condition of Country 
1506 (for two months) — 

Disorders and discontent. De- 
pletion of the public revenues. 
B X, 299-300; C ii, 247, 249; 
H vi, 183, 184. 



-{- Ferdinand V, the Catholic 
(Regent) 
{Vide supra.) 



Regency for Joanna ' 
(Cardinal Ximenes, Regent) 
A very able man. 



1606-1616 + 

Insurrections quelled. Con- 
quest of Oran, Burgia, Algiers, 
Tunis, and Navarre. Extension 
of commerce. Kingdom raised 
again to importance. Agricul- 
tural improvement, a ; A ii, 
288-90; B x, 395, 415-6; E 
vii, 685; H vi, 203, 207, 267, 
269. 

1616-1517 ± or + 

Order maintained. Wars suc- 
cessful in Navarre, disastrous in 
Africa. B X, 446, 447, 458, 461, 
462, 471 ; C ii, 289 ; H vi, 292, 
296, 297. 



+ Charles V (I), the Emperor 

Inordinately ambitious. Was 
accomplished, restless, crafty, cold, 
and selfish. Gloomy and eccen- 
tric in his latter years, a ; H vii, 
206-12 ; also E. Armstrong, 
"The Emperor Charles V." 2 
vols. London, 1902. 



1617-1666 d= or + 

In this and the succeeding 
reign Spain reached her apogee 
of outward splendor. On the 
credit side we may mention the 
conquest of Mexico, Peru, Milan, 
and Tunis, and the increase of 
money. On the debit side this is 
perhaps offset by the cost of 
foreign wars and the loss of pop- 
ular liberty, a; A v, 5, 9, 11, 
23, 30, 33, 263; B xi, 110-24, 
444, xii, 122, 128, xv, 75, 84, 96; 
J ii, 144, 145. 

1 Non-royal and divided regencies are taken at minus. 



330 



APPENDIX 



RXJLER 

± or + Philip II 

A difficult character to grade. 
Mentally he was ambitious, in- 
dustrious in petty details, but a 
procrastinator, and lacking in 
judgment and breadth of view. 
He was gloomy, morose, suspi- 
cious, despotic, jealous, and dis- 
simulating, and by many con- 
sidered cruel. His temperance 
is offset by his extravagant ex- 
penditures. His chief virtue ap- 
pears to have been his patience. 
a; c; also Wenzelburger, " Gesch. 
Niederlande," ii, 7-10, and 
Martin Hume, "Philip II." 



Condition of Country 

1556-1598 =fc or + 

Height of outward splendor 
and beginnings of internal decay. 
Acquisition of Portugal. Spain 
lost control of Netherlands. Riches 
and extravagance of the nobility. 
Depletion of national funds. Pov- 
erty of the people. Agriculture, 
industry, and commerce declined. 
Destruction of the Armada, o; 
A V, 58, 61, 62; B xiii, 45, 117- 
8, XV, 136-9; H viii, 328, 381, 
ix, 150, 202, 257, 325, 373, x, 
355 ; J ii, 146-8 ; K 190. 



— Philip III 

Weak, indolent, with a tendency 
to melancholia. Pious and well- 
meaning, but pleasuro-loving, ex- 
travagant, and careless, a ; G 
11; Also Watson, "History of 
PhiUp III." 



1598-1621 — 

Rapid decline. Poverty and 
depopulation. Rivalry and in- 
trigues in the court. Indepen- 
dence of the Netherlands acknowl- 
edged. Expulsion of the indus- 
trious Moriscoes. a ; Ay, 87, 
89, 90; B xv, 355, 393, 484-5, 
496; H X, 383, 395, 471, 486, 
488, 505 ; J ii, 148-9. 



— or ± Philip IV 

Indolent, weak character. 
Governed by Olivarez. Had 
a fair understanding and culti- 
vated tastes. Luxurious and 
licentious, a ; Also Don A. Ca- 
novas del Castillo, " Estudios 
del reinado de Felipe IV." 



1621-1665 — 

Continued decline in agricul- 
ture, commerce, and the me- 
chanic arts. Further depletion of 
finances. Loss of Portugal and 
the island of Jamaica, a ; A v, 
92, 93, 98, 99, 276; B xvi, 105, 
chap. 7, xvii, 355, 359, 370-83; 
H xi, 17, 65, 271, 273 ; J ii, 149. 



APPENDIX 



331 



Rtjler 

— Minority of Charles II 
(Mary Anne, Queen of Philip IV, 

Regent) 
Petty intriguer. Her private 
life was pure. Several others 
shared in the control of the gov- 
ernment. 

— Charles II 

An imbecile. Virtues negative, 
a; G 284-317. 



— Philip V 

Indolent and sensuous. Was 
well-meaning and good-natured, 
but became melancholy and 
finally insane, a; B xix, 252- 
253 ; H xii, 451, 454. 



db or — Ferdinand VI 

Of mediocre or inferior capac- 
ity, but prudent, firm, and up- 
right. Became insane, a; B 
Jdx, 378, 387, 390; G 350, 359, 
371; H xii, 451. 

+ Charles III 

Enlightened, efficient, just, and 
sincere. Not brilliant, but had a 
very well-balanced mind, a ; G 
392-411. 



Condition of Country 

1665-1679 — 

Decline continued. Intrigues. 
Rebellion in Sicily. Loss of 
Franche-Comte and fourteen 
fortresses in Flanders, a; A v, 
103-5; B xvii, 101-2, 386; H 
xi, 275, 291, 297-9. 

1679-1700 — 

Misery, poverty, hunger, dis- 
orders, decline, especially in agri- 
culture, finances, and strength of 
the army, a; Ay, 277; B 
xvii, 136-7, 170, 186-7, 234, 402- 
412, 426; H xi, 379, 381, 451, 
485-6 ; / ii, 158. 

1700-1745 + 

Improvement in commerce, 
industry, army, and navy. Terri- 
torial losses, Gilbraltar and 
Minorca, a; A v, 141, 164, 
278-81; B xix, 235, 238, 243, 
245 ; H xii, 319, 435. 

1745-1759 + 

Improvement in agriculture, 
commerce, and industry. Finan- 
cial reforms. A v, 166, 167, 283 ; 
B xix, 340-7, 378; H xii, 491, 
492, 500. 

1759-1788 + 

Continued improvement in 
financial and commercial condi- 
tions, including agriculture and 
the useful arts. EfiSciency of the 
army raised. Foreign policy not 
particularly successful. A v, 170, 
171, 175, 181, 283, 284; B xx, 
360-80; H xiii, chap. Ill, 210- 
224. 



332 APPENDIX 



BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR PORTUGAL 

a. Encyclopaedia Britannica. 9tli and 11th editions. 
h. La grande encyclopedic. 

A. Stephens, H. M. History of Portugal. Story of the Nations 

Series. London, 1891. 

B. McMuRDO, Edward. The History of Portugal. 3 vols. Lon- 

don, 1888-1889. 

[Vol. I is nothing more than an abridged translation of Hercu- 

lano's Historia de Portugal, though Herculano's name is not 

mentioned. Vols. 2 and 3 are taken from Pinheiro Chagas and 

others.] 

C. Dunham, S. A. History of Spain and Portugal. 5 vols. London, 

1832-33. 

[Out of date, but interesting to compare with modern opinions.] 

D. Herculano, a. Historia de Portugal. 4 vols. Lisbon, 1853. 

[The standard authority for the early period, but closes with the 
year 1279.] 

E. Schaefer, H. Geschichte von Portugal. 4 vols. Hamburg, 

1836-52. EE. Same, French Translation. Paris, 1846. 

F. Oliveira Martins, J. P. Historia de Portugal. 2 vols. Lis- 

boa, 1894-95. 

[Brilliant and sketchy. His writings show much independence 

of judgment and sound scholarship.] 

G. Pinheiro Chagas, Manuel. Historia de Portugal. 8 vols. 

Lisboa, 1899. 
H. Gama Barros, Henrique da. Historia da administracao Publica 

em Portugal. 2 vols. Lisboa, 1885-96. 

[Based on original sources.] 
J. Fonseca Benevides, Francisco da. Rainhas de Portugal. 2 

vols. Lisboa, 1878-79. 
K. Herculano, A. Historia da origem e do estabelecimento da 

inquisigao em Portugal. 3 vols. Lisboa, 1864. 
L. SousA SiLVA Costa Lobo, A. de. Historia da sociedade em 

Portugal. Lisboa, 1903. 
M. Oliveira Martins, J. P. Os filhos de Joao I. 2 vols. Lisboa, 

1901. 
N. CoELHO RocHA, A. Eusaio sobre a historia do governo e da 

legislaiao de Portugal. Coimbra, 1843. 
P. Jayne, K. G. Vasco da Gama and his Successors. London, 1910. 
Q. Beazley, C. R. Prince Henry the Navigator. The Hero of 

Portugal and of Modern Discovery. London and New York, 

1908. 



APPENDIX 



333 



RULEB 

+ Henry of Burgundy 

Count of Portugal 

Brave, brilliant, enterprising. 
Not much known about his per- 
sonal traits. A 21; C iii, 178 ; 
D i, 202-203, 232. 



Condition of Country 

1094-1114 + 

Founded the family prestige. 
B i, 129-130; C iii, 178; D i, 
231-2. 



+ Theresa 

Very ambitious, able, and ener- 
getic. Politically astute. Her 
moral character has been the sub- 
ject of debate. Probably her 
virtues were not equal to her 
talents, a; A 21; D i, 232, 
234-235, 289, 475-480 ; F i, 60- 
64. 

+ Alfonso I 

Brave, tenacious, and enter- 
prising. Great enthusiasm and 
love of glory. Charged with 
treachery and cruelty, a ; A 
34, 35-59 ; D i, 299, 300, 304 ; F 
i, 78 ; M i, 37. 

— Sancho I 

Able administrator, extremely 
energetic. Violent temper. A 69 ; 
B i, 242, 296-297, 298 ; C iii, 189 ; 
G i, 43, 46. 



1114-1139 + 

Dominions were built up and 
vastly strengthened, a; A 28, 
29, 31; B i, 132-133, 145-148; 
C iii, 179 ; D i, 246-247, 28^290. 



1139-1185 



+ 



Portugal founded as a kingdom 
(in status if not in name) and 
territory expanded to the south, 
as far as the Tagus. A 37, 39, 
40, 53 ; B i, 150, 152, 172, 217 ; 
C iii, 180, 185, 188. 



1186-1211 



+ 



Further advance through in- 
ternal improvements. Charters 
granted to many cities. Agri- 
culture and immigration fostered. 
o; A 60-70; B i, 275, 297; 
G i, 38-46. 



± Alfonso II 

Able and vigorous, but harsh and 
tyrannical. More of a schemer 
than a warrior. Avaricious and 
grasping, a; A 70-74; B i, 31, 
357; C iii, 190-193; D ii, 186; 
F i, 98 ; G i, 52, 58-59. 



1211-1223 zi= 

Financial gains. Constitutional 
advance. First Portuguese Cor- 
tes. Royal power increased at 
the expense of the nobles, a; 
A 70-74; B i, 357, 358; C iii, 
191, 192; H ii, chaps. IV-VII; 
Fi, 98; Gii, 59, 250-251. 



334 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 
Minority of Sancho II 
No one royal person in control. 



± Sancho II 

A brave and dashing soldier; 
but indolent when not at war. 
Lacked administrative ability. 
Became sensual and unpopular. 
Material for estimating Sancho 
II is meagre and the whole pic- 
ture of his reign is colored by 
party prejudice. A 78; C iii, 
194 ; D ii, 340-341. 

+ Alfonso III 

A great warrior and statesman, 
but an unprincipled tyrant, a ; 
A 80, 81; B i, 453, 474; G i, 
88-9. 



-f- Diniz 

Called "the Laborer." Great 
abilities. Ardent, sensuous, some- 
what cruel. A patron of litera- 
ture and was himself a poet, a ; 
A 85, 86 ; 5 ii, 15 ; C iii, 168, 169, 
171 ; G i, 164, 174. 



Condition of Country 
1223-1227 
Obscure period . Probably much 
anarchy during the first three 
years. Peace made with Pope 
Honoricus III and conquest of 
Elvas. a; A 74-75; D ii, 263- 
87 ; G i, 59-64. 

1227-1245 — or ± 

Much territory taken from the 
Moors. The reign ended in in- 
trigues and civil war. The king 
deposed by the clerical party 
headed by Alfonso. A 75, 79 ; 
C iii, 193-195; D ii, livro V; 
G i, 64-88. 



1245-1279 -I- 

Conquest of Algarve. General 
prosperity. Commerce and in- 
dustry increased. Municipal or- 
ganization became more extended, 
and Cortes more representative. 
Rebellion of Deniz (1277-1279). 
a; A, 80-83; B i, 472-474; C 
iii, 198-199; G i, 251; H ii, 
chaps. IV-VII, X ; N 85. 

1279-1325 + 

Country made great advances, 
especially in agriculture and ad- 
ministration of justice. Navy 
estabUshed. Commercial treaty 
with England (1294). Several 
rebellions occurred, but these 
were brief and comparatively 
harmless, a; A 8&, 87, 89 ; B i, 
472, 473, 474; C iii, 200, 201, 
204; F i, 126-127, 173-174; 
H ii, chap. X, also page 255. 



APPENDIX 



335 



RULEK 

+ Alfonso IV, the Brave 

Able, but cruel and tjTannical. 
Is accounted chaste. A 91-97 ; 
B ii, 198 ; G i, 248-250. 



Condition of Country 

1325-1357 + 

In general peaceful and pro- 
gressive. Agricultural, commer- 
cial, and legislative advance. Por- 
tugal assisted the Spaniards in 
defeating the Moors (Salado, 1340). 
Famines in 1333. Black Death, 
1348. A 92-95 ; B ii, 199 ; C iii, 
205, 206, 208, 213 ; G i, 248-50 ; 
H ii, 172-174, 177, 194-197, 259. 



-|- Peter the Severe 

A wise, despotic, and severely- 
just ruler. A picturesque char- 
acter. Popular in spite of his 
faults. Strong in his hatred and 
spontaneous in his love, a ; A 
99, 100; F i, 101-10; G i, 280. 

— Ferdinand I 

Naturally bright, affable, and 
imaginative, but was weak, in- 
decisive, indolent, frivolous, and 
dishonourable ; lacked courage, 
failed to keep his faith. Came 
under the influence of the notori- 
ous Leonora Telles. a; A 101- 
103; B ii, 211; C ii, 207; F i, 
128-41 ; H ii, 259. 



+ or zh Regency for Beatrix 
Leonora Telles, consort of Ferdinand 
I, Regent 
Considerable ability, at least 
in intrigue. Ambitious and ener- 
getic. Her character has been 
much censured, perhaps unjustly, 
as the chroniclers were under the 
patronage of the house of Aviz. 



1357-1367 + 

Stern enforcement of law and 
order. Commercial treaty and 
continuance of active trade with 
England. Agricultural prosper- 
ity. Royal treasury enriched 
a; A 99-100; B ii, 210; F i, 
101- ; Gi, 264, 270; H ii, 259. 

1367-1383 _ 

General disruption. Lisbon 
besieged, Portugal ravaged. De- 
cadence in agriculture. Royal 
treasure wasted. Some repairing 
of castles and fortifications. Im- 
provement in the marine. A 
99, 100, 103, 104; B ii, 243; C 
iii, 219, 221, 222, 224, 227; F i, 
128-146; H ii, 188-90, 265. 
L 19, 287 ; N 82. 



1383-1385 



Civil War. 



336 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 
-t- John I, called " The Great," 
also "The Father of his Country" 

Brave and able, prudent, dip- 
lomatic, popular with the lower 
classes, a; A 114-121; B ii, 
370; C iii, 245; F i, 167-168; 
Q 133-135. 



Condition of Country 

1385-1433 + 

Portugal greatly developed. 
Beginnings of expansion beyond 
the seas. Legislative improve- 
ment. Financial management 
not good at first. Taxes not 
burdensome. A 110-127; B ii, 
365, 371 ; C iii, 234, 235, 244, 245, 
246, 247; F i, 158-168; L 300- 
306, 388. 



± or -f- Edward * 

Of good natural ability but 
lacked energy and decision. Mod- 
erate and enlightened in his views, 
truthful and affectionate, fond of 
literature, a; A 127, 128; C 247, 
256; £;^ 451-452; L 319; M 25, 
26,32,209-211,217; Q 136. 

— Minority of Alfonso V 

Regency divided. 



1433-1438 — 

Short reign. Disastrous ex- 
pedition to Tangier. A 127, 128 ; 
B ii, 404; C iii, 247, 256; EE 
451; H ii, 188-200, 271; L 
319 ; M i. Chap. VIII. 



1438-1439 — 

Brief period filled with discord. 
A 130,131 ; // ii, 272, 273; N ii, 
39, 71. 



+ Minority of Alfonso V 

Peter, uncle of the king. Regent 

Brilliant qualities, excellent 
character, Uberal and accom- 
plished, a; A 132; B ii, 381; 
L 321 ; M i, 108 ; Q 136. 



1439-1449 



+ 



Progress, increased commercial 
relations with Africa, important 
first codification of the civil laws, 
minor pests (1439-1440). A 131, 
132; B ii, 426, 433, 439; C iii, 
260; G iii, 397; H ii, 200; M 
ii, 71, 89. 



— or ± Alfonso V 

Weak and indecisive, with little 
practical wisdom, an instrument 
in the hands of his courtiers. 
Generous and impulsive, is ac- 

1 Edward was intellectually active but not practical 
be ranked above mediocrity. 



1449-1481 — 

Country declined, finances 
wasted, exploration languished, 
minor pests (1464, 1466, 1468). 
A 133, 134, 144-154; B ii, 500, 

As a ruler he cannot 



APPENDIX 



337 



Ruler 
counted very chaste, a; A 135 ; 
Ciii, 275; £^£^569-571; F i, 191- 
192; G iii, 395, 396, 414, 445, 
447 ; L 327, 371 ; M i, 101 ; ii, 93. 

+ John II 

Called "the Perfect" — a great 
king. Resolute, keen, and subtle. 
Severe and often cruel. a ; A 
158, 159 ; B iii, 2 ; C iii, 35 ; F i, 
189, 195, 196, 200. 



± or + Emanuel 

Called "the Fortunate." A 
difficult character to estimate. 
Mediocre or perhaps superior. 
His period has been too little 
studied, a; A 171, 172; F ii, 
5, 13, 19. 



Condition of Country 
503, 510, 529; C ii, 262, 268, 
269, 275, 276; EE Chap. IV; 
F i, 189-94 ; H ii, 191-194 200- 
201, 274-277. 

1481-1495 + 

Marked increase in trade and 
prestige. Further exploration, 
several minor pests during this 
reign. A 156, 158, 163, 165, 169 ; 
B iii, 48, 49 ; C iii, 276, 277, 285, 
286, 287, 291, 297, 298; F i, 195- 
209; G iii, 101 ; H ii, 201-205. 

1495-1521 + 

Portugal's greatest days in out- 
ward splendour. Riches of the 
East poured into Lisbon. A 
170, 171; B iii, 53, 54, 58, 59, 
96, 109, 110, 111, 116; G iii, 
101, 206, 226-7. 



— John III 

A narrow, unenlightened mind. 
"A weak and immoral bigot" 
(Jayne). A 178, 179; B iii, 119; 
F ii, 41-42 ; X iii, 333 ; P 120. 



1521-1557 zt 

Territorial increase and national 
supremacy maintained ; but the 
germs of decay were beginning 
to show themselves. Inquisition 
definitely established. A 178, 179, 
181, 182, 184 ; B iii, 120, 124, 153, 
154 ; C V, 192, 193 ; F ii, 25-26, 
41^2; K iii, 21, 24, 30, 320, et 
passim. 



± Catherine of Spain, Regent' 1567-1562 ± 

Intellectual and energetic, but Conditions remained the same, 
bigoted and unpopular, a; A A 240; B iii, 158-164 ; C v, 194. 
238, 240; B iii, 157, 160, P 257, 
259. 

1 Above the average of princesses, but not above the average of actual 
rulers. 

Z 



338 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 

— Cardinal Henry, Regent 

A vain, weak, and mean char- 
acter, a; B ui, 157, 158, 159, 
160; Fii, 57, 71. 

— Sebastian 
Ambitious, rash and adventur- 
ous. Tyrannical, melancholic, an 
unbalanced and disordered mind. 
Killed in Africa, aged 24. His 
ten-year reign necessarily merges 
in his minority, a ; A 242-293 ; 
F ii, 55-56. 

— Cardinal Henry 
(Character above.) He was 

now, fui'thermore, old and dying. 



Condition of Country 

1562-1568 — 

Decay made itself more evident. 
A 241 ; B iii, 161, 165-167, 170, 
182 ; C V, 194. 

1568-1578 — 

Disastrous war in Africa. Fur- 
ther decline in national strength. 
Great pest (1568). A 241-245, 
251-255 ; B iii, 178, 182, 216, 217 ; 
Cv, 206; /^ii, 46-69. 



1578-1580 — 

Country in turmoil and corrup- 
tion. A 257, 258; B iii, 221, 
222, 241; C v, 211, 212; F ii, 
70-75. 



" Sixty years captivity." Portugal under Spanish rule. 



zfc or + Philip n of Spain 

A difficult character to grade. 
Mentally he was ambitious, in- 
dustrious in petty details, but a 
procrastinator and entirely lack- 
ing in judgment and breadth of 
view. He was gloomy, morose, 
suspicious, jealous, dissimulating, 
selfish, ungrateful, and by many 
considered cruel. His temper- 
ance is offset by his extravagant 
expenditures. His chief virtue 
appears to have been his pa- 
tience. References under Spain. 

— Philip HI of Spain 

Weak, indolent, with a tendency 
to melancholia. Pious and well- 
meaning, but pleasure-loving, ex- 
travagant and careless. Refer- 
ences under Spain. 



1580-1598 — 

Internal decay of Portugal con- 
tinued, though its outward pres- 
tige remained about the same. 
A 291, 294; B iii. 111, 314, 316; 
C V, 219. 



1598-1621 — 

Financial exhaustion and mer- 
cantile decline in the East, a; 
A 294, 295, 299, 301 ; B iii, 325- 
327; C V, 228; F ii, 109-112. 



APPENDIX 



339 



Ruler 
— Philip IV of Spain 

Indolent and weak character 
governed by Olivarez. Had a 
fair understanding and cultivated 
tastes. Luxurious and licentious. 
References under Spain. 



± John IV 

Indolent and pleasure-loving. 
A negative character, fond of 
music and hunting parties, de- 
voted to religion. The queen, 
Louisa de Guzman, was the real 
head of the royal household. 
a; A 324; F ii, 138. 



-}- or ± Minority of Alfonso I 
Louisa de Guzman, Regent 
Energetic, ambitious, and able. 
a; A 326 ; J ii, 78. 



— Alfonso VI 

Practically an imbecile, with 
uncontrollable vices and excesses. 
A 330 ; F ii, 142. 



Condition of Countrt 

1621-1640 — 

Disasters and discontent, 
further financial and commercial 
decline, increased poverty, in- 
creased taxes, a; A 299, 301, 
303; B iii, 336, 338, 356, 358, 
363; Fii, 115, 116. 

1640-1656 ± or + 

1640 Portugal proclaimed her in- 
dependence. Wars against Spain 
characterized on both sides by 
weakness and indecision. Diplo- 
matic position weak. Some re- 
vival of the nation's commercial 
activities, a; A 324-325; B 
iii, 379, 384, 389, 390, 399, 406 ; 
F ii, 126-139. 

1656-1662 ± or + 

Portugal's position somewhat 
strengthened, especially in the 
army. Tl;ie tendency of the pe- 
riod seems questionable. Impor- 
tant victory over the Spaniards 
(1659) ; but they were in pos- 
session of Southern Portugal 
(1662). Diplomacy rather suc- 
cessful, a; A 326-330; B iii. 
413, 427; C v, 245-246; F ii, 
127, 130, 131, 139-141. 

1662-1668 ± 

A period of wars with Spain, 
Portugal in the end successful. 
Internal affairs in a bad condition. 
Methuen Treaty (1703) not gen- 
erally considered advantageous to 
Portugal, a; A 331-332; B 
iii, 419, 422, 426, 427 ; C v, 246, 
247; Fu, 131, 132. 



340 



APPENDIX 



RULEB 

± Peter II, Regent and King 

Ambitious, intriguing, and un- 
principled. A rough, uncultured 
man with considerable shrewdness. 
His private life much condemned, 
a; Biii, 441, 468, 470. 



Condition of Country 

1668-1706 ± 

Country remained unpros- 
perous, in spite of the new influx 
of gold from Brazil, a ; A 332- 
334; B iii, 442, 443, 470-471; 
C V, 253 ; F ii, 143-145. 



± John V 

Superficial, luxurious, and ex- 
travagant. A notorious volup- 
tuary. Had literary tastes and 
was not without a sense of jus- 
tice, a; A 352-354; B 489; 
F ii, 150, 152, 163, 164. 



1706-1750 ± 

Country continued to decline. 
Court and government especially 
corrupt. Wealth from Brazil did 
not suffice to meet the waste and 
extravagance. Much building of 
churches, monasteries, and public 
buildings. A 350-354; B iii, 
517-526; C v, 255-256; F ii, 
150, 151, 164, 172. 



± Joseph 

A sensible, well-balanced char- 
acter. (Supported the minister 
Pombal to whom the reforms are 
accredited.) a; A 3p4 ; C v, 
260; Fii, 181. 

— Maria 

Weak in intellect and finally 
became insane. Ruled jointly 
with Peter III her uncle and hus- 
band, who was also a mental 
weakling, a ; A 370, 373 ; F ii, 
212, 215. 



1750-1777 -I- 

Reforms and internal improve- 
ments. Agriculture, finances, in- 
dustry, and commerce advanced. 
Great earthquake, a ; A 354— 
370 ; F ii, 206-209 ; N 215. 

1777-1788 — 

Deplorable state of affairs 
again. Fiscal decline, a ; A 
370-373 ; F ii, 212-217 ; A^ 215. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR THE NETHERLANDS 

o. Encyclopaedia Britanniea. 9th and 11th editions. 

b. La grande encyclopedie. 31 vols. Paris, 1886-1902. 

A. Blok, Petrus Johannes. History of the People of the Nether- 
lands. Trans, by Oscar A. Bierstadt and Ruth Putman. 5 
parts. London and New York, 1898-. 

[The best general history of the Netherlands.] 



APPENDIX 



341 



B. Kampen, N. G. Geschichte der Niederlande. [In Geschichte 

der europaischen Staaten, Heeren und Ukert.] 2 vols. Ham- 
burg, 1831-1833. 

C. Motley, J. L. Rise of the Duteli Republic. 3 vols. New York, 

1856. [Partisan in its spirit.] 

D. Motley, J. L. History of the United Netherlands. 

New York, 1868. 

E. Beer, A. Allegemeine Geschichte des Welthandels. 

Wien, 1860. 

F. Davies, C. M. History of Holland and the Dutch. 

London, 1851. 

[Although out of date, contains many useful facts.] 

G. Wenzelburger, K. T. Geschichte der Niederlande. 

schichte der europaischen Staaten, Heeren and Ukert.] 
Gotha, 1879-1886. 
H. CoxE, W. History of the House of Austria. 5 vols. London, 1820. 



4 vols. 



3 vols. 



3 vols. 



[In Ge- 
2 vols. 



Ruler 
+ Philip I, the Good 

Enterprising, extremely ambi- 
tious. ."A clever statesman," 
wrongly called "the Good." Was 
benevolent, affable, and just, but 
also ostentatious, immoral, and 
sometimes cruel, a ; A ii, 123 ; 
B i, 224 ; F i, 252, 255 ; G i, 359. 



-|- Charles I, the Rash, or the Bold 
An extremely able and ambi- 
tious warrior whose valour and 
zeal exceeded his judgment. Open- 
hearted and free from deceit, 
but unscrupulous in his deeds. 
Rude and abstemious in his mode 
of Ufe. Selfish and tyrannical, 
and notorious for his uncontrolled 
outbiu-sts of passion. Cruel in 
revenge, but was a model of con- 
jugal fidelity, a; A ii, 144, 145; 
B i, 227, 231 ; F i, 260 ; G i, 346. 



Condition of Country 

1436-1467 4- 

Power of the country increased. 
Advantageous treaties led to 
growth of commerce and manu- 
factures. Agriculture improved. 
Gain in public finance. Loss of 
personal liberty, a; A i, 329- 
338; B i, 224; E ii, 174-176; 
F i, 252, 255, 256 ; G i, 371, 396. 



1467-1477 



or + 



Costly wars which brought the 
country no advantage. Taxa- 
tion was excessive, but the funda- 
mental conditions enabled it to be 
well met. Wealth of the burgher 
classes increased in spite of de- 
cline of political liberties. The 
wars were carried on chiefly be- 
yond the border, so that compara- 
tive peace and order ruled in the 
Netherlands, a; A ii, 134-145; 
B i, 227, 235, 236, 238-240 ; F i, 
259-266, 267, 268, 270; G i, 
349, 360, 396-397. 



342 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 
— Mary 

Young and inexperienced. 
Twenty years old when she came 
to the throne. Twenty-five when 
she died. Intellect probably 
mediocre or inferior. Fond of 
outdoor sports. Popular with 
her subjects, partly on account 
of her beauty and grace, partly 
because of her leniency or even 
slackness of government, a ; B 
i, 242; G i, 397. 



-{- Maximilian I 

(Regent) 
vigorous, eloquent, 
Crafty and ambitious, 
and magnanimous, 
and temperate in his 
He is by some charged 
(References un- 



Able, 
learned. 
Popular 
Chaste 
habits. 

with duplicity 
der Austria.) 



— Philip, the Handsome 

Weak, insignificant, indolent. 
A profligate, devoted to pleasure. 
Gentle and pacific. References 
under Spain, also B i, 270 ; F i> 
333. 



+ Minority of Charles V (II) 
Maximilian I, Regent 

Able, vigorous, eloquent, 
learned. Crafty and ambitious. 



Condition of Country 

1477-1482 ± 

Internal dissensions, which 
reduced the country to a state of 
desolation. The navy encoun- 
tered a severe disaster. The 
"Great Privilege" was granted, 
which confirmed the people in 
their liberties. Bruges suffered, 
but Antwerp grew, a; A ii, 
147; B i, 240-245; E i, 176; 
F i, 284, 291, 293, 294; G i, 
397-398. 

1482-1494 — 

A period of party struggles, 
revolts of the cities. "Bread 
and Cheese" war caused by 
famine in the northern provinces. 
Order established after ten years 
of disturbances and financial 
exhaustion. Much misery among 
the people. Heavy taxes. Fish- 
eries and cloth fabrication were 
injured. Measures taken for in- 
creasing the naval power, a; 
A ii, 150, 151, 154; B i, 246, 247, 
249, 250, 251, 252, 255-256, 257, 
259; F i, 298-320; G i, 378- 
389, 398-401 ; / i, 359-366. 

1494-1506 + 

States lost their "Great Privi- 
lege" but enjoyed peace and suf- 
ficient liberty. Considerable com- 
mercial advance, especially with 
Spain and Portugal, a; A ii, 
158; B i, 261, 262, 265, 270; 
F i, 334 ; G i, 389-394, 401-403. 

1506-1507 ± 

Brief period without special 
significance. Maximilian ac- 

cepted as Regent after some op- 



APPENDIX 



343 



Ruler 

Popular and magnanimous. 
Chaste and temperate in his 
habits. He is by some charged 
with duplicity. References un- 
der Austria. 



Condition of Country 

position. Difficult to separate 
this period from the following, 
a; Aii, 159; Gi, 359; H 11, 12. 



+ Minority of Charles V (II) 
Margaret of Savoy, Regent, daughter 
of Maximilian I 

Brave and vigorous. A wise 
and able administrator. Also the 
author of many works in prose 
and verse. Mild, affable, and 
condescending, a; ^ ii, 159; 
B i, 271 ; F i, 384, 385 ; H ii, 
12, 86. 



1507-1515 + 

Administration of the govern- 
ment successful. Commerce and 
fisheries remained prosperous. 
Diplomatic position strengthened 
by alliance with England. A ii, 
159, 247; F i, 336, 337, 360; G 
i, 395. 



+ Charles V (II), the Emperor 

Sagacious, vigorous, accom- 
phshed, and tactful. Inordinately 
ambitious. Selfish and crafty. 
Gloomy and eccentric in his latter 
years. Much duplicity in his 
character. References under 
Spain. 

This period is a double rule, as 
Margaret was retained in the 
regency. Her influence must be 
added to that of Charles, a; C 
i, 113; Gi, 802, ii, 9. 



1515-1530 + 

Agriculture, industry, and 
trade continued in a flourishing 
condition. Coinage reformed. 
Liberty alone suffered. Ant- 
werp became the first commercial 
city in the world, a; B i, 299- 
303, 337-339; E ii, 176; G i, 
792-815. 



+ 



Mary, Regent 
Sister of Charles V 



Strong, bold, masculine type. 
Had much abiUty. Cold, ob- 
stinate, and unpopular. To her 
influence must also be added that 
of Charles V. B i, 330; C i, 
150 ; F i, 297 ; G i, 802. 



1530-1555 + 

Conditions continued as above. 
a; Aii, 247; B i, 330; C i, 113; 
G i, 792-815. 



344 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 
+ Emanuel Philibert of Savoy, 
Regent for Philip II of Spain 

A brilliant soldier of fortune, 
but as far as his relations with 
the Netherlands are concerned 
his administration was brief and 
unimportant. He was better as 
a soldier than a governor, a ; b; 
A ii, 247 ; D i, 150-152. 



Condition of Country 
1555-1559 



+ 



A period of discontent, not 
characterized by any important 
changes. Spain gained the im- 
portant victory of St. Quentin 
over the French, in which the 
Dutch played an important part. 
Trade continued to increase 
(Kampen). a; A ii, 247; B i, 
336-351; F i, 491, 499. 



1 Margaret of Parma, Regent 
Natural daughter of Charles V 

Proud, courageous, ambitious, 
and able. A masculine type of 
woman. Said to have been very 
deceitful. Was personally good- 
tempered and affable. The influ- 
ence of Philip II and especially 
Cardinal Granvella is to be added, 
o ; b ; ^ ii, 247 ; C i, 227 ; F i, 
505 ; G ii, 67-69. 



1559-1567 — 

Conditions everywhere dis- 
turbed by the religious questions. 
Discontent, persecutions, up- 
risings. Great emigration of 
fugitives. Kampen has statis- 
tics to show the condition of trade 
between 1550 and 1566. "In 
the summer of 1566 business had 
been practically at a standstill" 
(Blok). a; b; A ii, 247, iii, 40; 
B i, 336-351, 365; C i, 293-4; 
E ii, 178-9 ; G ii, 67-69. 



J Alva, Regent 
The influence of Philip 
should be added. 



II 



1567-1573 — 

Conditions similar to those 
above, though somewhat worse. 
A iii, 43, 52, 56, 75; B i, 367- 
377, 383; C ii, 142-147, 279- 
290, 403-411, 412-457, 500-505, 
517. 



1 Requesens, Regent 
The influence of Philip II should 
be added. 



1573-ci>. 1575 — 

This regency may be combined 
with the preceding. C ii, 511- 
528. 



1 For these three periods it is not easy to say who should be considered the 
ruler. 



APPENDIX 



345 



Ruler 

+ William, the SUent 

One of the great men of all 
times. Able as a soldier, but 
was far more illustrious as a 
statesman. Was remarkably pre- 
cocious. Possessed of indomi- 
table energy and unbroken cour- 
age. Broad and patriotic in his 
views. Subtle and patient in 
his methods. Eloquent and ac- 
complished, tolerant and hu- 
mane, a; b; A iii, passim; C 
passim; G ii, 72-80. 



Condition of Countrt 

cir. 1575-1584 + 

HoUand and Zealand gained 
their independence and liberty. 
United Provinces were established 
1580. These remained compara- 
tively tranquil and increased in 
prosperity, while the southern 
provinces (no longer included 
in this tabulation) declined, a ; 
b; A iii, 86, 88, 92, 105, 106, 
128, 182; B i, 467-474; C iii, 
passim. 



+ 



Maurice of Nassau 



1584-1625 



+ 



A miUtary genius of the high- 
est order. His political ability 
was less remarkable. Honest in 
the main, generous, and patriotic. 
Certainly devoted to whatever 
he considered to be his duty. 
Sometimes accused of arbitrary 
and personal motives, a; b; A 
iii, passim; C passim; D pas- 
sim; F ii, 558, 559; G ii, 884- 
886. 



Dutch defeated the Spanish at 
most points. Virtual acknowl- 
edgment of the independence of 
the United Provinces. Increase 
in trade, manufactm-es, and gen- 
eral prosperity. East India Com- 
pany founded (1602). Dutch 
become lords of the sea and chief 
traders of the world, a; b; A 
iii, 272, 289, 291, 323, 324, 336; 
E ii, 180; F ii, 198-199, 201; 
G ii, 563-887. 



+ Frederick Henry 

Though not equalling in genius 
WiUiam the Silent or Maurice, 
was a highly talented, prudent, 
and successful soldier and states- 
man. Sincere, generous, modest, 
and honorable. Showed remark- 
able constancy of character, a; 
b; A iv, 21 ; F ii, 645 ; G ii, 888, 
984-986. 



1625-1647 + 

A period of splendour. In- 
crease in commerce and inter- 
national prestige. Naval vic- 
tories against the Spanish, a ; 
6 ; ^ iv, 21-73 ; B ii, 54-77, 99- 
106; E ii, 182-185; G ii, 889, 
987-990. 



346 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 
+ WiUiam II 

A youth of brilliant promise 
and precocious gifts. Brave, ac- 
tive, proud, and ambitious. Fiery 
and arrogant, though well-mean- 
ing and chivalrous. Died aged 
twenty-four, a; b; B ii, 124, 
127, 128 ; F ii, 693. 



Condition of Countbt 

1647-1650 ± 

The prestige of the country 
remained unimpaired. The 
United P*rovinces were recog- 
nized by Spain as free and inde- 
pendent. Popular liberty de- 
cUned. Portuguese in South 
America injured the Dutch 
interests, a; b; AW, 151-75; 
Bii, 99, 117-122, 124-125, 127; 
E218. 



— The States 

Governed, in theory at least, 
by the States-General and Council 
of State. 



1650-1672 ± 

Commercial prosperity re- 
mained about the same. Weak 
diplomacy with decUne in inter- 
national prestige. Dutch colo- 
nies in North America and Brazil 
were lost, but colonial gains were 
realized in the East. Internal 
discord and discontent. Up- 
risings in some districts, a; b; 
A iv, 241-64; B ii, 140, 157-158, 
177-181, 185, 187, 188-189, 227- 
299 ; E ii, 182, 184-185, 218, 220. 



+ William III 

Extraordinarily precocious. One 
of the greatest of diplomats. 
Able as a statesman. As a sol- 
dier, brilliant, though less great. 
Brave, active, resourceful. Not 
popular. "An outward coldness 
covered a hidden warmth." Both 
arbitrary and magnanimous. His 
aims were noble, his honour un- 
reproached. Free from vanity. 
Domestic life not praiseworthy. 
a; b; Dictionary of National 
Biography; B ii, 282, 334; F 
iii, 257, 259, 260-263. 



1672 1702 

The country was saved from 
the encroachments of France. 
Commerce shows a creditable 
record. Although the wars cost 
heavily, the country's credit was 
good at the close of the period. 
Much general increase of wealth. 
Revocation of the Edict of Nantes 
brought many desirable immi- 
grants, a; A iv, 504^5 ; B ii, 
271-272, 293, 319-320, 322-328, 
374-376 ; E 218-219 ; F iii, 242- 
243. 



APPENDIX 



347 



Ruler 
The States 



Condition of Country 

1702-1747 — 

Decline in commerce and ma- 
terial prosperity. The political 
influence more distinctly de- 
clined. Army and navy deterio- 
rated. Public corruption. Petty 
family interests placed over pa- 
triotic. Taxes increased, a; b; c; 
A V, 42-63 ; B ii, 370-374, 384- 
385, 391, 393, 409, 420, 435, 437, 
441 ; E ii, 219, 222-223 ; H iv, 259. 



± or — William IV 

A cultivated though dull, quiet 
mind. Mediocre talents. Up- 
right in character and zealous for 
the welfare of his country, a ; 
A V, 125; B ii, 441 ; F iii, 420- 
421. 



1747-1751 =bor — 

A period of internal commo- 
tion and some uprisings. In- 
tended reforms were initiated, 
but the brevity of the period 
gives no opportunity to judge the 
outcome, a; A v, 114-26; B ii, 
437-441 ; F iii, 404, 406, 407, 420. 



± or — Minority of William V 
Anne, daughter of George II of Eng- 
land, Regent 

A woman of superior gifts and 
cultivation, but little good sense 
or judgment. Imperious, vio- 
lent, headstrong. Selfish and am- 
bitious, a; A v, 127; B ii, 488; 
F iii, 422, 430. 



1751-1759 — 

A few years of comparative 
peace and well-being were broken 
at the advent of the Seven Years' 
War (1756). Dutch navy in a 
poor condition, commerce greatly 
injured. The diplomatic policy 
weak, a; Av, 127-41 ; B ii, 442- 
444 ; F iii, 421-434. 



— Republic 

(The States exercised the power 
of Stadtholder.) 



1759-1766 — 

Conditions continued as before 
except that the navy became 
strengthened. In 1762 a serious 
business panic occurred. A v, 142- 
50; B ii, 448-451 ; F iii, 431-434. 



348 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 
— William V 

Well-meaning, amiable, but 
weak and irresolute. Lazy and 
addicted to the pleasures of the 
table, a; A V, 151, 169; B ii, 
461 ; F iii, 438^41. 



Condition of Country 

1766-1795 — 

Trade injured by the English 
wars and American Revolution. 
Decay of commercial companies. 
Quarrels and disturbances. Di- 
plomacy weak. The period ended 
in a revolution. Netherlands be- 
came virtually a province of 
France, a; b; B ii, 456, 461, 
465-477, 486, 500, 532; F iii, 
442-450, 456, 465-466, 468-474, 
483, 499, 554-603. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR DENMARK 

a. Encyclopaedia Britannica. 9th and 11th dditions. 

A. Allen, C. F. Histoire de Danemark. 2 vols. Copenhague, 

1878. 

B. Bain, R. N. Scandinavia. A History of Denmark, Norway, 

and Sweden. Cambridge, 1905. 

C. Dunham, S. A. History of Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. 

(Lardner's Cabinet Cyclop). 3 vols. London, 1839. 

[Out of date, but convenient for broad statements of such facts 

as go undoubted.] 

D. Weitmeyer, H. (Editor). Denmark, Its History, etc. London, 

1891. 

E. CoxE, W. Travels into Poland, Russia, Sweden and Denmark. 

[Coxe has the reputation of being very partial in his estimates 
of royalty.] 3 vols. 1784. 

F. Wright, J. H. (Editor). A History of All Nations. 24 vols. 

Philadelphia, 1905. 

G. Dahlmann, F. C. Gesehichte von Dannemark. [In Geschichte 

der europaischen Staaten, Heeren und Ukert.] 5 vols. Ham- 
burg, 1840-1902. 



+ Valdemar IV 

Considered to be a man of 
genius, great in war and state- 
craft. Shrewd, energetic, inde- 
fatigable. Made everybody 



1340-1375 + 

Various regions were consoli- 
dated and reunited under a 
strong and orderly rule. Den- 
mark became a powerful state. 



APPENDIX 



349 



Ruler 

work. Arbitrary and tyrannical 
in his nature, a; A i, 200-201 ; 
B6; C ii, 247 ; D 10. 



Condition of Country 

Construction of many roads, 
canals, mills, castles, and for- 
tresses. The wars were success- 
ful, except with the Hanseatie 
League. A i, 192-201; B 6; 
C ii, 244-247, 249, 252 ; D 10. 



+ 



Margaret 
Regent and Queen 



Of remarkable ability. Pru- 
dent, vigorous, and despotic. Not 
much known of her private char- 
acter, a; A i, 205, 219-220 ; B 
9; Ciii, 9; D 10-11. 



1375-1412 



+ 



Sweden subjugated and con- 
soUdated with Denmark and 
Norway. Schleswig recovered. 
Peace and order were maintained. 
A i, 205, 208; B 8; C ii, 256- 
259; D 10-11; E v, 269. 



— Eric 

Weak and incapable, cruel, 
capricious, and violent. A i, 220, 
227-229 ; B9; C iii, 10. 



1412-1439 

Loss of territory. Disasters 
and defeats. Revolts of the 
people. Eric deposed. A i, 218- 
228; B 9; C iii, 11, 12, 14, 16; 
D 11. 



± Christopher III 

There is very little in history 
concerning his personal traits. 
Said to have had an "enlightened 
mind." C iii, 24, 26. 



1440-1448 ± 

Brief and unimportant reign. 
Comparative peace and pros- 
perity. Copenhagen grew in 
importance. Loss of influence 
over Sweden and Schleswig. 
Liberty of the peasantry declined. 
A i, 230-235 ; B 9; C iii, 23, 24, 
25. 



=b Christian I 

Active and brave, though of 
mediocre ability. Liberal, hu- 
mane, amiable, and pious. A i, 
254 ; E V, 272. 



1448-1481 ± 

No marked advance or decline. 
Sweden subjugated, and then 
again lost. Finances in a bad 
condition. A i, 248-254; C iii, 
35, 36, 37, 42 ; F xi, 130. 



350 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 

± John 

Mild, prudent, reasonable, pop- 
ular. Subject at times to melan- 
cholia wliich Ibordered on insan- 
ity, a ; C iii, 60 ; E v, 283. 



Condition of Counthy 

1481-1513 ± or + 

Wars with Sweden which came 
to no profit. Disastrous invasion 
of Ditmarsh. Navy enlarged. 
Finances improved. Advanta- 
geous treaty with the Hanseatic 
towns. A i, 243, 259-265; B 
11 ; C iii, 58-59. 



+ 



Christian II 



1613-1523 



H- 



Intellectual, and extremely bold 
and enterprising. A friend of 
the lower classes. Excessively 
cruel and obstinate. Mentally 
unbalanced at times, a ; A \, 
265, 267; B 12, 32; C iii, 60; 
E V, 283 ; F xi, 130. 



Improved jurisprudence and 
increase in commerce. Better 
condition of the peasantry. Op- 
pression of the nobles led to re- 
volts and flight of the king. 
Sweden subdued, and then (1520- 
1523) gradually under the leader- 
ship of Gustavus Vasa threw off 
the Danish yoke. A i, 271, 
275, 276, 277, 285; B 26, 27; 
C iii, 62, 64, 84, 85, 86 ; D 13, 14. 



ziz Frederick I 

Of moderate ability, with good 
sense. ! Cautious, crafty, and 
peace-loving. No striking vir- 
tues or vices. A i, 308 ; 5 29 ; 
C iii, 104 ; £; v, 298 ; F xi, 132. 



1523-1533 =k 

Events of the Reformation. 
No marked progress or decline 
in material conditions. Discon- 
tent among the peasantry. B 
30 ; C iii, 89, 90, 93, 104. 



Interregnum 
Government divided. 



1533-1534 — 

Civil wars. Violences and cru- 
elties. A i, 311-314. 



-f- Christian III 

A good Filler, patient, Industri- 
ous, with strong common sense. 
a ; A ii, 16 ; B 67. 



1534-1569 



+ 



Comparative peace and pros- 
perity. Commerce increased. 
Several wise laws enacted, a ; 
A ii, 15, 16; fi 66-75; C iii, 113. 



APPENDIX 



351 



Ruler 

d: Frederick II 

Of mediocre ability. Tactful 
and popular. 

Frederick II was assisted by 
many able ministers, a; A ii, 
29 ; B 84, 85 ; C iii, 138 ; F xii, 
105. 



Condition of Country 

1559-1588 + 

Increased international pres- 
tige. Better financial condition. 
More commerce and industry. 
Many public buildings erected. 
Subjection of Ditmarsh. a; A 
ii, 17, 21 ; B 84-85 ; C iii, 138 ; 
F xii, 105. 



Minority of Christian IV 
(Regency divided.) 



1588-1596 + 

Order and prosperity main- 
tained, a; A ii, 30 ; C iii, 139. 



4- Christian IV 

Brave, active, vigorous, able. 
Magnanimous, with a high sense 
of duty, he is the best-known king 
of Danish history. His nature, 
however, was overambitious, self- 
ish, and sensuous, a ; A ii, 47, 
50, 56, 64, 68. 



1596-1648 =b 

In the first part of this reign 
Denmark enjoyed much commer- 
cial and industrial advance, and 
many internal improvements. In 
the last part she suffered severely 
from foreign wars, especially in 
her conflicts with Gustavus Adol- 
phus of Sweden, a ; A ii, 49, 
50, 52-68; B 151-155, 158, 162; 
C iii, 143, 144, 150, 151, 152; 
D 15-16. 



± Frederick III 

An enigmatical character. 
Shrewd and calculating. Brave 
on occasion. MUd, prudent, and 
amiable. Charged with selfish- 
ness and duplicity, a ; A ii, 110 ; 
B238; Ciii, 163, 183; D 16. 



1648-1670 =fc 

In the early part of the reign 
there were wars with Sweden, 
in which the Danes lost terri- 
tory. After that, internal con- 
ditions somewhat improved. 
From this reign and until 1848 
Denmark became one of the most 
absolute monarchies in Europe, 
a ; A ii, 79, 85, 105, 109 ; B 242, 
243, 244, 255; C iii, 166, 168; 
D 16, 17. 



352 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 
Christian V 

Brave, but weak and incapable. 
Good-natured and popular, but 
extravagant and devoted to ease 
and pleasure, a; A ii, 131. 



Condition of Country 

1670-1699 d= 

Wars with Sweden, barren of 
results. Commercial advance 
and better navy. Decline in 
agriculture, finances, and con- 
dition of the peasantry. Weak 
diplomatic position, a; A ii, 
112, 114, 126, 127, 128; B 276, 
299 ; C iii, 185, 188 ; D 20. 



+ 



Frederick IV 



Vigilant, able, and successful. 
Amiable, popular, and well-mean- 
ing. Immoral in his private life. 

Accused of "unprincipled am- 
bition." A ii, 148, 149; B 298; 
C iii, 283 ; F xiv, 95. 



1699 1730 -I- 

General prosperity. Schles- 
wig acquired and annexed to 
Denmark. Fiscal condition much 
improved. Alany schools built. 
Condition of peasantry amelio- 
rated. Serfdom abolished, a ; A 
ii, 138, 142, 147 ; Z> 21 ; F xiv, 
95. 



± Christian VI 

Mediocre ability. Diligent and 
sincere. Ruled by others. Shy, 
sickly, and mildly melancholy. 
Benevolent and pious. A ii, 169 ; 
B 399, 401 ; C iii, 282-283. 



1730-1746 ± 

A period of peace. Growth of 
industries. A better navy. De- 
cline in finances, agriculture, and 
liberty of the peasantry. A ii, 
151, 152, 153, 157, 166, 167; 
fi 398, 399; C iii, 282-283 ; Z) 23. 



sb Frederick V 

Intelligent but not brilliant. 
Moderate, well-meaning, and con- 
scientious. A ii, 170, 187 ; B 
401 ; F xiv, 316. 



1746-1766 



+ 



Condition of peace continued. 
Commerce and industry ad- 
vanced. Agriculture and the 
peasantry in a bad way, but im- 
provement was shown during the 
last part of the reign. A ii, 
174, 175, 176, 180-185, 187-189; 
B 399, 400. 



APPENDIX 353 

■^^^^^ Condition of Country 

- Christian VIII 1766-1808 + or ± 

Weak and ignorant. A dissi- The sweeping reforms of Stru- 

pated degenerate. Practically in- ensee occupied the first part of 
sane. C iii, 299 ; fi 401 ; i^ xv, this reign. They were of ques- 
^^- tionable value. Last part of the 

reign was progressive. C iii, 
299-302; B 403, 405, 406, 410. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR SWEDEN 

a. Encyclopaedia Britanniea. 9th and 11th editions. 

b. Biographie Universelle. 85 vols. 

c. La grande encyclopedie. 31 vols. 1886-1902. 

d. Brockhaus. Konversations Lexikon. 

A. Geijer, E. G. The History of the Swedes, translated by J. A. 

Turner, London. First portion, comprising first three vols, of 
the original from the earliest period to the accession of Charles X. 
(Continuation, see French or German editions.) 1845. 
AA. Geijer, E. G. Geschichte Schwedens. (In Heeren und Ukert 
Geschichte der europaischen Staaten. 4 vols. Hamburg 
1832 — Gotha, 1855. 

B. Dunham, S. A. History of Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. 

(Lardner's Cabinet Cyclop.) 3 vols. London, 1839. 
[Out of date, but useful to compare with modern opinions.] 

C. Beer, Adolf. Allgemeine Geschichte des Welthandels. 3 vols 

Wien, 1860-84. 

D. Wright, J. H. (Editor). History of All Nations. 24 vols. Phila- 

delphia, 1905. 

E. Coxe, W. Travels in Poland, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark 

3 vols. 1784. 

F. Bain, R. Nisbet. Scandinavia. A Political History of Den- 

mark, Norway, and Sweden from 1513 to 1900. Cambridge 
1905. ^ ' 

G. Bain, R. Nisbet. History of Charles XII. New York, 1895. 

H. SuNDBARG, GusTAV (Editor). Sweden, Its People and Its In- 
dustry. Historical and Statistical Handbook, published by order 
of the government. Stockholm, 1904. 

/. Carlson, F. F. Geschichte Schwedens, continuation of Geijer 
3 vols. Gotha, 1875, 1887. 

K. Stavenow, Ludvig. Geschichte Schwedens, 1718-1772. 

[The seventh volume and continuation of the work of Geijer 
and Carison in Heeren und Ukert, etc., series.] Gotha. 1908 
2a 



354 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 
4- Gustavus Vasa 

A man of very high ability. 
Brave, cautious, economical, and 
extremely industrious. Stern, 
just, and even tyrannical, but 
virtuous and popular, a ; b; 
A i, 144 ; B iii, 205 ; D xi, 140 ; 
F 33, 59. 



Condition of Country 

1525-1560 + 

Sweden won her independence 
from Denmark. Law and order 
maintained. Increase in com- 
merce. Considerable progress in 
agriculture and mining. Taxes 
alleviated, a; Ai, 134, 145 ; B iii, 
205; C ii, 482; D xi, 140, 141. 



± Eric XIV 

Of brilliant mental endow- 
ments. ."A good orator, poet, 
musician, and painter." Devoid 
of practical wisdom, "an incom- 
petent ruler." Suspicious, vio- 
lent, cruel, and headstrong. Be- 
came at times mentally deranged, 
o; b; Ai, 145; Dxii, 104; F 116, 
124. 

d= John III 

Learned, and gifted as a 
student. As a ruler his position 
is doubtful. An unbalanced 
mind. Violent, selfish, dishonour- 
able, extravagant. A i, 146 ; B 
iii, 214 ; E iv, 187 ; F 129, 132. 



— Sigismund 

Weak and bigoted, though culti- 
vated in literature and the arts. 
Unreliable, wilful, and obstinate. 
Devoid of executive force, a ; 
E v, 174 ; F 138. 

— Sigismund and 

+ Duke Charles (afterwards 
Charles IX) 

Charles acted as regent for 
Sweden. Sigismund was King 
of Poland. 



1560 1568 — 

Public treasure wasted. 
Much general discontent and 
suffering. Reign ended in a 
rebellion in which Eric was de- 
posed, a; A i, 147, 149; D 
xii, 105, 106; F 115-125. 



1568-1592 ± 

Much disorder and want of 
economy. Industry made little 
progress. Events of the Catholic 
reaction. Wars with Russia, 
which led to some conquests 
along the Baltic. A i, 177, 178; 
D xii, 106, 109 ; F 126, 127, 133. 

1592-1595 — 

Religious disturbances contin- 
ued. F 134-135. 



1595-1600 — 

Religious and personal war- 
fare between Charles and Sigis- 
mund. The latter deposed. F 
135-139. 



APPENDIX 



355 



Ruler 
-1- Charles IX 

Strong, decisive, and sagacious. 
Zealous to promote the interests 
of Ms people, yet severe in the 
exercise of his power, and subject 
to violent fits of passion. Un- 
scrupulous in his methods, a ; A 
i, 209 ; B iii, 221 ; D xii, 146 ; E 
V, 175; F 143. 

+ Gustavus Adolphus 

Of exceptional genius. A great 
warrior and statesman. Adored 
by his subjects for his many noble 
virtues, a; h; B iii, 232; D 
xii, 229. 



— Minority of Christina 

Regency divided 

(Oxenstierna, a non-royal 
statesman, at the head of affairs.) 



-|- Christina 

Superior intellect and many 
learned accomplishments. Her 
character was extremely erratic. 
Mistrustful, haughty, satirical, 
passionate, and licentious, a ; 6 ; 
A i, 148, 324 ; B iii, 236 ; D xiii, 
129. 



Condition of Country 

1600-1611 + 

Successful diplomacy. Com- 
merce, manufactures, and min- 
ing flourished. Improved judi- 
ciary. Unsuccessful war with 
the Danes in the last years of his 
reign, a; A \, 201 ; C ii, 483- 
484 ; Z) xii, 137 ; F 142-143. 

1611-1632 -I- 

Marked growth of Sweden's 
international prestige. Great im- 
provement in the army, which 
gained many brilliant victories. 
Acquisition of Ingria, Riga, and 
a part of Karelia. Prosperity in 
all economic conditions, a ; d; 
A i, 222, 228, 230; C ii, 484; 
D xii, 229. 

1632 1644 + 

Sweden continued to play a 
successful part in the Thirty 
Years' War. Reforms in the in- 
ternal administration. Manufac- 
tures, especially of arms and am- 
munition, were in a flourishing 
condition, a; Ai, 294r-296, 310. 

1644-1654 4- or d= 

Successful termination of the 
wars with Denmark (1645) and 
also of the Thirty Years' War 
(1648) in which Sweden obtained 
the duchies of Bremen, Verden, 
most of Pomerania, and Wismar. 
Sweden very high among the 
nations. In the last years came 
a general discontent and peasant 
uprising, a ; A i, 343 ; B iii, 
234 ; C ii, 485 ; F 221-227. 



356 



APPENDIX 



Rdlkr 
+ Charles X 

Extremely brave and enterpris- 
ing. An able general. In the 
main just, though prone to fits of 
anger, a; A A iv, 351-357; B 
iii, 239 ; E iv, 39, 44 ; F 229, 250, 
256. 



Condition of Country 

1654-1660 + 

Denmark forced to give up 
Scania, Halland, Blekinge, and 
other territories. Sweden main- 
tained her international prestige. 
The wars were, however, burden- 
some, a; c; A A iv, 206, 219, 
351-357; B iii, 240; C ii, 485; 
E iv, 35 ; F 229-257. 



Minority of Charles 
Regency divided. 



XI 1660-1672 ± 

Increased trade and industry, 
especially iron and silver. Im- 
proved jurisprudence. Livonia 
acquired by Sweden. On the 
other hand there was much fer- 
menting discontent among the 
lower classes. The finances were 
very badly managed. The for- 
eign policy was weak, Sweden 
playing into the hands of France, 
a; d; AA iv, 425, 431, 432-436, 
438, 440, 532-547; C ii, 485; 
i-W, 292-94; G 10-12. 



-|- Charles XI 

Ambitious and energetic, with 
high political ability. Chaste, 
temperate, economical. Anx- 
ious for the welfare of his country. 
He was, however, stubborn and 
severe, and considered by many 
an unprincipled tyrant, a ; B iii, 
247 ; D iii, 274 ; E iv, 47-49. 



1672-1697 + 

From 1672 to 1679 a period of 
wars in which Sweden was at 
first humiliated but finally vic- 
torious. Latter part of the reign, 
peace and prosperity with marked 
progress in commerce and in- 
dustry. Improved financial con- 
dition, attained, however, by 
measures injurious to a certain 
minority of the subjects, a; c; 
A A iv, 577, V, 1-56, 450-475; 
B iii, 245; C i, 485; D xiii, 
274; Eiv,47. 



APPENDIX 



357 



Ruler 
— Minority of Charles XII 

Regency divided. (Count Pi- 
per, Prime Minister in fact though 
not in name.) 



Condition of Country 
April 5-Nov. 6, 1697 ± or + 
Dissensions and disturbances. 
Diplomatic strength fairly well 
maintained. Good financial man- 
agement continued, a; A A vi, 
4-6; G 36-37. 



+ Charles XII 

An extraordinary martial gen- 
ius. "His ambition was mad- 
ness and his valour was ferocity." 
Rude but chaste, simple in his 
mode of hving. "Indifferent 
monarch, but a great soldier.'! 
a; b; B iii, 277 ; E iv, 50. 



— Ulrica Eleanor 
Deficient in courage and talent. 

Considered to have a penchant 
for intrigue and a vindictive 
nature. She is credited with 
domestic virtues. G 2 1 , 259, 260 ; 
K30. 

— Frederick I 
Well-meaning but weak and 

lazy. Politically, a nonentity. 
a ; K 32-33. 



1697-1718 — 

Foreign wars which brought 
misfortune and poverty upon the 
country. Dechne in trade, in- 
dustry, and agriculture. Some 
excellent civil and criminal laws 
were enacted. Loss of the Baltic 
provinces to Russia, a; AA vi, 
41, 103, 176-179, 310-315, 320, 
351-353 ; B iii, 278 ; C ii, 485- 
486; Dxiii, 340. 

March, 1719-April, 1720 — 
Loss of Bremen and Verdeen 
to Hanover, but these and other 
events belong to the treaties 
which closed the wars of Charles 
XII. a ; B iii, 278. 

1720-1751 + then — 

P^st twenty years were peace- 
ful and progressive under direc- 
tion of Horn. Increase in com- 
merce, trade, mining, and general 
exports. Kingdom placed in a 
better state of defence. In 1741 
Sweden fought a ridiculous and 
unsuccessful war with Russia. 
In 1743, humiliating Peace of 
Abo, by which Sweden lost 
Eastern Finland, a; B iii, 280; 
C ii, 488-489; D xiv, 110; F 
350-353 ; H 87 ; K 89-122, 18&- 
205. 



358 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 
— or ± Adolphus Frederick 

Mentally inferior. Weak and 
indecisive. Mild, temperate, and 
peace-loving. B iii, 286, 289 ; D 
xiv, 317; E iv, 52; F 353^. 



Condition of Country 

1751-1771 — 

Country in a state of lethargy. 
Its international influence had 
become insignificant. Internal 
commotions. Decline in manu- 
factures. Peasantry oppressed. 
Government became notoriously 
corrupt, a ; B iii, 286, 287 ; C ii, 
487 ; D xiv, 317 ; F 354-359 ; H 
87. 



-}- Gustavus III 

Brilliant, accomplished, ener- 
getic, and versatile. "In addition 
to his talents as a statesman, he 
was distinguished as a poet and 
dramatist.'! His life was gov- 
erned by selfish ambition, his dis- 
position was harsh, arrogant, and 
imperious, a; 6; B iii, 298; 
D XV, 235, 236 ; /^ 380 ; H 87. 



1771-1792 -I- 

Revival of agriculture, indus- 
try, and commerce. Beneficial 
reforms in the administration of 
justice, a ; C ii, 489 ; D xv, 239. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR RUSSIA 

a. La Grande Encyclopedic. 

h. Encyclopaedia Britannica. 9th and 11th editions, 

c. Brockhaus Konversations Lexikon. 

A. Ramboud, Alfred. The History of Russia from the Earliest 

Times to 1877. Translated by L. B. Lang. 2 vols. London. 

B. Strahl UNO Herrmann. Geschichte des russischen Staates (in 

Heeren und Ukert series). 7 vols. Hamburg and Gotha, 
1839-66. 

C. Kelly, Walter K. The History of Russia, compiled from the 

works of Karamsin, Tooke, and Segur. 2 vols. London, 1854. 
[Out of date.] 

D. Beer, Adolf. Allgemeine Geschichte des Welthandels. 3 vols. 

Wien, 1860-84. 

E. SoLovEV, S. M. Histoire de Russie. Translated from the 

Russian by the Princess Souvoroff. Paris, 1879. 

F. Bain, R. Nisbet. Slavonic Europe, a Political History of Poland 

and Russia from 1447 to 1796. Cambridge, 1908. 



APPENDIX 



359 



G. MoRFiLL, W. R. Russia (in the Story of the Nations Series). 

London, 1904. 
H. Waliszewski, K. Le berceau d'une dynastie, les premiers Ro- 
manov, 1613-1682. Paris, 1909. 
J. Ralston, W. R. S. Early Russian History. London, 1874. 
K. Bain, R. N. The First Romanovs. London, 1905. 
L. Waliszewski, K. The Romance of an Empress, Catherine II of 

Russia, translated from the French. 2 vols. London, 1894. 
M. Waliszewski, K. L'heritage de Pierre le Grand, r&gne des 

femmes, gouvernement des favoris, 1725-1741. Paris, 1900. 
N. Waliszewski, K. La crise revolutionnaire, 1584-1614. Paris, 

1906. 
O. MoRFiLL, W. R. A History of Russia from the birth of Peter 

the Great to Nicholas II. London, 1902. 
P. Bain, J. N. The Pupils of Peter the Great. Westminister, 1897. 
Q. Bain, J. N. The Daughter of Peter the Great. Westminister, 

1899. 
R. Waliszewski, K. La derniere des Romanov. Paris, 1902. 



Ruler 
+ Ivan III, the Great 

Cool, resolute, deliberate, and 
economical. A skilful diplo- 
matist, stealthy and cunning in 
his methods. Tyrannical and 
passionate, a; A i, 217; B ii, 
314, 431-435 ; F 35; J 206, 207. 



rfc Vassili V 

Not brilliant, but possessed 
industry, prudence, tenacity, and 
diplomatic cunning. Very auto- 
cratic in his rule, c; A i, 242; 
Bui, 1; Ci, 132; F 105; J 137. 



Condition of CotrNTRY 

1462 1505 + 

Russia founded as an empire 
and consolidated. Conquest of 
Novgorod, Bulgaria, and a part of 
Lithuania. Acquisition of Tver, 
Rostoff, Yaroslav, and Kazan. 
Army and finances strengthened. 
Considerable building activity. 
b; A i, 226, 233; B ii, 432-435; 
F 35-40; J 108, 110, 122, 129; 
G 59-60. 

1505-1533 + or =fc 

Strength of the empire main- 
tained. Some reverses at the 
hands of the Tartars, but in the 
end the country was enlarged and 
strengthened. Many hardships 
endured by the people, such as 
famines, fires, and pestilences. 
Successful foreign diplomacy, b ; 
A i, 233 ; B iii, 49-52 ; C i, 132- 
133 ; ^' 104 ; J 137, 138, 140. 



360 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 

± or + Minority of Ivan IV 
Helen Glinska, stepmother of Ivan IV, 
Regent 
Able and resolute, but unpopu- 
lar and immoral, b; B iii, 57, 
60 ; C i, 133-134. 



Minority of Ivan IV 
Regency divided 



Condition of Country 

1533-1538 ± 

Not an important period. 
Despotic authority and order 
maintained in spite of court in- 
trigues. Minor wars in Lith- 
uania and Crimea. B iii, 73-76 ; 
C i, 133-134 ; F 106. 

1538-1547 — 

Intrigues, uprisings, and dis- 
orders. Tartars harried the em- 
pire. State treasury plundered. 
B iii, 57, 60-73, 78-86; F 106- 
107. 



+ Ivan IV, the Terrible 

Energetic and very able, es- 
pecially in statecraft. Was mer- 
ciless and dissolute. Notoriously 
cruel and superstitious, espe- 
cially jthe last part of his life, 
when he became virtually a mad- 
man, a; h; A \, 279; B iii, 
167-218, 283-288; C 138; F 
109-112; G 65, 70, 71, 79, 132- 
133 ; J 142-143. 



1547-1584 -h 

Kazan and Astrakhan con- 
quered and annexed. Siberia 
invaded and partly subdued. 
Many churches built. Some in- 
crease in foreign trade. Famine 
and pestilence in 1570. Not aU 
the wars were successful. Mos- 
cow was burned by the Tartars 
in 1574. 6; A i, 252, 302; B 
iii, 96-102, 118-123, 218-219; 
C i, 136-146 ; D 502 ; F 112-130. 
G 67, 70, 72, 76-79, 82-85. 



— Feodor I 

Extremely weak-minded. Had 
a good character, pious and phil- 
anthropic. (Boris Godunov the 
real ruler. See below.) h; A \, 
311; B iii, 376, 377; F 163; J 
149, 212 ; G 89, 90. 



1584-1598 -I- 

Empire strengthened. Tar- 
tars repulsed. Smolensk fortified. 
Archangel built. Swedes driven 
into Narva. Further subjuga- 
tion of Siberia. Commercial re- 
lations broadened, peasantry 
bound to the soil and consequent 
depopulation, h; A \, 316; B 
iii, 381, 382-384, 386-397; C i, 
162, 163, 165; F 158, 161-162; 
G93. 



APPENDIX 



361 



Ruler 

+ Boris Godunov 

Brother-in-Law of Feodor I 

Great capacity and unbounded 
ambition. A tyrant. Cunning, 
unscrupulous, and suspicious, but 
not wantonly cruel. Patronized 
literature, a ; 6 ; A i, 321 ; B 
iii, 377, 438; F 160-161, 165- 
166 ; G 98 ; J 150. 



Condition of Country 

1598-1605 ± or + 

Externally Russia's diplomatic 
position strengthened. Internally 
great commotion during the last 
six months attending the false 
Demetrius. Great famine (1601- 
1603). Depopulation among the 
peasantry, but there was an in- 
flux of desirable foreigners, b; 
A i, 320; B iii, 439, 450-^51, 
456-458,459-461; C 166-178; F 
166-172; G 98; J 156. 



— Minority of Feodor II 

A youth of sixteen. Murdered 
in less than two months. Reign 
may be considered a minority 
with the power divided. 



April 13, 1605- June 1, 1605 — 

Treasons and conspiracies, b ; 
B iii, 469-470 ; C i, 180. 



± Demetrius 

Ambitious, courageous, accom- 
plished, versatile, but imprudent. 
Good-natured, affable, and well- 
meaning. Magnificent and ex- 
travagant. B iii, 474, 475 ; C 
i, 169, 172, 182, 186, 187, 201 ; F 
173-174 ; J 162. 



1605-May 18, 1606 =fc 

Establishment of a more peace- 
ful condition of affairs, and many 
beneficial laws, soon followed by 
a conspiracy in which Demetrius 
was murdered. Treasury de- 
pleted. B iii, 474, 477-481 ; C i, 
184, 189-200, 201 ; G 104. 



zt or — Vassili (Basil) Shuiski 

A crafty and unscrupulous in- 
triguer. Timid in action, faith- 
less, and unpopular. "A nervous 
little old man, very shrewd and 
very stingy." B iii, 483; C i, 
189, 190, 201 ; F 176 ; J 220, 221. 



1606-1610 — 

Russia invaded by the Poles. 
General confusion. Tartars plun- 
dered the border, b; fi iii, 
485-502; C i, 202, 208, 209; 
F 176-180; J 167-168; G 104, 
105. 



362 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 
Interregnum 



Condition of Country 

1610-1613 — 

Anarchy for two years followed 
by the expulsion of the Poles. 
Civil disorder, however, contin- 
ued until 1613. Treasury plun- 
dered, b; A i, 346; B iii, 502- 
512; C i, 210-215; F 181-186; 
J 169-171; G 105-107; K 30, 
40. 



± Michael Romanov 

Ruled jointly with his father 
+ Feodor (Philarete) from 1617 
to 1633 

Michael was an amiable, hon- 
orable, conscientious prince of 
mediocre or perhaps superior 
capacity. 

Feodor (Philarete), of similar 
temperament, and equally vir- 
tuous, was highly endowed with 
wisdom and ability. F 191 ; G 
106; H 52; /v 47,61, 67. 



1613-1645 + 

Internal condition of the coun- 
try somewhat improved, espe- 
cially in the condition of the 
people, in commerce, manufac- 
tures, and the army. Popula- 
tion increased through the in- 
troduction of many desirable 
foreigners, b; d; A i, 356; B 
iii, 539-548; C i, 215, 217; F 
188, 189-191, 193-194; G 107, 
108; K 41, 50, 55, 60, 67, 121. 



Minority of Alexis 
Botis Morosoff in control 



1645-1650 ± or + 

Much oppression, injustice and 
discontent. Several insurrections 
and riots. On the other hand 
the army was improved and the 
frontiers strengthened, b ; B iii, 
589-598 ; C i, 218, 219 ; H 58-59, 
60, 61, 65-74, 80; K 96-98, 100, 
102. 



± or + Alexis 

About the average in mental 
capacity. A well-balanced mind. 
Very industrious and conscien- 
tious. He is especially noted for 
his good nature, humanity, and 



1650-1676 -1- 

In spite of troubles the reign 
was undoubtedly a period of prog- 
ress. Codification of the laws. 
Incorporation of the country of 
the Cossacks, and territory gained 



APPENDIX 



363 



Ruler 
gentle, courteous behaviour. Good 
husband and father, a ; b; G 
130 ; H 510-522 ; K 189. 



— Feodor III 

Reigned from the age of foiu*- 
teen to twenty years. (May be 
considered as a minority or di- 
vided regency.) 

± or + Minority of Ivan and Peter 
the Great 
Sophia, Regent 
A remarkable person of ex- 
ceptional courage, force, and 
much ability. Historians differ in 
their estimate of her moral char- 
acter, some picturing her as un- 
scrupulous, cruel, and licentious, 
others as comparatively blame- 
less. F 281-284; G 133-134; 
K 195-196. 

-|- Peter the Great 

Extraordinary ability, will- 
power, and energy. Impulsive, 
passionate, tyrannical, but often 
clement. Coarse, brutal, licen- 
tious, epileptic, a; b; c ; B iv, 
309-313; F 285-287; G 162- 
173. 



Condition of Country 
from Poland. Minor rebellions 
put down. Trade and foreign 
relations broadened. Finance, 
however, remained in a bad 
condition. 6; d; B iii, 626, 
627, 648-651, 660-666; C i, 
221-223; G 117; H 56. 

1676-1682 + 

Successful wars with the Tar- 
tars. Several reforms, one of 
which, the abolition of the Myesi- 
nichestvo, was important, c ; A 
i, 400 ; H 536-544 ; K 192-194. 

1682 1689 — 

A period of confusion and mas- 
sacres. Insurrection of the 
Stelitz. Unsuccessful expedition 
against the Tartars. 6; B iv, 
1-29 ; C i, 227-234. 



1689-1725 + 

Order established with a firm 
hand. Addition of the terri- 
tories of Little Russia, Livonia, 
Ethonia, Ingria, and a part of Fin- 
land. Seaports obtained. St. Pe- 
tersburg founded. Foundation of 
a navy. Improvement of the 
army. Increase in manufactures, 
commerce, and the liberal arts. 
b; c ; A ii, chaps. I-III ; B iv, 
333-347, 364-365, 367, 393-402, 
406-411; C i, 272-278, 289-291, 
293, 298-299, 310, 339, 345, 347, 
349, 353 ; D ii, 504-507 ; E 473- 
488 ; F 298, 309, 326-327. 



364 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 

— or ± Catharine I 
Ignorant, unambitious, though 

shrewd and sensible. Not much 
political ability or inclination to 
direct the helm of state. Life 
indolent and intemperate. Gen- 
tle in disposition and very hu- 
mane, b; A u, 123 ; B iv, 482 ; 
C i, 365, 397, 398, 399-400, 401. 
F 329-330; M 13 ; O 110-111, 
114; P 111-113. 

— Minority of Peter II 
Regency in the hands of a coun- 

cU. 



— Anne Ivanovna 

Had a fair natural intelligence, 
but her mind was narrow and un- 
educated. Many bad traits of 
character. Sullen, vindictive, self- 
ish and sensuous. Laziness al- 
ternated with bursts of energy. 
F 340, 341 ; G 191 ; M 163-173 ; 
O 142-144 ; P 176, 182, 195, 199, 
280, 284-285. 



Minority of Ivan VI 
Regency of Biren 



Condition of Country 

1725-1727 + 

A peaceful reign without 
marked internal change. Dip- 
lomatic relations strengthened 
with Austria and Germany. 
Taxes reduced. A ii, 132; B iv, 
472, 475, 478-480; C i, 397; 
F 330-332; G 176-177; 113. 



1727-1730 =fc 

Intrigues in the court. No 
marked advance or decline. Mau- 
rice of Saxony prevented from 
getting possession of Courland. 
Diplomatic apathy, b; B 507- 
530 ; C i, 402-403 ; F 335-338 ; 
119; P 124-127, 146-148; Q 9. 

1730-1740 ± or + 

Reforms in the army. Poor 
condition of the navy. Canals 
and public roads built. Success- 
ful intervention in the affairs of 
Poland. War with the Turks 
not especially successful, but 
Russia gained a few towns, 
though at much expense. 20,000 
persons said to have been ban- 
ished to Siberia. Increased taxa- 
tion and oppression, b; c ; A 
ii, 144; B iv, 557-594, 626-628; 
C i, 407, 410, 412-415, 418, 421 ; 
E 516-526; F 350; 125, 131, 
132 ; P 177, 199, 318 ; Q 20. 

Oct. 28, 1740-Nov. 20, 1740 
A short period without any 
special significance. Overthrow 
of Biren's regency. 6 ; .4 ii, 132 ; 
B iv, 507-530 ; C i, 402, 403. 



APPENDIX 



365 



Ruler 

— Minority of Ivan VI 

Anne Leopoldovna, Regent 

Indolent, timid, and very in- 
capable. Lacking in ambition. 
Lived in seclusion. Dissolute and 
slothful. Except her natural 
mildness, had not a single quality 
which could by any possibility 
command respect or admiration. 
A ii, 154; ^528; F 530; M 
288, 307, 312-318; Q 30-31; 
40-42. 

± or + Elizabeth 

Uneducated, but possessed a 
very keen mind. Indolent and 
selfish, capricious, and indulgent. 
Good-natured, but subject to 
outbursts of passionate anger. 
Extravagant and extremely li- 
centious, a ; A ii, 173 ; B v, 
176-177; G202; 202; P150; 
Q 71, 131-142; R 30-98, 534. 



Condition of Country 

Nov. 20, 1740-Dec. 6, 1741 ± 
A short period. Intrigues and 
violence soon led to the overthrow 
of Anne, Ivan VI, and their 
party. Swedes defeated (Sept. 
3, 1741), but the Russians did not 
follow up their victory, b ; B 
iv, 660-675; C i, 423-424; E 
528-531. 



1741-1762 + 

Pomerania and the southern 
part of Finland acquired. In- 
crease in commerce and manu- 
factures. Improvements in bank- 
ing. Siberia began to be peopled. 
Much tyranny. A large number 
of persons banished to Siberia. 
Treasury exhausted through ex- 
travagancies. Many public build- 
ings erected, b; c; An, 167, 171 ; 
B V, 170, 171, 176; C i, 429, 440, 
443, 445, 446, 450; E 541, 542; 
Q 315, 316; R 176-204, 271-273, 
531-534. 



— Peter III 

Half imbecile. Weak, disso- 
lute, violent. Was, however, 
called "good-hearted." Indo- 
lent, b; B V, 242, 243; L 
87, 100 ; 192, 193, 195, 196 ; Q 
98, 193. 



Jan. 5, 1762- July 10, 1762 ± 

Brief reign. Several legal re- 
forms. Abolition of the Secret 
Court of Police and of some 
monopolies. Some improvement 
in the navy and army. Many 
talented Frenchmen banished 
from the country. Much dis- 
content and sedition, ending in a 
revolution, b; yl ii, 174 ; B v, 
244, 245, 251 ; C i, 455, 456, 457, 
458; E 545-548; L 208-211; 
192-193. 



366 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 
+ Catharine II 

An extraordinary character. 
Ambitious and courageous. Had 
great enthusiasm, resolution, nat- 
ural wit, and insight. Charming 
in manner, with boundless good 
humour, but was heartless, un- 
scrupulous, and extremely li- 
centious, a; b; C ii, 137-145 ; 
F 410-412, 434 ; G 199, 219, 220, 
248 ; L passim. 



Condition of Country 

1762-1796 + 

Important conquests in the 
south and west. Part of Poland, 
the Crimea, the Kuban, Courland, 
and a part of the frontiers of 
Tm-key added to Russia. Legal 
reforms regarding the adminis- 
tration of justice. Population 
and industry increase. Financial 
exhaustion. Increased interna- 
tional prestige. Internal ad- 
ministration not so good. Poor 
condition of the army, b; c; 
A ii, 208, 211, 215 ; C ii, 126, 127, 
141-149 ; D ii, 508 ; E 558-620 ; 
F 409-434; G 223-248; L pas- 
sim. 



— Paul 

Foolish, arrogant, almost in- 
sane in his capricious eccentrici- 
ties. Fits of benevolence alter- 
nated with tjTanny. a; b; A 
ii, 248 ; C ii, 153-156, 168, 186 ; 
G251; 254-258. 



1796 1801 — 

Decline in national prestige. 
Nation brought to the verge of 
bankruptcy. Dechne in exports 
of raw material. Great perver- 
sion of justice. Small territory 
of Georgia annexed 1799. b; c; 
A ii, 268; C ii, 160, 165-166; 
G 251-257; 257-275. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR PRUSSIA 

a. AUgemeine Deutsche Biographic. 52 vols. Leipzig, 1875-1906. 

b. Eneyclopiedia Britanniea. 9th and 11th editions. 

c. Brockhaus. Konversations Loxikon. 

d. La grande encyelopedie. 31 vols. Paris, 1886-1902. 

A. TuTTLE, Herbert. History of Prussia. 4 vols. Boston, 1884- 

1896. 

B. Ranke, L. von. Zwolf Biicher Preussischer Geschichte. 5 

vols. Leipzig, 1877-1879. 

C. Droysen, I. G. Geschichte der Preussischen Politik. 14 vols. 

Berlin and Leipzig, 1868-1886. 



APPENDIX 



367 



D. 



E. 



G. 



H. 



K. 
L. 



Preussisclie Geschichte. 3 vols. Stuttgart, 1900- 

History of the Reformation in Germany. 3 vols. 

Geschichte des preussischen Staates. 2 vols. 

3 vols. 



Prutz, Hans. 

1901. 
Ranke, L. von. 

London, 1847. 
Berner, Ernst. 

Munchen, 1891. 
Beer, Adolf. Allgemeine Geschichte des Welthandels 

Wien, 1860. 
VoiGT, Friedrich. Geschichte des Brandenburghisch-Preussi- 

schen Staates. 2 pts. Berlin, 1867. 
Pierson, W. Preussische Geschichte. Siebento verbesserte und 

vermehrte Auflage. 2 vols. Berlin, 1898. 
Lavisse, E. Etudes sur I'histoire de Prusse. Paris, 1890. 
Ranke, L. von. Memoirs of the House of Brandenburg and 

History of Prussia during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Cen- 
turies. Translated. 3 vols. London, 1849. 



Ruler 
4" Frederick I 

Vigorous, able, masterful. 
Popular, tactful, good-hearted, 
but without any high sense of 
honour. "One of the best schol- 
ars in Germany." a; h; c; A 
i, 67-68 ; B i, 104-106 ; D i, 177 ; 
H i, 152. 



± Frederick II 

(Son of Frederick I) 

Careful and thoughtful; de- 
termined in pressing his claims. 
Not inclined to warfare. Of a 
calm, pious, and melancholy tem- 
perament. Tenacity of purpose 
was his most noteworthy trait, 
a ; c ; A i, 70-71 ; B i, 134-135 ; 
C i, pt. i, 66-67 ; D i, 160, 177 ; F 
60 ; Hi, 164. 



Condition of Country 

1415-1440 + 

Peace and order largely se- 
cured for the first time in many 
years. Turbulent nobles sup- 
pressed. Wars against Mecklen- 
burg and Pomerania generally 
successful. The Ukermark again 
united to Brandenburg, h; c; 
A i, 68-89; B i, 84-104; C i, 
394-402, 456-461, 505, 599-609; 
F 53-54 ; H i, 136-152, 195, 197. 

1440-1470 ± or + 

Further consolidation. Pre- 
tentious nobles were humbled. 
The towns of Berlin and Cologne 
brought into order and subjec- 
tion. Neumark acquired. Ad- 
vantageous diplomatic relations 
with Mecklenburg, Saxony, and 
Hesse. Public debt increased, 
o; 6; c; A \, 70-72; B i, 109- 
111, 113-134; C ii, pt. i, 50-63, 
131-134, 206-213, 273-276, 361- 
362; D i, 147-162, 177; F 60- 
65 ; Hi, 195-196. 



368 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 

+ Albert III (Achilles) 

(Son of Frederick I) 

John (see below) also governed 
in Brandenburg. Highly tal- 
ented as a soldier and politician. 
Active, adventurous, combative, 
a lover of splendour and the 
pleasures of life. Concerning his 
moral character there is a differ- 
ence of opinion. He was perhaps 
underhanded, tortuous and self- 
seeking in his mighty ambitions. 
Much of the actual government 
of Brandenburg was left to his 
son John (see below), o; b; c; 
Ai,72; Bi, 135; D i, 161-162, 
177 ; E 43; F72; Hi, 164-165. 



Condition of Countbt 

1470-1486 =b or -f 

A period of warfare and heavy 
taxations. The enemies of Bran- 
denburg in Pomerania and Meck- 
lenburg were humbled. Con- 
siderable dissatisfaction and dis- 
order, but the disruptive forces 
were kept fairly well in check. A 
72 ; Bi, 134-141 ; C ii, pt. i, 393- 
396, 397-405; D i, 162-172; F 
66-72 ; H i, 164-175, 196. 



± John (Cicero) 

Considered an easy, comfort- 
able, and mediocre character. 
Well educated and a patron of 
learning. Deficient in strength 
of purpose, but cannot be called 
distinctly weak, a ; c ; A i, 73 ; 
C ii, pt. i, 519-520 ; D i, 171, 177 ; 
H i, 177. 



1486-1499 rb 

A comparatively featureless 
period. Treaty with Pomerania 
of doubtful significance. Power 
of cities declined ; that of the 
nobles increased. Government 
tended towards centralization. 
Tax on beer. Internal order not 
very well maintained, c ; A i, 
73-76; B i, 143-147; D i, 172- 
177 ; F 73-76 ; H i, 176-179, 196. 



Minority of Joachim I 
' Frederick of Anspach, Regent 



1499-1502 

Brief period. Nothing of im- 
portance. 



± or -|- Joachim I 

A man of remarkably strong 
will. Narrow-minded, taciturn. 
Not gifted with showy quaUties, 
but succeeded in pursuing a 
shrewd and definite poUcy. Noted 



1502-1535 -I- 

The most notable event was 
the introduction of Roman law. 
Its value to the country is debat- 
able. Both the nobles and the 
cities were held in stern subjec- 



APPENDIX 



369 



RtTLER 

for his learning, which was of a 
pedantic nature. A i, 77, 78, 79 ; 
D i, 178, 179 ; F 77, 79-80 ; H 
i, 179, 190, 194. 



Condition of Country 
tion. Diplomatic position strong. 
Internal order very well main- 
tained, h; c ; A i, 78-87 ; B i, 
147-148, 152, 155, 157 ; D i, 178- 
196 ; F 77-88 ; H i, 179-195, 356. 



± Joachim II 

Of mediocre ability, and "no 
very firm views or convictions." 
Not gifted as a soldier or admin- 
istrator, but withal a very clever 
poUtician. A lover of pleasure, 
pomp, and lavish expenditure. 
Took a cultured interest in the fine 
arts. Not a man of bad inten- 
tions. 6; c; A i, 87, 101-102; 
D i, 201-203, 242; /?" 94; H \, 
224r-22,Q. 



1535-1571 ± 

Reformation spread quietly and 
was officially recognized in 1539. 
Power of the Estates increased. 
Bad financial management left 
the country in debt. Peaceful re- 
lations with empire and Smalkald 
League. PoUtical treaties were 
wise. 6 ; c ; A i, 87-88, 101-102 ; 
B i, 160-166; D i, 197-243; F 
89-97 ; H i, 206-226. 



it or -f- John George 

A contrast to his father. Ex- 
tremely vigorous and energetic. 
An able administrator. Not in- 
clined to warfare. Harsh, ty- 
rannical, perhaps unjust. Simple 
and domestic in his tastes. Seems 
to have been genuinely interested 
in the welfare of his country, 
b; c; A i, 101; D i, 244 ; Hi, 
226. 



1571-1598 4- 

Fi nances at first greatly 
strengthened, afterwards some- 
what declined. Country ad- 
vanced in general prosperity. 
Manufactures and trade in- 
creased. Much desirable immi- 
gration of Protestant refugees 
from France, and especially from 
the Netherlands. Peace and 
neutrality maintained. Renewed 
understanding with Pomerania 
over the question of the succes- 
sion. The actual diplomatic po- 
sition became isolated and not 
strong. Many new public build- 
ings and fortifications. 6 ; A i, 
102 ; B i, 176, 177 ; D i, 243, 269, 
276; F 98-104; // i, 226-232. 



2b 



370 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 
=fc Joachim Frederick 

Medium grade of ability. Well 
educated and industrious. Quiet, 
peaceful, honest, and well in- 
tentioned. A i, 103; B i, 185; 
D i, 220 ; J i, 82. 



Condition of Country 

1598-1608 d= 

Few striking events. Estab- 
lishment of a State Council 
(Geheime Rat) which drew power 
away from the Estates, which had 
not succeeded well in preserving 
order. Some political advance 
towards the ultimate control of 
Preussen. b; A i, 103 ; D i, 276, 
278, 280, 282-291; F 104-108; 
H i, 232-240, 349-350 ; / i, 82- 
85. 



± John Sigismund 

Not a man of marked personal 
character or strength of purpose, 
but possessed, on the other hand, 
of a fair share of instinctive 
shrewdness. Inclined to out- 
bursts of rage alternating with 
complacency. A hard drinker 
and prone to idleness, but was 
probably not Avithout patriotic 
intention, b; A i, 124 ; B i, 186 ; 
D i, 300 ; i^ 108 ; H i, 268. 



1608-1619 =b 

Much religious commotion end- 
ing in the recognition of the prin- 
ciples of toleration. East Pom- 
erania united to Brandenburg 
through marriage. Otherwise not 
an important or interesting period. 
Dispute over Julich-Cleves re- 
mained unsettled, b; A i 124- 
128; B i, 186-189; F 108-113; 
H i, 240-241, 257, 263-268, 354. 



— George William 

Timid and capricious. Sought 
his own ease and comfort. Weak 
morally and physically as well 
as mentally, o; 6; A i, 128, 131 ; 
D i, 324; F 114-115; // i, 268, 
269; J i, 121. 



1619-1640 — 

Very marked decline. Attempt 
to play a neutral part in the 
Thirty Years' War met with 
every disaster. Brandenburg 
crushed between Denmark and 
the Emperor, Prussia between 
Sweden and Poland. The nation 
brought to bankruptcy, poUtical 
dissolution, and internal lawless- 
ness. 6 ; A i, 128-142 ; B i, 217- 
218; D i, 326-377; F 114-124; 
H i, 268-287 ; J i, 121-132. 



APPENDIX 



371 



Ruler 
-\- Frederick William 

Called the Great Elector. 
Rugged, vigorous, patient. One 
of the ablest men of his day. Pru- 
dent and careful. A strong, di- 
rect will, often violent temper. 
A Uking for strong drink. Not 
altogether popular or nicely scru- 
pulous, but was a man of broad 
and essentially high ideals, a; b; 
c; d; B i, 378-383; D ii, 273- 
288; if 218. 



— Frederick I 

Ability below the average of 
kings. Vain, ostentatious, in- 
terested only in petty details. 
Relied on the judgment of others. 
Humane, generous, even extrava- 
gant, b; ^1,253-255; B i, 482 ; 
H ii, 33-34; / i, 203, 205; K 
233, 243. 



-I- Frederick William I 

Very parsimonious, industri- 
ous, determined, and arbitrary. 
Not an attractive person, but 
was nevertheless an able adminis- 
trator. Coarse, brutal, and fero- 
cious, appears to have been de- 
voted to duty, at least as he saw 
it. b; c; d; Ai, 433, 438, 460 ; 
J i, 233-234 ; H ii, 43^4. 



Condition of Country 

1640-1688 -^- 

Definite and vigorous policy at 
once estabUshed. Army reorgan- 
ized, disciplined, and rendered 
effective. Important victories of 
Fehrbellin and Settin. The Diet 
suppressed. Agriculture and 
commerce improved and encour- 
aged. Much desirable immigra- 
tion. Revenues greatly increased. 
Acquisition of Eastern Pomerania, 
Magdeburg, Halberstadt, and 
Minden. General political im- 
portance greatly enhanced, b ; 
d; A i, 145-204; B i, 272-288, 
381-382 ; D i, 378-420 ; F 126- 
218; G ii, 458; H i, 287-341; 
K 222-232. 

1688-1713 — 

Corruption in the government. 
Deterioration of the army. De- 
pletion of the treasury. Exces- 
sively burdensome taxation. 
Foreign policy weak. Prussia 
gained the status of a kingdom, 
and some further desirable immi- 
gration took place, but in general 
the period was one of decline. 
b; A i, 279 ; B i, 450, 460-470, 
482-483 ; J i, 203-210 ; K 232-243. 

1713-1740 -f- 

Country enjoyed peace and 
internal development. Most im- 
portant were the miUtary and 
financial improvements. Indus- 
trial expansion. Immigration en- 
couraged and population in- 
creased. No great external 
achievements. Diplomatically 

Prussia became isolated, b ; A 
i, 378-430; B i, 484-496; G ii, 
459 ; H ii, 35-77. 



372 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 
+ Frederick II, the Great 

Broad and comprehensive gen- 
ius. Great firmness of will. In- 
satiable ambition and love of 
power. An indefatigable worker. 
Cold, cynical, and arbitrary, but 
not devoid of personal attach- 
ments. Attentive to justice and 
the welfare of humanity, a; b; 
c; d; H ii, 184-185. 



Condition of Country 

1740-1786 + 

Great progress in nearly every 
department. Seventy million tha- 
lers in the treasury at the close 
of the reign. Army raised to 
200,000 well-disciplined troops. 
Agriculture improved. Colonies 
of immigrants established. All 
kinds of manufactures flourished, 
especially silk. Prussia became 
for the first time recognized as 
a power in Europe. At least 
100,000 foreigners came into 
P*russia and altogether the popu- 
lation increased enormously. "It 
is not pretended, however, that 
Frederick's rule made his sub- 
jects happy" (Tuttle). b; A 
iii, chap. 3, 4 ; B ii, 61 ; F 402- 
420 ; G ii, 460-461 ; K 273-302. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR AUSTRIA 

a. Allgemeine doutsche Biographie. 52 vols. Leipzig, 1875-1906. 

b. Enc3-clopa)dia Britannica. 9th and 11th editions. 

c. WuRZBACu. Biograpliisches Loxikon. 60 vols. Wien, 1856-91. 

d. Brockhaus. Konversations Lexikon. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1906. 

e. La grande encyclopedie. 31 vols. Paris, 1811-62. 

A. CoxE, W. House of Austria. 3 vols. 1847. AA. 5 vols, 

London, 1820. 

B. Leger, Louis, P.M. A History of Austro-Hungary from the Ear- 

liest Times to the Year 1889. Trans, from the French by Mrs. 
Birkbeek Hill. Preface by E. A. Freeman. London, 1889. 

C. Ruber, Alfons. Geschichte Osterreiehs. 5 vols. Gotha, 1885- 

96. 

D. Menzel, Wolfgang. The History of Germany from the Earliest 

Period to the Present Time. Trans, from the fourth German 
edition by Mrs. Geo. Horrocks. 3 vols. London, 1876-79. 

E. Wright, J. H. (Editor). A History of All Nations. 24 vols. 

Philadelphia, 1905. 

F. Grindly, Anton. History of the Thirty Years' War. Trans, by 

Andrew T. Brook. 2 vols. N. Y., 1884. 



APPENDIX 



373 



G. Beer, Adolf. Allgemeine Geschichte des Welthandels. 3 vols. 
Wien, 1860. 

H. Prtjtz, Hans. Staatengesehichte des Abendlandes im Mittel- 
alter. 2d. vol. Berlin, 1887. 

J. Krones, Franz. Handbuch der Geschichte Oesterreichs mit 
besonderer Riicksicht auf Lander-, Volkerkunde und Culturge- 
schichte. 4 vols. Berlin, 1876-79. 

K. Ranke, Leopold von. History of the Reformation in Germany. 
3 vols. London, 1905. 

L. Mayer, Franz M. Geschichte Oesterreichs mit besonderer Riick- 
sicht auf das Culturleben. 2 vols. Wien und Leipzig, 1900-01. 

M. Whitman, Sidney. Austria. New York, 1889. 



Ruler 

-\- Rudolph I, of Hapsburg 

(Emperor) 

Physically and mentally a 
grand figure in the age in which 
he lived. Noted for his practical 
wisdom, prudence, and sense of 
justice, a ; 6 ; c ; A i, 53, 58 ; 
Cii, 3. 



Condition of Country 

1276-1291 + 

Austria, Stjoia, and Carniola 
acquired through force of arms 
by Rudolph of Hapsburg, who 
had already been elected Emperor. 
The most important fact is that 
order and tranquillity were re- 
stored. A i, 57; C ii, 3-7; D 
ii, 27; E ix, 311, 314; H 131- 
140; L i, 117, 174. 



+ Albert I 

Able, energetic, brave, firm. 
Excessively ambitious. Was 
avaricious, rapacious, and ex- 
tremely cruel, but is credited with 
an austere frankness and with 
domestic virtue, a ; 6 ; c ; A i, 
79 ; C ii, 9-10 ; D ii, 85 ; i/, 144 ; 
L i, 289, 298. 



1283-1308 1 



+ 



Internal order vigorously main- 
tained. TjTanny was felt chiefly 
by the nobles. Robber barons 
were suppressed. Burghers, the 
surburban class, and serfs were 
catered to, and received benefits. 
Most of the interest centers 
around events outside of Aus- 
tria, and the efforts of Albert to 
strengthen the then disorganized 
Empire. 6 ; A i, 80 ; 5 644 ; C ii, 
51-62, 95, 100; D ii, 85; E ix, 
318; H 144-151; L i, 289-292. 

> The government of Rudolph and his son Albert overlapped for eight years. 



374 



APPENDIX 



Rttler 
Frederick and Leopold 
± Frederick " the Handsome " 

Mediocre ability, brave, amia- 
ble, and not deficient in accom- 
plishments ; mild, benevolent, and 
honourable. A i, 82; AA i, 144; 
D ii, 116. 
± Leopold 

Bold, hardy, energetic. Pos- 
sessed considerable talent for war- 
fare, but was a restless, turbulent 
spirit, lacking in judgment. He 
seems to have fallen into a state 
of melancholia after the battle of 
Muhldorf, 1322, and died 1326 in 
a "fit of frenzy." A i, 83, 102; 
AA, i, 126, 144, 149 ; L i, 300. 

Albert and Otto 
+ Albert " the Wise " 

A distinctly superior ruler. 
High talents as a soldier and ad- 
ministrator. Learned, benig- 
nant, humane ; extremely popu- 
lar with his subjects. A i, 116, 
118; B, 144, 145; C ii, 186, 194; 
D ii, 126. 

Otto " the Gay " 

An obscure character, but little 
mentioned. Died Feb. 16, 1339, 
aged 37. A i, 103. 

+ Rudolph IV 

This prince was called by four 
different surnames, — "The Si- 
lent," "The Magnificent," "The 
Learned," and "The Founder." 
Each one, says Kroner, "char- 
acterized one of his qualities." 
He is generally credited with high 
and precocious talents and a 
knowledge of the arts and sciences. 



Condition of Country 

1308-1330 =fc 

A period of warfare with the 
Swiss and Bavarians not char- 
acterized by success or by impor- 
tant results in any direction. On 
the whole the Austrians appear to 
have been the losers. The terri- 
torial gains were the county of 
Pfirt or Ferrette (1324), and the 
domains of Kyburg (1326). In 
1315 the Forest towns threw off 
the Austrian yoke. A i, 81-102 ; 
B 143, 644; C ii, 113-148. 



1330-1359 -I- 

Increase in territory and exter- 
nal strength. Territorial gains : 
Breisach, Schaffansen, Rhein- 
felden, N^uburg, Rappenchwyl, 
and the duchy of Carinthia. 
Losses : Lucerne, Glaris, and 
Zug. Vienna and Klagenfurt, the 
capital of Carinthia, received new 
municipal codes. Suppression of 
"Trial by Combat" in Carinthia. 
A i, 106, 109; B 144, 145, 644; 
C li, 185-194, 403-404. 

1359-1365 -I- 

Brief but important reign. 
Austria proper gained the large 
territory known as the Tyrol, 
and became more independent of 
the Empire. Internal adminis- 
tration was \agorous. Trade and 
manufactiires were encouraged. 
Taxes imposed on wine and beer. 
University of Vienna and Cathe- 



APPENDIX 



375 



Ruler 
Considerably in advance of his 
times. Was secretive in his 
plans, and perhaps undei'hand in 
his methods. Is believed to have 
falsified charters to further his 
independence of the Empire. 
Died aged 25. A i, 118, 122; 
B, 145 ; C ii, 288 ; / ii, 133. 

Albert and Leopold 
=±= Albert III 

Placid and peaceful disposition. 
A slow, serious person not defi- 
cient in firmness or understanding. 
Attached to the pursuit of liter- 
ature and the exact sciences. 
Popular with his subjects. A i, 
123, 140, 141 ; C ii, 304-305 ; L 

i, 328. 

± Leopold 

Brave, ambitious, impetuous ; 
devoted to warfare, but his plans 
were not well thought out. His 
character described as rapacious. 
(Died in 1386, aged 35.) A i, 
123 ; G ii, 305 ; L i, 328. 
=fc Albert IV and William 
Albert IV 

A rather vague and doubtfully 
outlined character. Was called 
by some "the Patient." Had a 
reputation for piety and devotion 
to religion and occult sciences. 
Also undertook a dangerous pil- 
grimage to Palestine, which gained 
for hira much romantic admiration. 
Died in 1404. AAi, 203, 204 ; B, 
149 ; C, 323 ; J ii, 322 ; L i, 347- 
William " der Freundliche " 

An obscure person. Said to 
have been popular and to have 
had knightly qualities. Died in 
1406. J ii, 192, 223. 



Condition of Country 
dral of St. Stephen founded. 
AA i, 172, 174, 175 ; B 147-148 ; 
C ii, 260-288, 403-404; J ii 
132-152; L 320, 321, 412, 413, 
445-449, 451. 



1365-1395 ±or + 

A period of external wars of 
doubtful outcome. Internal con- 
ditions in Austria peaceful. Con- 
siderable waste of resources. 
Gains in territory : (1367) Breis- 
gau, (1374) the property of the 
counts of Gorica in Carniola, 
(1379) the Bailiwick of Suabia, 
(1381) Hohenberg, (1382) Trieste. 
From 1379 to 1386 territories of 
the House of Hapsburg were 
divided between Albert and Leo- 
pold, Austria alone falling to 
Albert. A i, 124, 128-130, 140; 
G ii, 288-303, 316, 321 ; L i, 327- 
331. 

1395-1406 ± 

A brief and unimportant period. 
Dissensions among Hapsburg 
branches. Styria, Carinthia, 
and Carniola administered by 
William, who claimed also 
Austria. An agreement was 
reached that both should rule 
jointly (1404). Some parliamen- 
tary advance (die Stande). B 
149 ; C ii, 322-324, 396, 397, 405- 
407 ; J ii, 217-223 ; L i, 346-349. 



376 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 
Minority of Albert V 
Leopold IV and Ernest, Regents 
± Leopold 

Of no great ability and little 
virtue. Quarrelsome and self- 
seeking. Outwardly polished and 
a patron of learning. His char- 
acter has perhaps been unduly 
slandered. A A i, 206-207; B, 
105 ; C ii, 409-20 ; J ii, 227. 
+ Ernest der Eiserne, younger 
brother of Leopold IV 

Strong, positive, able, and exces- 
sively ambitious and covetous. 
AA i, 206-207; B 150; J ii, 
227, 261 ; L i, 349. 

+ Albert V (Emperor, 1438) 

Able administrator. A firm, se- 
rious, dignified, lofty type of man. 
Simple in his tastes. Taciturn 
nature. Magnanimous, highly 
esteemed. A i, 171; B, 150; C 
ii,421; J ii, 320. 



— Minority of Ladislaus " Post- 
humous " 

Control of the government 
divided. Ladislaus was a weak 
youth and died aged seventeen. 



Condition of Country 

1406-1411 — 

A period of discord. Lawless 
nobles and banditti devastated 
the country. "Sometimes the 
power of Leopold was predomi- 
nant, sometimes that of Ernest ; 
and the aim of both was to enrich 
themselves by exactions and im- 
positions before the young Albert 
could assume the reins of govern- 
ment." ^A 1,206-207; B 150; 
C ii, 410-418, 420 ; J ii, 224-227 ; 
L i, 349. 



1411-1439 -I- 

Change to tranquility and pros- 
perity. Security for life and 
property. Turks driven from 
Hungary, 1435. Bohemia and 
Hungary came to the Hapsburgs 
through marriage of Albert V 
with Elizabeth, heiress of these 
countries. A i, 147; B 150; C 
ii, 421 ; J ii, 279, 312-320. 

1439-1457 =fc 

Austria, Hungary, and Bohemia 
may theoretically be considered 
as united in this reign under a 
single crown worn by the youth- 
ful Ladislaus. Practically there 
was no union. Various parties 
and factions were at war with 
each other. The period not with- 
out glory from the important 
victories gained by Hunyady and 
Ladislaus of Poland against the 
Turks, b; d; c; AA 1,243-263; 
J ii, 321-377 ; L i, 362-370, 449- 
450. 



APPENDIX 



377 



RtTLER 

Frederick III (Emperor), and his 
younger brother Albert 

In 1458 Albert was granted 
Upper Austria, Frederick, Lower 
Austria. Vienna was to be the 
joint residence. 
± Frederick III 

Slow, persistent, phlegmatic. 
Lacked energy. His disposition 
peaceful. Sedentary in his tastes. 
A lover of learning. Stubborn 
and selfish. His private life was 
chaste and abstemious. Consist- 
ently devoted to the aggrandize- 
ment of his family, b; A i, 321, 
335, 384; D ii, 183; E x, 198; 
J ii, 389, 489-491; K 150; L i, 
390-391. 

=1= Albert 

Ardent, impetuous, restless, 
rash, gay ; excessively ambitious, 
prodigal, fond of war. A A i, 
301 ; J ii, 337, 352, 382, 392. 



Condition of Country 

1457-1463 — 

On the death of Ladislaus, 
Hungary and Bohemia separated 
from Austria. This period was 
occupied by party warfare be- 
tween the brothers Frederick and 
Albert, b; AA i, 325-333; / 
ii, 377-392 ; L i, 372-375. 



Frederick III (Emperor) 
See above. 



1463-1493 d= 

The Turks several times in- 
vaded Carniola and Styria. In 
1485 the Austrians were defeated 
by Matthias Corvinus, king of 
Hungary, who made Vienna his 
capital. House of Austria ag- 
grandized its power by the mar- 
riage of Maximilian with Mary, 
heiress of Burgundy. Though 
often considered a weak and un- 
fortunate reign, there is a good 
deal to be said on the favorable 
side. Austrian political influence 
was considerably augmented. 
Something was aecompUshed 
towards suppressing lawlessness 



378 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 



+ Maximilian I 

Vain and versatile. Called 
"the last of the knights." Brill- 
iant, eloquent, learned, ambitious, 
and a hard worker, but too impul- 
sive and erratic. He is by some 
charged with duplicity. He was 
amiable and popular. A pic- 
turesque figure. One of the best 
remembered of the Hapsburgs. 
a; 6; c; A i, 393, 394-397; C 
iii, 464; K, 118. 
+ Charles V 

Sagacious, vigorous, inordi- 
nately ambitious. Much duplic- 
ity in his character, selfish, cold. 
"His virtues were negative rather 
than positive.'.' References, see 
Spain. 
+ Ferdinand I 

Well educated and very indus- 
trious. Though not endowed 
with brilliant talents, is generally 
considered a superior ruler. Ami- 
able, frank, just, sober, and pure 
in his domestic life. Inclined 
towards peace and a moderate 
policy. 1 a; b; c; yl ii, IG; 
B, 259; C iii, 480; iv, 196, 201, 
202 ; L ii, 59-60. 



Condition of Country 
and furthering justice. Suabian 
League benefited Austria. Taxa- 
tion was especially burdensome. 
Considerable building, h; AA i, 
333-358, 367-369, 376-381 ; J ii 
425-435, 454-471 ; 480-492; L i, 
376-391, 450, 483, 513. 

1493-1519 + or ± 

Austria enlarged and consoli- 
dated. Establishment of law and 
order. Reforms and improve- 
ments in the internal administra- 
tion, in the army and navy, and 
poUce regulations. Foreign di- 
plomacy weak. Finances declined. 
Taxation high. 6 ; A i, 376, 394 ; 
B 251-255, 645; C iii, 450-453, 
454, 459, 489; L i, 394-399, 451, 
483. 

1519 1521 =b 

Brief period. No important 
changes. C iii, 479-491. 



1 Probably rated too low 



1521-1564 ± 

Period of the Reformation. 
Uprisings in Tyrol, Hungary, 
and Bohemia, which were sup- 
pressed. Civil wars in Tran- 
sylvania, which country was lost. 
Finances declined. Possessions 
extended by several important 
districts. Army strengthened 
and condition of the peasantry 
improved. Industry grew. A ii, 
494, 495, 499, 517, 519, 523, 526; 
AA ii, 229, 234r-235 ; B 257; 
C iii, 504, 511, 513, iv, 199, 202- 
203, 206, 207, 209; L ii, 1-60, 
296-300, 312. 
in "Heredity in Royalty." 



APPENDIX 



379 



Ruler 
-|- Maximilian II 

Wise and prudent. Talented, 
liberal, and amiable. A model 
husband and father. An excel- 
lent character in many ways, but 
was perhaps lacking in firmness. 
a; b; c; C iv, 248, 249 ; J iii, 
287-288 ; L, ii, 76. 

Rudolph II 
In youth he evinced good capac- 
ity and considerable learning. 
Mild, indolent and pleasure-lov- 
ing. Increasing melancholia and 
a penchant for drink terminated 
in mental weakness during the 
last fourteen years of his life. 
Resigned his crown. ^ a ; c ; A 
ii, 129 ; B, 261 ; C, iv, 284-286, 
359-360 ; D ii, 308, E xii, 57, 71 ; 
J iii, 292-294 ; L ii, 109. 

— Matthias 

In his youth active, restless, 
and ambitious. No great ability. 
Unreliable and intriguing. Dur- 
ing his latter years, which com- 
prised the period of his reign, he 
showed little interest in affairs of 
state, a; c; A ii, B, 263 ; C v, 
46; E xii, 151, 160, 164; J iii, 
294-295; L ii, 109-110, 112. 
ri: Ferdinand II 

Diligent, and well-meaning, but 
narrow-minded. Patient and de- 
vout, but tyrannical and bigoted, 
perhaps cruel. Private life 
praiseworthy. Extravagant in 



Condition of Country 

1564-1576 + 

A period of peace, law, strength, 
order and justice. Austria not 
successful in the question of 
Poland. Cities were very flourish- 
ing, lower classes prosperous. A 
ii, 57; AA ii, 286, 295, 315, 337; 
C iv, 249 ; J iii, 287-288 ; L ii, 
60-76, 296, 300. 

1576-1611 — 

Many civil and religious up- 
risings. Internal confusion. 
Weakness and corruption in the 
government. Agrarian difficulties 
and peasant's war. A ii, 62-130, 
109, 111, 113, 115, 121, 123; B, 
261 ; C iv, 296, 363, 365, 476-555 ; 
J iii, 288, 295-297, 314-319, 322- 
382; L ii, 77-109. 



1612-1619 =fc 

Unsettled conditions continued. 
Civil and religious troubles. Hu- 
mihating peace with Turkey 
(1615). Treasury depleted, a; 
b; A ii, 131, 133, 137; C v, 43- 
116; E xii, 169, 171; J iii, 288, 
382-398; L ii, 109-121. 



1619-1637 — or ± 

Part of the Thirty Years War 
period. Various foreign wars. 
No marked progress on the ma- 
terial side. Much building of 
religious edifices. Finances de- 

1 The grade (5) which was accorded Rudolph II in "Heredity in Royalty" 
has been criticised. This was given as a conservative way of escaping the dif- 
ficulty of weighing natural ability against indolence and late mental un- 
balance. As a ruler he was certainly weak. 



380 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 

the use of money, a ; b; e; A 
ii, 298, 299; B 264 ; E xii, 171, 
182; F ii, 250; J iii, 505-506; 
L ii, 172-173. 



Condition of Country 

pleted. Many intelligent sub- 
jects emigrated. Loss of per- 
sonal liberty. A ii, 161-291 ; 
A A iii, 189-190; D ii, 375; E 
xii, 172-173, 183, 202, 209, 215, 
216, 261, 294; G ii, 441; J iii, 
402-405, 426-506; L ii, 121- 
173, 313. 



d= Ferdinand III 

Of mediocre ability. Learned 
and fond of the arts, but lacking 
in strength and decision of charac- 
ter. Mild, frugal, and extremely 
just, a; b; c; AA iii, 255; B 
266; C V, 516-517; D ii, 375; 
E xii, 294 ; F ii, 257 ; J iii, 551- 
552. 



1637-1657 ± 

Establishment of internal peace. 
Constitutional progress. Frugal 
financial management. Decline 
in international prestige. Loss of 
Alsace. Considerable depopula- 
tion, b; A ii, 302, 305, 308, 309, 
311, 314, 317, 319, 322, 341-344; 
B 266, 341, 344; C v, 517, 616- 
617 ; E xii, 321-322 ; / iii, 516- 
547, 551-561 ; L 177-183. 



db Leopold I 

A learned recluse. Diligent in 
application to details, but lack- 
ing in depth and decision. Pri- 
vate and domestic virtues praise- 
worthy. WeU-meaning and ex- 
tremely charitable, a; b; c; 
A ii, 515; A A iii, 479; E xiii, 
157 ; J iii, 563-j565 ; L ii, 183. 



1657-1705 -1- 

By the Peace of Carlowitz 
Austria acquired Turkish Hun- 
gary, Slavonia, and Transylvania. 
Improvements in the administra- 
tion of justice and in the army. 
Financial depletion. Some decline 
in trade, b; d; e; A ii, 382, 
571, 588; E xiii, 157; G ii, 442- 
443 ; J iii, 562-688 ; L ii, 274. 



-\- Joseph I 

Clear, active, and vigorous 
intellect. Amiable, generous, 
tolerant, and humane. Tastes ar- 
tistic and scientific, a; c; A A 
iv, 1-4, 117, 118; B, 342; E xiii, 
303 ; J iii, 563-565 ; L ii, 236. 



1705-1711 + 

Brief reign. War of the Span- 
ish Succession was on. Empire 
showed strength in its inner and 
outer activities, a; b; c; A iii, 
3, 49, 77 ; E xiii, 303 ; L ii, 230- 
237, 325. 



APPENDIX 



381 



RULEB 

— Charles VI 

Stupid and obstinate. A poor 
ruler, deficient in intellectual 
grasp. Cold, jealous, suspicious, 
unreliable, though probably well- 
intentioned. Pious; fond of the 
fine arts, a; c; A iii, 113, 240; 
D iii, 16; L ii, 251. 



Condition of Country 

1711-1740 — 

Peace of Passarowitz (1718) 
brought increase of territory, 
which, however, was of doubtful 
advantage. Events of 1733-1739 
unfortunate for Austria. By the 
Peace of Belgrade much territory 
given back to the Turks. Fi- 
nances and condition of the army 
reduced to a deplorable state. 
Weak diplomacy. Some increase 
in trade and industry. At the 
close of this reign Austria had 
sunk to a point of extreme 
weakness, b; e; A iii, 108, 110, 
135, 145, 167, 177, 189, 199, 219, 
221, 225; D iii, 15; E xiv, 188; 
G ii, 443, 444 ; L ii, 244, 231. 



+ Maria Theresa 

Brave, able, very industrious, 
economical. Kind, charitable. 
A good wife and mother. Strict, 
even illiberal in her prejudices. 
a; b; c; A iii, 482; B 381; 
D iii, 48. 



1740-1780 -I- 

The various portions of the 
kingdom unified and centralized. 
Austria gained slightly in territory 
and greatly in prestige. Industry, 
commerce, and agriculture im- 
proved, a; b; c; d; e; A iii, 
483 ; B 329-381 ; G ii, 433, 445 ; 
447, 453, 454; L ii, 421-433, 
545-555. 



± Joseph II 

A very strange character. 
Restless, brave, ambitious, men- 
tally, alert, and well-inf ormed,'but 
was impractical and visionary. 
An incompetent general. Benev- 
olent, generous, and anxious to 
bring about reforms. Austere 
but amiable. Praised for his 
domestic virtues. His chief vice 



1780-1790 ± 

Neither progress nor decline is 
clearly marked. A period of 
internal agitations and foreign 
wars. The reforms were too 
drastic to meet with success. 
Some improvement in agricul- 
ture, roads, and canals. Some 
dearly bought success against the 
Turks. The diplomatic position 



382 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 
was duplicity, a; b; c; d; 
A iii, 486, 541-542; B, 393; D 
in, 84 ; L ii, 473-474. 



+ Leopold II 

A clever, cautious politician. 
Intelligent and energetic. Kind- 
hearted and just. Is said to have 
been a libertine, a ; b; c; A 
iii, 552, 553, 579 ; B, 398-399. 



Condition of Country 
of Austria was weakened to the 
advantage of Prussia, b; d; e; 
A iii, 488, 491, 494, 499, 510, 521, 
522, 531, 533, 543; B 382-393; 
D iii, 86, 90 ; G ii, 433, 445, 446, 
447, 450, 451, 456 ; L ii, 449-474, 
552-553; M 266-273. 

1790-1792 ± 

Brief period. Opinions vary 
as to its significance. Restora- 
tion of law and order by concilia- 
tions. Perhaps a weakened dip- 
lomatic position. Private Uberty 
somewhat curtailed, a; b; d 
e ; A iii, 545, 547, 552, 562, 579 
B 398-400; L ii, 474, 481 
M 274-278. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR TURKEY 

a. Encyclopaedia Britannica. 9th and 11th editions. 

A. CuEASY, Sir Edward. History of the Ottoman Turks. London, 

1877. 

B. Freemax, E. a. The Ottoman Power in Europe. London, 1877. 

C. Von Hammer-Purgstall, J. Geschiehte des Osmanischen Reiches. 

4 vols. Buda-Pest, 1834-35. 

D. The Cambridge Modern History. Edited by (A. W. Ward, 

G. W. Prothero, Stanley Leathes, planned by the late Lord 
Acton). 13 vols. Cambridge, England, 1902-11. 

E. ZiNKEisEN, J. W. Geschiehte des Osmanischen Reiches in Europa. 

7 vols. Hamburg and Gotha, 1840-63. 

F. La Jonquiere, A. Historie de I'Erapire Ottoman. Paris, 1881. 

G. Lane-Poole, Stanley. The Story of Turkey. London and New 

York, 1900. 
H. JoRGA, N. Geschiehte des Osmanischen Reiches. 2 vols. Gotha, 
1908-09. 



+ Osman (Othman I) 

Brave, resolute, subtle. An 
able warrior and popular leader. 
Highly eulogized for mildness. 



1288-1326 + 

Foundation of the Ottoman 

power. Dominion enlarged, 

partly at the expense of rival 



APPENDIX 



383 



Ruler 
humanity, and justice, although 
he is reported to have murdered 
his uncle, a; A, 2; B, 103. 



Condition of Country 
chieftains, but principally from the 
Greek Empire, a ; A 8; B 103; 
C i, 79-80 ; H i, 149, passim. 



+ Orkhan (Urkhan) 

Great organizer. Superior 
military and political talents. 
"A brave warrior and upright 
prince." Free from cruelty, a ; 
A, 16; B, 103; C i, 142. 



1326-1359 + 

Extensive conquests from the 
Greeks in Asia Minor. Army of 
Janissaries founded, also many 
mosques, colleges, and other 
public institutions, a ; A 16 ; 
fi 103; C i, 117-135. 



"t- Murad (Amurath) I 

Able warrior and politician. 
In the main upright, though cruel 
at times, a ; A, 24; C i, 180 ; 
F, 131-132. 



1359-1389 + 

Prosperity and victories. Con- 
quest of Roumelia and Bulgaria, 
a; A 22, 26; B 108 ; H i, 215, 
passim. 



-\- Bayezid (Bajazet) I, the Thunder- 
bolt 

An able general, distinguished 
for the rapidity of his movements. 
Cold, cruel, licentious, and a 
drunkard, a; A, 24, 37, 47; 
B, 110; C i, 182; Hi, 266. 



1389-1402 + 

Conquest of the greater part 
of Asia Minor and a considerable 
portion of Greece. Victory over 
allied Christians at Nicopolis. De- 
feated by Tamerlane at Angora. 
a; A 33, 36; B 110, 111; C i, 
182, 248-250. 



Interregnum 



-j- Mahommed (Muhammed) I 

Accomplished, just, and mag- 
nanimous. A patron of htera- 
ture and poetry, a; A, 54, 59; 
C i, 305. 



1402-1413 — 

Kingdom weakened in the 
struggles of rival princes. A 50 ; 
B 113; Ci, 265. 

1413-1421 + 

Turkish dominion again con- 
solidated and restored. The 
European power of the Ottomans 
made but small advance. Con- 
siderable building of mosques, 
etc. a; A 54-59; B 113 ; C i, 
302, 305. 



384 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 
-1- or ± Murad (Amurath) II 

An able, just, and humane 
ruler. "His character was as 
noble as it was commanding." 
a; A, 66; C i, 350-351 ; G, 101. 



Condition of Country 
1421-1451 



+ 



Turkish power advanced. Thes- 
salonica added. In the wars with 
Hunyady victories balanced de- 
feats, a; B 125; C i, 575-578, 
594. 



-f Mahommed II, the Conqueror 

Not only a great soldier and 
statesman and organizer, but a 
master of many languages. Was 
notorious for his cruelty, lust, 
and faithlessness. a; A 75 ; 
5 114; Ci, 173-175. 



1451-1481 + 

Marked advance. Famous 
capture of Constantinople. Servia 
and Bosnia reduced, also Trebi- 
zond, Karaman, the Crimea, and 
many lands of the Greek Archi- 
pelago were added to the Turk- 
ish dominion. Much building of 
schools, mosques, etc. a ; B 125 ; 
C 1, 575-578 ; 594 ; H\\, 1, passim. 



± Bayezid (Bajazet) II 

Unambitious and peace-loving. 
Simple in his habits. Austere 
in his devotions. Fond of specu- 
lative philosophy. His virtues 
were much praised. Deposed by 
his son Selim. a ; A 122 ; B 
125 ; C i, 623-624, 684. 



1481-1512 ± 

A general lethargy. Practi- 
cally no advance against the 
Christians. Many internal dis- 
turbances. No special decline. 
A single naval victory. Appar- 
ently no lack of finances. More 
building, a; A 121, 125; B 
125 ; C i, 624, 647, 649, 684, 685- 
687. 



+ 



Selim I 



A warrior of high ability. 
Remarkable for his political sa- 
gacity and literary talent. Ex- 
tremely cruel and bloodthirsty. 
Cared little for pleasure, a ; 
A 127 ; B 126 ; C i, 691-694, 801 ; 
D i, 90 ; H ii, 316, passim. 



1512-1620 



+ 



Empire doubled in extent. 
Conquests of Kurdistan, Sjrria, 
and Egypt. Increase in the navy. 
a; B125; C i, 799 ; H ii, 327. 



APPENDIX 



385 



RULEE 

-f- Suleiman I, the Magnificent 

One of the ablest rulers of his 
time. Brilliant genius in war 
and government. Extremely 
just. Free from vices. Warm- 
hearted and sincere. He is, how- 
ever, accused of undue severity 
in ordering the execution of many 
of his officers and relations. 
a; A 211; B 127; C, ii, 351- 
353 ; D i,92; Hii, 342, passim. 

— Selim II 

Weak in intellect. Extremely 
degraded. Idle, sensuous, ad- 
dicted to drunkenness and the 
coarsest vices. Cruel and treach- 
erous, a; A 272; B 130. 



— Murad (Amurath) III 
"Weak and sensual, as well as 

cruel, but his mind was not alto- 
gether without cultivation." He 
ruled in name only. a ; A 225 ; 
E iii, 385-387. 

— Mahommed III 

Feeble ruler, devoted to pleas- 
ure. Weak-minded, jealous, 
sickly, voluptuary. Put his nine- 
teen brothers to death, a ; A 
231-38; C iii, 667-668. 



— Ahmed I 

Irresolute, weak, selfish, and 
indolent, though moderate and 
good-natured. Too much a lover 
of pleasure. yl 238 ; C ii, 766; 
E iii, 733. 

2c 



Condition of Country 

1520-1566 + 

Turkish Empire attained the 
summit of its power and glory. 
Conquest of Hungary, Trans- 
sylvania, Rhodes, and a large 
portion of Armenia. Much build- 
ing of mosques, bridges, and 
roads. A 156, 181, 209; B 127; 
D i, 92 ; ii, 128 ; H ii, 342-453. 



1566-1574 ± 

Neither advance nor decline 
clearly marked. Cyprus and 
Tunis were won. The Turks 
met an overwhelming defeat in 
the famous naval battle of Le- 
panto. a ; B ISO; D iii, 136. 

1574-1595 — 

Rapid decay. Insubordination 
in the army. Transylvania, 
Moldavia, and Wallaehia rose 
in revolt, a; 224, 228, 229; E 
iii, 389, 397, 559, 572-579, 775- 
783. 

1595 1603 — 

Inglorious reign. Decline. 
Unsuccessful war in Persia. Re- 
volts in the army. A victory 
over the Austrians and Tran- 
sylvanians, but nothing came of 
it. a; A 224^237; C ii, 667- 
670. 

1603-1617 — 

Further loss of national pres- 
tige, a; A 241. 



386 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 

— Osman (Othman) II 

A bold, ambitious youth with 
little poUtieal wisdom or mili- 
tary skill. "Very cruel and hard- 
hearted," but not sensual. A 
242-243 ; E in, 734. 

— Mustafa I 

An imbecile, a; A, 242; C 
ii, 770, 813. 

+ Murad (Amurath) IV 

Courageous, vigorous, decisive. 
Passionate, tyrannical, cruel, and 
a drunkard, a ; A 246 ; B 137 ; 
Ciii, 137, 206-211. 



— Ibrahim 

Weak and sensuous voluptuary. 
Cowardly, selfish, cruel, brutal. 
a; A 259; B 137; C iii, 253- 
256. 

— Minority of Mahommed IV 
(Kuprili, grand vizier 1656-1661, fol- 
lowed by his son Fazil) 

Both were men of great abiUty. 
a; A 272; C iii, 523-524, 689, 
690. 



— Mahommed IV 

"Weak, selfish, not especially 
cruel. Devoted to hunting. 
Had some literary tastes. Lazy 
and good-natured. Just and 
clement. A 277, 294, 299 ; C iii, 
614, 615, 690. 



Condition of Country 

1618-1622 — 

Loss of territory which was 
restored to Persia. Revolt of 
the Janissaries and murder of 
Osman. a; A 242; C ii, 776- 
777, 799-809. 

1622-1623 — 

Miseries, disorders, intrigues, 

robberies, and murders. A 244 ; 

C ii, 815. 

1623-1640 + 

Order and discipline reestab- 
lished. Turkey again restored 
to something of its former glory. 
Revenues were honestly adminis- 
tered. Bagdad retaken from the 
Persians. Reforms in the army. 
a; A 250-253; C iii, 210; E 

260-262. 

1640-1648 — 

All the evils that had been 

curbed for a time broke out 

afresh. Treasury depleted. 

Taxes increased, a ; A 259-261 ; 

C iii, 252. 

1648-1663 -I- 

Disorders and evils until 1656, 
when Kuprili came into control. 
After this progress and prosperity. 
Order established. Tenedos, Lem- 
nos, taken from the Venetians a ; 
A 273, 276, 277 ; C iii, 475, 482, 
523-524. 

1663-1687 ± 

Island of Candia captured by 
the Turks, under the leadership 
of Fazil Ahmed, but after his 
death, in 1676, disaster followed 
disaster and many cities were lost. 
Naval power declined, a ; A 
283, 290, 294-296 ; 5 148 ; C iii, 
613, 787-803. 



APPENDIX 



387 



Ruler 
— Suleiman II 

Dull, though well-meaning. 
Devoted himself to petty details 
in reorganizing the army. Not 
idle or sensual. Pious, credulous. 
A 301 ; C iii, 806. 



— Ahmed II 

Feeble, melancholy, and pious. 
Had little influence. Mild and 
well-meaning, fond of literature. 
a; cm, 847, 872. 

— Mustafa II 
Naturally intelligent and culti- 
vated. Started with firmness and 
good intentions. Not a strong 
character. In his latter life sank 
into ease and sensuality. Was 
deposed, a; A 323; C iv, 74. 



± or — Ahmed III 

Mediocre, peaceful character. 
Lover of ease and luxury. Ruled 
by his grand viziers, a ; A 349 ; 
C iv, 268. 



— Mahmud I 

Little intellect. No influence. 
Mild in disposition, quiet in his 
tastes. Humane and affable, a ; 
C iv, 481 ; F 368. 



Condition of Country 

1687-1691 — 

Mutiny and pillage by the 
Janissaries. Tiu-ks lost the 
greater part of Hungary, but 
recovered Servia and Belgrade. 
a; A 301-304; C iii, 809-811, 
835, 838, 841, 843. 

1691-1695 — 

Defeats, domestic instureetion, 
pestilence, a; A 310-11; C iii, 
848, 859, 861, 862, 869; F 343. 

1695-1703 — 

First part of the reign success- 
ful against the Austrians, last 
part disastrous. Further de- 
feats, loss of territory and inter- 
national prestige. Peace of Car- 
lowitz, 1699, marked the final 
decUne of the Ottoman power. 
a; A 312-324; B 155; C iii, 
892, 893, 913-926, iv, 133; 
F 343-347. 

1703-1730 ± 

Success against Peter the Great 
at the Pruth. Recovery of Azoph 
and Morea balanced loss of 
territory in the disastrous war 
with Austria. Internal condi- 
tions were fairly prosperous, a; 
A 349 ; C iv, 125-129, 133, 164r- 
166, 266-268. 

1730-1754 + 

A fairly prosperous reign. Sue- 
cess against the Austrians. Bel- 
grade, Orsova, with portions of 
Servia, Bosnia, and Wallachia, 
restored to Turkey. Increased 
international prestige. a; A 
375 ; C iv, 367-368 ; F 363. 



388 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 
— Osman (Othman) III 

Inferior ability. Changeable, 
passionate. Left the direction of 
affairs to others, o; C iv, 483, 
497 ; E V, 847. 



Condition of Country 

1754-1757 =t 

Brief reign. No important 

changes. A 377 ; C iv, 483-497 ; 

E V, 847-848. 



— Mustafa III 

Mediocre ability, and much in- 
dustry. Well-intentioned, but 
hasty and headstrong. Devout, 
austere. A 380 ; C iv, 648-649 ; 
E V, 848-852. 



1757-1773 — 

First part of the reign filled 
with reforms and not unpros- 
perous. Last part disastrous. 
Russians took Crimea, Moldavia, 
Wallachia, in 1770. b; A 378; 
C iv, 497, 503, 543-545; E v, 
848-852. 



— Abd-ul-Hamid 

Weak and insignificant ruler. 
Left the direction of affairs to his 
vizier. A 409 ; C iv, 650, 653. 



1773-1789 — 

Humiliating peace of Kainardji 
in 1774. In the last part of the 
reign Turkey suffered further 
defeats by the Russians and 
Austrians. 6 ; A 415 ; B 161 ; 
C iv, 655-662. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR SCOTLAND 

a. Dictionary of National Biography. 66 vols. London, 1885-1901. 

b. Encyclopaedia Britannica. 9th and 11th editions. 

A. Burton, John H. History of Scotland. New edition revised. 

9 vols, and index. Edinburg and London. 1873. 

B. Mackintosh, John. The History of Civilization in Scotland. 

New edition. 3 vols. 1892-95. 

C. Brown, P. Hume. History of Scotland. 3 vols. Cambridge, 

1899-1909. 

D. Lang, Andrew. A History of Scotland from the Roman Occupa- 

tion. 4 vols. Edinburgh and London, 1900-07. 



+ Robert Bruce 

Able warrior and administrator. 
Brave, popular, liberal, and pious. 
b; A ii, 251, 298, 308; C i, 167- 
168. 



1306-1329 + 

Many wars in which the coun- 
try was exhausted, but victories 
far outnumbered the defeats. 
Scotland was consolidated and 



APPENDIX 



389 



Ruler 



— Minority of David II 
(Randolph, Earl of Moray, Regent) 

A ii, 310. 

— Minority of David II 
(Donald, Earl of Mar, nephew of King 

Robert Bruce, Regent) 
Weak and incapable. 6 ; A ii, 
310;Bi, 304; C i, 171. 

— Minority of David II 

(Sir Archibald Douglas, and after- 
wards Sir Andrew Moray, Regents) 

C i, 174. 

± Minority of David II 

(Robert Stuart (afterwards Robert II) 

Regent. At this time young and 

active 

6 ; Aii, 369 ; B i, 313. 

— David II 

Incapable, headstrong, extrav- 
agant, passionate, and devoted 
to pleasure. A ii, 337 ; B i, 308, 
310,313; Ci, 175, 178. 



± Robert II (House of Stuart) 

A man of judgment and fair 
ability, but at that time of his 
life in poor health, indolent, and 



Condition of Country 
freed from English rule. Many- 
wise laws were enacted relative 
to the administration of justice 
and organization of the army. 
b; A ii, 244, 250, 263, 303, 305, 
308 ; B i, 295, 296, 300 ; C i, 161, 
163, 166, 169. 

1329-1332 + 

Vigorous and successful gov- 
ernment, b; B i, 304. 

July, 1332-August, 1332 — 
Disasters, b; B i, 304, 305. 



1332-1338 — 

Scots defeated by the English. 
b; Bi, 305-306 ; C i, 172, 174. 

1338-1341 + 

Strongholds of Perth, SterUng, 
and Edinburgh were won back. 
C i, 174, 175. 

1342-1371 — 

Scots defeated. English over- 
ran the southern part of Scotland, 
which was obliged to pay a large 
ransom to England. Deplorable 
state of internal disorder. Tur- 
bulence among the nobles. Im- 
poverishment of the country. 
Some parhamentary advance, b ; 
A ii, 324, 325; B i, 308-309; 
C i, 180-183. 

1371-1390 

Rather uneventful and vague 
conditions. Scots were victori- 
ous over the English at Otter- 



390 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 
peace-loving. Simple and affable 
in his manners. Not much is 
known about his private life. 
Had many illegitimate children. 
6; Aii, 369; Bi,Sl3; C i, 186- 
187. 

— Robert III 

Of less intellect and even more 
indolent then Robert II, his 
father, otherwise much like him. 
b; Aii, 372 ; 5 i, 320 ; C i, 195- 
196, 202. 



+ Minority of James I 

(Robert, Duke of Albany, son of 
Robert II, Regent) 

A man of energy and ability, 
^ii, 395; Bi, 326; C i, 203, 208. 
— Minority of James I 

(Murdock, son of Albany, Regent) 

Weak, lazy, incompetent, b ; 

B i, 326. 

+ James I 

Fearless, active, accomplished. 
An able administrator and organ- 
izer. Literary tastes. A lover of 
peace and justice, a ; A ii, 409 ; 
B i, 330, 335, 336 ; C i, 216. 



— Minority of James II 

(Regency divided) 

Archibald, and then William, 
Earls of Douglas, were only nomi- 
nally regents. Crichton and Liv- 
ingstone alternately had the cus- 
tody of the young king. 



Condition of Country 
bourne, 1388. "Social progress 
of the nation was much re- 
tarded." Minor Border raids, 
but the general result was a 
gradual recovery of Scottish terri- 
tory, b; A a, 348, 357, 365; 
B i, 313, 317, 319; C i, 188, 194. 

1390-1402 — 

DecUne. Scots suffered several 
defeats. English harried over the 
border. Lawlessness among the 
nobles, miseries among the peo- 
ple. Parliament enacted some 
good laws, b; A ii, 372-374; 
B i, 320, 322-323 ; C i, 196, 199, 

201. 

1402-1420 + 

Important victory for the gov- 
ernment at Harlaw. Better es- 
tablishment of order. A ii, 387- 
394 ; E i, 326 ; C i, 205, 208. 

1420 1424 — 

Distinct decline. C i, 209. 

1424-1437 + 

Prosperous and comparatively 
peaceful reign. Subjugation of 
the Highlands. Many legal re- 
forms relative to private warfare, 
justice, commerce, coinage, etc. 
Many parUaments. b; A ii, 
399-409 ; B i, 327, 330, 332, 333, 
337; C i, 212, 214, 218. 

1437-1451 — 

A period of private wars. 
b; Ci, 223-229. 



APPENDIX 



391 



Ruler 
ijames II 
Accidentally killed in his thir- 
tieth year. Considered a promis- 
ing young man, energetic and 
impulsive, b; Ci, 231, 241, 242 ; 
D i, 328, 333. 

-|- Minority of James III 

(Kennedy, grandson of Robert III, 
Chief Regent) 

Wise, moderate, and upright. 
a; b; A iii, 2; B i, 345 ; C i, 
256 ; D i, 338-339. 

— Minority of James III 

(Regency divided) 



— James III 

Lacked bravery and energy. 
Of rather inferior capacity, though 
a lover of Uterature and the fine 
arts. Charged with a propen- 
sity for low company, a ; A 
iii, 19, 24, 33; B i, 348; C i, 
269, 287-288. 

± James IV 

Ambitious and brave, but rash 
and quixotic. Not adept in diplo- 
macy or generalship. Truthful, 
liberal, and popular, but licentious. 
a; b; A iii, 51-80 ; C i, 295, 307, 
339. 



Condition of Codntht 

1451-1460 ± 

Civil wars and border raids. 
Good progress in legislation relat- 
ing to agriculture, coinage, and 
the administration of justice. 
b; B i, 340, 341, 343, 344; C i, 
242-245. 

1460-1466 -f- 

Comparatively peaceful and 
orderly. Lord of the Isles de- 
feated, b; A iii, 2; B i, 345; 
C i, 256, 257 ; D i, 338. 

1466-1474 — 

Plots and conspiracies among 
the nobles. Decline in the ad- 
ministration of justice, b; A 
iii, 9 ; B i, 345-346, 347 ; C i, 257. 

1474-1488 — 

A period of lawlessness. Con- 
spiracies of the malcontents. De- 
feat and murder of the king. 
Loss of Berwick to the English. 
Debasement of the coinage. 6; 
A iii, 18, 23, 27, 29 ; B i, 34, 350, 
351, 352; C i, 285-287, 288, 290, 
291, 293. 

1488-1513 ± 

Establishment of law and order. 
Beginnings of naval power. In- 
crease in international importance 
and commerce. Disastrous defeat 
at Flodden, in which the flower 
of Scottish chivalry perished. Fi- 
nancial exhaustion. A iii, 45, 55, 
56, 79 ; B i, 357, 359, 363 ; C i, 
294, 298-300, 310, 313, 337-340, 
345. 



■ Not graded. 



392 



APPENDIX 



Rtjler 

± Minority of James V 

(John Stewart, Duke of Albany, 

cousin to James V, Regent part of 

the time) 

Difficult to estimate. One 
finds differing views about him. 
Enterprising and able as a nego- 
tiator, though a poor general. 
Lavish and extravagant, a; B 
ii, 36 ; C i, 355. 

— Minority of James V 

(Regency divided part of the time) 



-\- James V 

Ambitious, vigorous, with more 
than average abiUty. Popular 
with the lower classes. Irregular 
in his manner of Ufe. a ; b; A 
iii, 184 ; B ii, 62 ; C i, 374, 396. 

— Minority of Mary 

(James Hamilton, Earl of Arran, 
Regent) 

Weak, easy, fickle. C ii, 4. 



Condition of Country 

1613- — 

Turmoil and internal contest. 

Merges into the following period. 

A iii, 89, 93, 95 ; B ii, 36, 37 ; C 

i, 358-363, 366-367. 



-1528 — 

Unsettled conditions contin- 
ued. A iii, 89, 93, 95 ; B ii, 36, 
37. 

1528-1542 + 

Successful reign with the excep- 
tion of the Scotch defeat at Sol- 
way. Renewed order and pros- 
perity, b; A iii, 183; C i, 392, 
394, 396, 397, 399. 

1542-1554 — 

The country suffered greatly by 
the Englishraids. b ; A iii, 233, 241, 
269; fiii,66,76,86; C ii, 10-11, 13, 
15-16, 19, 23, .30-31, 33-36. 



-J- Minority of Mary 

(Mary of Lorraine, Regent) 

A strong, able character. 
ii, 87 ; C ii, 40, 69. 



B 



+ or ± Mary, Queen of Scots 

Brilliant and emotional. Not 
particularly wise politically. Pas- 
sionate, revengeful, and unpatri- 
otic, a; b; A iii, 137; C ii, 101, 
116. 



1554-1560 ± 

Events of the Reformation. 
No marked progress or decUne in 
political or material matters, b ; 
A iii, 303, 309, 367, 369, 373; 
B ii, 90-100 ; C ii, 39-44, 45-78. 

1560-1567 — or =t 

Condition similar to the fore- 
going period. A iii, 31, 49, 56, 
65, 69, 89, 114, 123, 127, 129, 233, 
235, 247; B ii, 118, 120, 125, 143, 
144; Cii, 81, 117-118. 



APPENDIX 



393 



Ruler 
-I- Minority of James VI 

(Murray, Regent) 
A man of energy and firmness. 
His character has been estimated 
very differently according to the 
temper or prejudice of those 
who have judged him. a; B ii, 
152 ; C ii, 143. 



Condition of Country 

1567-1570 — 

Order restored and justice ad- 
ministered . Then famine and pes- 
tilence. English invasion and 
civil war, 1569. b; A iv, 290, 
365, V, 7, 9, 23, 29 ; B ii, 149, 150 ; 
C ii, 134, 141-142. 



± Minority of James VI 

(Matthew Stuart, Earl of Lenox, 

Regent) 
"Intellectual medocrity and 

lack of personal stamina.'! C ii, 

145. 



1570-1571 — 

Plots and counter plots. In- 
trigues and seizures. B ii, 152; 
C ii, 147. 



± Minority of James VI 

(Earl of Mar, Regent) 
Not distinguished. "Honest 
and faithful.': C ii, 151. 



1571-1572 

Civil wars and turmoil. 
A V, 67 ; C ii, 151, 156. 



b; 



— Minority of James VI 

(Earl of Morton, regent) 
Non-royal, a ; b; A v, 133 ; 
Bii, 155; Cii, 160-161, 164, 181. 



1572-1580 + 

Peace and order reestablished. 
A V, 133 ; B ii, 165 ; C ii, 162, 
164-165. 



Minority of James VI 
(Regency divided) 



1580-1587 — 

Disorder. Raid of Ruthven. 

5; A v, 189; B ii, 179, 182, 183. 



± James VI (I of England) 

Shrewd, but vain, foolish, and 
weak. Learned, but pedantic and 
trivial. Pompous and arbitrary. 
Not the coward he is sometimes 
painted. a;b; Bu, 187, 219 ; C ii, 
274, 275, 280. 



1587-1625 + 

Diminution of disorder. Some 
increase in general prosperity. 
Introduction of new industries, 
glass, soap, and leather, and de- 
velopment of woolen manufac- 
ture. Loss of political liberty, b ; 
A V, 317, vi, 17, 18 ; B iii, 2 ; C ii, 
167, 27&-278, 280-281, 283. 



394 APPENDIX 

BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR ENGLAND 
a. Dictionary of National Biography. 66 vols. London, 1885-1901. 
h. Encyclopaedia Britannica. Oth and llth editions. 

A. Green, J. R. A Short History of the English People. 4 vols. 

London, 1894. New York, 1893. 

B. Freeman, E. A. The History of the Norman Conquest. 6 vols. 

Oxford, 1871. 

C. Stubbs, William. The Early Plantagenets. New York [1876]. 

[Epochs of Modern History.] 

D. Gardiner, S. R. The History of England from the Accession of 

James I. 10 vols. London, 1893-99. 

E. Rogers, J. E. Tuorold. The History of Agriculture and Prices 

in England. 7 vols. Oxford, 1866-1902. 

F. Cunningham, W. The Growth of English Industry and Com- 

merce during the Early and Middle Ages. Cambridge, 1890. 

G. Cheyney, E. p. Introduction to the Industrial and Social His- 

tory of England. New York, 1901. 

H. Traill, H. D. (Editor). Social England, A Record of the Prog- 
ress of the People, by Nineteen Specialists. 6 vols. London, 
1893-97. 

J. Stubbs, W. The Constitutional History of England, in its Origin 
and Development. 3 vols. Oxford, 1874-78. 

K. Freeman, E. A. The Reign of WiUiam Rufus and the Accession 
of Henry I. 2 vols. Oxford, 1882. 

L. GiBBiNS, H. DE B. Commerce in Europe. London, 1891. 

M. Yeates, J. The Growth and Vicissitudes of Commerce. Lon- 
don, 1872. 

N. Woodward, W. H. Expansion of the British Empire. Cam- 
bridge, 1899. 

O. The Cambridge Modern History. Edited by (A. W. Ward, G. W. 
Prothero, Stanley Leathes, planned by the late Lord Acton). 
13 vols. Cambridge, England, 1902-11. 

P. Ramsay, Sir J. H. The Angevin Empire. London, 1903. 

Q. Wylie, J. H. History of England under Henry IV. 4 vols. 
London, 1884-98. 

R. Ramsay, Sir J. H. The Foundations of England. 2 vols. Lon- 
don, 1898. 

S. Hunt, W., Poole, R. L. (Editors). The Political History of 
England. 12 vols. London. 1907. 

T. Norgate, Kate. England under Angevin Kings. 2 vols. Lon- 
don, 1887. 

U. Davis, H. W. C. England under the Normans and Angevins. 
London, 1905. 



APPENDIX 



395 



Ruler 
-)- William I (the Conqueror) 

Remarkable genius and iron 
will. An unscrupulous and some- 
what cruel tyrant. Good hus- 
band and father, a; b; A 165 ; 
B iv, 18, 612, 615; S ii, 9-10. 



Condition of Country 

1066-1087 -I- 

England unified. Marked ad- 
vance in law and order, although 
the people were oppressed, a; 
b; B iv, 18, 612, 615; G 14, 17; 
S ii, 10-11. 



-I- or ± William II (Rufus) 

Brave and able soldier, crafty 
statesman. Clever but unsus- 
tained. A violent ruffian, ex- 
tremely tyrannical and perfidious, 
especially debased in his private 
life. Both avaricious and extrav- 
agant, a; b; A 166; K i, 5, 
144-59, 168-71; ii, 335, 337, 
490-504; S ii, 80. 



1087-1100 ± 

Conquests in Normandy and 
Main. Extension of the power of 
England on the Welsh marches. 
Settlement of northwestern fron- 
tier. But the heavy cost of the 
wars brought the people to a state 
of extreme wretchedness. Taxa- 
tion was especially oppressive, b ; 
^ 166 ; K i, 4-5, 153, 474, ii, 337 ; 
S ii, 73, 91. 



zfc Henry I (Beauclerc) 

Of marked ability and self- 
control. A good soldier and a 
great administrator. Energetic, 
industrious, learned, eloquent, and 
judicious. Cold, crafty, cruel, 
and dissembling. Temperate ; he 
was, however, licentious, a ; b; 
K i, 197, ii, 379-82; R ii, 319- 
322; S ii, 115-7. 



1100-1135 



+ 



The taxes were heavy, but the 
general picture of this reign is 
distinctly bright. Peace and se- 
curity in the land, and relatively 
active trade. The country gained 
in prestige through the French 
wars. Charter of Liberties, Many 
towns also received charters, a ; 
6 ; A 183 ; 5 152 ; F 133 ; /iC ii, 
402, 454r-5 ; S ii, 156, 168, 189-90. 



— Stephen 

Brave, active, and well-meaning, 
but incapable. "A mild man, 
soft and good, and did no jus- 
tice." Frank and generous, a; 
6 ; A 193-197 ; R ii, 345, 453-4, 
S ii, 196, 204, 207, 214, 227. 



1135-1154 — 

A period of anarchy and suffer- 
ing. Invasion by the Scots and 
loss of territory on the Border, 
a ; 6 ; A 193 ; G 19 ; fl ii, 345 ; 
S ii, 196, 214, 253. 



396 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 
+ Henry II 

Rough, sensuous, vigorous, in- 
dustrious, and learned. Temper 
violent. A great lawgiver. Led 
an extremely active life. Had a 
wonderful memory. His worst 
characteristic was his tricky dis- 
honesty. He was certainly pop- 
ular with al classes of the people, 
a; A 197-9; P 246-8; S ii, 
255-8. 



Condition of Country 

1154-1189 + 

Reestablishineut of law and 
order. Marked advance in juris- 
prudence. Reforms in the cur- 
rency. England's power rose. 
Active building, a ; b; A 198, 
199,210, 211; P 248-57; S ii, 
25&-7, 320-6, 352. 



+ or ± Richard I 

Brave and brilliant warrior. 
Possessed many accomplishments. 
Frank, generous, and sincere. 
He was also passionate, impetu- 
ous, licentious, and haughty, but 
not essentially cruel, a : A 213, 
214; P 367; S ii, 335, 361-3; 
T ii, 207-8, 281, 320. 



1189-1199 -I- 

Constitutional progress along 
the lines of the former reign. 
The country suffered from exces- 
sive taxation resulting from the 
crusades and the king's ransom. 
b; A 215; G 25; P 272, 351. 



-I- John 

Not lacking in cleverness and 
spasmodic energy, but devoid of 
judgment and breadth of insight. 
Utterly depraved, mean, vindic- 
tive, hcentious, cruel, and false. 
a ; A 231 ; P 379 ; 502-3 ; S ii, 
401-3. 



1199-1216 :!: 

Turbulence and discord result- 
ing in the Magna Charta. The 
rights of individuals defined and 
enhanced. This constitutional 
growth must be regarded as of 
great importance, b ; A 234, 238, 
242, 243. 



— Regency 

William Marshall, Earl of Pembroke 



1216-1219 -I- 

Order established, a; A 246; 
C 170. 



— Regency (Divided) 

Hubert de Burgh, Pandulf , Peter de 
Roches, Stephen Langton. 



1219-1227 + 

Further restoration of order. 
French influences expelled. A 
267, 268 ; C 172. 



APPENDIX 



397 



Ruler 
— Henry III 

Feeble administrator. Vain, 
reckless, extravagant, obstinate, 
and undependable. Sexually moral 
and not in the least cruel, a; b; 
A 271, 272. 



-f Edward I 

Stern, able, laborious, and con- 
scientious. Practical adminis- 
trator. Chaste and temperate. 
True to his word. Arrogant, 
vindictive, and perhaps cruel. 
a; A 324, 345, 347, 350-351; 
F 242-245, 247. 

— Edward II 
Cowardly, incapable, dissolute. 

A hard drinker. Not tyrannical. 
Weak, indolent, and faithless. 
a; b. 

— Regency (Divided) 
Queen Isabella, Mortimer, and 

several others. 



+ Edward III 

Extremely enterprising and ad- 
venturous. Brave, active, and 
able, though not a great organizer. 
Selfish, ambitious, ostentatious, 
and licentious, a; b; J ii, 374. 



Condition of Country 

1227-1272 ± 

A period of trouble and suffer- 
ing. In contrast we find the be- 
ginnings of a parliament and 
germs of constitutionalism. The 
crown became impoverished, but 
the wealth of the nation was as 
a whole increased. There was 
much building on a large scale. 
h; A 279, 292, 293, 300 ; C 161. 

1272-1307 + 

General prosperity and marked 
economic advance. Judicial re- 
forms. Conquest of Wales and 
Scotland. Depletion of treasury. 
a; b; A 322, 324, 331; f 241. 



1307-1327 — 

Misery and national decline. 

Loss of Scotland, a ; b; A 
408-409 ; J ii, 323. 



1327-1330 — 

War with Scotland unsuccess- 
ful, and ."Shameful Peace'.' of 
1328. 

1330-1377 + 

Restoration of order. Im- 
portant constitutional and 
social advance. Extension of in- 
ternational importance and 
growth of commerce. However, 
a reign of hardships and poverty 
for the people. Black Death. 
a', b; A 440, 444, 448, 478, 495 ; 
F 245; J ii, 311, 373, 375, 377, 
380. 



398 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 
Regency (in a Council) 



± or — Richard II 

A strange character, full of 
contradictions. Good natural 
ability and occasional firmness of 
will, but was impetuous, revenge- 
ful, foolish, extravagant, arbi- 
trary, and extremely fitful, a ; 
b; c; A50Q; Q i, 2. 

± Henry IV 

Extremely energetic. Also 
brave, prudent, accomplished, and 
sagacious. Devout, temperate, 
and chaste. Perhaps upon occa- 
sions cruel, but on the other hand 
often showed clemency, a ; A 
514 ; J iii, 7 ; Q iv, 126, 149, 457. 



+ Henry V 

Brilliant commander and states- 
man. Pure in life, temperate, 
liberal, merciful, and honourable. 
a; h; c; J iii, 75; 5 iv, 230, 232, 
285. 



— Regency 

Humphrey of Gloucester 

Fourth son of Henry IV, held 
the title of Protector, but the 
real government was equally 
shared by the Council. The 



Condition of Country 

1377-1389 — 

Political and social discontent. 
Peasant risings, under Wat Tyler, 
and others. War with France, 
characterized for the most part 
by disasters, b ; A 485-497. 

1389-1399 — or ± 

Court factions and petty civil 
warfare. Misery and discontent 
continued. Power of House of 
Commons increased, b ; A 485, 
505-508 ; J ii, 303, 305, 463, 513, 
622 ; Qi,2. 

1399-1413 ± 

The general poverty of the pre- 
vious reign continued. Internal 
troubles and ci\dl wars. The 
nation gained ground in political 
power and prestige. Increased 
influence of the Commons, b ; 
A 514-516; J iii, 2, 48, 70; Q i, 
404, 437, 449, iii, 300, iv, 144, 
148-150. 

1413-1422 ± 

Conquests in French territory. 
England's glory greatly enhanced 
and diplomatic position strong. 
Internal order was maintained, 
but the country was much drained 
on account of the French war. b ; 
F i, 369 ; J iii, 93 ; S iv, 236-238, 
281. 

1422-1440 — 

Loss of French territory. De- 
chne in England's political pres- 
tige. "The general state of 
things had never been less hope- 
ful.'! Parliamentary franchise 



APPENDIX 



399 



Ruler 
Duke of Bedford, third son of 
Henry IV, also played an impor- 
tant role as leader in France, and 
as regent. 
— Henry VI 

Extremely weak, with periods 
of insanity. He was merciful, 
pious, domestic. Had literary 
tastes. 



± or + Edward IV 

Brave, vigorous, eloquent. 
Vicious, cruel, sensuous, and ex- 
travagant. An able general and 
diplomat, but was spasmodic in 
his activities. Affable in his 
manners and popular, in spite 
of his vices and autocratic rule. 
S iv, 411, 412, 419, 450, 451, 469. 



=fc or 4- Richard III 

(Regent and King) 

Brave, ambitious, cunning, and 
olear-sighted. Probably cruel and 
unscrupulous, though not the mon- 
ster commonly pictured. There 
is singularly Uttle known about 
Richard III. a; h; J iii, 225; 
Gairdner's " Richard III ; " Mark- 
ham's " Richard III." 

+ Henry VII 

Prudent, vigorous, able, des- 
potic, and very avaricious. A 
patron of art, literature, and 



Condition of Country 
became narrowed by statute of 
1429. b; A 527-544; J iii, 118; 
S iv, 286-300. 

1440-1461 — 

(1440. End of Gloucester's Re- 
gency.) 

(1442. Majority of Henry VI.) 
Further loss of French terri- 
tory. Country impoverished and 
exhausted. Anarchy prevailed. 
Cade's rebellion, a ; b; A 545- 
554; J iii, 143, 144, 150; S iv, 
310-404. 

1461-1483 ± 

Civil and agricultural wars 
and violence. Commercial ad- 
vance and the beginnings of 
manufacture. Much building of 
churches and manor houses. The 
Wars of the Roses did not much 
affect the general prosperity. 
Legislation and taxation were 
poorly administered. Power of 
ParUaraent declined, b ; A 561 ; 
J iii, 209, 217, 273, 275, 286. 

1483-1485 ± 

Similar to the reign of Edward 
IV. b; A 561, 584-587; J iii, 
235. 



1485-1509 + 

Gradual establishment of order. 

Marked growth of commerce. 

Constitutional retrogression be- 



400 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 
commerce. His chief fault was 
his practice of extortion. Details 
of his private life but little 
known, a; b; c; A 592. 



Condition of Country 
gan during the latter part of the 
reign, with decline of the power 
of the baronage. Exchequer well 
filled. Navy strengthened, b; 
c ; A 563-565 ; L 97. 



+ Henry VIII 

Extraordinary vigour of mind 
and inflexibility of will. Accom- 
plished and versatile, but im- 
perious, selfish, cruel, and sensual. 
a; c; ii, 462. 



1509-1547 + 

Greatly increased importance 
of England internationally. 
Growth of agriculture, grazing, 
commerce, manufactures and 
navy. Greater influence over 
Wales and Ireland. Constitu- 
tional decline, b; M 260; ii, 
462. 



— Regency for Edward VI 

Somerset and 1 
Northumberland 



Protectors 



1547-1553 — 

Decline in international pres- 
tige. Depletion of the treasury. 
Revolts and general discontent. 
6; A 712, 715, 716; ii, 477, 
496. 



± Mary 

High-spirited and courageous, 
and devoted to what she consid- 
ered her duty. In her youth 
precocious and promising, but 
afterwards suffered from a weak 
constitution. In her latter days 
mentally unbalanced. Not wan- 
tonly cruel, a; b; c ; A 720. 



1553-1558 — 

A period of persecution. Eng- 
land defeated and humiliated 
abroad. 6; A 731, 732. 



+ Elizabeth 

Extremely able, scheming, prac- 
tical, and brave. Vain, luxurious, 
wilful, mendacious, and vindic- 
tive. Patriotic and unusually 
popular, o; b; c; A 733-748. 



1558-1603 4- 

Peace, prosperity, progress. 
Political prestige vastly increased. 
Growth in wool manufactures, but 
greater growth in commerce. &; 
A 744, 745, 778, 780, 785, 789. 



APPENDIX 



401 



Ruler 

± James I 

Shrewd, but vain, pedantic, and 
trivial. Unscrupulous, pompous, 
and arbitrary. A heavy drinker. 
a; b; c; A 974. 



dh Charles I 

Proud, reserved, accomplished. 
Little political wisdom. Tem- 
perate and chaste. His chief 
faults were duplicity and obsti- 
nacy, a; b; A 1019 ; H iv, 159. 



Condition of Country 

1603-1625 + 

Steady progress in material con- 
ditions. Improvement of agricul- 
ture. Colonial expansion. Growth 
of manufactures. European cam- 
paigns and policies not successful. 
Foreign poUtical prestige dechned. 
b ; A 990, 1002 ; H iv, 46, 48, 122, 
124, 130, 133, 141, 143, 158,439. 

1625-1649 + 

Expansion of commerce and 
general material prosperity. De- 
cline in international prestige. 
Public discontent. Distress dur- 
ing civil war. Parliament strug- 
gled for its existence. A 1027, 
1033, 1070, 1072, 1075, 1112, 
1117; E v,68; H iv, 48. 



Interregnum 
The Commonwealth 



1649-1659 + 

Marked improvement in com- 
merce, agriculture, and in the 
navy. Order established. &; A 
1222, 1260 ; // iv, 440 ; N 127. 



— Charles II 

Affable, witty, and debonair, but 
had no ambition. Sensual, dis- 
sipated, indolent, and extrava- 
gant, a; 6; c; A 1351-1356. 



— James II 

Industrious and perhaps well- 
meaning in his political aims, 
but lacked judgment, tact, and 
2d 



1660-1685 + 

Important constitutional and 
legal advance. Growth of the 
House of Commons. Increase in 
shipping, silk trade, and banking. 
Agriculture did not improve. 
Much desirable immigration in 
this and subsequent reign. For- 
eign policy weak. A 1435 ; H 
iv, 350, 362, 363, 450, 454, 455. 

1685-1689 + 

Further development of indus- 
tries. Tyranny. People and Par- 
liament finally asserted them- 



402 



APPENDIX 



Ruler 
breadth of insight. Much cour- 
age and fair ability in youth, but 
this had deteriorated by the time 
of his accession. A great liber- 
tine until a few years before his 
death, when he became a religious 
ascetic, a; b; // iv, 351. 



Condition of Country 
selves, 1688. Henceforth House 
of Commons most important 
branch, b ; A 1481-1483 ; H iv, 
349, 352, 375. 



+ WUliam III 

Extraordinarily precocious. One 
of the greatest of diplomats. Able 
as a statesman. As a soldier, 
brilliant, though less great. 
Brave, active, resourceful. Not 
popular. "An outward coldness 
covered a hidden warmth." Both 
arbitrary and magnanimous. His 
aims were noble, his honour un- 
reproached. Free from vanity. 
Domestic Hfe not praiseworthy. 
a : 6. See also under Netherlands. 



1689-1702 -f- 

Development of a constitu- 
tional monarchy. Bill of rights. 
International prestige again as 
in the days of Cromwell. Trade 
and wealth increased. 6; A 
1526, 1529; H iv, 451, 507, 508, 
513, 585, 592. 



— Anne 

Dull, narrow, weak, obstinate. 
Deeply religious. Many simple 
virtues, o ; b. 



1702-1714 ± 

Successful foreign policy. Com- 
merce continued to expand. In- 
dustries prospered. New trade 
established with Nova Scotia, 
Newfoundland, and Hudson's Bay 
territory. Gibraltar and Minorca 
acquired. Growth of the Cabi- 
net, b; A 1570; // iv, 516, 518, 
581, 585, 587. 



— George I 

Dull and ignorant except for 
a fair knowledge of military 
affairs, frugal, steadfast in his 
friendships. Coarse in his tastes. 
Vicious in his private life, a ; 
b; c; A 1579. 



1714-1727 4- 

An era of peace and material 
progress. Silk, woollen, linen, and 
glass industries prosperous, b ; 
A 1592; H V, 1, 2, 111, 117. 



APPENDIX 



403 



Ruler 
— George II 

Dull, methodical, parsimonious, 
a martinet. Coarse and licen- 
tious in his tastes, a ; b; c. 



± George III 

Had a good memory. Much 
tenacity of purpose and talent of 
a narrow sort. Unyielding, frugal, 
of punctilious virtue. Last part 
of his life he was insane, a; b; 
c; A 1665-1667; Also Beckles 
Willson, " George III, as Man, 
Monarch and Statesman," (1907). 



Condition of Country 

1727-1760 4- 

1727-1739, Peace and pros- 
perity. 1739-1760, Foreign pol- 
icy became more vigorous. Vic- 
torious in foreign wars. Con- 
quest of Canada and India. 
Foundation of charitable insti- 
tutions, b; A 1594-1596, 1619, 
1648, 1657-1661 ; // v, 6, 185. 

1760-1811 + 

Loss of the American Colonies, 
but commerce with them was 
soon greater than before. Great 
progress in agriculture, with the 
science of cultivation and rota- 
tion of crops, and in cattle 
through improvement in breeds. 
In manufactures by inventions 
Uke the flying-shuttle, jenny, 
mule, and steam-engine. Many 
canals built and water lands re- 
claimed, b; A 1620, 1718, 1727, 
1729; H V, 301, 305, 367, 369, 
452, 482, 499, 568. 



APPENDIX II 



[Reprinted from Science, N.S., Vol. XXX., No. 777, pp. 703-704, November 

19, 1909.] 

A NEW NAME FOR A NEW SCIENCE ' 

The following list, though noticeably brief, attempts to include all 
books and memoirs in which the facts of history of a personal nature 
have been subjected to statistical analysis by some more or less objec- 
tive method. Such researches may be made to contribute to the science 
of eugenics. They also stand upon the border line of the allied sciences, 
psychology, anthropology, and sociology. Since investigations of this 
nature contribute to several sciences, and at the same time primarily 
to the philosophy of history itself, it seems necessary to have some 
special name to designate tliis class of work. The word "biometry,'' 
already in general use, does not meet the requirements. It fails to ex- 
press the primary value of this class of research, namely, elucidation 
of the philosophy of history for its own sake, and also fails to suggest 
that the work should be carried forward by the historians themselves. 
I propose the word 5'historiometry,'! derived from the Greek la-ropla, 
history, and nirpov, measure. 

It may bo noticed that these investigations treat only of groups of 
individuals. I am already convinced from the indications of several 
researches which I have now under way, that the quantitative method 
may be successfully applied to historical events of a more general 
character. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF HISTORIOMETRY 

De CandoUe (Alphonse). ''Histoire des sciences et des savants depuis 
deux sifeoles." Geneve, etc. (H. Georg), 1873. Contains lists 
of scientific names objectively (impersonally) compiled. 

Cattell (J. McKeen). "A Statistical Study of Eminent Men." 
Popular Science Monthly, February, 1903, pp. 359-377. [Abstract in 
Psychological Review, March, 1895.] The names of a thousand emi- 

1 "Some Desiderata in the Science of Eugenics and Bibliography of Histori- 
ometry," by Dr. Frederick Adams Woods. Reprinted from Vol. V. of the 
American Breeders' Association Report of the Meeting, held at Columbia, 
Mo., January 6, 7, and 8, 1909. Report of the Committee on Eugenics. 

404 



APPENDIX 405 

nent men of all time are here arranged in the order of their eminence 
by the strictly objective, and valuable "space method." Attempt 
should be made to test the limits of the accuracy of this method by 
comparing these names with those selected by other methods. 

Cattell (J. McKeen). "A Statistical Study of American Men of 
Science." Science, November 23, November 30, December 7, 1906. 
Although the facts are not drawn from history, they are useful as a 
check to compare with historical statistics. The names were selected 
by the "method of voting." 

EUis (Havelock). "A Study of British Genius." London (Hurst & 
Blackett), 1904. [First appeared in Popular Science Monthly, Febru- 
ary-September, 1901.] A valuable study based upon the "Dic- 
tionary of National Biography." Contains lists of British men of 
genius and talent, objectively derived and useful for fiu-ther study. 

Galton (Francis). "Hereditary Genius. An Inquiry into its Laws 
and Consequences." 2d edition. London (Macmillan), 1892. 
The earliest of biographical statistical studies, first published in 
1869. Many of the lists of names are not compiled by any strictly 
objective method. 

Galton (Francis). "English Men of Science, Their Nature and Nur- 
ture." London (Macmillan), 1874. Fellows of the Royal Society. 

Galton (Francis) and Schuster (E.). "Noteworthy Families." Lon- 
don (Murray), 1906. Families of scientific men objectively studied. 

Jacoby (Paul). " Etudes sur la selection chezl'homme." Avantpropos 
par Gabriel Tarde. 2d edition. Paris (Alcan), 1904. The last 
quarter of this work dealing with the origin of French men of talent 
has decided scientific value. The first portion of the book deals with 
royalty, le pouvoir, contains no statistical treatment, and is entirely 
misleading. 

Lorenz (Ottokar). "Lehrbuch der gesammten wissenschaftlichen 
Genealogie." Stammbaum und Ahnentafel in ihrer geschichtlichen, 
sociologischen und naturwissenschaftlichen Bedeutung. Berlin 
(Hertz), 1898. Suggestive at the time it was written, but contains 
scarcely any statistical treatment. 

Odin (A.). "Genese des grands hommes gens de lettres frangais 
modernes." 2 vols. Paris (H. Welter), 1895. A study of 6382 
French men of letters. Valuable for its facts. The conclusions are 
often unwarranted. 

Woods (Frederick Adams). "Mental and Moral Heredity in Royalty : 
a Statistical Study in History and Psychology, with 104 Portraits." 
New York (H. Holt), 1906. [Abstract in Popular Science Monthly, 
August, 1902-April, 1903. Brief abstract in Psychological Review, 
March, 1902.] The individuals are included in the study by a 



406 APPENDIX 

strictly objective plan. Attempt is made to reduce the subjective 
element to a minimum while grading them to a scale of ten, by aver- 
aging opinions of historians. Conclusion that heredity outweighs 
environment is arrived at by several statistical methods. The gen- 
eral method of "averaging opinions" is shown to be practical and 
to give orderly results, harmonious with other researches in heredity. 
Human heredity shown to be "alternative" (non-blending). 
" The Great Men of France (XlXth Century)." From London Times 
in Science, January 11, 1907. Names were obtained by popiilar 
vote. 

Frederick Adams Woods. 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 



APPENDIX III 

[Reprinted from Science, N.S., Vol. XXXIII., No. 850, pp. 668-574, 
April, 14, 1911.] 

HISTORIOMETRY AS AN EXACT SCIENCE 

In the issue of Science for November 19, 1909, under the title "A 
New Name for a New Science" I proposed the term historiometry for 
that class of researches in which the facts of history have been subjected 
to statistical treatment according to some method of measurement 
more or less objective or impersonal in its nature. These researches 
have chiefly had in view the listing and grading of historical characters, 
either for the purpose of studying mental heredity or for the better 
appreciation of problems associated with the psychology of genius. 
Researches of this type are capable of a far greater expansion and appli- 
cation than is generally supposed. They can be applied to events as 
well as to individuals. They can, by treating the vast store of human 
records which exist in books as material for the construction of an 
exact science, work towards the solution of a wide range of historical 
problems, such as the causes underlying the rise and fall of nations or 
other fundamental questions in history. 

Before anything can be done which shall give general satisfaction and 
agreement it will be necessary for this subdivision of science to justify 
itself, to measure its own shortcomings, to appreciate its own limita- 
tions, as well as to prove its own right to recognition of independent 
estate. 

If we are to fathom historical causation by objective methods it is 
obligatory first to prove that history itself, as we commonly find it in 
the printed records, is a sufficiently valid account of what actually hap- 
pened. Second, it is equally necessary to find proof that the objective 
methods correctly deal with these facts. It might be supposed that 
the second proof awaits the first ; but this is not necessarily so. If the 
records themselves were very much at fault, so that the statements of 
historians were very far from ideal truth, or if the objective methods 
of collecting and analyzing these statements were subject to a large 
error (or if both these forces were in play) then it would be difficult 
to find wherein the trouble lay. But if, on the contrary, it fortunately 

407 



408 APPENDIX 

be that history as we find it is in its important statements a fair repre- 
sentation of the truth, and if the methods of historiometry which deal 
with these records are also sound, then it is not difficult to prove both 
propositions at the same time. 

I will give some instances to illustrate this, which show that such is 
the case for several types of historical records and for several methods 
of history measurement. This could not be done did we not possess 
some third criterion, some third standard of comparison of a non-his- 
torical nature. One such non-historical criterion is furnished by the 
known correlation ratios for resemblances between close blood relatives 
as determined in the anthropometric laboratory. These have been 
worked out and accurately measured for mental and moral traits, 
stature, head index, and length of forearm. I have shown in "Heredity 
in Royalty" ^ that if the members of royal families are graded by the 
adjectives applied to them by historians and encyelopaBdists and then 
the coefficients of resemblance are measured between the near of kin, 
who have been so graded, these coefficients (historiometric) sub- 
stantially agree with the anthropometric. Such would not be the case 
if historians perverted the truth greatly, or if for any other reason the 
truth were largely unattainable. To make this clear it is only necessary 
to think what the result would be if history were merely "a pack of 
lies agreed upon" as the extreme view puts it. We should then fail 
to properly pick out our true intellectual giants and runts. The result 
would be nothing but confusion. A whole series of errors would be 
distributed at random. This would act like rain on waves and flatten 
down to a common level the real differences between the individuals. 
The correlation measurements would fall and we should get no results 
comparable to those obtained from the delicate and accurate measure- 
ments of the anthropometric laboratory. 

Furthermore, any weakness in the method of grading, any failure 
to properly classify the great men in the high grades and the degener- 
ates in their proper grades would work in precisely the same direction 
to lower the correlation coefficients. The supposed errors of history 
and the difficulties of grading act as two united strains of tension to pull 
the coefficients down towards zero, which would be the coefficient for 
random distribution. If the coefficient can stand the strain without 
declining, then, roughly speaking, we may conclude both that the his- 
tol^ical foundation is just and that the method of procedure is sound. 

There are two other illustrations of method which I would like to 
summarize here. One of these series of tests is the trying out of a 
standard biographical dictionary (historical persons) against two lists 
of contemporaries (non-historical persons) and all three in terms of 

1 New York, Heury Holt, 1906. 



APPENDIX 409 

still another set of facts, namely birthplaces of distinguished Americans. 
The second series of tests concerns the relative fame of Euripides versus 
Sophocles, the encyclopaedias having been used and then this compared 
with expert modern criticism and both with the opinions of the Athe- 
nians. 

As concerns American history, one fact is very evident at the start, 
whatever be the method of grading as applied to Americans or what- 
ever be the mental eminence graded, some states in the Union, some 
sections of the country, have produced more eminence than others 
far beyond the expectation from their respective white populations. 
In this regard Alassachusetts always leads, and Connecticut is always 
second, and certain southern states are always behind, and fail to ren- 
der their expected quota. I have already pointed out ^ that the ratios 
seem orderly for a first approximation. That is, the higher the grade 
of the individuals the greater and greater becomes the proportion of 
those born in Massachusetts. This may be expressed as a ratio, p 
into the random expectation. Thus if there were no forces at work 
beyond chance distribution the ratios for all sections of the country 
would be expressed by unity, p = 1. If there be found twice as many 
persons born in a certain locality as one would expect from the popu- 
lation let it be expressed as p = 2, three times as many, p = 3, etc. 
These ratios are easily computed and can be expressed as fractions or 
with decimals. I have computed these ratios for the thirteen original 
states, but will present here only the statistics from Massachusetts and 
Virginia. 

It wiU be seen in Table I, that Massachusetts has never failed to 
produce twice as many eminent men as the population would lead 
one to expect, and has for some ranks and types of achievement pro- 
duced about four times the expectation, p ranges between 2.1 and 
4.7. Virginia, on the contrary, has but rarely produced as many as 
might be expected from the large white population, and the ratios in the 
same table are either below the expectation or not significantly above 
it. The other New England states (statistics not here given) have 
all done more than their share, but always less than Massachusetts. 
New York gives a trivial though constant excess above the expectation. 
From here southward the ratios drop off suddenly, so that New Jersey, 
Delaware, Pennsylvania, Maryland, North Carolina, and Georgia have 
always furnished less than their share. For South Carolina the ratios 
again rise and exceed the expectation, but only by the slightest measu- 
rable amount. North Carolina, of all the thirteen original states, has 
always had the worst record in the way of producing distinguished 

* "American Men of Science and the Question of Heredity," Science, N. 
S., Vol. XXX., No. 763, pp. 205-210, October 13, 1909. 



410 



APPENDIX 






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APPENDIX 



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412 APPENDIX 

men ; the ratios falling to about one quarter of what might be expected 
from the white population. 

Regarding the tables for the two contrasted states, Massachusetts 
and Virginia, and following down through the columns marked "ratios, 
or number of times the random expectation according to the popula- 
tion at the approximate age of their birth," one sees first that the Massa- 
chusetts ratios run from 2.1 to 3.9 and the Virginia from 0.2 to 1.1. The 
higher Massachusetts ratios are associated with the lists of names in 
which the standards for admission to the lists are higher — that is, 
specially selected groups of the more eminent. Massachusetts also 
shows an extra merit when science or literature is alone considered, 
but this is merely an accentuation of some cause or causes which have 
enabled her to lead, no matter what type of success be the criterion. 

There is also to be seen a probably significant gain in the ratios for 
Massachusetts from the census of 1790 to 1850. A further study of 
this special phenomenon might develop some interesting conclusions. 
The ratio also rises when only those in Lip-pincolC s are considered who 
have received adjectives of praise. Nine-tenths of the persons named 
in this dictionary are given a passing notice by the editors and nothing 
critical is said of their lives or their work beyond the barest record. 
About one-tenth receive such adjectives of praise as "celebrated," 
!' illustrious," "eminent," "famous," ;' noted," etc. 

A -priori we may suppose that these represent an extra superior group 
as compared with the other nine-tenths. A posteriori the supposition 
is verified, because how else can be explained the rise in the ratio for 
Massachusetts from 2.8 to 3.8? If this "adjective method" did not 
select a superior group it would not raise the ratios, or in other words 
draw it further away from random hazard for which p = 1. The more 
accurately it seizes hold of the right persons and justly expresses real 
differences dependent upon natural causes the more it will raise this 
ratio. One can now see how it is possible in this way, and in similar 
ways, to actually test the validity of any method of selection. Its 
value depends, among other things, upon its ability to raise, or lower, 
a ratio in a proper degree, suitable to the case in hand, so that the ra- 
tios shall fit in, and harmonize with other ratios and other results. 

If, for instance, the "space method," or the selecting the 234 men 
who have had the most space allotted to them in the dictionary, had 
not raised the Massachusetts ratio from 2.8 to any more than say 2.9 
or 3.0 we might be justified in concluding that this method was inferior 
in accuracy to the "adjective method." As it turns out, it raises the 
ratio to 3.6. So one suspects that the "space method" is not quite 
as accurate as the "adjective method," since it does not raise the ratio 
as much though it deals with a smaller group. Of course one instance 



APPENDIX 413 

like this does not decide anything. I merely give it as an illustration 
of the ways in which historiometry may proceed. 

I have also essayed a new method, namely selecting from Lippin- 
coWs a Ust composed of all those Americans whose biographies have been 
written and published in separate works. This constitutes a very 
small and presumably correspondingly select group, 129 in number. 
The ratio for Massachusetts is here seen to rise to 3.9, practically the 
maximum. It should of course do so if the method is sound and is 
successful in seizing hold of the right men. This may prove a very 
accurate, practical, and rapid method of objectively listing great men 
in ancient or modern history, subject of course to such limitations and 
adjustments as special problems may require. 

It can be seen that the general raising of the ratios is in no way de- 
pendent on the dictionary containing a large number of clergymen and 
writers. As a matter of fact, more than a third of the names are those 
of lawyers, bankers, merchants, politicians, government officials, sol- 
diers, manufacturers, and engineers. Here by narrowing the list from 
1266 to 232 and dealing with only a small group, we raise the ratio 
from 2.4 to 3. It might be supposed by some that a greater attention 
is shown Massachusetts by writers of books, biographies, and histories 
because these writers live in the neighborhood. " Lippincott's Bio- 
graphical Dictionary," however, is published in Philadelphia. Still 
it may be influenced by previous writings and earlier biographical dic- 
tionaries published in the neighborhood of Boston. If this is so to any 
appreciable extent then we should expect the ratio for Massachusetts 
to fall when present-day persons are graded by methods which have 
either nothing or little to do with historical traditions. 

Two such methods of grading we fortunately possess in the compila- 
tions known as "Who's Who in America," and "American Men of 
Science." The ratios for Massachusetts do not fall. They dovetail 
in with the ratios from Lippincott's. Hence we may conclude that 
the differentiations found in Lippincott's are not caused by unjust his- 
torical tradition and, furthermore, as far as one can see they are not 
in part caused by the same. "Who's Who in America" has been 
often used as an objective basis for sociological inquiries, but the criti- 
cism has been made that this book gives undue inclusion of authors 
and professors. I think this criticism is unjust. About forty per cent 
of the whole fall under the more practical types enumerated in Table 
I. These I have considered separately as far as the initials A, B, and 
C. They yield a ratio for Massachusetts of p = 2.5, which is very 
close to that for the whole book p = 2.6. The same for Lippincott's 
is p = 2.4, which is not in its exact theoretical position, as it should be 
higher than that drawn from "Who's Who in America.'^ It will, of 



414 



APPENDIX 



course, be appreciated that the clearing up of small disagreements like 
this requires further analysis and the computation of the probable 
errors. 

The ratios from Virginia I present in this abstract merely as a gen- 
eral contrast to Massachusetts. I prefer to make further statistical 
inquiries before attempting to interpret their meaning. 

The third series of tests which illustrate the exactitude of histori- 
ometry are drawn from comparative studies of the fame of Euripides 
and Sophocles. In Science, October 7, 1910, Mr. C. A. Browne called 

Table II 



Authorities 



Bergk, "Griecliischer litera- 
turgeschichte," 1894 . . 

Bernhardy 

Croiset 

von Christ 

Curtius 

MiiUer and Donaldson 

R. C. Jebb 

Gilbert Murray 

Jevons 

Encyclopedias 

Meyer's " Konversations Lex- 
ikon" 

Brokhaus' "Lexikon" . . 

"La Grande Encyelopedie" . 

"Encyclopagdia Britannica," 
1890 

"New International Ency- 
clopaedia" 

Lippincott's ' ' Biographical 
Dictionary," 1892 . . . 



Sophocles 



Space 

Lines or 

Pages 



110 pp 
74 pp 
57 pp 
34 pp 

200 1s 
25 pp 
11 pp 
19 pp 
11 pp 



109 1s 
112 Is 

298 1s 

550 1s 

207 1s 

52 1s 



Adjectives 



Euripides 



Pro 



128 
71 

115 
46 
25 
31 
16 
31 
14 



9 

6 

27 

22 

10 



Con 



28 

23 
13 
3 

3 

4 




Space 
Lines or 



137 pp 
116 pp 
71 pp 
40 pp 
773 Is 
30 pp 
16 pp 
28 pp 
13 pp 



126 13 
161 Is 
178 1s 

995 1s 

181 Is 

45 1s 



Adjectives 



Pro 



100 
105 

132 
35 
36 
17 
24 
15 
19 



2 
5 

10 

7 
6 



Con 



64 

97 
57 
20 
20 
14 
11 
6 
9 



attention to the fact that Sophocles received the first prize from the 
Athenians twenty times, and Euripides only four times, while since 
their deaths various writers from Plato to Emerson have referred to 
and quoted Euripides more than Sophocles. Mr. Browne also shows 
that both Curtius and Grote, and biographical dictionaries, and en- 
cyclopaedias as well, allot more space to Euripides than they do to his 
elder rival. This seems to indicate that the opinion of the Athenians 



APPENDIX 415 

has been reversed by posterity, but the real explanation I have found 
to be otherwise. 

It appears that the problem that Mr. Browne proposes is a very deli- 
cate one. These two great Greek dramatists stand in such an exalted 
position and so close to one another, both being near the extreme range 
of human genius, that probably not two hundred individuals who have 
ever Uved have exceeded them in eminence. ^ Therefore, compared 
with all men of all historical time, these two are almost merged in some- 
thing like a point at the extreme end of a line. It is like splitting and 
measuring the components of a binary star at a great distance. It 
would be no discredit to any objective method of differentiation if it 
failed to give interpretable conclusions. As it is, it turns out that the 
problem presented is just within the limits of historiometric discrimina- 
tion so that the figxires yield uniformity and repetition warranting real 
conclusions. 

I have extended Mr. Browne's list and have found confirmation of 
the statement that more space is devoted to Euripides than to Sopho- 
cles. This would leave the impression that Euripides is to-day frankly 
considered the greater of the two, which is not the impression that one 
gains by even a cursory reading of the printed matter so spaced. 
Fvu-thermore, I am informed by John Williams White, Professor of 
Greek, Emeritus in Harvard University, that for the last hundred 
years the general estimate of scholars has placed Sophocles above 
Euripides. This is precisely the conclusion which is obtained from the 
extraordinary character of some of the terras and sentences of eulogism 
which one finds applied to Sophocles. In these same authorities one 
never finds for Euripides anything like the following: "There has 
hardly been any poet whose works can be compared with those of 
Sophocles for the universality and durability of their moral significance 
... of all poets of antiquity Sophocles has penetrated most deeply 
into the recesses of the human heart" (M tiller and Donaldson). "He 
renders tragedy a perfect work of ideal art " (R. C. Jebb). Occasionally 
the direct comparison is made and then Euripides suffers ; for instance, 
as when Gilbert Murray says : — 

" No wonder Sophocles won four times as many prizes as Euripides. 
. . . Sophocles shows at times one high power which but few of the 
world's poets share with him ... in the second (Edipus there is a 
certain depth of calm feeling unfettered by any movement of mere 
intellect, which at times makes the subtlest and boldest work of 
Euripides seem 'young man's poetry' by comparison." 

It can be easily seen that this general impression can be checked up 
and is unfailingly expressed by each ratio of the adjectives of praise 

1 Cf. J. McK. Cattell, The Popular Science Monthly, February, 1903, p. 359. 



416 APPENDIX 

(pro) against those of dispraise (con). For every single authority 
consulted the answer is the same, — the proportionate ratio favors 
Sophocles.i 

The "space method " fails here to give a verdict agreeing with modern 
and ancient opinion probably for special reasons peculiar to the case. 
More plays of Euripides are extant and there is more to be said in the 
way of adverse or qualifying criticism. It is not to be denied that the 
interest in Euripides is, and always has been, intense, perhaps greater 
than in Sophocles, but the position of the latter is more majestic and 
more sublime. The lexicons alone would have given this conclusion 
in a few minutes' reading. All these facts, in connection with those 
taken from Lippincott's dictionary, indicate that the "adjective 
method" is a very delicate way of measuring small differences if for 
any reason it is desirable to do so. 

The questions here touched upon concern only the individuals, but 
I know from material as yet unpublished that the quantitative objec- 
tive method can be applied to events as well as to persons. If its 
validity for the study of individuals can be securely grounded, then its 
application to events will naturally follow and will be thereby the more 
easily and surely established. 

Space has permitted only a brief abstract, but I think that enough 
has been given to prove that researches of this nature furnish harmony 
and order, intertwine and mutually support each other, form an or- 
ganic structure, and are entitled to recognition among the exact sciences. 
It must be remembered that exactitude in science is a relative term. 
Abstract mathematics may be exact, but no science of physical meas- 
urement is really exact. Astronomy, which is usually thought of in 
this way, only gives an approach towards an ever expanding ideal. 
No two observers have ever quite agreed upon the latitude of the Green- 
wich observatory, and the last transit of Venus was, if I remember 
rightly, in comparison with the computed prediction, some eleven 
seconds off. All we ask is that the exactitude shall be sufficient for the 
practical needs of the problem in hand. 

I think it must be agreed that this first synthesis and coordination of 
isolated researches presents a very encouraging picture. It indeed 
gives proof that a workable instrument has been obtained capable 
not only of dealing with questions as intricate as human nature and its 
attributes, but actually at the same time demonstrating the essential 
validity of the historical data on which are based the percentile grades, 
ratios, correlations, or other superstructure. This latter conception 
is to me the most interesting side of the whole matter. It has usually 

1 In this part of the work I have had the assistance of Mr. A. A. Jenkins, of 
the Harvard Law School. 



APPENDIX 417 

been impossible to scientifically refute those critics who claim that the 
so-called facts of history are so uncertain and subject to so great an 
error and prejudice that it is unsafe to build conclusions upon them by 
statistical methods. They have not of course ever known that such 
was the case nor have they ever had any way of estimating how far 
the records of history, as they exist in standard works, encyclopaedias, 
and biographical dictionaries, actually deviate from the absolute truth. 
It has been assumed, on the other hand, by those who have been en- 
gaged in grading historical characters, that the records represent a 
fair approximation towards the ideal truth. The human record which 
we call history stands somewhere between two extremes, somewhere 
between the quagmire of complete falsehood and heights of perfect 
truth. It is possible as we go on to appreciate, with closer and closer 
accuracy, just what deviation from ideal truth any great set of histori- 
cal records contains. 

Such researches give promise of at last furnishing the long-sought 
correct method of penetrating the tangled and perplexing jungle known 
as philosophy of history. This domain of thought is to-day in poor 
esteem among those who, as historians of the modern school, seek in 
documentary sources to reconstruct the past around some central 
theme, some individual age or nation. No wonder these careful 
investigators have become disgusted with the a priori dogmatism, the 
partizan spirit, the free generalizations from half truths and the eter- 
nally conflicting conclusions. Historical philosophers, in their desire 
to explain everything at once, have been content to formulate theories, 
and then pick from the totality of history selected facts to support 
them. With methods highly subjective, and carrying a large personal 
equation they could not help but find exactly what they wished. The 
ways of inductive science may be slow at first, but even a small nucleus 
of collected and coordinated facts soon grows with astonisliing rapidity ; 
and every objectively established piece of work makes it, with acceler- 
ated speed, that much easier to progress along lines of certainty and 
exactitude. 

Frederick Adams Woods. 

masaachusetts institute op technology. 



2e 



INDEX 



Analysis of correlation tables, 245-279. 
Anthropo-geographical interpretation, 

20. 
Anthropology, measurements of, 16-36. 
Appendix, explanation of, 9. 
Aragon, bibliography, 318. 

correlation table, 241. 

grading, rulers and conditions, 324. 

summarized history, 77-80. 
Aristocracy of wealth, 280-304. 
Austria, bibliography, 372. 

correlation table, 243. 

grading, rulers and conditions, 373. 

summarized history, 161-177. 
Authorities, 7, 9, 25. 
Autonomic school, 20. 

Bias, vii, 22, 30, 275-276. 
Bibliography, for Aragon, 65. 

Austria, 161. 

Castile, 65. 

Denmark, 113. 

England, 196. 

France, 37. 

Netherlands, 91. 

Portugal, 87. 

Prussia, 151. 

Russia, 139. 

Scotland, 187. 

Sweden, 123. 

Turkey, 178. 

United Spain, 81. 
Bibliography of Historiometry, 404. 
Bodin, 17. 
Bossuet, 17. 
Bravery, 5. 

Breeder's view of history, 277 
Brilliancy, 5. 
Buckle, 16, 19. 

Castes, evolution of superior, 298-301. 
Castile, bibliography, 318. 

correlation table, 241. 

grading, rulers and conditions, 318. 

summarized history, 65-76. 



Causation, historical, 32, 33, 36, 280- 

303. 
Causes, their assignment, 32-35. 
Change in conditions are sudden after 

monarch's death, 277. 
Characteristics which win, 274. 
Chroniclers, 17, 276. 
Cities, share of leading men, 27. 
Civilization, its decline, 2. 

determinants, 16. *— 

early states of, 302. 
Coefficients, strain of, 24. 
Comparisons, systematic, 3. 
Complexity of history, 290. 
Comte, Aug., 18. 
Conditions, of Country, 5. 

of Rulers, 241. 

influence of, 247-249. 
Correlation, agreement of, 23-27. 

coefficient, 245. 

masking of, 11. 

of grading, 240. 

tables, 241-244. 
Countries studied, fourteen, 36. 
Courage, 5. 

Criticisms, mistaken, 25-26. 
Curve, showing distribution of in- 
tellectual qualities, 295. 

Decline of nations, 295. 
Denmark, bibliography, 348. 

correlation table, 242. 

grading, rulers and conditions, 348. 

summarized history, 113-122. 
Descendants, few left by inferior 

branches, 272. 
Deviation of correlations, 245. 
Differences, problems of, 290-294. 
Dogmatic opinion permissible, 15- 

36. 
Dogmatic statements, 34. 
Doubtful cases conceded, ix. 
Droysen, 19. 

Duration of royal leadership, 294. 
Dynastic factor, the, 2. 



419 



420 



INDEX 



Economic interpretation, 20. 
Eminent men, distribution of, 407-417. 
Encyclopsedias, 9, 407-417. 
England, bibliographj% 394. 

correlation table, 244. 

grading, rulers and conditions, 395. 

summarized history, 196-239. 
Epithets, characteristic, 8. 
Error, approximate, etc., 23, 35. 

constant, 275. 

in data, 23, 24. 

probable, 245. 

random, 275. 

sources of, 11, 12. 
Evolution, 15. 

False Bias, 275. 

Farnam, H. W., The Economic Utili- 
zation of History, 292. 
Flint, History of the Philosophy of 

History, 19. 
France, bibliography, 305. 
correlation table, 241. 
grading, rulers and conditions, 306. 
summarized history, 37-64. 

Galton, 21. 
Gametes, 277-278. 
Gametic causes, 257. 

a priori view, 271-275. 

inheritance, 269-270. 

interpretation of history, 277. 
Genealogical method, viii. 
General survey, 240-279. 
Genetic view, 15, 277-279. 
Genius, 259, 262, 274, 298. 
George William, a type, 281-289. 
Geographical interpretation, 20. 
Goodness, 5. 
Grading kings, 4-14. 

method, 24, 407-417. 

topics used, 10. 

weakness in, 24. 
Graphic curves to show class differences, 

280-304. 
Great Elector, the. 284-285. 
Great Man view of history, 280-304. 
Great men, importance as factors, 1-14. 
Guizot, 19. 

Hegel, 17. 
Heredity, viii, 23. 
Historians, disagreements of, 7. 
partisanship of, 15. 



Historiometry, an exact science, 407. 

central idea, 15-36. 

bibliography of, 404. 

philosophy of, vii-x, 1-14, 15. 
History, breeder's view of, 277. 

causation in, 280-303. 

complexity of, 290. 

errors of, x. 

gametic interpretation, 277. 

need of new interpretation, 1-14. 

philosophy of, 1-15. 

printed statements of, 3. 
Historical estimates rarely reversed, 

276. 
Hohenzollerns, 281-289. 

Ibn KhaldQn, 16. 

Ideological interpretation, 20. 

//; the postulation of, 287. 

Individualistic interpretation, 20. 

Influence of individual monarchs, 1-14. 

Inquiry, the limit of, 12. 

Insanity, 259, 264. 

Intellectual qualities, distribution, 295. 

curve of, 296. 

traits, 5. 
International marriage of rulers, 255. 
Interpretation of the results, 240. 
Interreigns, 253-255. 

KhaldQn, Ibn, 16. 
Kings, classification of, 4. 
Kulturgeschichte, 20. 

Leadership, duration of royal, 294. 
Lehr, P. E., Etudes sur I'histoire, etc., 

271. 
Liberty, political, 10. 
Lists, compilation of, 27, 28. 

Marriage of rulers, international, 255. 
Mathematical principles in grading, 24. 
Measurements, approximate nature of 

scientific, ix. 
Measurements of anthropology and 

psychology, 15-36. 
Mental, distribution, curve of, 297. 

superiority, 258-260. 

traits, 5. 
Method for collecting evidence, 1-14. 

its chief aim, 20. 

new one needed, 19. 

of differences, 292. 

threefold, 4. 



INDEX 



421 



Minorities, 13, 14. 

evidence from, 240-279. 
Monarchs, an international breed, 13. 
Montesquieu, 16, 17. 
Moral traits, 5. 

types, 269. 

Nations, the life of, determinants, 16. 
Natural selection, 273. 
Netherlands, bibliography, 340. 

correlation table, 242. 

grading, rulers and conditions, 341. 

summarized history, 91-112. 
Non-royal leaders, 13. 

Objective nature of the problem, 3. 
Objectivity and Induction, 35. 
Ottoman power, expansion of, 247-248. 

Parallelism between rulers and con- 
ditions, 240-279. 
Pedigrees, evidence from, 240-279. 
Percentage and correlation coefficient, 

245. 
Personal, characteristics, 274. 

equation, the, 32. 

influence of statesmen, 13. 
Personality, viii. 
Philosophers of history, their failure, 

15-36. 
Philosophy of historiometry and his- 
tory, 15. 
Political interpretation, 20. 
Portugal, bibliography, 332. 

correlation table, 242. 

grading, rulers and conditions, 333. 

summarized history, 87-90. 
Precocity of royalty, 258-259. 
Probability, degrees of, 291. 

measurement of, 287-288. 
Problem stated, 1-14. 
Prussia, as an example of causation, 
280-304. 

bibliography, 366. 

correlation table, 243. 

grading, rulers and conditions, 367. 

summarized history, 151-160. 
Psychic categories, arbitrary, 6. 
Psychology, measurements of, 15-36. 

Quantitative analysis, 21, 22. 

valuation, 20, 21. 
Quetlet, 21. 



Regencies, 13, 253-255. 
Results, interpretation of, 240. 
Richard III, 30. 
Rousseau, 17. 

Royalty, natural ability of, 240-279. 
Royalty and nobility, relative dif- 
ference between, 2. 

characteristics of, 258-266. 

compared with other classes, 257. 
Rulers and conditions, 240. 
Russia, bibliography, 358. 

correlation table, 243. 

grading, rulers and conditions, 359. 

summarized history, 139-150. 

Schlegel, F. von, 18. 
Scope of the work, 1-14. 
Scotland, bibliography, 388. 

correlation table, 244. 

grading, rulers and conditions, 388. 

summarized history, 187-195. 
Significance of Regencies and Minori- 
ties, 1-14. 
Sociological school, the, 20. 
Spain (United), bibliography, 318. 

correlation table, 241. 

grading, rulers and conditions, 318. 

summarized history, 81-86. 
Standard works, value of, 21. 
Struggle among scions of royal families, 

274. 
Stupidity, 5. 

Sultans, their maternal ancestry, 247. 
Survival of fittest, 272. 
Sweden, bibliography, 353. 

correlation table, 242. 

grading, rulers and conditions, 354. 

summarized history, 123-138. 

Table I. Ruler and Conditions, 241- 

244. 
Table II. Cases and Sequences, 250. 
Table III. Regencies, Minorities, and 

interreigns, 253. 
Tables of correlation, 241. 

cases and sequences, 250. 

conditions, 241-244. 

regencies, minorities, 253. 

rulers, 241, 266-268. 
Tabular columns employed, 5, 6. 
Tabulation, 241. 

method, 27-29. 

of cases, 250. 

politico-economic, 9-10. 



422 



INDEX 



Tabulation — Continued. 

political movement, vii. 

regencies, 253-255. 
Talents of royalty, 259-261. 
Territorial outlines, 12. 
Tests, quantitative, 3. 
Traits which win, 274. 
Turgot, 19. 
Turkey, bibliography, 382. 

correlation table, 243. 

grading, rulers and conditions, 383. 

summarized history, 178-186. 



Variations, 240. 

in rulers not caused by conditions, 
251. 
Vico, 17. 

Weak kings, weak periods, 289. 

Wickedness, 5. 

Woods, F. A. , Separating Heredity from 

Environment, 279. 
Laws of Diminishing Environmental 

Influences, 279. 

Younger sons of kings, 259. 



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